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THE    BOXER    REBELLION 

A  Political  and  Diplomatic  Review 


jjJU^j^-^ 


BY 

PAUL  H.  CLEMENTS,  A.  M. 

Sometime  Fellow  in  International  Law^  Columbia  University 

Lecturer  at  Columbia  on  Far  Eastern 

Politics  and  Diplomacy 


SUBMITTED   IN   PARTIAL   FULFILMENT   OF   THE   REQUIREMENTS 

FOR   THE   DEGREE   OF   DOCTOR    OF   PHILOSOPHY 

IN  THE 

Faculty  of  Political  Science 
Columbia  University 


NEW  YORK 
19IS 


;i]s77/ 


C!^ 


11 


MY  FATHER  AND  MOTHER 


327799 


PREFACE 

The  present  volume  comprises  an  examination  into  the 
causes  of  the  Box  RebeUion  and  its  international  complica- 
tions, and  a  discussion  of  the  Joint  Note  of  1900  and  the 
Peace  Protocol  of  1901,  whereby  relations  between  China 
and  the  world  were  again  established  on  an  amicable  basis. 

There  need  be  no  apology  for  contributing  an  additional 
work  to  the  literature  on  this  fascinating  period  of  history. 
When  the  circumstances  and  results  of  this  remarkable  ex- 
hibition of  wrath  against  the  outside  world  are  fully  con- 
sidered and  appreciated,  it  can  be  realized  how,  at  one  stroke, 
entirely  unforeseen  by  critics  of  the  day,  it  shook  China  out 
of  the  sleep  of  centuries,  revolutionized  the  history  and 
politics  of  a  race  possessing  great  inherent  possibilities,  and 
formed  the  background,  the  cause,  in  fact,  of  momentous 
events  which  are  taking  place  in  the  Far  East  to-day  and  the 
ultimate  trend  of  which  it  is  impossible  to  foretell.  As  the 
period  of  Chinese  history  under  discussion,  from  1895  to 
1902,  occupies  a  unique  place  in  international  politics  and 
diplomacy,  the  author  has  carefully  examined  as  source  the 
invaluable  British  "  Blue  Books  "  dealing  with  the  affairs  of 
China;  the  reports  and  correspondence  of  the  Department 
of  State  respecting  the  foreign  relations  of  the  United 
States,  as  well  as  numerous  treaties,  notes  and  declarations 
found  elsewhere. 

The  author  desires  to  acknowledge  the  invaluable  assist- 
ance of  Professor  John  Bassett  Moore,  who,  at  great  sacri- 
fice of  time,  went  over  the  entire  work  with  him;  and  to 
Professor  Edwin  R.  A.  Seligman  for  his  instruction  and 
419]  7 


8  PREFACE  [420 

advice  in  preparing  the  volume  for  the  press.  Acknowledg- 
ment is  also  due  to  Professors  Ellery  C.  Stowell,  Friedrich 
Hirth,  and  James  Harvey  Robinson  for  their  many  kindly 
criticisms  and  suggestions.  It  may  be  added  that  the  studies 
of  the  author  were  first  encouraged  and  directed  into  the 
Far  Eastern  field  by  his  friend,  Professor  Amos  S.  Hershey, 
of  Indiana  University.  P.  H.  C. 

Columbia  University  in  the  City  of  New  York,  July,  1915. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 


Causes  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion 

^  Meaning  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion 15 

-  China  and  the  world  in  past  history 16 

The  Manchu  conquest    ...  17 

China  and  Europe  in  the  XVIth  and  XVIIth  centuries 18 

Results  of  the  Opium  war 20 

-  Real  significance  of  the  Chino-Japanese  war 25 

Territorial  aggressions  of  the  Powers 26 

Restraining  influence  of  the  Hay  circular  note  of  September,  1899.  37 

Character  of  the  Emperor  Kuang  Hsu 40 

Dismissal  of  Weng  Tung-ho 42 

Kang  Yu-wei  as  Adviser 43 

First  reform  decree  of  June  11,  1898 44 

Further  decrees 46 

Decree  of  September  5 49 

The  Coup  d '  Etat 54 

Tzu  Hsi's  resumption  of  the  regency 56 

Reasons  for  failure  of  reform 56 

Indifference  of  Powers  to  *'  Palace  revolution  "        .    .  •   •   •  59 

Persecution  of  reformers    ...  60 

'V' Policy  of  Empress  Dowager 63 

Reception*to  wives  of  diplomats 66 

Health  of  Emperor 67 

V  Resumption  of  regency  by  Tzu  Hsi  a  vital  cause  of  the  Rebellion  .  69 

Other  immediate  causes 70 

The  missionary  question. 72 

XThe  outbreak  in  Shantung 76 

<Other  outbreaks    ....       82 

^Europe's  failure  to  appreciate  the  situation. 84 

421]  9 


lO  CONTENTS  [422 

PAGE 

PART  II 
The  International  Complications  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion 

Question  of  the  Kangsu  troops        89 

First  Legation  guards         93 

Second  Legation  guards 97 

Attitude  of  Chinese  Government  towards  the  Boxers. 100 

Imperial  decrees  concerning  Boxers.        .    ,. lOi 

Distinction  between  "  good  and  bad  "  s6cieties         108 

Instructions  to  Viceroys.           112 

Arrival  of  foreign  warships  at  Taku 113 

Dynastic  succession.    .   .               114 

Attitude  of  the  Yangtse  Viceroys 119 

Policy  of  United  States 125 

Bombardment  of  Taku 128 

A  state  of  war  existing  ? 130 

Seymour  expedition.        .       132 

Capture  of  Tientsin 134 

Second  Allied  army     135 

Capture  of  Peking 136 


PART  III 

The  Restoration  of  Order  and  the  Peace  Protocol  of 
September  7,  1901 

Letter  of  Emperor  of  China  to  President  McKinley 139 

Reply  of  the  President 140 

Letters  to  Europe  and  replies 142 

V  Li  Hung-chang  appointed  Commissioner 145 

His  proposed  armistice 147 

y  Prince  Ching  co-Plenipotentiary -. 151 

Their  credentials       .  152 

Renewal  of  punitive  expeditions      155 

Paotingfu 155 

Chuchow      157 

Situation  at  Shanghai.    . 158 

Proposed  resumption  of  hostilities '. 161 

'  Foreign  extensions  at  Tientsin 164 

*^  Attitude  of  the  United  States 167 

^  Occupation  of  Imperial  Palace  at  Peking 173 

Beginning  of  negotiations.  .    .    •    •    • 175 

The  German  proposal  for  punishment 17c 

Replies  of  the  Powers i'^6 


423]                                        CONTENTS  II 

PAGE 

Edict  of  September  25  inadequate 180 

The  French  proposals ...  184 

t/  Acceptance  by  the  Powers 185 

Bases  of  negotiations      ...           187 

The  Joint  Note 189 

Elaboration  by  Diplomatic  Body  at  Peking 193 

Further  Imperial  decrees 199 

Final  Protocol  of  September  7,  1901 203 

APPENDIX 

I.   The  Joint  Note 207 

II.  Reply  of  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries  to  Joint  Note  ...  211 

III.  Final  Protocol  of  September  7,  1901 213 

Bibliography 223 

Index 235 


PART  I 
CAUSES  OF  THE  BOXER  REBELLION 


V 


I 


PART  I 
Causes  of  the  Rebellion 

Meaning  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion — China  and  the  World  in  Past  History 
— The  Manchu  Conquest — China  and  Europe  in  the  XVIth  and 
XVIIth  Centuries — Results  of  the  Opium  War— nReal  Significance  of 
the  Chino-Japanese  War — Territorial  Aggressions  of  the  Powers — 
Restraining  Influence  of  the  Hay  Circular  Note  of  September,  1899 
— ^Character  of  the  Emperor  Kuang  Hsu — Dismissal  of  Weng  Tung- 
ho — Kang  Yu-wei  as  Adviser — First  Reform  Decree  of  June  11, 
1898 — Further  Decrees — Decree  of  September  5 — The  Coup  d'Etat — 
Tzu  Hsi's  Resumption  of  the  Regency  —  Reasons  for  Failure  of 
Reform— Indifference  of  Powers  to  "  Palace  Revolution " — Perse- 
cution of  Reformers — Policy  of  Empress  Dowager — Reception  to 
Wives  of  Diplomats — Health  of  Emperor — ^Resumption  of  Regency 
by  Tzu  Hsi  a  Vital  Cause  of  the  Rebellion — Other  Immediate 
Causes — The  Missionary  Question — The  Outbreak  in  Shantung — 
Other  Outbreaks — Europe's  Failure  to  Appreciate  the  Situation. 

The  Boxer  Rebellion  may  be  regarded  as  the  culmination 
of  misunderstandings  between  China  and  the  Powers  in 
every  phase  of  international  activity.  It  was  the  last,  the 
supreme,  the  most  desperate  effort  of  all  to  keep  the  Middle 
Kingdom  riveted  to  the  standards  of  antiquity,  and  its  fail- 
ure, complete  in  every  respect,  even  from  the  viewpoint  of 
the  Chinese  themselves,  made  possible  and  inevitable  the 
China  of  to-day. 

A  detailed  examination  of  the  causes,  immediate  and  re- 
mote, of  this  final  protest  against  western  civilization  would 
demand  an  exhaustive  review  of  Chinese  institutions,  char- 
acter and  customs  entirely  beyond  the  scope  of  this  volume, 
an  examination  leading  back  at  least  to  the  days  of  Con- 
fucius. A  brief  outline,  however,  may  be  given  in  passing, 
427]  15 


1 6  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [428 

showing  how  contributory  events,  one  piled  upon  the  other, 
at  last  brought  about  this  racial  cataclysm,  with  conse- 
quences so  momentous  and  far-reaching  that  they  could  not 
be  understood  at  the  time,  much  less  fully  appreciated.  In 
effect,  the  Boxer  Rebellion,  through  the  very  completeness 
and  humiliation  of  its  failure,  made  possible  the  future  posi- 
tion of  China  as  a  real  member  of  the  sisterhood  of  na- 
tions ^  this,  however,  at  a  heart-breaking  cost,  involving  a 
shock  to  the  national  consciousness  such  as  stands  without 
parallel  in  history. 

The  Qiinese  had  not  always  been  isolated  from  the  rest 
of  mankind.  Before  the  Manchu  conquest  in  the  XVIIth 
century  there  had  been  quite  an  extensive  though  spas- 
modic commercial  intercourse  with  the  west  and  a  slight 
acquaintance  with  western  culture.  The  products  of  China 
had  been  interchanged  with  those  of  the  Roman  Empire; 
Chinese  engineers  had  been  employed  on  the  construction 
of  public  works  in  Persia;  Buddhism  had  been  introduced 
from  India ;  a  Chinese  army  had  penetrated  as  far  west  as 
the  Caspian  region;  Marco  Polo  and  his  two  uncles  had 
found  a  flattering  welcome;  the  Jesuits  had  flourished  at 
Peking;  the  Nestorian  Tablet  had  been  erected,  a  mute  re- 
minder to-day  of  what  the  current  of  history  might  have 
been;  and  the  first  embassies  from  Europe  had  been  gra- 
ciously received,  provided  they  kowtowed.  By  such  means 
a  healthy  curiosity  toward  the  outside  world  had  been  occa- 
sionally stimulated.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Chinese 
had  already  developed  to  a  great  extent  that  exclusiveness 
characteristic  of  them  up  to  the  close  of  the  last  century. 
Nor  is  this  to  be  wondered  at,  for  such  was  the  inevitable 
resultant  of  their  past  history,  national  ideals  and  environ- 
ment. 

Surrounded  by  tribes  in  a  savage  or  semi-civilized  state, 
which  were  greatly  inferior  from  every  point  of  view,  it  is 


/ 


429]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  1 7 

not  surprising  that  the  Chinese  should  have  looked  upon 
these  as  barbarians,  fitly  to  be  designated  by  the  radical 
for  dog.  Furthermore,  a  vast  expanse  of  desert  and  moun- 
tain and  sea  made  intercourse  with  the  advanced  parts  of 
the  world  extremely  hazardous  and  uncertain,  all  the  more 
so  when  the  favorite  land  routes  were  cut  off  by  the  fall  of 
Constantinople  and  the  ascendancy  of  the  Seljuk  Turks  in 
western  Asia.  Moreover,  the  occasional  exchanges  of 
goods  and  ideas  with  European  nations  had  been  too  small 
in  volume  appreciably  to  affect  the  Chinese  race  or  to  in- 
fluence its  development.  Yet  these  little  beginnings,  if  care- 
fully fostered,  might  have  led  to  greater  things,  and  such 
undoubtedly  would  have  been  the  case  had  it  not  been  for 
the  rigid  policy  of  seclusion  adopted  by  the  alien  Manchu 
monarchs,  the  greatest  misfortune,  considering  that  age  of 
world  expansion,  which  China  could  have  suffered.  Al- 
though in  this  the  Manchus  only  copied  the  preceding  Ming 
d3^nasty,  yet  the  XVI Ith  century  was  not  the  century  for 
the  continuance  of  such  a  state  policy,  and  therein  lay  the 
evil,  to  be  accentuated  all  the  more  in  the  years  to  come. 

The  Manchurian  conquerors  of  one  of  the  most  favored 
regions  of  the  globe  were  not  slow  in  realizing  that,  being 
relatively  few  in  numbers,  it  was  to  their  interest,  as  over- 
lords of  an  intelligent  and  law-abiding  though  passive  race 
constituting  one-fourth  of  the  human  family,  to  close  all 
avenues  of  approach  from  outside,  to  interdict  all  efforts 
at  change,  to  seal  the  cotmtry  so  that  a  repetition  of  their 
own  exploit,  or  disaffection  with  their  own  rule  resulting 
from  outside  influences,  would  be  impossible.  In  other 
words,  it  was  the  policy  of  the  Manchu  monarchs  to  keep  the 
ideas  of  the  country  as  they  found  them,  in  statu  quo,  and 
to  prevent  any  expansion  of  these  ideas  either  from  without 
or  from  within.  *"  Thus  the  innate  conservatism  of  the 
Chinese  was  immeasurably  increased,  thus  antiquity  was 


\ 


1 8  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [430 

lauded  as  the  only  period  of  Chinese  history  worth  while, 
thus  the  sages  were  exalted  as  the  teachers  of  wisdom  such 
as  had  never  been  heard  since  and  never  would  be  heard 
again  by  mortal  man.  Thus  a  careful  watch  was  kept  on  all 
the  frontiers;  intercourse  with  Europe  was  practically  pro- 
hibited, and  humiliating  concessions  were  demanded  of  the 
few  embassies  and  traders  who  braved  the  discouraging 
conditions  of  entry.  Thus  by  degrees  the  inherent  pre- 
judices of  the  Chinese  were  encouraged,  generation  after 
generation,  through  a  monotonous  repetition  of  this  dead- 
ening policy,  all  the  more  successful  as  it  emanated  from 
the  "  Son  of  Heaven  ",  until  was  reached  that  stage  of  over- 
weening national  conceit  and  that  dense,  impenetrable  ignor- 
ance of  the  outside  world,  unmoved  by  reason  or  fact  or 
experience,  which  may  be  described  as  the  antithesis  of 
western  progress  and  enlightenment. 

Nor  was  the  renewed  contact  with  Europeans,  from  the 
XVIth  century  onward,  at  all  likely  to  change  the  precon- 
ceived opinions  of  them  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese.  In- 
stead of  being  advance  agents  of  a  higher,  or  at  least  a  more 
universal  civilization,  the  early  representatives  from  the 
Occident  could  not  have  been  better  chosen  to  harden  in  the 
Chinese  mind  all  of  the  previous  mistaken  impressions. 
First  in  1506  arrived  the  "  Falanki  "  (Franks)  at  Canton, 
"  and  by  their  tremendously  loud  guns  shook  the  place  far 
and  near  ".  About  contemporaneously  with  these  maraud- 
ers came  the  Hollanders,  who  ^'  inhabited  a  wild  territory  ", 
whose  ''  feet  were  one  cubit  and  two-tenths  long ",  and 
whose  "  strange  appearance  frightened  the  people  ".^  Next 
arrived  the  Portuguese  in  15 16,  to  ruin  by  their  execra'ole 
conduct  what  promised  to  be  a  fair  beginning.  A  like  series 
of  disreputable  acts  brought  failure  to  the  Spaniards,  whose 

1  From  a  Chinese  account,  quoted  by  Douglas,  Europe  and  the  Far 
East  (Cambridge,  1904;  rev.  ed.,  New  York,  1913),  p.  10. 


43 1 ]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  19 

outrages  resulted  in  swift  retaliation,  twenty- three  of  their 
embassy  suffering  the  "  lingering  death  ".  With  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Russian  missions  of  1689  and  after,  and  the 
British  in  1793  and  18 16,  these  determined  efforts  of 
Europe,  exerted  primarily,  so  it  seemed,  not  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  friendly  relations  with  China  but  for  selfish 
purposes  of  gain  by  fair  means  or  foul,  were  those  of 
"  pirates  rather  than  peaceably  disposed  men ",  whose 
methods  of  dealing  with  the  Chinese,  directly  opposite  to 
what  they  should  have  been,  "  went  far  to  justify  the 
Chinese  Government  in  its  policy  of  rigid  seclusion  from  all 
associations  with  Europeans  "/  Either,  like  the  Dutch  mis- 
sion of  1656,  they  groveled  for  favors  contemptuously 
doled  out  to  them,^  or  they  appeared  in  the  faintly  concealed 
guise  of  punitive  expeditions,  harrying  the  coast  and  com- 
mitting every  act  of  brigandage  and  uncivilized  warfare, 
such  as  burning,  killing,  rapine  and  robbery,  upon  the  de- 
fenceless inhabitants.  That  atavistic  modes  of  thought  were 
indelibly  fixed  in  the  minds  of  the  Chinese  by  such  a  course 
of  action  on  the  part  of  European  governments  and  people 
is  not  strange.  Neither  can  the  Chinese  be  blamed  for 
condemning  the  whole  world  alike,  for  by  these  examples, 
each  almost  a  repetition  of  the  other,  they  were  forced  to 
place  all  nations  in  the  same  category.  Thus,  primarily 
the  fault  of  Europe,  all  efforts  to  establish  commercial  rela- 
tions with  China  proved  futile  until  the  country  was  par-  ^ 
tially  opened  by  England  in  1840,  through  the  agency  of 
the  Opium  war.^ 

^  Holcomb,  China's  Past  and  Future  (London,  — ) ,  p.  108. 

'  For  like  Dutch  experiences  in  Japan  and  at  the  Deshima  "  factory," 
see  Foster,  American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient  (Boston,  1903),  pp.  12-16. 

'  For  original  sources  on  the  early  embassies  preceding  the  Opium 
war,  see  Johan  Nieuhof,  L'Amhassade  de  la  Compagnie  Orientate  des 
Provinces  Unis  vers  I'Empereur  de  la  Chine  .  .  .  fait  par  P.  de  Goyer 


20  '^'///•"  I^OXER  REBELLION  [432 

Whatever  may  he  said  of  the  niorahty  of  Eng^land's  act 
in  waging  this  particular  war,  the  fact  remains  that  by  such 
means,  after  diplomacy  had  completely  failed/  China  was 
at  last  forced  into  definite  trade  relations  with  the  world, 
and  that,  through  the  sacrifice  of  British  blood  and  treasure, 
other  nations  were  enabled  equally  to  participate  in  the  ad- 
vantages thus  wrung  from  China.     The  Chinese,  totally 

it  Jac  de  Keyser,  trans,  into  Krencli  by  J.  clc  Carpentier  (London,  1665), 
and  an  English  trans,  by  Jolm  Ogilhy  (2d  ed.,  London,  1673) ;  Adam 
Brand,  Journal  of  the  Embassy  from  Muscovy  into  China,  i6(^3-95> 
trans,  from  High-Dutch  by  W.  II.  Lndolf  (lx>ndon,  1698)  ;  E.  Y.  Ides, 
From  Moscow  Overland  to  China  (London,  1706)  ;  vEneas  Anderson, 
A  Narrative  of  the  British  Embassy  to  China  in  the  Years  179^,  i793 
and  1^94  (London,  1795)  ;  Houckgcest  A.  E.  van  Braam,  Authentic 
Account  of  the  Embassy  of  the  Dutch  East  India  Company  to  China, 
1794-95,  trans,  from  the  French  of  L.  E.  Moreau  de  Saint- Mery,  2  vol. 
(London,  1798)  ;  Sir.  G.  L.  Staunton,  Authentic  Account  of  the  Em- 
bassy to  the  Emperor  of  China,  undertaken  by  Order  of  the  King  of 
Great  Britain  .  .  .  taken  principally  from  the  Papers  of  Earl  Macartney 
(London,  1797)  ;  Henry  Ellis,  Journal  of  the  Late  Embassy  to  China 
{Amherst  Mission),  2  vol.  (London,  1818)  ;  George  Timkowski, 
Travels  of  the  Russian  Mission  through  Mongolia  to  China  and  Resi- 
dence  in  Peking  in  the  Years  1S20,  1821,  trans,  into  English  by  H.  E. 
Lloyd,  2  vol.  (London,  1827) ;  Edmund  'Roberts,  Embassy  to  the  East- 
em  Courts  of  Cochin-China,  Siam  and  Muscat,  in  the  U.  S.  Sloop-of- 
War  Peacock,  18$^- 34  (New  York,  1837).  See- also  Mrs.  Helen  Hen- 
rietta Robbins,  Our  First  Ambassador  to  China,  an  Account  of  the 
Life  of  George,  Earl  of  Mac^tney.  icith  Extracts  from  his  Letters,  and 
the  Narrative  of  his  Experiences,  as  told  by  himself  (London,  1908). 
Other  accounts  of  early  embassies  and  dealings  with  China  are 
found  in  Sir  John  Davis,  The  Chinese  (New  York,  1857);  A.  Delano, 
Narrative  of  Voyages  (Boston,  1857) ;  Sir  Robert  K.  Douglas,  Europe 
and  the  Far  East;  John  W.  Foster,  American  Diplopnacy  in  the  Orient; 
Charles  GutzlafT,  History  of  China,  2  vol.  (New  York.  1834):  Walter 
A.  P.  Martin,  Cycle  of  Cathay  (New  York,  n)ob)  ;  S.  Wells  Williams, 
The  Middle  Kingdom,  2  vol.,  rev.  ed.  (New  York,  1907). 

*  The  imposing  embassy  under  Lord  Napier  in  1834  was  the  last 
diplomatic  efVort  of  Great  Britain  before  the  Opium  war  to  arrive  at  a 
peaceful  understanding  with  the  Peking  Court.  With  its  f.nilure  Great 
Britain  resorted  to  military  force  as  the  last  argument. 


433]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELUON  21 

defeated,  and  unable  further  to  stem  the  advance  of  inter- 
natioyjd  relations  and  commerce,  concluded  peace  with 
Great  Britain  under  heavy  penalties/  and  later  extended  like 
privileges  of  trade  to  the  United  States  and  France.* 

I  By  the  ln.il\  .il  X.iiikim'.  \iir,ir,(  lo.  i-'r,  i  .  mi.  Iii.lni;'  llu-  (  ^piiutv 
war,  Chui.i  .ir.icr,!  l,.  ..iumi  in.-  iumI'.  (>.  l.u>i'Mi  li.i,lc,  llic.r  li\r  .niiMiial 
"treaty  poil:.  '"  lu-nn-  (  .mi, mi,  \in.>\,  !• ,  x  ..  I  u  >\\  .  \m;'i.,.  .iiul  .Mi.iii"!  i.ii. 
In  addition  llu-  i.sl.nul  ol  IUmh^  K.mii-  w  ,is  i  iiU-il  m  pi-i  piMiuly  ami  a 
war  indctunity  of  Jfji.cxxuxK)  p.n.l  l.\  (  hm a,  which  included  within  tliat 
sum  the  damages  for  British  ..|Miim  .K  .(i..\.-,I  .\\  ('.midn  in  iS^g  hy  the 
famous   Commissioner    l.in.      A    iiiMil.ii    i.iuii    w.i.   (    i.iMi  .lu-.l,   and   it 

was  aiMccl  thai  hciirclOi  111  all  .hpU'iinln  ml  n  .  ,  uii -.r  jiriwrcil  (he  tWO 
nations   w.is   1(1   lie   iiMi.liuicd   on   a   li.i.f.  ol    al'',,.|iih-  (■.|iialil\\ 

^  Tlie     Unit^'il     Sl.ilc,     ua'.     I.Mlmi.ilr     in     ■..•(iiimr,     |m.>1i.iM\      (lie     most 

expert  man  in  AinciKa  loi  ilu;.r  lU'.'oiiaii.'ii-.,  (  aid.  i  u'.lmiK,.  .i  ;.nc- 
ccssful  hiwyer,  later  Attorney-(uMi.  i  al  (hi'.  ..|imi..ii',  wluK-  oianpying' 
that  office  still  being  quoted  .-is  anih..Mi\,  cNp..  i.iiu  .c,  1.-..11.I,  .  .up.nl-.), 
a  skilled  diplomat  and  a  brilhanl  pn  s..ii.ilil\  na.liU  .i.l.ipi.il.l.-  1..  ihc5 
intricacies  of  dealing'  with  ili.-  ihi.ni.il  mind.  .\  .  .1  1.  uli  ..i  his/ 
talents,  the  American  {vc:\\\  ...in.mu.l  sixteen  mon-  piovisn.ns  than 
the  British  treaty  oi  iw,.  \r.ii-.  pi.-\i,.ii..  .ml  .iP...  ,1  i.n  clearer  embodi- 
ment of  th<>  primapic  nl   c.vtia  U'l  i  ilmi.il  ii  \ 

It  sr.iii'.  (jMiir  iiic  fashion  with  •..um-  wiiuas,  when  comparing 
Cuslnng's  iicaty  ol  VVang-hia  with  the  lie.ily  "I  Nanking,  to  disparage 
the  latter  and  unduly  praise  the  former.  In  lin;  i.p.ard  it  must  b© 
remcmhered  that  luigland  was  dealinp,  uiih  a  .KU.ii.  .1  enemy  granting 
concessions  only  at  the  sword's  poini  ,  m..n.i\ti,  ha. I  it  not  been  for 
ilCngland's  successful  conduct  of  the  war,  lushiiD.' .  (m  sion  in  all 
prohahility  would  have  been  a  total  faihu'e. 

For  President  Tyler's  comprehensive  report  on  affairs  with  the  Far 
'Fast  at  this  time,  which  report  was  written  by  Wchsicr  in  his  capacity 
as  Secretary  of  State,  see  Richardson,  Messaurs  ami  l^apers  of  the 
Presidents,  10  vol.  (Washington,  1896),  vol  j,  p|i  1  ;  14.  I'or  the  act 
of  Congress  of  March  3,   1842,  appropriaim      j.|. ......   lor  the  purpose 

of    establishing    ConmKaci.il     icliili.ai'.     Ih'|\\(.ii     (   lim.i      iml     the     I'Milcd 

States  on  a  treaty  h.i.is,  .<■.•  ,  / '.  ,s.  ,'w.i/.,  (k'i.  |..lm  i;.i  •..•11  M.M.ie, 
//  Difjest  of  lutanational  Imxv,  H  vol.  ( VVa  .limcion,  i(jn<.),  vol.  5, 
p.  416.  The  full  text  of  Webster's  instructions  lo  (  n  limi'  1  foimd 
in  Webster's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  467,  and  in  part  in  M...,i.  I'l./.-.st,  vol. 
5,  pp.  416,  417. 

Tyler's  unique  letter  to  the  Emperor  of  China  is  given  in  Foster, 
o/>.  (it.,  p.  H.>,  and  in  United  States  28th  Congress,  2d  Session,  Senate 


22  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [434 

The  Opium  war  begins  a  new  epoch  in  the  relations  of 
China  with  the  Powers,  a  period  which  may  roughly  be  esti- 
mated as  extending  from  1840  to  1895,  marked  on  one  side 
by  the  unreasoning  hostility  of  China  to  everything  foreign 
and  on  the  other  side  by  constant  aggressions  of  Europe, 
these  aggressions,  however,  still  tempered  by  a  belief  in  and 
respect  for  China's  latent  military  power  and  the  prestige 
naturally  accorded  to  so  vast  an  empire. 

But  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that,  through  the  defeats 
of  a  single  war,  China  would  or  even  could  have  reversed 
the  policy  and  habits  of  centuries.  In  fact,  there  was  little 
to  show  at  the  time  that  the  war  of  1840  had  resulted  in  any 
material  or  moral  benefit.  The  opening  of  the  treaty  ports 
was  delayed,  on  the  ground  that  they  were  "  unsafe  "  for 
foreigners,  and  the  same  offensive  tactics  and  thousand 
petty  exactions  were  religiously  adhered  to  by  China  as 
before  the  first  international  conflict.  Only  in  the  payment 
of  the  indemnity  to  England  did  China  act  with  any  degree 
of  celerity,  and  then  for  the  sole  purpose  of  ridding  certain 
Chinese  territories  of  British  troops,  who  were  quartered 
^  upon  the  land  until  such  payment  was  forthcoming.  Gov- 
ernment and  people  were  united  in  the  common  cause  of 
f^  opposition  to  all  demands  of  the  foreign  Powers.  The 
Peking  Court,  following  the  customary  practice  of  Oriental 
nations,  pursued  a  policy  of  masterly  inactivity  coupled 
with  a  contemptuous  disregard  for  treaty  stipulations,  al- 
though it  must  be  admitted  that  China  was  as  yet  unac- 
quainted with  international  law  and  the  binding  qualities  of 

Documents,  no.  139.  Another  version,  slightly  differing  in  detail,  is 
found  in  Williams'  Middle  Kingdom,  vol.  2,  pp.  565,  566,  Says  Wil- 
liams concerning  this  letteY,  op.  cit.,  p.  565 :  "  Caleb  Cushing  .  .  . 
"brought  a  letter  .  .  .  which  is  inserted  in  full  as  an  instance  of  the 
singular  mixture  of  patronizing  and  deprecatory  address  then  deemed 
suitable  for  the  Grand  Khan  by  western  nations." 


435]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  23 

formal  agreements.  Especially  was  China  unacquainted 
with  agreements  imposed  through  the  agency  of  force. 
The  great  Taiping  Rebellion,  inspired  by  the  disappointed  ~ 
scholar  Hung  Sui-tsuen,  who  had  failed  in  his  attempts  at 
advance  standing  among  the  literati,  furnished  another  ele- 
ment of  uncertainty  and  disorder.^  Trade  was  paralyzed, 
merchants  complained ;  all  was  confusion.  It  was  plain  that 
further  corrective  punishment  was  necessary,  and  this  finally 
came  in  1857,  indirectly  through  the  accumulation  of  griev- 
ances and  abuses  ever  since  1842,  directly  on  account  of 
the  indignity  to  the  supposedly  British  lorcha  "Arrow  ". 

France  and  Great  Britain  joined  forces  in  the  sharp  and 
decisive  struggle  which  followed.  It  was  soon  over,  but 
again  China  misjudged  the  trend  of  international  events. 
A  supplementary  punitive  expedition  in  i860,  as  the  last 
argument  of  the  exasperated  Allies,  struck  at  the  very  heart 
of  the  Chinese  Government,  burned  the  Summer  Palace, 
drove  the  Court  into  hasty  flight,  and  by  these  drastic  meas- 
ures gained  that  final  step  in  diplomacy  for  which  Europe 
had  been  laboring  for  centuries,  namely,  representation  at. 
Peking  and  recognition  of  equality.  * 

A  period  of  comparative  international  tranquility  fol- 
lowed, one  phase  of  which  was  the  unique  Burlingame  mis- 
sion in  1868  to  the  United  States  and  Europe.^  It  seemed 
that  China  at  last  understood  the  impossibility  of  keeping 
foreigners  out  of  the  Middle  Kingdom,  and  that  the  attempt 

1  The  Taiping  IRebellion  is  interesting  from  an  international  point  of 
view  as  several  times  Europe  was  on  the  verge  of  recognizing  the 
rebels.  But  sympathy  for  the  movement  soon  changed  to  disgust  at 
the  lawless  character  and  impossible  claims  of  the  revolutionary  gov- 
ernment, which  finally  collapsed  through  the  victories  of  the  Imperial 
troops  led  by  Generals  Ward  and  Gordon. 

2  For  a  sympathetic  treatment  of  Burlingame  and  his  career,  see 
F.  W.  Williams,  Anson  Burlingame  and  the  First  Chinese  Mission  to 
Foreign  Powers  (New  York,  1912). 


24  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [436 

to  refuse  all  diplomatic  and  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  rest  of  the  world  could  be  henceforth  hardly  more  than 
a  Utopian  dream,  a  condition  of  the  past  never  again  to  be 
realized.  Therefore  to  all  outward  appearances  China 
made  the  best  of  the  unwelcome  situation  and,  barring  a 
desultory  war  with  France  over  Tongking  in  1885,  re- 
/  mained  on  fairly  good  terms  with  the  rest  of  mankind 
until  1894-95. 

Nevertheless,  the  outbreak  at  the  close  of  the  last  century 
revealed  conclusively  that  ever  since  1842,  though  outwardly 
acquiescent,  China  never  forgave  nor  forgot,  and  that  when 
the  supreme  moment  should  come,  as  it  was  judged  to  have 
come  in  1900,  in  it  would  be  expressed  to  the  fullest  meas- 
ure the  ''  concentrated  wrath  and  hate  of  sixty  years  "/ 
Defeated  with  monotonous  regularity  by  Europe,  forced  at 
the  cannon's  mouth  to  conform  to  a  mass  of  new  and  be- 
wildering and  in  their  eyes  onerous  treaty  stipulations,  none 
of  which  they  desired,  at  no  time  had  the  Chinese  met  the 
Powers  in  a  mutuality  of  interests.  The  Burlingame  peace 
mission  was  an  episode  in  itself,  inspired  by  the  idealism  of 
one  man,  and  may  be  regarded  as  entirely  detached  from  the 
general  current  of  Chinese  politics.  Though  gifted  with  a 
vision  of  the  future,  Burlingame  was  fifty  years  ahead  of 
his  time,  and  his  ideas  regarding  China's  relations  with  the 
rest  of  the  world  were  impossible  of  realization  in  his  day 
as  each  country  had  to  learn  by  bitter  experience  the  les- 
sons which  culminated  in  the  establishment  of  the  Far  East- 
ern Republic. 

A  further  fact  to  be  noted  is,  that  by  successfully  weather- 
ing the  great  Taiping  Rebellion,  the  Manchu  monarchy 
gained  a  new  lease  on  life,  and,  gradually  increasing  in 
power,  by  1895  seemed  strong  enough  to  last  indefinitely. 

1  Holcomb,  Outlook,  1904,  P-  407. 


437]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  25 

Consistent  in  its  opposition  to  the  foreigner  and  foreign     1 
relations,  with  the  exception  of  the  first  two  emperors  of      \^ 
the  dynasty,  this  recovery  of  power  in  the  monarchy  meant     _\  _ 
that  the  poHcy  of  closing  the  country  would  become  stronger 
than  ever,  coupled  as  it  was  with  the  instincts  of  self-pres- 
ervation; and  that,  once  sure  of  its  ground,  the  Peking 
Court  would  not  hesitate  to  throw  down  the  gauntlet  to 
united  Europe  if  necessary.     It  was  the  war  with  Japan 
that  brought  matters  to  a  climax,  revealed  China's  rotten- 
ness to  the  world,  struck  a  blow  at  royalty  comparable  only 
to  the  disasters  of  i860,  and  hastened  the  inevitable  conflict 
with  the  Powers,  a  struggle  which,  considering  all  events, 
was  bound  to  come  sooner  or  later,  and  the  surprise  was 
that  it  so  soon  followed  the  humiliation  of  1895. 

Contrary  to  the  general  impression,  the  Chino- Japanese 
war  cannot  be  called  a  national  conflict  in  so  far  as  China 
was  concerned.  Strictly  speaking,  it  was  regarded  as  an 
affair  of  the  Manchu  regime;  its  disasters  were  their  dis- 
asters, its  mistakes  their  mistakes.  Also,  the  war  was  prin- 
cipally fought  in  a  region  foreign  to  the  "  Eighteen  Prov- 
inces ",  the  invading  Japanese  for  the  most  part  entering, 
not  China  proper,  but  the  dependency  of  Manchuria,  the 
ancestral  home  of  the  reigning  dynasty,  and  which  the  latter 
alone  in  duty  were  bound  to  defend.  Therefore  the  Chinese 
considered  themselves  removed  from  all  responsibility,  and 
persisted  in  viewing  the  conflict  as  an  incident  of  the 
Manchu  foreign  policy  of  no  intimate  concern  to  any  but 
the  Manchus.  A  like  analogy  to  this  somewhat  curious  rea- 
soning was  revealed  a  decade  later  when  the  Russian  bu- 
reaucracy, not  the  Russian  people,  was  supposed  to  have 
engaged  Japan  in  this  identical  region.  Of  course,  had  both 
wars  been  successful  instead  of  dismal  failures,  the  train  of 
reasoning  in  both  instances  would  have  been  precisely  the 
opposite  in  the  case  of  all  those  affected.     Thus  the  appar- 


\ 


26  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [438 

ent  lack  of  patriotism  in  both  countries  is  afforded  an  easy 
and  convenient  explanation,  as  an  unfortunate  situation  in 
which  the  governments  were  involved,  but  not  the  people. 
Granting  the  above  weak  argument,  why  should  the  Chinese 
have  cared  much  about  the  unexpected  turn  of  events  ?  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  mass  of  them  did  not  care ;  they  remained 
indifferent,  aloof,  almost  neutral,  one  might  say.  It  was 
not  the  war  itself  which  in  the  main  contributed  to  the  cy- 
clonic frenzy  of  a  few  years  later.  It  was  the  consequences 
of  that  war,  the  revelation  of  the  weakness  of  China  to  the 
world,  the  fastening  of  the  stupendous  indemnity,  by  which 
Japan  realized  a  hundred  per  cent  profit,  upon  the  people  at 
large,  who  thus  had  to  pay  a  heavy  price  for  Manchu  folly ; 
and,  above  all,  the  territorial  loot  of  the  Empire  by  Europe 
following  the  intervention  at  Chefoo.  These  staggering  re- 
sults in  turn  were  among  the  causes  of  the  catastrophe  of 
1 1900. 

In  order  fully  to  understand  the  position  of  the  European 
♦  Powers  in  regard  to  the  Far  East  at  the  time  of  the  Boxer 
Rebellion,  it  will  be  necessary  to  sketch  their  territorial  ag- 
gressions in  China  during  the  years  immediately  preceding 
the  conflict.  Of  all  immediate  causes  of  this  last  upheaval 
\oi  China  against  the  Occident,  these  aggressions  were  the 
most  important  factor.  Had  they  never  occurred,  it  is 
doubtful  whether  there  would  have  been  a  rebellion.  _To 
Europe's  land-greed  this  sorry  page  of  history  is  primarily 
due;  and  more  than  that,  furnished  the  example  and  ex- 
cuse for  a  series  of  recent  events  so  effectively  limiting 
China's  sovereignty  and  integrity  that  even  to-day  the  ulti- 
mate consequences  cannot  be  foreseen. 

After  the  intervention  of  Russia,  France  and  Germany 
at  Chefoo  in  1895  on  China's  behalf,  for  which  China  well 
knew  there  would  be  a  heavy  reckoning  in  the  near  future, 
Russia  was  the  first  to  show  her  hand.     This,  however,  was 


439]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  27 

done  in  a  friendly  manner  and  with  perfect  diplomacy, 
through  the  floating  of  a  4  percent  loan  of  400,000,000 
francs  at  94 J^  payable  in  thirty-six  years,  without  security, 
the  Czar  himself  guaranteeing  the  interest  by  royal  ukase. ^ 
This  unexampled  generosity  enabled  China  to  liquidate  half 
the  war  indemnity  to  Japan.  The  next  step  of  Russia  was 
to  "  facilitate  the  execution  of  the  loan  ",  which  was  the 
ostensible  purpose  of  founding  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank 
with  its  thirty  branches  throughout  Siberia  and  the  Far 
East.^  The  bank  proved  of  immense  service  to  Russia  as 
it  was  a  desirable  and  necessary  screen  for  demands  on 
China,  which  demands,  though  seemingly  obtained  for  this 
corporation,  supposedly  a  private  one,  were  in  reality 
granted  to  the  Imperial  Russian  Government  through  this 
convenient  agency.  The  climax  of  early  Russian  conces- 
sions was  revealed  by  the  unauthorized  publication  of  an 
agreement  known  as  the  Cassini  Convention,  the  first  part 
of  which  dealt  primarily  with  railway  and  mining  grants 
and  the  second  with  unusual  privileges  accorded  Russia  in 
Manchuria.  Most  significant  of  all  was  the  provision  that, 
as  Russia  "  has  never  possessed  a  seaport  in  Asia  which  is 
free  from  ice  and  open  the  year  around  ",  China  was  "  will- 
ing "  to  lease  the  port  of  Kiaochau  (Tsingtao)  for  fifteen 
years  (Art.  I).  Russia  was  also  to  help  fortify  Port 
Arthur  and  Talienwan  (Dalny,  now  called  Dairen  by  the 

ipor  the  negotiations  of  M.  Witte,  Russian  Minister  of  Finance, 
with  Hottinguer  and  Co.  and  other  French  bankers,  see  Henri  Cordier, 
Histoire  des  Relations  de  la  Chine  avec  les  Puissances  Occidentales, 
3  vol.  (Paris,  1902),  vol.  3,  pp.  304-308. 

2  See  Kanichi  Asakawa,  The  Russo-Japanese  Conflict  (New  York, 
1904),  p.  85,  from  "Statutes  of  the  Bank,"  published  Dec.  8,  1896,  in  a 
Japanese  source,  the  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  642-660. 

See  W.  W.  Rockhill,  Treaties  and  Conventions  with  or  concerning 
China  and  Korea,  1894-1904  (Washington,  1904),  pp.  207-211,  for 
"Charter  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank,"  Dec.  10,  1895,  Engl,  version. 


28  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [440 

Japanese),  and  was  not  to  ''permit  any  other  foreign  Power 
to  encroach  upon  them",  while  China  bound  herself  "never 
to  cede  them  to  another  country"  (Art.  X)/  But  in  ob- 
taining these  far-reaching  concessions  the  Russian  diplo- 
mats failed  to  take  into  account  the  tremendous  uproar 
which  Europe  surely  would  raise  and  certainly  did  raise 
when  the  alleged  Russian  advantages  appeared  in  the  North 
China  Herald.  This  convinced  Russia  that  she  had  gone 
too  far,  and  the  existence  of  the  Cassini  Convention  was 
flatly  denied  both  by  Russia  and  by  China.  By  this  simple 
expedient  the  agitation  in  Europe  was  quieted;  and,  Rus- 
sian diplomacy  having  suffered  a  decided  setback  in  the 
Far  East,  matters  rested  for  a  while,  and  Russia  concerned 
herself  only  with  building  the  Eastern  Chinese  Railway 
under  an  agreement  obtained  through  the  subsidiary  Russo- 
Chinese  Bank. 

European  spoliation  of  China  was  soon  reopened,  from 
an  unexpected  quarter,  and  it  was  Germany  who  gave  Rus- 
sia, and  all  the  world  for  that  matter,  a  practical  illustra- 
tion of  how  to  deal  with  China  regarding  leases  and  con- 
cessions. Germany  herself  had  looked  longingly  upon 
Kiaochau,  and  the  reported  leasing  of  that  harbor  to 
Russia  through  the  Cassini  Convention,  though  quickly  repu- 
diated, yet  prompted  Germany  to  action.  An  admirable 
pretext  soon  came  in  the  murder  of  two  German  mission- 
aries in  the  province  of  Shantung,  where  Kiaochau  was 
located.  Germany  at  once  struck  with  the  mailed  fist.  A 
naval  expedition,  despatched  in  all  haste  to  Kiaochau,  ex- 
pelled the  Chinese  garrison,  seized  the  port,  and  raised  the 

1  The  text  of  the  Cassini  Convention  is  given  in  Weale,  Re-Shaping 
of  the  Far  East,  2  vol.  (London,  1905),  vol.  2,  p.  439,  and  Beveridge, 
Russian  Advance  (New  York,  1904),  p.  469.  A  French  version  ia 
found  in  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  343-347;  also  in  Revue  Generate 
de  Droit  Internationale  Public,  vol.  xii,  1905,  note  to  pp.  226-228. 


441  ]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  29 

German  flag  to  the  salute  of  twenty-one  guns  and  three 
cheers  for  the  Kaiser.  Then  began  the  tortuous  negotia- 
tions with  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office,  the  Tsung-H  Yamen, 
from  the  date  when  they  first  met  "  to  consider  this  seizure 
of  territory  by  a  friendly  Power  ",  to  the  time  when  China 
was  forced  to  give  way.  Baron  von  Heyking,  Grerman  Min- 
ister at  Peking,  finally  announced  to  the  world  that  Ger- 
many had  received  a  lease  of  Kiaochau  (city  of  Tsingtao 
and  Kiaochau  Bay)  for  ninety-nine  years,  preferential 
treatment  in  Shantung,  railway  and  mining  grants,  and 
indemnity  for  the  murdered  missionaries.  All  this  on  ac- 
count of  the  death  of  two  priests  of  whom  the  German  Gov- 
ernment had  never  before  heard. ^ 

Russia  in  particular  was  much  impressed  ^  by  the  Ger- 
man action  and  immediately  arranged  to  do  likewise,  but 
with  far  greater  tact.  Conceding  Germany's  right  to  Kiao- 
chau, after  an  extensive  correspondence  between  Berlin 
and  St.  Petersburg,  Russia  transferred  her  activities  else- 
where, and  soon  had  "  permission  "  to  winter  her  fleet  at 
Port  Arthur.     To  allay  Japanese  apprehensions,    Russia 

*  The  treaty  for  the  lease  of  Kiaochau  is  given  in  British  Parliamentary- 
Papers,  China  No.  i  (1899),  Inclosure  in  no.  66,  reprinted  from  the 
Reichsanzeiger  of  April  29,  1898;  also  in  United  States  For.  Rel.,  1898, 
Inclosure  in  no.  2884,  pp.  187-190;  Weale,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  455-459; 
Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  357-361 ;  Alexis  Krausse,  The  Far  East: 
Its  History  and  its  Question,  2d  ed.  (London,  1903),  pp.  344-346. 

'  So  was  Great  Britain.  Notice  the  following  appreciation  of  the 
German  action  by  the  London  Times  of  November  16,  1897 : 

"  Instead  of  wasting  time  in  making  remonstrances  at  Peking,  which 
would  assuredly  have  been  met  as  usual  by  the  innumerable  dilatory 
devices  of  Chinese  diplomacy,  the  Germans  have  landed  a  force  in 
Kiao-chou  Bay,  in  order  to  bring  to  bear  the  only  kind  of  influence 
that  Chinamen  seem  able  to  understand  .  .  .  The  experiment  is  one 
which  we  ourselves  have  tried  on  one  or  more  occasions,  with  results 
so  excellent  as  compared  with  any  obtainable  by  diplomatic  negotiation 
that  there  is  reason  to  wonder  why  we  do  not  always  follow  the  more 
effectual  method." 


30  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [442 

notified  the  Japanese  Government  that  ''  Port  Arthur  had 
been  lent  to  Russia  only  temporarily  as  a  winter  anchor- 
age ",  and  Japan  replied  that  she  "  credited  this  assur- 
ance "/  The  British  also  were  disinclined  at  first  to  oppose 
Russian  attempts  to  gain  a  satisfactory  Far  Eastern  harbor, 
doubtless  as  an  added  precaution  at  that  time  for  Constan- 
tinople. In  fact,  Mr.  Balfour  went  so  far  as  to  say  that 
"  we  had  always  looked  with  favor  upon  the  idea  of  Russia 
obtaining  an  ice-free  harbor  on  the  Pacific  ".^  It  was  not 
that  which  alarmed  England  and  later  caused  a  sharp  diplo- 
matic struggle  ending  in  British  defeat,  but,  as  the  Marquis 
of  Salisbury  expressed  it :  ''  The  Russian  Government  had 
now  given  a  most  unfortunate  extension  to  this  policy '', 
by  which  Lord  Salisbury  meant  the  three  Russian  demands 
which  were  being  made  on  China,  as  follows : 

''     I.  The  lease  of  Port  Arthur. 

11.  The  lease  of  Talienwan  (Dalny). 
"'   III.  The  construction  of  a  railroad  to  Port  Arthur  and 
Talienwan,  connecting  either  city  with  the  Russian  lines, 
and  thus  making  either  one  a  terminus  of  the  Great  Siberian 
Railway, 

These  demands  were,  of  course,  quite  an  elaboration  of 
the  original  innocent  desire  for  an  ice-free  harbor. 

Encouraged  by  England,  China  endeavored  to  persuade 
Russia  to  consider  the  question  of  Port  Arthur  and  Talien- 
wan separately,  but  was  peremptorily  informed  that  the 
lease  of  both  places  must  be  granted  before  March  I'j, 
1898,  "  failing  which,  Russia  would  take  hostile  meas- 
ures ".^     China  delayed  until  the  last  day,  then  signed  the 

*  China  No.  i  {1898),  no.  29. 
^Ibid,,  no.  loi. 
'  Ibid.,  no.  126. 


443]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  3 1 

convention  ceding  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan,  as  well  as 
the  adjacent  waters,  "  in  usufruct "  to  Russia  for  twenty- 
five  years,  with  the  privilege  of  renewal  if  mutually  agree- 
able/ The  Russian  press,  which  means  particularly  the 
Novoe  Vremya,  was  jubilant  over  this  ''  new  and  undoubted 
diplomatic  disaster  to  Lord  Salisbury's  Government  ".^  In 
this  the  Novoe  Vremya  was  quite  right.  All  that  Great 
Britain  had  succeeded  in  accomplishing  after  a  prolonged 
diplomatic  struggle  was  to  put  her  objections  "  on  record  ". 
Germany  was  silenced  because  of  the  Kiaochau  affair ;  France 
was  Russia's  ally,  therefore  her  friend.  Japan  received  the 
disquieting  news  in  ominous  silence,  which  alone  should 
have  been  enough  to  forewarn  Russia.  All  outward  ex- 
pressions of  opposition  to  Russia  in  Japanese  military  and 
diplomatic  circles  remained  practically  unspoken,  carefully 
concealed,  to  pour  out  in  a  resistless  flood  at  the  appointed 
time. 

As  the  occupation  of  Port  Arthur  by  Russia,  not  for  com- 
merce but  as  a  fortified  naval  base,  was  held  to  ''  disturb 
the  balance  of  power  "  in  north  China,  the  British  began 
to  press  the  Yamen  for  the  lease  of  Weihaiwei,  directly  op- 
posite from  the  Russian  acquisition.  A  short  time  before, 
Great  Britain  had  declined  the  offer  of  this  identical  port 
on  the  praiseworthy  ground  that  the  Foreign  Office  aimed 
at  "  discouraging  any  alienation  of  Chinese  territory ". 
This,  however,  with  the  reservation  that  the  "  existing  posi- 
tion "  would  not  be  ''  materially  altered  by  the  action  of 

1  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1898,  pp.  184,  186;  "  Precis  "  in  China  No.  i  (1899)  r 
no.  187,  pp.  127-129;  Asakawa,  op.  cit.,  pp.  130,  131;  Beveridge,  op.  cit., 
pp.  118,  119;  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  362-364;  Krausse,  op.  cit., 
PP-  349,  350 ;  Rockhill,  op.  cit.,  pp.  50-52 ;  Weale,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  459- 
462. 

"^  Novoe  Vremya  of  March  21  (April  2),  1898;  trans,  in  China  No.  i 
(1899),  Inclosure  in  no.  14. 


32  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [444 

other  Powers  "/  Such  an  unusual  attitude  could  not  have 
been  expected  to  last  in  Far  Eastern  diplomacy,  and,  as  it 
was  soon  discovered  that  Russia  had  subjected  the  above 
"  existing  position  "  to  a  "  rude  shock  ",  Downing  Street 
considered  itself  released  from  the  above  rather  odd  declar- 
ation. But  to  palliate  matters.  Sir  Claude  MacDonald, 
British  Minister  at  Peking,  announced  that  England  was  at 
Weihaiwei  solely  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power,  and  that 
England  "  would  give  it  up  to-morrow  "  if  Russia  would 
evacuate  Port  Arthur.  Little  difficulty  was  experienced  in 
persuading  China  beyond  ''  wearisome  discussions  "  over 
minor  details,  and  as  soon  as  the  Japanese  stepped  out  the 
British  stepped  in,  on  terms  ''  similar  to  those  granted  to 
Russia  for  Port  Arthur  ".^ 

The  Germans  were  not  interested  in  England's  new  pos- 
session. To  them  it  was  ''  a  matter  of  indifference  which 
flag  floats  over  Weihaiwei  ",  but  they  pointed  out  that  the 
British  action  "  implies  a  change  for  the  worse  in  the  rela- 
tions between  Russia  and  England  "  (Norddeutsche  Zei- 
tung).^  This  proved  true,  and  Russia  brought  all  possible 
pressure  to  bear  upon  China  to  prevent  the  port  from  fall- 
ing into  British  hands,  but  was  unsuccessful.  The  Japan- 
ese, on  their  part,  were  only  too  glad  to  have  a  friendly 
power  take  their  place  and  thus  offer  a  welcome  counter- 
part to  Russian  aggression.    It  may  be  noted  that,  although 

^.China  No.  i  (1898),  nos.  90,  91. 

^U.  S.  For.  Rel,  1898,  p.  190;  China  No.  i  {1899),  p.  I99;  iRockhill, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  60,  61.  For  Great  Britain's  "  formal "  declaration  to  Ger- 
many, "that  in  establishing  herself  at  Wei-hai  Wei,  she  has  no  in- 
tention of  injuring  or  contesting  the  rights  and  interests  of  Germany 
in  the  province  of  Shantung,  or  of  creating  difficulties  for  her  in  that 
province,"  see  Rockhill,  op.  cit.,  p.  180;  China  No.  i,  {1899),  pp.  27-31. 

^  Norddeutsche  Zeitung  of  April  6,  1898.  These  comments  first  ap- 
peared in  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  and  were  reproduced  in  the  Berlin 
newspapers.     See  trans,  in  China  No.  i  {1899),  no.  12  and  Inc. 


445]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  33 

Weihaiwei  was  occupied  on  the  pretext  of  preserving  the 
balance  of  power,  such  "  necessity  "  has  long  since  passed; 
nevertheless,  though  the  Russians  have  been  driven  out  of 
Port  Arthur,  the  British  are  still  in  possession  of  the  town 
on  the  opposite  mainland. 

Through  fear  of  French  encroachments  in  the  south, 
England  found  excuse  for  similar  undertakings  on  the 
Chinese  littoral  directly  across  from  Hong  Kong,  and  de- 
manded an  extended  territory  upon  the  sudden  discovery 
that  the  British  colony  lacked  adequate  protection.  China 
was  persuaded,  we  might  rather  say  forced,  to  cede  some 
two  hundred  square  miles,  "  nothing  more  than  was  neces- 
sary ",  before  British  apprehensions  were  relieved.  Origi- 
nally the  British  intention  was  to  demand  absolute  cession, 
as  with  the  island  of  Hong  Kong  in  the  Opium  war,  but 
this  was  by  no  means  advisable,  as  both  Germany  and  Rus- 
sia had  obtained  their  proprietory  rights  by  leases  of  ninety- 
nine  and  twenty-five  years  respectively.  In  deciding  be- 
tween the  two,  England  modestly  chose  the  ninety-nine  year 
lease,  thus  emulating  Germany.  One  clause  of  the  en- 
suing agreement  referred  to  opium,  both  the  high  contract- 
ing parties  engaging  to  unite  in  eradicating  the  evil  as  much 
as  possible.  Credit  for  this  stipulation  was  due  mainly  to 
Sir  Robert  Hart."^ 

But  England  was  not  yet  through  with  China.  From 
having  been  the  nation  seemingly  least  disposed  (always 
excepting  the  United  States)  to  take  advantage  of  China's 
helplessness  she  turned  out  to  be  one  of  the  worst.  Further- 
more, China  had  earlier  refused  a  British  loan  and  this  had 
greatly  irritated  Downing  Street.  To  make  the  British 
position  doubly  secure  in  spite  of  the  loan  failure,  now  that 

*  See  China  No.  i  (1899),  "O-  225  for  a  discussion  of  the  Hong  Kong 
Extension,  and  Inclosure  in  no.  225  for  the  Convention. 


34  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [446 

the  partition  of  China  seemed  imminent,  Great  Britain  in 
1898  secured  a  pledge  that  the  Yangtze  Valley  would  never 
be  alienated  to  another  Power,  thus  arrogating  the  vast  ter- 
ritories of  central  China  and  the  richest  provinces  of  the 
Empire  as  British  sphere  of  influence/  Then  Japan 
judged  it  high  time  to  act,  and  exacted  a  similar  pledge 
from  China  as  regarded  the  province  of  Fukien,  and  China, 
having  again  established  the  necessary  precedent,  again 
could  not  refuse.  Later  the  Japanese  also  negotiated  for 
and  received  a  settlement  at  Amoy.^ 

France,  meanwhile,  had  been  far  from  idle.  The  year 
of  the  Chino-Japanese  war  saw  the  French  already  firmly 
established  in  Annam,  Cambodia,  Cochin-China  and  Tong- 
king,  embracing  a  territory  of  315,250  square  miles  and  a 
population  of  18,000,000  souls.  And  now  while  Russia, 
Germany  and  England  were  seizing  provinces  right  and 
left  France  serenely  appeared  with  similar  demands,  which 
apparently  combined  all  that  the  former  three  had  obtained. 
On  April  11,  1898,  the  Yamen  received  an  enumeration  of 
what  France  expected,  namely : 

I.  Kwangchouwan  to  be  leased  for  ninety-nine  years  as  a 
coaling  station. 

II.  The  right  to  construct  a  railway  to  Yunnanfu  from 
the  Tongking  frontier. 

III.  The  promise  of  China  not  to  alienate  to  another 
Power  the  provinces  of  Kwangtung,  Kwangsi  and  Yunnan, 
or  the  island  of  Hainan. 

Like  the  Germans  at  Kiaochau,  the  French  disembarked 

1  See  China  No.  i  (1899).    Inclosures  2  and  3  in  no.  20. 

^Ibid.,  nos.  41,  45,  164.  The  United  States  for  a  time  seemed  inter- 
ested in  a  settlement  at  Amoy  as  a  Chinese  base  of  supplies  for  the 
Philippines,  but  fortunately  the  idea  was  given  up.  See  U.  S.  For. 
ReL,  1899,  no.  132,  p.  150;  no.  42,  p.  151;  no.  169,  p.  151;  no.  211,  p. 
152;  no.  290,  p.  153. 


447]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  35 

an  armed  force  at  Kwangchouwan  and  raised  the  French 
flag  with  the  same  salutes  and  hurrahs.  Even  the  inevitable 
proclamation  to  the  inhabitants  was  not  forgotten.  But 
friction  developed.  It  seemed  that  the  Viceroy  at  Canton 
offered  determined  opposition  to  the  French  demands,  which 
was  very  irritating,  as  he  ^'rendait  toute  entente  impossible", 
a  convenient  and  customary  way  at  that  time  of  deprecating 
the  conduct  of  patriotic  Chinese.  Though  the  Viceroy  was 
unsuccessful,  the  native  population  continued  their  resist- 
ance, with  the  result  that  two  French  sailors  were  set  upon 
and  beheaded.  Of  course  this  gave  an  excellent  opportu- 
nity for  further  demands,  and  later  came  the  welcome  news 
of  an  additional  murder,  that  of  a  French  missionary.  To 
such  extent  had  good  fortune  thus  come  to  France's  aid 
that  on  June  9,  1898,  M.  Hanotaux,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  was  able  to  announce  to  his  colleagues  that  the 
French  demands  had  been  met  in  full  by  China. ^ 

Next,  France  raised  quite  an  international  disturbance 
when  she  suddenly  demanded  an  extension  of  her  settle- 
ment at  Shanghai.  That  the  ground  to  be  incorporated  was 
in  part  an  old  cemetery  did  not  deter  the  French  in  the  least. 
The  difficulty  lay  not  in  the  observance  of  the  sacred  cus- 
toms and  institutions  of  the  Chinese,  over  which  Europe 
rode  roughshod  at  will,  but  in  the  fact  that  the  English  and 
Americans  resident  in  Shanghai  had  property  situated  in 
the  proposed  extension.  Consequently,  France  found  the 
British  Foreign  Office  and  the  American  Department  of 
State  united  in  opposition.  The  usual  diplomatic  threats 
and  parleys  followed,  until  France  either  shaved  down  her 
demands  or  gave  the  necessary  assurances.    This  ended  all 

*  See  Cordier,  op.  jcit.,  vol.  iii,  "Projet  de  Convention  relatif  a 
Kouang-tcheou  Wan,"  pp.  370372;  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1898,  p.  191; 
Rockhill,  op.  cit.,  pp.  55-57;  France,  Documents  Diplomatiques,  Chine, 
1898-1899,  pp.  2-4. 


36  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [448 

disputes,  and  everyone  was  highly  pleased  with  the  course 
affairs  had  taken,  all  but  China,  whose  wishes,  however, 
did  not  count/ 

These  leases  and  concessions  marked  the  definite  amount' 
of  territory  actually  placed  under  foreign  administration, 
always  with  the  saving  clause  that  ''  China's  rights  were  to 
be  respected  ",  which  rights  were  not  respected  at  all.  But 
actual  cession  of  territory  did  not  limit  the  extent  of  Euro- 
pean aggression.  The  surrounding  province  or  provinces 
were  invariably  designated  by  each  Power  as  constituting  a 
"  sphere  of  influence  ",  wherein  that  individual  Power  con- 
sidered itself  entitled  to  dominate  all  others.  Thus  Ger- 
many, leasing  Kiaochau,  declared  the  entire  province  of 
Shantung  as  the  German  "  sphere  ".  Russia,  by  virtue  of 
the  cession  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny,  claimed  the  Three 
Chinese  Eastern  Provinces  (Manchuria).  Japan,  through 
a  settlement  at  Amoy  and  a  promise  of  non-alienation, 
claimed  the  province  of  Fukien.  France  claimed  the  terri- 
tory bordering  on  Tongking;  and  England,  through  the 
"  shadowy  claim  "  over  the  Yangtze  Valley,  was  supposed 
to  have  the  first  call  upon  the  rich  lands  watered  by  that  im- 
portant tributary.  In  all  there  were  eighteen  provinces  of 
the  Chinese  Empire,  and  of  these  eighteen  thirteen  were 
pre-empted  by  the  Powers,  the  thirteen  most  populous,  most 
wealthy,  and  most  desirable,  including  within  them  all  the 
important  waterways,  harbors,  mines  and  economic  centres 
that  were  possible  of  access  to  foreign  commerce. 

^  For  a  complete  review  of  the  negotiations  for  the  extension  of  the 
French  settlement  at  (Shanghai,  see  China  No.  i  (1899),  nos.  319,  325, 
359,  370,  384,  407,  409,  410,  416,  432,  437,  439,  440,  444,  448,  449,  452, 
454,  455,  463;  China  No.  i  (jgoo),  nos.  24,  33,  44,  45,  5i,  55,  nP,  124, 
127,  128,  131,  132,  182,  186,  197,  198,  200,  201,  204,  209,  233,  234,  235, 
266,  388,  402,  413,  414,  444,  450,  458,  462;  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1899,  nos. 
129,  146,  168,  171,  183,  18^,  203,  206,  228,  231,  pp.  143-150;  Cordier, 
op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  438-446. 


449]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  37 

There  were  a  few  redeeming  features  of  this  sordid  chap- 
ter of  history,  most  prominent  of  which  was  the  attitude 
taken  by  the  United  States.  True  to  its  time-honored  poHcy, 
the  American  Government  decHned  to  participate  in  the  ter- 
ritorial loot  of  the  Empire.  Instead,  the  moral  support  of 
the  State  Department,  as  directed  by  John  Hay,  was  con- 
tinually exercised  for  the  benefit  of  China,  protesting  here 
and  there  against  these  unexampled  aggressions,  and  in  prac- 
tical isolation  standing  aloof  from  the  land-hunger  of 
Europe.  Finally,  seeing  that  American  commercial  inter- 
ests were  being  jeoparidized  by  the  conflicting  policies  of  the 
Powers,  Secretary  Hay  submitted  a  Circular  Note,  Septem- 
ber, iSgp,  in  which  he  requested  the  aaherence  of  every  na- 
tiorf  concerned  to  the  following  propositions  : 

I.  Non-interference  with  any  treaty  port  or  vested  inter- 
ests of  the  "  sphere  "  or  leased  territory  of  any  Power. 

n.  Application  of  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff,  except  in  free 
ports,  under  Chinese  control. 

III.  Equality  of  treatment  as  to  harbor  dues  and  railroad 
charges  in  the  various  "  spheres  ".^ 

This  note  was  not  political,  as  is  popularly  supposed,  but 
economic,  on  the  face  of  it  merely  to  protect  American  and 
other  commercial  interests  in  China.  Each  Power  was  ap- 
proached separately,  consequently  each  Power  was  obliged 
to  answer  separately.  By  this  diplomatic  strategy  Secre- 
tary Hay  revealed  diplomatic  ability  of  a  high  order.  The 
correspondence  which  followed  with  the  government^  of 
Europe  and  Japan  was  gratifying  in  results.    Italy  was  un- 

^See  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1899,  no.  664,  pp.  128,  129;  no.  927,  pp.  129-131 ; 
no.  205,  pp.  131-136;  no.  434,  PP-  136-138;  no.  26^,  pp.  138,  139;  no.  82, 
pp.  140,  141;  no.  761,  p.  142;  China  No.  i  {1900),  nos.  345,  415,  422. 
See  also  Asaka-yva,  op.  cit.,  ch.  v,  "Secretary  Hay's  Circular  Note," 
pp.  135-139;  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  "La  Porte  lOuverte,"  pp.  446-448; 
Mahan,  The  Interest  of  America  in  International  Conditions  (Boston,. 
1910),  ch.  iv,  "The  Open  Door,"  pp.  185-212. 


38  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [450 

qualified  in  her  acceptance ;  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany 
and  Japan  agreed,  provided  every  Power  did  likewise.  Rus- 
sia, as  was  expected,  gave  the  usual  involved  diplomatic 
reply,  but  practically  acquiesced,  and  then  closed  with  the 
beautiful  sentiment  that  the  Imperial  Government  attached 
the  "  highest  value  "  to  anything  which  would  "  consolidate 
the  traditional  relations  of  friendship  existing  between  the 
two  countries  ",^  which  the  State  Department  took  for  what 
it  was  worth. 

Although  no  final  agreement  was  made,  Hay  notified  the 
American  Ambassadors  at  London,  Paris,  Berlin,  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Rome,  and  the  American  Minister  at  Tokyo  that 
he  regarded  these  expressions  of  adherence  as  "  final  and 
definitive  ".  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  state  the  exact 
benefits  of  this  note,  inasmuch  as  these  benefits  were  largely 
of  a  moral  nature  vastly  greater  than  the  mere  acceptance 
of  the  commercial  principles  therein  stated. .  However,  by 
this  skillful  stroke  of  diplomacy,  the  territorial  entity  of 
China  was  doubly  assured,  for  so  long  as  a  "  sphere  "  was 
not  alienated  to  another  Power  exclusively,  there  was  little 
danger  of  it  passing  entirely  into  that  Power's  hands.  Sec- 
retary Hay  well  knew  that  exclusive  economic  domination 
is  the  invariable  forerunner  of  political  absorption;  there- 
fore, by  insisting  upon  an  equality  of  commercial  treatment 
-and  economic  opportunity  for  all  nations,  he  was  able  to 
prevent  that  final  step  towards  complete  political  control. 

But  the  Hay  note  could  not  do  the  impossible;  it  could 
not  reconcile  the  great  mass  of  Chinese,  who  were  unaware 
of  the  note,  with  existing  conditions  as  brought  about 
largely  by  the  extraordinary  political  policies  of  Europe, 
the  effects  of  which  upon  China  in  the  year  1899  were  most 
unfortunate.     The  Chinese,  unable  to  help  themselves,  and 

1  U.  S.  For.  Rel,  1899,  no.  761,  p.  142. 


45 1 ]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  39 

seeing  city  after  city  leased  out  to  foreign  Powers  and  en- 
tire provinces  dominated  by  foreign  influence,  grew  ex- 
tremely suspicious  of  every  move  made  by  Europe,  and 
many  of  them,  not  understanding  the  policy  of  the  Ameri- 
can Government,  placed  the  United  States  in  the  same  cate- 
gory. The  Powers,  in  their  mad  scramble  for  land,  did  not 
take  into  account  the  rights  of  the  Chinese,  but  arranged 
among  themselves  where  their  particular  "  spheres  "  and 
leases  should  be  located,  and  not  until  the  disastrous  year 
of  the  Boxer  Rebellion  did  they  realize  and  reluctantly  con- 
cede that  China,  after  all,  possessed  remarkable  innate  vigor 
and  was  far  less  decrepit  than  had  been  imagined;  that 
she  was,  in  fact,  capable  of  something  more  than  mere  re- 
taliation by  mob  violence  and  riots.  In  1899,  however,  thei 
united  opinion  of  Europe  was  that  China  would  soon  dis-J 
appear  as  a  sovereign  entity,  dismembered  and  divided. 
Everything  then  pointed  that  way,  partly  because  China  had 
not  yet  shown  any  determined  resistance  to  European  ag- 
gression, and  also  because  the  European  demands  had  been 
comparatively  easy  of  realization.  Besides  acquisitions  of 
territory,  there  were  numberless  other  demands  too  tedious 
to  mention,  consisting  mainly  of  religious  and  commercial 
concessions,  railway  grants,  and  heavy  indemnities  for 
every  conceivable  item  that  could  possibly  be  called  an  in- 
jury. Europe  seemed  under  the  impression  that  China  was 
an  immense  golden  harvest  to  be  reaped  by  the  first  comer, 
and  in  the  pursuit  of  this  agreeable  task  little  thought  was 
given  to  international  law  and  still  less  to  international 
comity  and  ethics. 

Now  to  return  to  the  internal  situation  of  the  Empire  as 
it  affected  the  Government  and  the  reigning  dynasty,  upon 
whom  fell  the  brunt  of  criticism  and  blame  for  this  dis- 
astrous condition  of  affairs. 

Because  of  the  crushing  defeats  which  overtook  the  Court 


40  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [452 

in  its  personal  quarrel,  as  the  non-Manchu  part  of  the  Em- 
pire viewed  it,  with  Japan,  the  Manchu  monarchy  ''  lost 
face"  with  its  subject  Chinese;  and  of  those  who  felt  the 
weight  of  responsibility  and  humiliation  heaviest  upon  them 
the  Emperor  was  the  foremost.  Kuang  Hsu  will  live  in 
history  as  the  instigator  of  reform  in  China,  even  though 
the  sum  total  of  his  efforts,  with  the  exception  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Peking,  was  doomed  to  failure.  Frail,  in  delicate 
health,  with  a  sensitive,  almost  feminine  face;  subject  at 
times  to  melancholia,  but  again  to  violent  outbursts  of  tem- 
per; a  dreamer,  of  a  poetic,  philosophical  cast  of  mind, 
Kuang  Hsu  was  a  well-intentioned  man ;  but  he  lacked  that 
firmness  of  character,  that  deliberate  disregard  of  conse- 
quences, that  ruthless  pursuit  of  a  fixed  policy  necessary 
to  make  of  himself  another  Peter  the  Great,  who  had,  one 
might  say,  the  like  mission  to  perform.  Although  he  had 
been  chosen  by  the  Empress  Dowager  on  the  death  of  the 
preceding  Emperor  Tung  Chih  mainly  on  account  of  his 
minority  and  the  negligible  qualities  which  he  possessed 
and  apparently  would  retain,  yet  for  a  while  he  seemed  cap- 
able of  great  things.  As  it  was,  he  astonished  the  world  for 
a  brief  period,  but  it  was  only  a  momentary  flash.  His 
physical  disabilities,  his  indecision,  his  fears,  his  lack  of 
princely  attributes,  his  negative  training  in  governmental 
affairs  during  his  years  of  preparation,  due  to  the  enervat- 
ing surroundings  into  which  a  corrupt  Court  had  deliber- 
ately thrust  him,  made  of  this  pathetic  descendant  of  the 
wise  Kang  Hi  another  Louis  XVI,  and  like  that  unfortunate 
monarch,  though  filled  with  ambition  to  ameliorate  the  con- 
dition of  his  people  and  to  rehabilitate  the  nation,  he  lacked 
those  essentials  of  greatness,  that  knowledge  of  individual 
character  and  ability,  that  Napoleonic  trait  of  correctly  esti- 
mating current  events,  that  prophetic  insight  into  the  future 
and  moulding  the  future  to  his  particular  desires  which  were 


453]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  41 

indispensable  to  the  institution  of  permanent  reforms  such 
as  he  attempted.  Considering  the  extreme  difficulty  of  his 
situation,  it  was  the  complete  absence  of  every  one  of  these 
characteristics  essential  for  success  which  makes  the  life  of 
the  well-meaning  Kuang  Hsu  a  tragedy  in  history.  He  was 
unequal  to  his  appointed  task,  and,  lacking  genius,  was 
crushed  by  obstacles  which  at  that  time  only  a  superman 
could  have  overcome. 

As  early  as  December,  1890,  and  again  in  June  of  the  fol- 
lowing year  Kuang  Hsu  had  endeared  himself  to  the  for- 
eign element  in  China  by  decrees  in  which  he  pointed  out  to 
his  subjects  that  Christianity  was  protected  by  existing 
treaties  with  the  Powers  and  by  instructions  to  officials  is- 
sued from  the  Court.    Said  he : 

The  doctrines  of  the  western  religion  have  for  their  purpose 
the  teaching  of  men  to  be  good,  and  although  our  people  become 
converts  they  do  not  cease  to  be  subjects  of  China,  and  are 
amenable  to  the  local  authorities.  There  is  no  reason  why 
peace  and  quiet  should  not  prevail  between  the  people  and  the 
adherents  of  the  new  religion. 

Officials  in  the  cities  and  provinces  were  admonished  to  pro- 
tect Christians  and  foreigners,  and  punishment  was  to  fol- 
low in  case  of  disobedience  or  negligence. 

But  Kuang  Hsu  at  that  early  date  had  not  yet  found  him- 
self. Lacking  a  commanding  intellect  and  personality,  he 
needed  some  strong  support  to  lean  upon,  some  spirit  bolder 
than  his  to  blaze  the  way,  to  inspire  him  to  action.  As 
has  been  noted,  the  defeats  of  the  Chino- Japanese  war  had 
been  most  keenly  felt  by  him,  and  these  disasters  in  them- 
selves made  him  more  than  ever  susceptible  to  schemes  for 
retrieving  the  face  of  China  by  a  glorious  return  to  ancient 
prosperity  and  power,  this  on  a  new  basis,  however. 

Always  an  omnivorous  reader,   especially  interested  in 


I 


42  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [454 

foreign  books,  among  which  missionaries  place  the  Bible, 
the  Emperor  soon  became  imbued  with  foreign  ideas  of  cul- 
ture and  progress,  as  contrasted  with  the  ultra-conservative 
tenets  of  the  Chinese  sages.  Some  credit  is  due  the  Im- 
perial tutor,  Weng  Tung-ho,  associated  with  the  Emperor 
since  the  latter's  childhood,  for  not  having  hampered  the 
Imperial  desires.  Weng  was  a  man  of  considerable  force 
of  character  in  his  way;  in  fact,  he  was  the  leader  of  the 
Southern  or  Chinese  party  at  the  Court,  as  opposed  to  the 
Northern  or  Manchu,  composed  mainly  of  the  Empress 
Dowager,  her  satellites,  and  the  Imperial  Court.  An  en- 
lightened Chinese  scholar  of  the  old  school,  but  not  wholly 
lacking  modern  tendencies,  Weng  deserves  praise  for  hav- 
ing allowed  his  pupil  free  rein ;  possibly  he  contributed  to  a 
certain  extent  to  the  brief  but  momentous  era  of  reform, 
the  ''  Hundred  Days  "  as  this  melancholy  bit  of  history  has 
aptly  been  described.^  His  curt  dismissal  on  June  15,  1898, 
through  the  general  shake-up  following  the  death  of  Prince 
Kung,  came  as  a  surprise  to  the  Court  circle  and  to  the 
Diplomatic  Corps  at  Peking.  No  doubt  the  Imperial  pupil 
found  his  master  too  cautious,  for,  although  Weng  has 
been  favorably  viewed  by  some  writers,^  yet  Sir  Claude 
MacDonald,  British  Minister  at  Peking,  found  him  "  ex- 
tremely obstructive,  notably  during  the  Burmah  frontier 
and  West  River  negotiations  ".  MacDonald  acknowledged, 
however,  that  Weng  was  "  prepossessing,  courteous,  and 
scholarly — an  excellent  type  of  the  Conservative  Chinese 
statesman  ".* 

*  Albert  Maybon,  La  Politique  Chinoise:  Etude  sur  les  Doctrines  des 
Partis  en  Chine  (Paris,  1908),  title  to  ch.  iii  of  pt.  ii. 

'  For  a  good  critical  estimate  of  Weng  Tung-ho,  see  J.  O.  Bland  and 
Edward  Backhouse,  China  under  the  Empress  Dowager  (Philadelphia, 
1910),  pp.234,  235. 

^  China  No.  i  {1899),  no.  268. 


455]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  43 

Weng  was  dismissed  because  another  had  found  more 
favor  in  the  Emperor's  eyes.  The  Chinese  destined  to  be 
the  right-hand  man  of  Kuang  Hsu  in  this  initial  progres- 
sive movement  was  one  Kang  Yu-wei,  native  of  a  small  vil- 
lage near  Canton  and  author  of  a  work  on  the  development 
of  Japan  which  the  Emperor  had  read  and  appreciated.  In 
January,  1898,  Kang  Yu-wei  had  obtained  an  interview  with 
the  Tsung-li  Yamen  and  in  a  three  hours'  harangue  had 
expounded  his  political  theories  to  them.  The  Yamen, 
though  composed  entirely  of  the  old  order,  with  rare  impar- 
tiality advised  him  to  memorialize  the  Throne.  The  result 
of  this  suggestion  was  a  meeting  of  Kang  Yu-wei  with  the 
Emperor.  A  partnership  was  struck  between  the  two  which 
lasted  throughout  the  reform  period  and  ended  only  with 

Following  is  the  holograph  decree  dismissing  Weng,  Ibid.,  Inc.  i 
in  no.  268: 

An  Imperial  Mandate 

Weng  Tung-ho,  Assistant  Grand  Secretary  and  President  of  the 
Board  of  Revenue,  has  of  late  made  many  errors  in  the  conduct  of 
business,  and  has  forfeited  all  confidence;  on  several  occasions  he  has 
been  impeached  to  the  Throne. 

At  his  private  audiences  with  the  Emperor  he  has  replied  to  His 
Majesty's  questions  with  no  regard  for  anything  except  his  own  per- 
sonal feeling  and  opinion,  and  he  has  made  no  attempt  to  conceal  his 
pleasure  or  displeasure  either  in  his  speech  or  in  his  countenance.  It 
has  gradually  become  clear  that  his  ambition  and  rebellious  feeling  have 
led  him  to  arrogate  to  himself  an  attempt  to  dictate  to  the  Emperor. 
It  is  impossible  to  permit  him  to  remain  in  the  responsible  position  of 
a  Grand  Councillor.  In  former  days  a  strict  inquiry  would  have  been 
held,  and  his  crime  punished  with  the  utmost  rigor  of  the  law.  Taking 
into  consideration,  hpwever,  his  long  service  as  tutor  to  the  Emperor, 
His  Majesty  cannot  bring  himself  to  meet  out  to  him  such  a  severe 
penalty. 

Let  Weng  Tung-ho  vacate  his  posts,  and  retire  into  private  life,  as 
a  warning  that  he  is  preserved  (from  a  worse  fate). 

Kuang  Hsu,  24th  year,  4th  moon,  27th  day. 
(June  15,  1898). 


44  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [456 

the  Coup  d'Etat,  when  the  Empress  Dowager  destroyed 
everything  by  a  single  blow. 

The  reform  movement  consisted  in  all  of  some  twenty- 
seven  decrees.  Three  of  them  were  promulgated  while  ' 
Weng  Tung-ho  was  still  in  office,  but  a  veritable  deluge  fol- 
lowed the  appointment  of  Kang  Yu-wei.  The  first  revolu- 
tionary decree,  published  to  the  world  in  the  official  Peking 
Gazette  of  June  11,  1898,  is  noteworthy  in  that  it  clearly 
states  what  the  Emperor  was  trying  to  do  and  what  abuses 
he  would  endeavor  to  correct.^  In  fact,  it  is  the  outline  of 
the  Emperor's  policy  throughout  the  reform  period.  It  is 
also  a  fine  example  of  Chinese  literary  effort.  The  decree 
reads  as  follows : 

For  a  long  time  past  the  condition  of  Imperial  afifairs  has^ 
been  a  subject  of  discussion  among  the  officials  of  the  Empire, 
Doth  metropolitan  and  provincial,  with  a  view  to  bring  about 
changes  necessary  for  improvement.  Decrees  have  been  fre- 
quently issued  by  the  Emperor,  for  a  special  system  of  examin- 
ations, for  doing  away  with  the  surplus  soldiery,  for  the  alter- 
ation of  the  military  examinations  and  for  the  institution  of 
colleges. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  these  things  have  been  so  often  care- 
fully thought  out,  and  so  many  plans  have  been  formed,  there 
is  no  general  consensus  of  opinion,  and  discussion  is  still  rife 
as  to  which  plans  are  best.  There  are  some  among  the  older 
officials  who  affirm  that  the  old  ways  are  best  and  need  no  alter- 
ation, and  that  the  new  plans  are  not  required.  Such  babblings 
are  vain  and  useless. 

The  Emperor  puts  the  question  before  you  thus:  In  the 
present  condition  of  Imperial  affairs,  with  an  untrained  army, 

^  Said  MacDonald  rather  cynically  in  forwarding  the  first  two  de- 
crees to  Lord  Salisbury :  "They  show  that  a  real  need  for  radical  reform 
is  thoroughly  recognized  by  the  Court  at  last,  but  there  is  little  reason 
to  hope  that  the  Imperial  admonitions  will  move  the  Chinese  bureau- 
cracy deeply."     China  No.  i  (1899),  no.  266. 


457]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  45 

with  limited  funds,  with  ignorant  "  literati,"  and  with  artisans 
untaught  because  they  have  no  fit  teachers,  is  there  any  diffi- 
culty in  deciding,  when  China  is  compared  with  foreign  nations, 
who  is  the  strong  and  who  is  the  weak?  It  is  easy  to  distin- 
guish between  the  rich  and  the  poor.  How  can  a  man  armed 
with  a  wooden  stick  smite  his  foe  encased  in  a  coat  of  mail  ? 

The  Emperor  sees  that  the  affairs  of  the  Empire  are  in  an 
unsettled  condition,  and  that  his  various  decrees  have  availed 
nothing.  Diversity  of  opinion,  each  unlike  another  as  fire 
differs  from  water,  is  responsible  for  the  spread  of  the  exist- 
ing evil.  It  is  the  same  evil  as  that  which  existed  in  the  Sung 
and  Ming  Dynasties  (circa  A.  D.  1000  and  1500).  Our  pres- 
ent system  is  not  of  the  slightest  use.  We  cannot  in  these 
modern  days  adhere  to  the  ways  of  the  Five  Kings  (circa 
B.  C.  2500)  ;  even  they  did  not  continue  exactly  after  the 
manner  of  their  respective  predecessors.  It  is  like  wearing 
thick  clothes  in  summer  and  thin  ones  in  winter. 

Now,  therefore,  the  Emperor  orders  all  officials,  metro- 
politan and  provincial,  from  prince  down  to  "  literati,"  to  give 
their  whole  minds  to  a  real  effort  at  improvement.  With  per- 
severance, like  that  of  the  saints  of  old,  do  your  utmost  to 
discover  which  foreign  country  has  the  best  system  in  any 
branch  of  learning  and  learn  that  one.  Your  great  fault  is 
the  falseness  of  your  present  knowledge.  Make  a  special 
effort  and  determine  to  learn  the  best  of  everything.  Do  not 
merely  learn  the  outside  covers  of  the  books  of  knowledge,  and 
do  not  make  a  loud  boast  of  your  own  attainments.  The 
Emperor's  wish  is  to  change  what  is  now  useless  into  some- 
thing useful,  so  that  proficiency  may  be  attained  and  handed 
on  to  posterity. 

The  Metropolitan  College  will  be  the  chief  one,  and  must  be 
instituted  at  once.  The  Emperor  orders  that  the  Grand  Coun- 
cillors consult  with  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  on  the  subject,  and 
to  come  to  a  decision  as  soon  as  possible,  and  then  to  memorial- 
ize the  Throne. 

Any  of  the  compilers  and  graduates  of  the  Hanlin  College, 


46  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^^g 

the  secretaries  of  the  Boards,  the  officers  of  the  Palace  Guards, 
expectant  Intendants,  Prefects,  district  magistrates  and  sub- 
ordinate officials,  sons  and  brothers  of  officials,  the  hereditary 
officials  of  the  Eight  Banners,  and  the  sons  of  the  military 
officials  of  the  Empire,  can  enter  the  College  who  wish  to  do  so. 
By  this  means  knowledge  will  be  handed  down  from  one 
generation  to  another.     It  will  be  strictly  forbidden  to  mem- 
bers of  the  College  to  be  careless  or  dilatory  in  their  studies, 
or  to  introduce  as  students  any  of  their  friends  without  regard 
for  the  latter's  capabilities;  for  such  things  would  frustrate 
the  benefit  of  this  excellent  plan  of  His  Imperial  Majesty. 
Kuang  Hsu,  24th  year,  4th  moon,  23d  day, 
(June  II,  1898). 1 

On  the  heels  of  this  momentous  decree  followed  another 
designated  for  the  ''  Viceroys  and  Governors  of  the  Em- 
pire ",  who  were  commanded  to  ''  select  from  all  grades  of 
their  subordinate  officials  such  men  as  are  to  their  knowl- 
edge of  good  reputation  in  everyday  life,  and  who  are 
honest,  and  have  some  knowledge  of  modern  things,  and 
have  no  grave  faults".  These  candidates  were  to  be  further 
examined  by  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  and  the  successful  ones 
recommended  to  the  Emperor  for  special  posts  in  the  offi- 
cial service.^ 

So  far  so  good ;  nothing  startling  had  as  yet  appeared  to 
frighten  the  conservative  gentry.  The  next  day,  however, 
a  decree  was  announced  containing  two  distinct  parts,  one 
of  which  related  to  commerce  and  foreign  intercourse. 
"  Commercial  matters  are  of  the  highest  importance  and 
the  suggestion  (for  the  appointment  of  special  Ministers  of 
Commerce)  is  one  which  deserves  to  be  acted  upon.  .  .  . 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  strict  conformity  to  these  regulations 
(the  establishment  of  Commercial  Bureaus)  w'ill  lead  to  a 

1  China  No.  i  (1899),  Inc.  in  no.  266. 

2  Ibid.,  Inc.  2  in  no.  266. 


459]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  47 

daily  improvement  in  trade  ".  Therefore,  officials  and  mer- 
chants were  exhorted  "  to  consult  together  for  the  most 
speedy  and  satisfactory  arrangement  of  commercial  matters. 
.  .  .  We  must  not  adhere  blindly  to  our  old  customs" ;  and 
provincial  officers  were  advised  to  memorialize  the  Throne 
in  order  to  inform  the  Emperor  how  things  were  progress- 
ing. 

The  other  half  of  the  decree  contained  a  "  suggestion  " 
from  some  one  (it  might  have  been  Weng  Tung-ho,  and 
probably  the  rock  upon  which  his  fortunes  were  wrecked) 
which  recommended  that  "  members  of  the  Imperial  Family 
should  go  abroad  ".  The  decree  rightly  commented  upon 
this  as  "  a  new  departure  ",  but  "  quite  in  accordance  with 
modern  custom  ".  Therefore,  the  Court  of  the  Imperial 
clan  was  ordered  "  to  select  from  the  Princes  of  the  first 
three  ranks  any  who  were  well  versed  in  modern  affairs 
and  ideas,  and  who  are  on  the  side  of  modern  improve- 
ment ".    These  were  to  await  the  Emperor's  instructions.^ 

In  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  the  above  "  startling  inno- 
vation "  ^  was  carrying  matters  too  far,  and  even  those 
Princes  designated  as  "  well  versed  in  modern  affairs  and 
ideas  ",  if  there  were  any  such,  failed  to  greet  the  Emperor's 
plan  with  any  degree  of  enthusiasm,  favoring  as  it  did  a 
radical  change  in  their  hitherto  circumscribed  political  ac- 
tivities as  regulated  by  the  Empress  Dowager.  Weng's  dis- 
missal followed  as  a  matter  of  course,  largely  through  Pal- 
ace intrigue,  and  Kang  Yu-wei  became  the  man  of  the  hour,^ 
soon  to  emerge  into  world  prominence  by  fathering  a  mass 
of  reforms  which,  because  of  their  very  magnitude  and 
rapidity  of  appearance,  nullified  their  purpose  and  whatever 
utility  they  might  have  possessed. 

^  China  No.  i  (1899),  Inc.  in  no.  267. 

'  As  characterized  by  Sir  Claude  MacDonald  in  Ibid.,  no.  267. 


48  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [460 

The  results  of  Kang  Yu-wei's  association  with  the  Em- 
peror were  amazing.  First  of  all  came  the  definite  abolition 
^of  the  old  examination  system.  In  the  future,  instead  of 
solely  embracing  literary  efforts  and  caligraphy,  the  can- 
didate's ability  was  to  be  tested  mainly  by  practical  ques- 
tions, in  other  words  by  western  learning.  The  Pa-ku  or 
literary  essay,  the  nation's  pride  from  time  immemorial  and 
heretofore  the  piece  de  resistance  of  all  Chinese  scholars 
and  prospective  Chin-shih's,  was  to  be  relegated  to  an  in- 
ferior position.^  ^^By  this  far-reaching  decree  the  entire 
system  of  education  in  China  was  for  the  time  being  over- 
thrown, and  the  literati,  discredited,  reduced  in  rank  and 
practically  useless,  almost  became  a  public  charge.     Then 

-followed  the  reorganization  of  the  army,  particularly  of 
the  eight  Manchu  "  Banners  ",  at  one  time  a  fine  lot  of 
medieval  soldiery  but  in  1899  as  scandalous  a  rabble  as  ever 
existed;^ the  founding  of  institutions  of  learning  in  the 
provinces  as  "  feeders  "  to  the  new  Peking  University;  the 

^establishment  of  official  Gazettes  throughout  the  Empire; 
the  right  of  any  and  all  Chinese  to  memorialize  the  Throne ;  ^ 

^he  proposed  creation  of  a  new  navy ;  the  installation  of  cen- 

J:ral  mining,  agricultural  and  railway  bureaus  at  the  capital ; 

^  The  British  Minister  considered  this  decree  "  probably  the  most 
important  ordinance."  He  continued :  "A  species  of  essay,  of  which 
the  composition  is  governed  by  highly  artificial  rules,  has  hitherto  been 
one  of  the  most  prominent  features  of  these  examinations.  For  this 
is  now  to  be  substituted  a  form  of  essay  of  a  more  practical  character. 
The  effect  of  this  reform  may  be  compared  with  the  change  that 
would  be  brought  about  if  in  England  an  absolute  mastery  of  Sanscrit 
verse  had  been  obligatory  on  all  public  servants,  and  were  now  dis- 
pensed with.  In  other  words,  the  large  army  of  students  in  the  Empire 
will  save  some  years  of  almost  useless  study.  The  change  has  been 
made  with  such  suddenness  that  injustice  is  done  to  those  who  have 
been  preparing  for  the  examination  under  present  conditions,  and  con- 
siderable discontent  must  be  aroused,  but  the  future  effect  cannot  be 
otherwise  than  good."     China  No.  i  (1899),  no.  297. 

'  Hitherto  restricted  to  high  officials,  if  the  documents  were  sealed. 


461]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  49 

and,  what  caused  the  most  consternation  of  all,  the  abolition  ^ 
of  many  of  the  sinecures  and  fat  allowances  that  had  been 
enjoyed  as  perquisites  by  the  Manchus  for  generations,  thus 
reducing  a  number  of  the  useless  horde  to  penury/  Fur- 
ther measures  designed  to  secure  for  China  a  budget  like 
those  of  the  European  Powers,  defined  the  mode  of  sub- 
scription to  the  Chinese  Internal  Loan,  abolished  some  of/ 
the  Grain  and  Salt  offices  and  their  attendant  grafts ;  ^ 
founded  the  "  Chinese  Progress  Magazine  " ;  provided  for  a 
railway  from  Peking  to  Hankow ;  *  protected  the  Christian 
religion  and  relations  with  the  foreigner;  converted  many 
of  the  temples  into  schools;  planned  a  total  revenue  of 
70,000,000  taels  annually ;  *  and  offered  liberal  rewards  or 
official  employment,  if  capable,  to  those  who  introduced 
"  new  books  ",^  or  established  colleges,  or  arsenals  for  the 
manufacture  of  rifles  and  cannon,  or  opened  up  mines,  or 
invented  something  useful,  or  improved  agriculture. 
Criticism  and  suggestion  concerning  the  policy  of  the  Gov- 
ernment was  to  be  freely  allowed  in  the  official  newspapers. 
In  the  decree  of  September  5th,  a  rather  pathetic  com- 
mentary on  this  ill-starred  movement,  the  Emperor  realized 
that  all  was  not  plain  sailing,  and  that  it  was  "  one  thing  to 
issue  a  reform  edict  and  another  to  get  it  obeyed  ".®    Speak- 

^  One  of  the  very  last  decrees  gave  the  Manchus  permission  to  settle 
in  the  provinces  if  they  wished  to  "  earn  their  living."  Bland  and 
Backhouse,  op.  cit.,  p.  198. 

"^  Those  abolished  were  "  all  Comptrollers  of  the  Grain  Tax  in 
provinces  where  there  is  no  grain  transport,  and  Comptrollers  of  the 
Salt  Revenue  in  provinces  where  no  salt  is  produced."  China  No.  i 
{1899),  no.  362. 

^Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  405. 

*  Douglas,  op.  cit.,  p.  326. 

^ "  Presumably  books  that  show  originality  of  thought."  China 
No.  I  (1899),  no.  362. 

^Ibid.,  no.  371. 


50  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [462 

ing  of  the  difficulties  of  his  task,  and  the  opposition  which 
he  had  aroused,  Kuang  Hsu  thus  addressed  his  subjects : 

In  promoting  reforms,  we  have  adopted  certain  European 
methods,  because,  while  China  and  Europe  are  both  alike  in 
holding  that  the  first  object  of  good  government  should  be  the 
welfare  of  the  people,  Europe  has  travelled  further  on  this 
road  than  we  have,  so  that,  by  the  introduction  of  European 
methods,  we  simply  make  good  China's  deficiencies.  But  our 
statesmen  and  scholars  are  so  ignorant  of  what  lies  beyond  our 
borders  that  they  look  upon  Europe  as  possessing  no  civiliza- 
tion. They  are  all  unaware  of  those  numerous  branches  of 
western  knowledge  whose  object  is  to  enlighten  the  mind  and 
increase  the  national  prosperity  of  the  people.  Physical  well- 
being  and  increased  longevity  of  the  race  are  hereby  secured  for 
the  masses. 

Is  it  possible  that  I,  the  Emperor,  am  to  be  regarded  as  a 
mere  follower  after  new  and  strange  ideas  because  of  my 
thirst  for  reform?  My  love  for  the  people,  my  children, 
springs  from  the  feeling  that  God  has  confided  them  to  me 
and  that  to  my  care  they  have  been  given  in  trust  by  my  illus- 
trious ancestors.  I  shall  never  feel  that  my  duty  as  sovereign 
is  fulfilled  until  I  have  raised  them  all  to  a  condition  of  peace- 
ful prosperity.  Moreover,  do  not  the  foreign  Powers  surround 
our  Empire,  committing  frequent  acts  of  aggression?  Unless 
we  learn  and  adopt  the  sources  of  their  strength,  our  plight 
cannot  be  remedied.  The  cause  of  my  anxiety  is  not  fully 
appreciated  by  my  people,  because  the  reactionary  element  de- 
liberately misrepresents  my  objects,  spreading  the  while  base- 
less rumors  so  as  to  disturb  the  minds  of  men.  When  I  reflect 
how  deep  is  the  ignorance  of  the  masses  of  the  dwellers  in  the 
innermost  parts  of  the  Empire  on  the  subject  of  my  proposed 
reforms,  my  heart  is  filled  with  care  and  grief.  Therefore  do 
I  hereby  now  proclaim  my  intentions  so  that  the  whole  Empire 
may  know  and  believe  that  their  sovereign  is  to  be  trusted  and 
that  the  people  may  cooperate  with  me  in  working  for  reform 
and  the  strengthening  of  the  country.     This  is  my  earnest  hope. 


463]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  5 1 

I  command  that  the  whole  of  my  reform  decrees  be  printed 
on  yellow  paper  and  distributed  for  the  information  of  all  men. 
The  district  magistrates  are  henceforward  privileged  to  submit 
memorials  to  me  through  the  provincial  viceroys,  so  that  I  may 
learn  the  real  needs  of  the  people.  Let  this  decree  be  ex- 
hibited in  the  front  hall  of  every  public  office  in  the  Empire 
so  that  all  men  may  see  it.^ 

From  July  nth  to  September  20th,  the  Emperor  and  his 
advisers,  first  Weng  Tung-ho,  then  Kang  Yu-wei,  had  their 
own  way  with  little  or  no  interference  from  the  Empress 
Dowager  who,  true  to  her  word,  seemed  to  have  gone  into 
complete  retirement.  Filial  piety,  however,  was  one  of  the 
predominant  traits  in  the  composition  of  Kuang  Hsu's  char- 
acter, and  at  first  he  had  unconsciously  bowed  to  his  Im- 
perial aunt's  former  absolutism  by  commanding  that  equal 
honors  and  presents  be  conferred  upon  Tzu  Hsi  as  if  she- 
were  still  jointly  associated  with  him  in  authority.^  The 
alliance  with  Kang  Yu-wei  altered  the  situation.  With  all 
his  flights  of  imagination  and  inability  to  forecast  the 
future,  Kang  had  wit  enough  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  the 
real  power  still  lay  with  the  Empress  ^Dowager,  whom  he 
hated  and  feared  with  the  intensity  born  of  a  presentiment 
of  impending  disaster.  Knowing  that  she  repaid  his  an- 
tagonism with  interest,  he  strove  with  all  his  energy  to  elim- 
inate the  "  Old  Buddha  "  from  Chinese  politics  by  driving 
from  the  Emperor's  mind  all  emotions  of  gratitude  to  the 
one  who  had  placed  him  upon  the  throne.  It  being  impos- 
sible for  Kang,  in  the  nature  of  things,  to  keep  his  designs 
secret,  the  knowledge  of  his  active  hostility  towards  Tzu 
Hsi  soon  became  public  property  in  the  Palace.  The  good- 
himiored  tolerance  with  which  she  had  previously  regarded 

*As  reprinted  by  Bland  and  Backhouse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  199,  200. 

^  Imperial  decree  of  June  11.     China  No.  i  (1899),  Inc.  2  in  no.  268. 


52  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [464 

the  reform  movement  then  gave  place  to  a  realization  of  its 
perils,  which  might  even  result  in  her  being  forcibly  assisted 
on  the  road  to  Heaven.  Though  fully  cognizant  of  the 
drift  of  events,  each  succeeding  day  more  unfavorable,  she 
bided  her  time,  holding  her  impatient  satellites  in  check 
until  the  danger  to  herself  and  to  her  party  became  over- 
whelming. Then  her  inactivity,  which  the  Emperor  had  as- 
sured himself  meant  indecision  and  a  sense  of  security,  was 
transformed  into  one  of  those  Hghtning-like  acts  of  which 
she  alone  in  all  China  seemed  capable.  As  by  a  bolt  from 
the  blue,  the  shell  of  reform  was  crushed  by  a  single  blow, 
well  directed  and  dealt  with  astonishing  rapidity. 

The  Emperor  had  severely  crippled  the  existing  official 
system  by  abolishing  six  of  the  Government  Boards  and  ap- 
portioning their  duties  among  the  remainder,^  thus  turning 
loose  a  large  staff  of  dispossessed  office-holders  to  swell  the 
ranks  of  the  malcontents  against  reform.  But  worse  was  to 
follow.  A  secretary  of  the  Board  of  Rites,  Wang  Chao, 
had  the  misplaced  courage  to  submit  a  memorial  which 
easily  outdistanced  even  the  grandiose  schemes  of  Kang 
Yu-wei.  This  document  contained  the  astonishing  recom- 
mendations that  the  queue  be  abolished,  that  Christianity-be 
established  as  the  state  religion,  that  a  national  parliament 
be  assembled,  and  that  the  Empress  Dowager  and  the  Em- 
peror make  a  journey  of  observation  to  Japan  and  Europe, 
to  witness  with  their  own  eyes  the  contrast  in  civilization 
and  progress  with  China  and  to  profit  thereby.  It  can  be 
imagined  how  these  proposals  amazed  the  ultra-Confucian 

^  These  six  Boards  were  abolished  "on  the  score  of  economy,"  as 
their  duties  were  "  largely  nominal."  Thereby,  however,  160  officials 
were  dismissed.  The  Emperor  had  also  resolved  that  "the  horde  of 
expectant  officials  at  the  various  provincial  capitals"  should  be  like- 
wise "carefully  weeded  out."  China  No.  i  {1899),  no.  362.  See  also 
no.  371. 


« 


465]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  53 

members  of  the  Board.  In  an  interview  with  Wang,  they 
begged  him  to  reconsider.  He  had  the  temerity  to  refuse, 
and  insisted  that  the  memorial  be  sent  as  it  was  to  the  Em- 
peror. That  was  accordingly  done,  but  the  Board  attached 
as  a  rider  a  counter-communication  denouncing  Wang  as  a 
visionary  and  praying  that  his  recommendations  be  inter- 
preted as  impracticable  and  absurd.  An  unlooked-for 
result,  the  Emperor  was  furious  at  this  attempt,  as  he 
chose  to  regard  it,  of  the  Board  to  dictate  his  actions  and  to 
aid  the  Imperial  mind  with  advice,  no  matter  how  humbly 
given.  It  seemed  that  Kuang  Hsu  was  not  as  open  to  con- 
viction by  arguments  from  outside  as  his  edicts  had  pro-j 
claimed  him.  In  a  fit  of  anger  of  the  martinet  variety^ 
such  as  he  frequently  displayed,  with  a  stroke  of  the  vermil- 
lion  pencil  he  dismissed  in  disgrace  the  two  Presidents  of 
the  Board  (one  a  Chinese  and  the  other  a  Manchu)  and 
four  Vice-Presidents  ^  for  having  dared  to  offer  sugges- 
tions, and  further  for  having  broken  the  seal  of  Wang's 
memorial,  instead  of  submitting  it  unopened.  The  inju- 
dicious'author  of  the  communication  was  himself  rewarded 
by  a  position  as  Judge  in  one  of  the  provinces.^  That  was 
the  last  important  act  of  Kuang  Hsu  in  his  brief  but  not  in- 
glorious career  as  reform  dictator.  The  cashiered  officials 
of  the  Board  of  Rites,  together  with  their  Manchu  and 
Chinese  sympathizers,  proceeded  in  a  body  to  the  palace  of 
the  Empress  Dowager  where,  en  retraite,  the  amiable  old 
lady  was  enjoying  herself  among  her  flowers  and  satis fy- 

*  The  Imperial  wrath  also  fell  upon  Li  Hung-chang,  who  was  dis- 
missed, September  7,  from  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  an  act  which  gave 
great  pleasure  to  Englishmen  in  China,  as  they  feared  Li's  pronounced 
(Russian  proclivities.  "  He  has  recently  shown  himself  markedly  anta- 
gonistic to  our  interests."  MacDonald  to  Salisbury,  China  No  i  (1899), 
no.  321. 

^  Wang  was  not  able  to  enjoy  his  reward,  as  the  reform  movement 
collapsed  shortly  afterwards. 


54  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [466 

ing  her  passion  for  theatricals.  On  their  knees  the  humili- 
ated bureaucrats  besought  her  to  resume  the  reins  of  gov- 
ernment, and  Tzu  Hsi,  feminine  to  the  last  by  dismissing 
them  without  indicating  her  mind,  perceived  that  the  psycho- 
logical moment  had  arrived  for  a  return  to  that  power 
which  she  coveted.^ 

Kang  Yu-wei  and  the  Emperor  sensed  the  danger  and  re- 
solved to  act  before  the  Empress  Dowager  could  have  her 
plans  perfected.  Kuang  Hsu,  completely  under  the  influ- 
ence of  his  adviser,  at  last  was  willing  to  seize  Tsu  Hsi  and 
hold  her  a  prisoner,  thus  to  prevent  her  from  doing  any 
further  mischief  to  reform.  To  accomplish  this,  it  was  nec- 
essary first  of  all  that  Jung  Lu,  Viceroy  of  Chihli  and  com- 
mander of  the  northern  military  and  naval  forces,  should 
be  disposed  of,  as  he  was  the  main  reliance  and  support  of 
Tzu  Hsi  and  next  to  her  the  chief  obstacle  to  the  new 
regime.  The  commission  to  make  an  end  of  Jung  Lu  fell 
upon  Yuan  Shih-kai,  protege  of  Li  Hung-chang  and  later 
governor  of  Shantung,  who  had  assembled  through  his  own 
initiative  and  energy  the  best  and  only  foreign-drilled  troops 
in  China  at  that  time,  some  seven  thousand  in  all.^  His 
instructions  were  to  repair  immediately  to  Tientsin,  arrest 
Jung  Lu,  summarily  behead  him  and  return  in  all  haste  to 
Peking,  surround  the  palace  of  the  Empress  Dowager  and 
take  her  captive.  Unfortunately  for  the  Emperor,  Yuan 
Shih-kai,  although  a  modern  Chinese,  elected  to  do  other- 
wise. Of  liberal  nature  and  tendencies,  the  most  popular 
native  official  with  the  foreigners,  yet  he  feared,  and 
rightly  so,  that  the  reform  movement  was  but  a  creation  of 
the  mist,  doomed  to  failure  through  the  inability  of  his 

^  Bland  and  Backhouse,  op.  cit.,  p.  197;  Douglas,  op.  cit.,  pp.  328-330; 
Sergeant,  op.  cit.,  p.  178;  Smith,  China  in  Convulsion,  vol.  i,  pp.  145,  146. 

^Drilled  by  the  German  von  Hanneken.  See  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol. 
iii,  p.  408. 


^Sy-^  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  55 

country  to  grasp  it ;  and  that  the  future  of  China,  instead  of 
brightening,  was  in  reaHty  getting  darker.  As  might  have 
been  expected,  far  from  decapitating  his  blood-brother  Juna 
Lu,  Yuan,  in  a  scene  of  Shakespearian  intensity,^  merely 
informed  him  of  the  sentence,  and  together  they  hurried 
back  to  Peking  and  laid  bare  the  plot  to  the  Empress  Dow- 
ager, who  already  had  more  than  an  inkling  of  it.  Imme- 
diately, this  energetic  old  woman,  accompanied  solely  by 
an  escort  of  eunuchs  picked  up  on  the  spur  of  the  moment, 
hastened  to  the  palace  where  the  Emperor  was  living  in 
solitary  grandeur,  and  taking  him  utterly  by  surprise,  over- 
whelmed him  with  her  wrath  and  contempt.  "  You  are 
after  all  but  an  unsophisticated  child.  Return  at  once  to 
your  inner  apartments!  It  is  evident  that  I  must  resume 
control  to  save  the  Empire,  which  you,  in  your  extreme  un- 
wisdom and  foolishness,  seem  to  be  doing  your  best  to 
drive  to  perdition  "."  Her  swift  action,  so  characteristic  of 
her  conduct  in  every  one  of  the  many  crises  of  her  life, 
completely  unnerved  the  mild-mannered  Kuang  Hsu.  With- 
out opposition  either  by  word  or  deed  he  surrendered  the 
great  seal  and  his  authority  with  it.  But  he  managed  to 
warn  Kang  Yu-wei  in  advance.  "  My  heart  is  filled  with 
very  great  sorrow,  which  pen  and  ink  cannot  describe.  You 
must  go  abroad  at  once,  and  without  a  moment's  delay  de- 
vise some  means  of  saving  me  ".* 

The  decree  of  September  21st,  in  name  only  from  the     / 
Emperor,  marked  his  fall  from  power  and  the  ruin  of  his 
party : 

^  For  interesting  accounts,  differing  in  detail,  of  the  meeting  between 
Yuan  Shih-kai  and  Jung  Lu,  see  Bland  and  Backhouse,  op.  cit.,  p.  206; 
Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  408. 

'^  As  reprinted  in  Douglas,  op.  cit.,  p.  331. 

^  As  reprinted  in  Sergeant,  op.  cit.,  p.  185. 


56  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [468 

The  affairs  of  the  nation  are  at  present  in  a  difficult  position, 
and  everything  awaits  reform.  I,  the  Emperor,  am  working 
day  and  night  with  all  my  powers,  and  every  day  arrange  a 
multitude  of  affairs.  But,  despite  my  careful  toil,  I  constantly 
fear  to  be  overwhelmed  by  the  press  of  work. 

I  reverently  recall  that  Her  Majesty  the  Empress  Dowager 
has  on  two  occasions  since  the  reign  of  Tung  Chih  (1861)  as- 
sumed the  reins  of  Government  with  great  success  in  critical 
periods.     In  all  she  did  Her  Majesty  showed  perfection. 

Moved  by  a  deep  regard  for  the  welfare  of  the  nation,  I 
have  repeatedly  implored  Her  Majesty  to  be  graciously  pleased 
to  advise  me  in  government,  and  have  received  her  assent. 

This  is  an  assurance  of  prosperity  to  the  whole  nation, 
officials  and  people. 

Her  Majesty  will  commence  to  transact  business  from  today 
in  the  side  Hall. 

On  the  23rd  of  September  I,  the  Emperor,  will  lead  my 
princes  and  high  officials  to  make  obeisance  in  the  Chih  Chang 
Hall.  Let  the  proper  officials  reverently  and  carefully  prepare 
the  fitting  programme  of  the  ceremony.^ 

^  Such  was  the  Coup  d'Etat,  in  itself  a  bloodless  revolu- 
tion and  the  end  of  reform.  The  reasons  for  the  failure  of 
the  "  New  China  "  are  easily  understandable.  In  attempt- 
ing too  much,  the  reformers  accomplished  practically  noth- 
ing at  all.  Their  ideal  structure  was  top-heavy,  and,  built 
upon  no  foundation  worth  speaking  of,  was  crushed  by  its 
own  weight.  Their  mistakes  were  many;  one  blunder  fol- 
lowed another;  no  adjustment  was  offered  to  harmonize 
existing  conditions.  Old  China  was  completely  discarded 
in  this  craze  for  the  modern  order,  and  institutions  and  cus- 
toms which  heretofore  had  been  the  backbone  of  the  na- 

'^  China  No.  i  {1899),  Inc.  in  no.  386.  Also  reprinted  in  Bland  and 
Backhouse,  op.  cit.,  p.  208;  Sergeant,  op.  cit.,  p.  186;  U.  S.  For.  Rel, 
1898,  Inc.  in  no.  49,  p.  218.  A  French  version  is  given  in  Cordier,  op. 
cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  408. 


469]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  57 

tional  existence,  were  henceforth  to  be  regarded,  if  not  as 
entirely  useless,  at  least  as  of  secondary  importance.  Un- 
doubtedly the  main  reason  why  the  movement  collapsed 
was  the  poor  judgment  displayed  by  Kang  Yu-wei  and  the 
Emperor.  In  their  zeal  for  innovation  and  change,  they 
struck  too  deeply  at  the  root  of  "  things  Chinese  ",  at  insti- 
tutions conservative  to  a  fault  and  the  most  difficult  in  the 
world  to  modify  or  change.  The  edicts,  covering  as  they 
did  a  great  variety  of  subjects,  military,  political,  educa- 
tional, social  and  civil,  were  presented  to  the  nation  in 
helter-skelter  fashion,  in  head-long  haste,  and  their  accept- 
ance and  observance  could  have  been  possible  only  through 
a  complete  revolution  in  Chinese  life,  manners  and  thought, 
a  breakaway  in  two  months  from  the  civilization  of  two 
thousand  years.  No  attempt  was  made  to  placate  opposi- 
tion or  to  allay  prejudices;  the  reformers  rode  rough-shod 
over  many,  in  fact  almost  all,  of  those  cherished  ideals 
which  had  becpme  atavisms  with  the  Chinese  centuries  ago. 
They  entirely  forgot  time  and  place,  and  exhibited  through- 
out that  unconsciousness  of  existing  conditions  to  be  met 
and  overcome  before  success  is  assured  which  seems  typical 
of  most  idealists  when  placed  in  a  position  of  authority.  It 
was  as  impossible  for  the  China  of  1898  to  swallow  the  in- 
digestible remedies  which  the  reformers  proposed  as  to  be 
governed  by  the  Republic  of  Plato,  and  as  far  as  the  ability 
of  the  masses  was  concerned  at  that  time  to  understand  and 
assimilate  what  was  being  offered  them,  Plato  would  have 
done  as  well  as  Kang  Yu-wei. 

The  reformers,  through  their  lack  of  foresight  and  of 
ability  to  strike  the  happy  medium,  had  the  misfortune  to  r 
antagonize  everyone  in  the  Empire  not  of  their  own  party, 
both  Manchus  and  Chinese,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest. 
First,  the  literati,  the  pride  of  the  people,  symbolic  to  them 
of  the  heights  of  human  attainment,  were  thrust  aside  with 


58  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [470 

scarcely  an  effort  made  to  incorporate  them  into  tfie  new 
order,  their  labors  discredited,  their  honors  automatically 
removed,  themselves  reduced  to  failures.  Thus  at  the  out- 
set the  innate  conservatism  of  the  Chinese  received  an  un- 
expected shock,  and  the  most  powerful,  the  most  numerous, 
the  most  revered  leaders  among  the  masses,  these  literati 
to  be  found  in  every  village,  hamlet  and  wayside  inn,  be- 
came the  most  insistent  opponents  of  the  new  regime.  In 
addition,  the  Manchus  were  practically  unanimous  against 
the  movement,  for  they  understood  that  were  it  to  succeed, 
its  triumph  would  mean  their  annihilation,  existing  as  they 
did  solely  on  sufferance ;  by  bribery,  corruption,  and  the  dis- 
inclination of  the  subject  race  to  a  violent  change  of  any 
kind.  They  were  not  alone  in  their  whole-hearted  opposition 
to  the  abolition  of  official  sinecures  and  grafts ;  the  attempt 
to  eliminate  the  "  squeeze  "  likewise  alienated  the  thou- 
sands of  petty  Chinese  magistrates  in  the  provinces,  who, 
without  these  illegal  perquisites,  could  not  exist  on  their 
miserably  inadequate  salaries.  By  the  conversion  of  tem- 
ples into  schools  for  "  western  learning  '*,  the  religious  sen- 
sibilities of  the  people  were  outraged,  and  those  sensibilities 
were  still  further  inflamed  by  the  multitude  of  priests  who 
feared  the  apparent  favoritism  of  the  edicts  towards  Chris- 
tianity. Still  more  distasteful  were  the  actions  of  a  certain 
proportion  of  the  "  Young  China  ",  whose  display  of  ego- 
tistical ignorance  of  the  fundamentals  of  human  nature  pro- 
duced exactly  the  opposite  effect  to  that  which  they  de- 
sired.^ A  goodly  number  of  them  ridiculed  the  literati, 
made  light  of  filial  piety,  scorned  the  national  heroes,  thus 
holding  up  to  contempt  the  most  sacred  traditions  of  China, 
ingrained  ages  ago  in  the  Chinese  character,  and  among  its 

* "  I  consider  that  the  cause  of  true  reform  in  China  has  been  much 
injured  by  the  injudicious  conduct  of  Kang  Yu-Wei  and  his  friends." 
MacDonald  to  Salisbury,  China  No.  i  (1899),  no.  401. 


471  ]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  ^g 

finest  attributes.  Thus  the  reform  was  discredited  mainly 
through  its  own  violence  and  lack  of  ability  to  appreciate 
the  past,  to  conciliate  the  present  and  to  interpret  the  future. 
The  movement  is  analogous  to  many  of  the  purist  and  re- 
hgious  waves  of  unrest  which  sweep  every  once  in  a  while 
over  the  United  States,  such  as  the  abolitionist  fanaticism 
which  brought  on  the  Civil  War,  and  the  perennial  "  revi- 
vals "  which  spring  up  here  and  there.  Like  each  of  these 
the  reform  movement  was  at  cross-purposes  with  humanity>/ 
at  large,  and  like  each  of  these  must  either  destroy  the  oppo- 
sition in  to  to  or  fail  in  the  attempt,  either  everything  or 
nothing. 

It  may  seem  rather  curious  on  first  thought  that  the  Powers 
should  have  been  so  indifferent  to  this  struggle  for  the  re- 
habilitation of  China,  and  that  no  encouragement  was  re- 
ceived by  the  reform  party  from  the  foreign  representatives 
at  Peking.  The  fault  for  this,  however,  lies  with  the  re- 
formers themselves.  They  made  no  attempt  to  enlist  for- 
eign sympathy  or  foreign  co-operation,  and  the  only  infor- 
mation that  the  Ministers  received  of  the  movement  was 
when  each  successive  edict  was  published  in  the  official 
Peking  Gazette.  As  to  the  purposes  of  Kang  Yu-wei  and 
his  ultimate  plans,  the  foreign  representatives  were  as  much 
in  the  dark  concerning  these  as  the  rest  of  China,  and  each 
new  surprising  innovation  startled  them  as  much  as  it  did 
the  outside  world.  Neither  the  Emperor  nor  any  of  his 
advisers  had  any  diplomatic  ability,  and  the  capable  and  ex- 
perienced Li  Hung-chang,  as  has  been  noted,  was  in  the 
opposite  camp.  Kang's  knowledge  of  world  politics  was 
small;  the  term  embraced  a  sphere  which  lay  outside  his 
special  line  of  activities.    To  quote  a  British  critic : 

It  must  be  remembered  .  .  .  that  his  knowledge  of  China's 
relations  with  foreign  Powers  and  of  negotiations  with  them 


6o  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [472 

is  very  slight;  he  appears  to  have  been  absorbed  in  questions 
of  internal  reform  and  to  have  paid  little  or  no  attention  to 
matters  of  foreign  policy.  He  speaks  generally  of  the  desir- 
ability of  an  Anglo-American  alliance  for  the  protection  of 
China,  and  the  danger  to  the  world  of  Russian  control  of  the 
masses  of  Chinese,  but  only  as  a  man  repeating  what  he  has 
read  in  the  way  of  wide  political  speculation.^ 

In  fact,  the  reformers  underrated  the  value  of  foreign  sym- 
pathy for  the  cause  and  the  benefits  which  might  have  ac- 
crued to  them  from  foreign  diplomatic  aid.  They  seemed 
content  only  with  the  internal  aspects  of  the  situation,  which 
was  a  serious  mistake.  Consequently,  it  is  small  wonder 
that  the  British  consular  and  diplomatic  corps  should  have 
termed  the  Coup  d'Etat  a  "  Palace  revolution  ",^  under- 
standing thereby  merely  the  triumph  of  one  Court  faction 
over  the  other.^ 

Although  the  Coup  d'Etat  itself  was  accomplished  with- 
out loss  of  life,  succeeding  events  revealed  choice  instances 
of  that  brutish  hate  and  persecution  generally  found  in  Ori- 
ental despotisms.  The  arch-conspirator  Kang  Yu-wei  es- 
caped,* much  to  the  chagrin  of  the  Empress  Dowager,  who 
doubtless  had  reserved  for  him  the  most  exquisite  tortures 
at  her  command.  We  learn  with  surprise  that  Kang  ''formed 
a  party  for  his  own  selfish  purposes;  therefore  his  offense 
is  very  grave  ".     Such  was  Tzu  Hsi's  denunciation  of  her 

*  Henry  Cockburn,  Memorandum  of  conversation  with  Kang  Yu-wei 
on  Voyage  from  Shanghai  to  Hong  Kong,  September  27-29,  1898,  in 
China  No.  i  {1899),  Inc.  2  in  no.  401. 

^Acting  Consul-General  Brenan  (Shanghai)  to  Lord  Salisbury, 
ibid.,  no.  ZZ7-  The  term  is  used  extensively  in  the  cited  volume  of 
the  Parliamentary  Papers. 

'  For  a  criticism  of  the  inactivity  of  the  Powers  see  Smith,  China 
in  Convulsion,  vol.  i,  p.  150. 

*With  the  help  of  British  sympathizers.  See  China  No.  i  {1899),. 
nos.  343,  379  and  Inc.,  386,  387,  401  and  Inc. 


473]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  6 J 

greatest  enemy.  Nor  was  that  all.  The  decree  of  Septem- 
ber 29th  is  an  illuminating  document  not  alone  for  its  mis- 
representation of  Kang's  reform  program,  which,  in  spite 
of  its  many  glaring  errors,  was  attempted  with  the  highest 
and  most  laudable  motives  possible,  but  also  as  illustrating 
how,  in  times  of  national  hate,  fear  or  distress,  history  and 
current  events  are  often  deliberately  distorted  by  educated 
and  uneducated  alike  in  the  blind  effort  to  justify  or  con- 
demn the  action  in  question.  In  presenting  the  other  sidv^. 
of  the  lantern,  a  wholly  false  view  by  the  way,  Tzu  Hsi 
said: 

Whereas  the  present  times  and  affairs  are  full  of  difficulties, 
the  Court  has  diligently  planned  for  the  Government,  seeking 
reforms  for  its  prosperity  according  to  the  plans  for  the  wel- 
fare of  the  people  as  handed  down  by  our  ancestors.  The 
Emperor  has  labored  night  and  day  with  unwearied  diligence, 
but  unexpectedly  there  appeared  a  manager  of  affairs,  Kang 
Yu-wei,  a  leader  of  false  doctrines,  a  deceiver  of  the  age,  a 
slanderer  of  men,  who  led  a  crowd  of  low  followers  and  took 
advantage  of  the  attempt  at  reforms  to  impose  his  own  re- 
bellious conduct.  ...  It  is  also  reported  that  his  murderous 
band  had  formed  a  society  to  preserve  China,  but  not  the 
Manchu  dynasty.  This  rebellious  conduct  is  certainly  to  be 
detested.  My  great  filial  affection  for  the  Empress  Dowager 
(the  edict  is  Tzu  Hsi's,  and  in  name  only  from  the  Emperor) 
must  be  known  to  foreigners  and  Chinese.  Kang  Yu-wei's 
learning  is  crafty  and  false.  Those  books  which  he  constantly 
made  were  opposed  to  the  classics,  misleading  and  destructive 
of  the  sages  and  laws.  Because  of  his  constant  advocacy  of 
reforms  he  was  appointed  to  a  post  in  the  Foreign  Office,  and 
we  (meaning  Kuang  Hsu)  appointed  him  to  immediately  re- 
pair to  Shanghai  to  take  charge  of  the  Government  press  (the 
reform  Gazette),  but  he  lingered  in  the  capital  to  stir  up  strife 
and  practice  his  dark  designs.  Unless  the  protection  of  our 
ancestors  had  enabled  us  to  clearly  see  his  schemes  before- 


62  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [474 

hand,  there  is  no  telling  what  would  have  happened.  Kang 
Yu-wei,  the  chief  of  rebels,  has  now  absconded;  therefore  let 
all  the  provincials  strenuously  seek  him  out  and  arrest  him  for 
severest  punishment.^ 

Unfortunately,   Kang's  brother  was   captured,  together 
I  with  five  other  young  men,  all  of  these  of  good  family,  well 
j  educated,  and  of  high  standing  in  Chinese  social  life.  These, 
I  brave   to   the   last,    were   publicly   decapitated   without   a 
'  moment's  delay  for  their  share  in  the  late  movement.     But 
the  Empress  Dowager  proceeded  no  further  than  with  the 
pursuit  of  the  sponsors  of  reform.     It  was  deemed  good 
policy  to  let  their  misguided  followers  alone.    "  Besides  the 
persons  arrested,  there  is  no  guaranteeing  that  among  offi- 
cials and  literati  there  may  not  be  others  who  were  seduced 
by  him  (Kang  Yu-wei)  ;  but  the  Court  will  act  with  great 
forbearance,  and  will  not  probe  deeply,  in  order  to  make 
known  our  caution  in  inflicting  punishments."  ^ 

One  of  the  most  prominent  of  those  who  fell  under  sus- 
picion was  Chang  In-huan,  who  was  one  of  the  two  members 
of  the  first  Chinese  Peace  Commission  to  Japan  in  1895. 
Although  it  was  satisfactorily  proved  that  Chang  "  did  not 
belong  to  Kang  Yu-wei's  party  ",  yet  ''  his  reputation  is  a 
bad  one"  (decree  of  September  26th).  The  ''reprehen- 
sible" Chang  was  further  stigmatized  (decree  of  Septem- 
ber 29th)  as  "  very  clever  at  imposing  on  people  ",  and  it 
further  developed  that  "  his  actions  were  deceitful,  myster- 
ious, and  fickle,  and  he  sought  after  the  rich  and  powerful". 
The  truth  of  the  matter  was  that  Chang  had  the  misfor- 
tune to  be  an  enemy  of  Li  Hung-chang,  who  was  now  re- 
turning to  power  with  the  Empress  Dowager.  September 
25  th  it  was  rumored  in  Peking  that  Chang  was  to  be  exe- 

^U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1898,  Inc.  in  no.  54,  p.  221. 

'  Decree  of  September  26,  in  China  No.  i  {1899),  Inc.  4  in  no.  386. 


475]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  63 

cuted,  *'  the  same  evening  or  next  morning  ".  Sir  Claude 
MacDonald,  the  British  Minister,  immediately  bestirred 
himself  "  to  make  an  appeal  on  his  (Chang's)  behalf  for  at 
least  due  consideration  of  any  charge  brought  against  him". 
MacDonald  continues : 

The  report  reached  me  late  in  the  afternoon,  and  it  was  there- 
fore necessary  to  take  prompt  measures.  It  was  supposed 
that  Li  Hung-chang  had  been  consulted  by  the  Empress 
Dowager  in  the  matter.  I  accordingly  addressed  a  letter  to 
his  Excellency  pointing  out  the  horror  with  which  such  sudden 
executions  were  regarded  by  all  western  nations,  and  the  bad 
effect  the  secret  and  hasty  condemnation  of  an  official  of 
Chang's  rank,  who  was  so  well  known  in  Europe,  would  pro- 
duce, and  begged  his  Excellency  to  use  whatever  influence  he 
possessed  to  prevent  such  hurried  action.  I  concluded  my 
letter  by  saying  that  I  appealed  to  him,  Li,  because  he  was  the 
only  statesman  now  in  Peking  who  was  conversant  with  Euro- 
pean methods,  and  would,  therefore,  thoroughly  realize  the 
disastrous  impression  which  such  a  summary  execution  would 
produce  throughout  the  western  world. 

Thanks  to  the  British  Minister's  efficient  aid,  Chang  was 
saved  from  probable  death,  but  was  detained  in  prison  and 
later  banished  to  the  frontier  of  Chinese  Turkestan.^ 

As  a  concession  to  Europe  and  to  the  foreigners  in 
China,  dtoubtless  to  allay  foreign  apprehension  and  avert 
diplomatic  interference,  the  Empress  Dowager  announced 
that  "  we  shall  endeavor  to  arrive  at  a  happy  medium,  and 
not  simply  follow  our  own  inclinations.  Therefore  all  offi- 
cials, great  and  small,  ought  to  sympathize  with  us,  and 
earnestly  strive  to  aid  us  in  the  administration  of  the  Gov- 
ernment and  to  proclaim  the  truth  ".     But  the  effect  of 

^  China  No.  i  (1899),  nos.  339,  343,  386,  387;  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1898, 
Inc.  3  and  5  in  no.  54,  pp.  220,  221. 


64  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [476 

these  fine  words  was  diminished  by  the  repressive  meas- 
ures against  reform.  Tzu  Hsi  reasoned  correctly  that  the 
object  of  the  Emperor  in  aboHshing  the  six  Government 
Boards  in  Peking  and  many  other  sinecures  had  been  "  to 
sift  out  and  reduce  the  number  of  supernumeraries  "  and 
"  all  necessary  duties  ".  However,  Tzu  Hsi  discovered  that 
the  "  provincial  officials  did  not  investigate  the  matter  ", 
with  the  result  that  "  numerous  memorials  recommending 
great  changes  "  poured  in  upon  the  Government.  In  rea- 
soning on  these  memorials,  said  an  edict : 

Falsehoods  have  been  propagated.  What  will  be  the  end? 
If  the  truth  is  not  made  known  there  is  reason  to  fear  that 
the  people  will  become  excited  by  this  random  talk,  and  tran- 
quility will  cease  to  prevail,  and  all  our  efforts  for  the  pros- 
perity of  the  Empire  will  avail  nothing. 

As  an  easy  solution  of  the  difficulty  and  to  her  own  satis- 
faction and  that  of  the  entire  Manchu  tribe,  the  Empress 
Dowager  ordered  the  six  Boards  to  be  "  restored  and  con- 
duct their  affairs  as  usual  ".^  As  regards  the  Emperor's 
dismissals  of  useless  officials  in  the  provinces,  these  orders 
were  declared  void.  Also,  the  task  of  deciding  which  of 
the  ''official  posts  and  officers  in  the  various  provinces  ought 
to  be  abolished  ",  and  which  "  unemployed  officials  "  should 
be  "  dispensed  with  "  was  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  "Gov- 
ernors and  Governors- General  '^  who,  understanding  per- 
fectly the  present  state  of  affairs  at  Court,  naturally  enough 
did  nothing. 

The  permission  given  by  Kuang  Hsu  allowing  anyone  to 

*  These  six  Boards,  of  no  use  whatever  to  the  efficient  administra- 
tion of  the  Government,  were  (i)  the  Imperial  Supervisorate  of  In- 
struction, (2)  the  Office  of  Transmission,  (3)  the  Grand  Court  of 
Revision,  (4)  the  Court  of  Imperial  Entertainments,  (5)  the  Court  of 
the  Imperial  Stud,  (6)  the  Court  of  Imperial  Ceremonial. 


477]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  65 

memorialize  the  Government,  so  that  "  we  should  see  with 
the  eyes  and  hear  with  the  ears  of  everybody  "  was  taken 
away.  The  result  was  that  only  high  officials,  as  hereto- 
fore, could  present  sealed  communications.  But  these  offi- 
cers were  instructed  "  to  say  what  they  have  to  say  in  fitting 
language  ".  The  Empress  Dowager  had  been  pained  to  find 
that  the  reform  edicts  were  "  full  of  frivolous  statements; 
some  even  touch  on  the  extravagant  ",  and  all  were  "  much 
wanting  in  order  ".  It  was  the  last  error  which  was  above 
all  a  deadly  sin  with  the  literati.  The  Chinese  Progress 
Magazine  was  declared  "of  no  benefit  to  good  government 
and  will  vainly  distract  men's  minds  ",  therefore  Tzu  Hsi 
recommended  that  it  "  be  abolished  at  once  ".  The  Imperial 
(Peking)  University  was  allowed  to  stand,  as  it  was  "  for 
the  culture  of  the  people  ".  As  for  the  new  education  in 
the  provinces,  ''  let  the  local  officials  in  all  prefectures  and 
districts  where  it  is  proposed  to  establish  minor  colleges 
consider  the  local  conditions  and  the  convenience  of  the  peo- 
ple ",  which  meant,  as  the  people  at  large  did  not  concern 
themselves  about  colleges,  that  nothing  would  be  done. 
Regarding  temples,  these  "  shall  continue  as  formerly  "  and 
"  need  not  be  converted  into  schools  "  as  the  reformers 
had  planned.  This  order  was  for  the  reason  "  that  the  peo- 
ple may  not  be  offended  "  in  their  religious,  or  rather  their 
Confucian  and  Taoist,  susceptibilities.  Regarding  trade, 
agriculture,  the  reorganization  of  the  army,  and  the  devel- 
opment of  revenue,  all  of  these  "  are  of  undoubted  conse- 
quence to  the  State  ",  but  "  must  imperatively  be  introduced 
gradually  'V  in  other  words,  not  at  all.  Furthermore,  "all 
business  must  be  deliberated  upon  with  the  greatest  care  in 
order  to  decide  what  should  be  introduced  and  what  re- 
jected, so  that  the  good  may  be  retained  and  not  a  single 

^The  italics  are  the  author's. 


66  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [478 

flaw  remain  ".  What  ''  good  "  would  thus  be  ''  retained  ", 
as  far  as  new  ideas  were  concerned,  may  be  judged  by  the 
admonition  that  "  all  obey  the  teachings  ",  which  meant 
Confucius  and  the  ancient  system  only,  with  no  modern 
hybrid.  This  ended  reform,  and  China,  with  hardly  a  dis- 
senting voice,  contentedly  slid  back  into  the  old  groove/ 

Two  phases  immediately  connected  with  the  Empress 
Dowager's  return  to  power  demand  comment.  One  of  these 
was  the  reception  given  to  the  wives  of  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives. Report  has  it  that  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  the 
first  "  barbarian  "  to  meet  Her  August  Majesty  face  to  face, 
had  solicited  the  interview  at  the  instigation  of  Lady  Mac- 
Donald.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  determining  cause, 
the  meeting  itself  was  probably  no  more  than  a  clever  bit 
of  diplomacy  on  the  part  of  Tzu  Hsi  to  make  herself  agree- 
able to  anyone  of  influence,  so  as  to  gloss  over  as  much  as 
possible  her  practical  usurpation  of  the  throne.  As  for  the 
reception,  it  was  a  distinct  success.  Lady  MacDonald  made 
a  brief  address  in  which  she  expressed  the  ''  feelings  of 
respect  and  pleasure  "  of  the  ladies  at  this  permission  "  to 
offer  personally  our  congratulations  upon  the  64th  birth- 
day of  Your  Imperial  Majesty  ",  and  concluded  with  the 
hope  that  now  "  the  peoples  of  the  East  and  West  will  con- 
tinue to  draw  nearer  to  each  other  in  social  intercourse  ", 
which  was  hoping  a  great  deal  at  that  time.  To  which  Tzu 
Hsi,  through  Prince  Ching,  replied  that  Lady  MacDonald's 
words  were  ''  propitious  and  pleased  me  greatly  ".  In  fact. 
Her  Majesty  almost  overacted.  Each  of  the  visiting  ladies 
was  embraced  and  given  a  pearl  ring,  and  later  Tzu  Hsi 
sent  each  a  portrait  painted  by  herself,  which  must  have 
been  a  fair  copy,  as  she  was  quite  a  skillful  artist.  She 
also  drank  a  "  loving  cup  of  tea  "  with  an  individual  sip  for 

^  China  No.  i  {1899),  Inc.  3  in  no.  386;  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1898,  Inc. 
2  and  6  in  no.  54,  pp.  219-221. 


479]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  67 

each  guest,  to  give  weight  to  her  reiterated  phrase  of  all 
being  in  "  one  family  "/  It  was  confidently  beheved  at  the 
time,  however,  that  at  last  the  barriers  were  down  and  that 
a  new  era  was  to  begin.  Minister  Conger  gave  the  opinion 
that  the  reception  might  "  inspire  within  the  Imperial  Pal- 
ace a  desire  to  see  and  know  more  of  western  people  and 
western  things;  and  that  when  it  is  once  known  by  the 
Chinese  people  generally  that  the  Empress  Dowager  is  her- 
self willing  to  see  and  entertain  foreigners,  some  of  their 
antipathy  will  be  allayed  ".  But  events  proved  otherwise, 
and  by  the  irony  of  fate  these  same  ladies  with  their  dis- 
tinguished husbands,  who  no  doubt  had  been  included  by 
Tzu  Hsi  in  her  transient  friendship,  were  trapped  in  their 
own  Legations,  the  one  place  sacred  the  world  over  by  in- 
ternational law  and  immemorial  custom,  fighting  for  .their 
lives  with  the  energy  of  despair.^ 

The  other  phase  dealt  with  the  health  of  the  unfortunate 
Kuang  Hsu.  Never  of  robust  constitution,  always  inclined 
towards  illness  and  melancholia,  it  is  small  wonder,  consid- 
ering the  terrific  strain  of  the  last  few  weeks  on  his  sensi- 
tive nature,  together  with  his  present  close  confinement, 
that  mind  and  body  should  have  suffered  a  serious  relapse. 
As  early  as  September  25th,  but  two  days  after  the  Empress 
Dowager  assumed  full  powers,  an  Imperial  edict  announced : 

^"At  the  instance  of  the  foreign  ladies  of  the  Legations,  this  touch- 
ing interview  was  repeated  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  1900,  under 
Hke  conditions.  Five  months  later  Her  Majesty  was  issuing  Edicts 
which  ordered  her  troops,  in  large  numbers  and  constantly  recruited 
with  fresh  men,  to  throw  Krupp  shells  and  fire  Mauser  and  Mann- 
licher  bullets  into  the  dwelling-places  of  these  same  ladies  from  the 
West,  with  a  view  of  their  speedy  extinction,  thus  leaving  only  the 
Chinese  (and  Manchu)  contingent  of  the  "one  family"  surviving. 
Smith,  China  in  Convulsion,  vol.  i,  p.  28.  See  also  Sergeant,  op.  cit., 
pp.  198-202. 

*See  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1898,  no.  114  and  Inc.  i  and  2  in  no.  114,  pp. 
223-225;  China  No.  i  (1899),  no.  426;  China  No.  i  (1900),  no.  22. 


¥ 


6S  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [480 

Ever  since  the  fourth  moon  we  have  constantly  been  indis- 
posed, and  although  for  a  long  time  have  been  under  treatment 
there  has  been  no  improvement.  Therefore,  if  there  is  any 
person  who  is  skilled  in  the  science  of  medicine,  let  him  be  re- 
commended immediately  by  any  official  in  the  Empire,  and  if 
he  is  now  residing  in  some  other  province,  let  him  come  to 
Peking  speedily  and  without  delay. ^ 

No  competent  Chinese  physician,  even  with  foreign  train- 
ing, seems  to  have  appeared,  and  some  three  weeks  later  the 
subject  was  voluntarily  broached  to  the  British  Minister  by 
Prince  Ching  and  the  Tsung-li  Yamen.  In  the  interview 
which  followed,  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  intimated  that 
"  the  rumors  with  regard  to  the  Emperor's  health  and  de- 
signs upon  his  life  were  well  known  to  them",  by  which  they 
referred  to  the  persistent  talk  going  the  rounds  in  Peking 
that  Kuang  Hsu  would  soon  "  ascend  on  High  "  through 
the  instrumentality  of  his  august  aunt.  Prince  Ching  took 
advantage  of  the  occasion  to  act  as  apologist  for  the  Em- 
press Dowager,  stating  that  she  was  "  not  wholly  opposed 
to  reform,  but  China  was  not  prepared  for  such  sweeping 
reforms  as  those  recently  laid  before  the  Emperor  ",  which 
was  probably  the  truth.  In  conclusion,  the  Prince  "  confi- 
dentially "  asked  the  British  Minister  ''  how  the  present  un- 
rest could  best  be  calmed  down ",  and  MacDonald  sug- 
gested the  happy  expedient  that  a  foreign  physician  be  called 
upon  to  give  "  a  certificate  as  to  the  Empetor's  health  ", 
which  would  have  ''  a  very  reassuring  effect  ".  The  advice 
of  MacDonald  was  received  "  with  every  sign  of  approval", 
although  he  was  quite  sure  it  would  be  disregarded.  Some 
days  later,  October  i8th,  a  pleasant  surprise  was  given  him 
when  he  learned  that  his  suggestion  had  been  acted  upon 

^  U.  iS.  For.  ReL,  1898,  Inc.  i  in  no.  54,  p.  219. 


48l]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  69 

and  that  Dr.  Detheve  of  the  French  Legation  was  commis- 
sioned to  examine  the  Emperor  and  "  certify  as  to  his  con- 
dition ".  The  Doctor's  diagnosis  showed  that  Kuang  Hsu 
was  suffering  from  Bright's  disease,  but  was  in  no  imme- 
diate danger.  The  part  of  this  incident  which  seems  to  have 
rankled  in  Tzu  Hsi's  mind  was  not  the  consultation  with  the 
foreign  physician  but  the  "  semi-official  "  warning  of  Mac- 
Donald  to  the  Yamen  in  which  he  expressed  his  "  firm  con- 
viction that  should  the  Emperor  die  at  this  juncture  of  af- 
fairs, the  effect  produced  among  western  nations  would  be 
most  disastrous  to  China  ".  The  British  Minister's  timely 
protest,  falling  little  short  of  diplomatic  interference,  may 
have  saved  the  Emperor's  life,  but  no  doubt  it  also  carried 
with  it  a  further  addition  to  that  legacy  of  hate  and  retalia- 
tion which  the  Manchu  Court  was  storing  up  against 
Europe,  to  be  settled  at  the  first  convenient  opportunity.^ 

The  resumption  of  the  regency  by  the  Empress  Dowager  I 
was  most  unfortunate  for  China  and  the  world,  and  its  dis- 
astrous consequences  were  exceeded  only  by  the  territorial 
aggressions  of  the  Powers.  Together  with  the  land-greed 
of  Europe  it  was  the  determining  cause  of  the  Boxer  Re- 
bellion, at  least  it  greatly  accelerated  the  conflict.  It  pro- 
vided the  excuse  by  which  the  revolt  against  outside  civili- 
zation and  intercourse,  growing  steadily  ever  since  1840^ 
could  be  brought  to  a  head  and  expressed,  as  it  were,  in  a 
nationalistic  way.  The  interpretation  given  in  the  length 
and  breadth  of  China  to  the  overthrow  of  reform,  crushed 
as  it  had  been  by  those  now  highest  in  authority,  could  mean 
nothing  else  to  the  overwhelming  mass  of  Chinese  than  thaf 
a  recurrence  to  the  old  order  would  quickly  result,  that 
everything  at  variance  with  their  own  mode  of  life  and  af- 
fairs, such  as  Europe  willed  and  not  as  they  wished,  would 

^  China  No.  i  (1899),  nos.  358,  363,  373,  401. 


r 


70  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [482 

be  repudiated ;  and  that  a  united,  a  supreme  effort,  would  be 
made  to  free  the  land  once  for  all  from  that  ''  unceasing 
stream  ",  the  hated  foreigner  and  his  work.  The  Boxer 
Rebellion  was  that  effort,  and  it  had  for  prelude  a  score  of 
spasmodic  attacks  on  foreigners  and  missionaries,  varying 
in  intensity  but  gradually  growing  worse,  all  of  which,  it  is 
significant  to  note,  occurred  after  the  Coup  d'Etat,  and  in 
spirit  and  inception  are  directly  traceable  to  that  event. 

There  were  other  immediate  causes.  The  burden  of  the 
Japanese  indemnity  has  already  been  touched  upon  and  was 
misfortune  enough  in  itself.  To  make  the  financial  situa- 
tion worse,  agrarian  and  taxation  troubles  brought  on  acute 
distress  in  the  congested  districts  of  certain  provinces.  With 
two  years  of  bad  weather  and  bad  crops  and  the  always  sen- 
sitive economic  balance  was  disturbed,  as  even  in  normal 
times  the  line  of  demarcation  between  sufficiency  and  star- 
vation in  some  parts  of  China  is  very  thinly  drawn. 
This  reduced  thousands  to  a  give-and-take  existence ;  robber 
bands  increased  as  never  since  the  Taiping  Rebellion; 
brigandage  and  piracy  flourished,^  and  the  ranks  of  the 

*  Constant  complaints  from  the  British  in  Hong  Kong  and  south 
China  "  of  the  disgraceful  prevalence  of  piracy  in  the  Cantonese  waters, 
both  on  the  rivers  and  along  the  coast,"  aroused  the  British  Min- 
ister, especially  as  the  Governor  of  Canton  was  adjudged  "singularly 
helpless  in  the  matter,"  and  as  the  pirates  had  become  a  "  serious 
scandal  and  hindrance  to  trade."  The  British  authorities  sent  a  small 
gunboat,  the  "  Sandpiper,"  to  patrol  the  West  River,  which  action 
irritated  Viceroy  Tan,  who  announced  that  "hereafter,  should  a 
British  man-of-war  come  into  conflict  with  pirates  on  the  inland 
waters  and  people  be  wounded  in  the  encounter,  China  cannot  be  held 
responsible,  nor  can  China  be  blamed  if,  owing  to  remissness,  the 
British  war-ship  is  not  able  to  protect  itself.  ...  If  British  men-of- 
war  cease  to  come  (up  the  West  River),  China  will  afford  protection 
as  before."  But  the  Chinese  authorities  seemed  unable  to  cope  with 
the  situation.  British  Consul  Mansfield  at  Canton  wrote,  July  27, 
1899,  that,  "  at  the  present  moment  there  is  a  feeling  of  uncertainty 
in  regard  to  both  life  and  property,  which  is  unprecedented.  Rob- 
beries on  land  and  by  water  are  of  daily  occurrence.     Blackmailitig 


483]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  7 1 

"  Fists  of  Righteous  Harmony  "  Society  were  swelled  by 
the  discontented  and  the  famishing.  Naturally  all  of  these 
difficulties  reacted  against  the  foreigners.  The  Yellow 
River,  appropriately  termed  ''  China's  sorrow  ",  overflowed 
again/  covering  immense  areas,  destroying  villages,  and 
driving  a  multitude  from  home  and  kindred  to  subsist  on 
charity,  on  anything  whatever  to  keep  body  and  soul  to- 
gether. Superstition,  the  popular  and  dreaded  fung-shui, 
held  the  foreigner  accountable  for  the  disaster.     The  likin 

and  the  abduction  of  persons  go  on  with  practical  impunity.  The 
robbers  and  pirates  are  driving  a  flourishing  trade,  and  their  successes, 
coupled  with  the  almost  certain  immunity  from  any  sort  of  punish- 
ment, add  continually  to  their  numbers,  which  are  now  said  to  aggre- 
gate several  thousands."  Accordingly,  another  vessel  was  dispatched, 
H.  M.  S.  "  Tweed,"  assisted  by  a  torpedo  boat  as  tender.  Admiral 
Seymour  of  the  China  Station  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  three 
British  ships  would  have  only  a  "  very  partial  effect,"  and  that,  "  if 
China  is  to  be  relieved  of  the  responsibility  of  policing  these  rivers, 
and  it  is  undertaken  by  Great  Britain,"  it  was  essential  that  a  "  numer- 
ous flotilla  of  shallow  draft  vessels  "  be  sent.  Then  came  the  Boxer 
Rebellion,  and  the  piracy  question  was  left  to  the  local  authorities 
to  deal  with  as  best  they  could,  while  England,  along  with  the  other 
Powers,  busied  herself  to  relieve  Peking. 
China  No.  i  {1900),  no.  74  and  Inc.  in  no.  74,  no.  83  and  Inc.  i  and 

2  in  no.  83,  nos.  96,  99,  102,  113,  120,  156  and  Inc.  i,  2  and  3  in  nos. 
156,  258  and  Inc.  in  nos.  258,  274-276,  287  and  Inc.  i,  2,  3,  4  and  5  in  nos. 
287,  301  and  Inc.  in  nos.  301,  302-305,  320  and  Inc.  i,  2  and  3  in  nos. 
320,  323  and  Inc.  in  nos.  323,  325  and  Inc.  i  and  2  in  nos.  325,  341  and 
Inc.  I,  2  and  3  in  nos.  341,  343  and  Inc.  in  nos.  343,  350  and  Inc.  i,  2, 

3  and  4  in  nos.  350,  361  and  Inc.  i  and  2  in  nos.  361,  362,  365,  372  and 
Inc.  in  nos.  372,  374  and  Inc.  i,  2  and  3  in  nos.  374,  377  and  Inc.  i  and 
2  in  nos.  377,  382  and  Inc.  i  and  2  in  nos.  382,  389,  403  and  Inc.  in  nos. 
403,  405,  411,  416,  418. 

^  Li  Hung-chang  was  ordered  by  Imperial  decree  to  confer  with  the 
Controller-General  of  the  Yellow  River  and  the  Governor  of  Shantung 
as  to  schemes  to  prevent  future  floods.  As  McDonald  said,  Li's 
task  was  "an  arduous  one."  The  Yamen  also  asked  the  British  Min- 
ister whether  English  engineers  were  available  as  advisers.  Great 
Britain  offered  to  send  three  competent  engineers  from  India,  but  again 
the  Boxer  'Rebellion  intervened  and  cut  negotiations  short.  China  No. 
I  {1899),  nos.  388,  390,  403,  424,  434,  461. 


72  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [484 

question/  always  a  bone  of  contention  between  China  and 
Europe,  came  into  prominence  at  the  worst  possible  time 
and  added  its  share  to  the  prevailing  discontent.  The  evils 
of  the  contraband  trade  in  opium,  severely  felt  because  of 
the  general  lack  of  prosperity,  became  acute,  and  here  with- 
out doubt  the  foreigner  was  to  blame. 

It  soon  developed  that  the  antipathy  of  the  native  popu- 
lation to  the  missionaries  was  as  strong  as  in  the  preceding 
generation.  "^The  propagator  of  the  Gospel  was  regarded  as 
the  advance-agent  of  his  particular  Government,  sent  to 
China  not  for  religion's  sake  but  in  a  political  capacity  thus 
disguised.  Nor  does  it  seem  possible  how  the  Chinese  could 
have  reasoned  otherwise  when  the  Catholic  clergy,  openly 
aided  by  France,  actually  demanded  and  obtained  jnandarin 
rank  for  their  bishops  and  a  sliding-scale  of  lesser  dignities 
for  the  lower  priesthood,  with  singular  foresight  providing 
even  for  the  ceremonial  cannon-shotj    It  is  to  be  regretted 

^  Serious  rioting,  especially  at  Hankow,  followed  the  transfer  of  the 
likin  and  salt  taxes  to  the  Imperial  Maritime  Customs,  where  they  were 
to  be  hypothecated  for  the  Anglo-German  loan. 

Ihid.,  nos.  100,  103,  iii,  145,  147  and  Inc.  in  nos.  147,  185,  212  and 
Inc.  in  nos.  212,  218,  460  and  Inc.  i,  2,  3  and  4  in  nos.  460,  468; 
China  No.  i  (1900),  no.  75  and  Inc.  in  no.  75,  no.  107  and  Inc.  in  no.  107. 

'-^An  excellent  discussion  of  the  question  of  rites  is  given  in  Cordier, 
op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  478-495,  a  review  of  the  entire  period  of  Catholic 
activities  in  China.  See  also  China  No.  i  {1900),  no.  176  and  Inc., 
188,  the  memorial  of  March  15,  1899,  for  the  above  political  status  to 
Catholics.  "The  same  day  the  Imperial  assent  was  given"  (Inc.  in 
no.  176). 

Speaking  of  these  ceremonies,  says  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  478: 
**  II  faut  bien  reconnaitre  que  le  chiffre  de  720,866  Chretiens  (Cordier's 
work  was  pubUshed  in  1902)  pour  toute  la  Chine  est  mediocre;  il  fut 
plus  eleve  au  XVIIe  siecle;  si  Ton  recherche  les  causes  de  cet  in- 
succes  des  missionaires  catholiques  dans  I'Empire  du  Milieu,  on' 
trouvera  que  la  Question  des  Rites  a  ete  la  pierre  d'achoppement  sur 
laquelle  est  venue  se  heurter  I'figlise  romaine,  grace  aux  intrigues  qui 
se  sont  nouees  autour  des  Souverains  Pontifes  ignorants  des  choses  de 
Chine  et  ne  les  entrevoyant  que  par  les  yeux  de  conseillers  souvent  de 
mauvaise  foi." 


485]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  7^ 

that  no  criticism  on  this  attitude  of  the  Chinese  can  be  ad- 
vanced, as  argument  would  be  too  much  confounded  by  fact. 
Fortunately,  the  Protestants  declined  like  political  ostenta- 
tion, although  their  magnanimity  to  China  was  overlooked 
by  the  Boxers  in  the  catastrophe  which  followed.  Equally 
exasperating  were  the  difficulties  experienced  with  the  mixed 
courts  (extra-territoriality)  and  with  the  administration 
of  the  law  in  general,  and  here  both  Protestants  and  Cath- 
olics were  equally  culpable. '  It  was  claimed  and  in  many  in- 
stances proved  that  the  Christian  convert,  too  many  times  a 
"  rice-Christian  ",  was  unduly  favored,  that  with  either  mis- 
sionary, priestly  or  consular  intervention  at  his  call  he 
would  escape  scot-free  or  with  a  light  sentence,  while  the 
orthodox  Chinese  was  punished  as  the  letter  of  the  law  de- 
manded j  Also,  considering  the  nature  of  missionary  activi- 
ties, it  was  inevitable  that  among  the  representatives  of  the 
Christian  religion  there  would  be  some  who  were  unfit  for 
their  extremely  difficult  calling,  who  were  narrow-minded. 
prejudiced,  intplerant^  viewing  the  totally  different  condi- 
tions and  standards  of  life  in  the  Chinese  community  through 
the  distorted  vision  of  the  average  New  England  village. 
Tolerance  for  and  a  sympathetic  understanding  of  the  faults 
and  failures  of  mankind,  together  with  a  correct  under- 
standing of  mankind  itself,  is  always  difficult  for  the  ideal- 
ist and  the  reformer.  Especially  is  it  hard  for  him  to  real- 
ize that  a  code  of  conduct  and  morals  of  great  success,  ap- 
parently, in  one  part  of  the  world,  may  be  a  total  failure 
when  transplanted  to  another  part,  due  to  the  different  en- 
vironment, to  racial  atavisms,  and  to  the  variability  of 
human  nature,  which  can  never  successfully  be  bound  down 
to  one  philosophy  applying  to  all  alike.  Thus  it  was  that 
the  native  convert  was  weaned  from  filial  piety,  which  the 
majority  of  his  Christian  advisers  confused  with  ancestor 
worship,  through  a  lack  of  knowledge  of  Chinese  social 


74  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [486 

conditions  J  For  a  time,  although  this  policy  is  now  hap- 
pily reversed,  he  was  taught  to  reject  the  teachings  of  his 
native  literature,  the  moral  guide  of  the  race  for  centuries 
and  imperishably  linked  with  it,  for  the  spiritual  benefits  of 
the  Scriptures.  He  was  led  to  expect  that  the  judges, 
through  foreign  pressure,  would  treat  him  with  partiality. 
He  was  instructed  to  refuse  his  tithe  for  the  humble  village 
festivals,  parades  and  theatricals,  the  only  pleasures,  be- 
sides a  fight  or  an  accident,  which  relieve  the  fearfully 
monotonous  existence  of  the  laboring  classes,  this  because 
he  was  made  to  understand  that  such  innocent  amusements 
were  sinful  according  to  the  Bible,  or  to  whatever  religious 
sect  the  particular  missionary  happened  to  belong.  ^Even 
in  those  fields  wherein  the  missionaries  did  a  truly  wonder- 
ful service  for  China  and  the  Chinese,  for  which  they  de- 
served and  have  received  unstinted  praise,  such  as  increas- 
ing the  comforts  of  life  and  raising  the  standard  of  living, 
introducing  sanitation,  hospitals,  medical  attendance,  and 
spreading  general  education,  their  work  was  either  ignored 
or  misunderstood,  because  of  its  obvious  correlation  with 
the  religion  of  EuropeJ  The  fault  lies  largely  with  Chris- 
^  :  tianity.  It  has  the  misfortune  in  every  alien  land  of  running 
counter  to  almost  all  the  cherished  local  institutions.  It 
offends  everyone,  it  antagonizes  every  creed,  it  mingles 
with  none,  because  its  fundamental  tenets  deny  the  co- 
existence of  any  other  faith  or  standard  of  morality.  In 
China,  Christianity  encountered  further  opposition.  This 
was  the  predilection  of  the  vast  majority  of  Chinese,  es- 
pecially the  educated  classes,  for  their  own  code  of  life  and 
morals,  which  leaves  little  to  be  desired  as  it  is  eminently 
practical  and  earthly,  with  no  speculations  on  divinity  and 
the  hereafter.  Probably  China  never  will  become  Christian- 
ized, for  the  Chinese  mind  does  not  lend  itself  to  theologi- 
cal dogmaj   It  would  indeed  be  a  misfortune  if  the  Far 


487]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  y^ 

East,  in  emulating  the  development  of  Europe,  had  yet  to 
undergo  that  course  of  instruction  in  Christianity  which 
marked  its  path  even  in  modern  history,  such  as  the  Revolt 
of  the  Netherlands,  the  Thirty  Years'  war,  the  Inquisition, 
the  Edict  of  Faith,  the  fires  of  Smithfield,  or,  granting 
these  lamentable  aftermaths  of  the  "  religion  of  peace  "  as 
impossible  to-day,  to  suffer  intestine  persecution,  political 
discrimination,  Catholic  disabilities,  the  Kulturkampf,  the 
warfare  between  science  and  theology,  and  the  factional  dif- 
ferences of  our  score  of  antagonistic  denominations.  Better 
Stygian  darkness,  of  course  according  to  our  view,  than  light 
at  such  a  cost.  The  Chinese  have  never  had  a  religious 
war ;  in  that  they  have  been  thrice  blessed. 

But  what  above  all  was  an  impenetrable  mystery  to  the 
Chinese  at  this  time  was  the  fact  that  Christian  Powers,  in- 
stead of  themselves  being  guided  by  the  doctrine  of  "peace 
on  earth  and  good  will  to  men  ",  to  which  they  gave  such 
constant  lip-service  through  their  clerical  representatives, 
should  have  followed  the  diametrically  opposite  policy  that 
''  might  makes  right ",  that  whatever  could  not  be  obtained 
by  fair  means  should  be  acquired  by  a  resort  to  blood  and 
iron.  It  was  the  European  code  of  political  morals,  essen- 
tially Machiavellian,  which  counteracted  every  good  result 
obtained  by  the  missionary,  which  predestined  reform  to 
failure,  and  which  fittingly  wound  up  with  the  greatest  dis- 
aster of  all,  the  Boxer  Rebellion.  The  mistakes  of  the  time 
were  largely  Europe's  mistakes,  even  to  that  final  blunder, 
the  bombardment  of  the  Taku  forts,  which  instantly  united\ 
all  the  rebellious  and  anti- foreign  elements  against  western/ 
aggression.  An  enumeration  of  the  immediate  determining 
causes  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion  is  more  to  be  found  in  diplo- 
matic archives  than  in  a  study  of  any  other  sources.  Leases, 
commercial  servitudes,  the  loss  of  sovereignty  over  the  finest 
harbors,  the  hypothecation  of  likin  and  salt  revenues,  the 


76  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [488 

contracts  to  promoters  and  concessions  to  missionaries 
forced  at  the  cannon's  mouth,  the  talk  of  partition,  the  dip- 
lomatic wrangles  over  "  spheres  of  influence  "  and  "  bal- 
ance of  power  ",  the  exaction  of  the  last  possible  farthing 
as  indemnity  for  acts  for  which  neither  Europe  nor  the 
United  States  would  have  granted  indemnity  or  apology — 
the  answer  of  the  Chinese  to  all  these  national  humiliations 
was  the  outbreak  of  1900.  In  fact,  from  the  day  of  the 
German  seizure  of  Kiaochau,  which  there  introduced  the 
sorry  argument  of  the  mailed  fist  in  Chinese  politics,  the 
Boxer  Rebellion  was  a  foregone  conclusion,  and  apology 
and  blame  for  succeeding  events  should  primarily  be  laid 
at  Europe's  door,  not  at  China's. 

Naturally,  the  Chinese  population  of  the  foreign 
"  spheres  ",  in  their  fear  over  what  seemed  then  the  cer- 
tain dissolution  of  the  Empire,  wreaked  their  vengeance 
first  upon  the  missionaries,  as  these  were  nearest  at  hand 
and  in  the  imagination  of  the  people  symbolized  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Powers  in  China  and  could  not  be  dissociated 
from  them.  It  seems  rather  appropriate  that  the  province 
of  Shantung,  the  scene  of  the  initial  European  aggression 
and  of  the  German  Hinterland,  should  likewise  have  cradled 
the  Boxer  movement  ^  and  furnished  the  first  concerted  op- 
position to  Europe.  It  so  happened  that  three  American 
missionaries  in  this  locality  were  roughly  handled.  With- 
out going  too  much  into  detail  over  this  particular  affair,  it 
may  be  noted  that  the  missionaries  submitted  a  correspond- 

N  ^  For  accounts  of  the  organization  of  the  Boxer'  movement  and  its 
preliminary  stages,  see  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  ch.  xxiv,  "Les  Boxeurs," 
pp.  451-462;  "Smith,  vol.  i,  ch.  x,  "Genesis  of  the  Boxer  Move- 
ment," pp.  152-174;  ch.  xi,  "Gathering  of  the  Storm,"  pp.  i75-i95; 
ch.  xii,  "(Spread  of  the  Rising,"  pp.  196-217;  Bland  and  Backhouse, 
op.  cit.,  ch.  xvi,  "The  Genesis  of  the  Boxer  Movement,"  pp.  247-250; 
Rev.  F.  L.  Hawks  Pott,  The  Outbreak  in  China  (New  York,  1900), 
pp.  79-91. 


489]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  jy 

ence  later  sent  to  the  American  Minister  at  Peking,  giving 
the  following  conclusions,  which  are  valuable  as  they  typify 
the  situation  in  the  early  months  of  the  Rebellion : 

1.  It  (their  particular  affair  in  Shantung  province)  is  clearly 
not  an  isolated  case,  but  one  of  several  simultaneous  occur- 
rences, showing  a  widespread  and  violent  antiforeign  feeling. 

2.  The  present  outbreak  is  directly  connected  with  the  Coup 
d'Etat  at  Peking.  The  people  are  led  to  believe  that  the  re- 
action against  the  Reform  Government,  of  which  they  have 
vaguely  heard,  involves  the  expulsion  of  the  foreigners. 

3.  Vigorous  measures  must  at  once  be  taken  in  the  way  of 
stringent  instructions  to  local  officials,  and  plain-spoken  pro- 
clamations, backed  up  by  the  necessary  force,  if  this  antiforeign 
feeling  is  to  be  subdued  before  worse  things  happen. 

4.  We  have  no  complaint  to  make  of  the  civil  authorities, 
with  whom  we  have  had  to  deal.  The  Prefect  Ting  Cheng 
and  the  hsien  or  county  official  of  I-chou-fu,  Chen  Kung 
Liang,  certainly  did  all  in  their  power  to  answer  the  appeal  of 
the  ladies  for  help. 

The  action  of  the  Chu  Chou  official,  as  related  above,  was 
prompt  and  effective.  The  prefect  for  six  days  travelled  liter- 
ally day  and  night. 

None  of  these  named  was  responsible  for  the  trouble,  as 
they  made  every  exertion  to  rescue  us  and  the  German  priest. 
It  would  be  a  great  injustice  if  they  were  made  to  suffer  in 
the  premises. 

5.  We  can  not  say  as  much  for  the  military  authorities  of 
I-chou-fu.  The  hsieh  tai,  or  resident  colonel  in  command  of 
the  regular  troops  ^  of  the  prefecture,  is  a  Mahomedan  named 
Li  Ying.  When  the  Jadies  appealed  to  him  he  refused  to  do 
anything,  on  the  absurd  ground  that  the  country  of  Ji  Chao  is 
the  territory  of  his  subordinate,  the  tu  ssu,  commandant  of 
Ngan  Tung  Wei,  on  the  seacoast.  Colonel  Li  has,  it  is  true, 
very  few  soldiers  under  his  command,  but  that  lack  is  in  itself 

^  The  italics  are  the  author's. 


/ 


y%  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [490 

a  just  cause  for  complaint,  and  besides  he  did  not  use  any  of 
the  few  men  he  has,  as  he  might  well  have  done.  Still  more 
culpable  is  the  case  of  Brig.  Gen.  Tai  Shou  Li,  who  was  sent 
down  from  Chinan-fu  in  the  spring  under  pressure  from  you 
(Consul  Fowler),^  as  he  himself  admitted,  for  the  express  pur- 
pose of  protecting  the  foreigner.  He  is  supposed  to  command 
a  liang  (500)  of  troops,  but  at  present  has  here  in  the  city 
(I-chou-fu)  only  about  80  or  100  men.  When  the  ladies  ap- 
pealed to  him  on  this  occasion  for  soldiers  to  go  to  our  rescue 
he  said  that  he  could  not  comply  without  an  order  from  the 
governor.  In  response  to  this  we  have  simply  to  say  that  if 
it  be  true  that  every  time  an  emergency  arises  he  must  wait 
for  orders  from  Chinan-fu,  640  li  away,  he  is  not  of  much  use 
here,  and  the  sooner  he  gets  the  necessary  authority  the  better 
for  the  foreigner. 

6.  If  the  Ho  Chia  Lou  ^  people  carry  out  their  promise  to  make 
full  restitution  for  the  damage  done  by  them,  we  are  not  dis- 
posed to  prosecute  them  for  their  flagrant  lawlessness.  That 
would  probably  be  a  wise  step,  if  only  to  bring  home  to  them 
the  gravity  of  their  crime.  We  should  feel  disposed,  however, 
in  view  of  our  compact  made  with  them,  to  intercede  with  the 
authorities  for  them  at  the  proper  time. 

7.  We  agreed  to  a  settlement  upon  the  basis  of  their  simply 
making  good  the  damage,  because : 

(i).  Although  we  were  ourselves  placed  by  them  in  un- 
doubted peril  of  our  property,  if  not  of  our  lives,  we 
were  not  actually  attacked ; 

(2).  We  recognize  the  fact  that  the  people  of.  Ho  Chia  Lou,, 
while  inexcusably  in  the  wrong  themselves,  had  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  real  grievance  against  some  of  our 
Christians  (meaning  the  native  converts),  which,  while 
not  enough  to  justify  their  resort  to  lawless  violence, 

*  American  consul  at  Chefoo. 
^  One  of  the  neighboring  villages. 


49 1 ]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  yg 

must    still    be    taken    into    account    in    judging    their 
conduct.^ 

Such  was  the  situation  as  early  as  November,  1898.  Min- 
ister Conger  acted  with  vigor  and  promptitude  to  have  the 
above  case  adjudicated  by  indemnity  and  punishment. 
After  months  of  weary  negotiations  with  the  Yamen,  he 
was  able  to  report  in  October,  1899,  that  a  "  satisfactory 
indemnity ''  had  been  paid,  and  thus,  although  the  Ameri- 
can Minister  failed  to  secure  the  punishment  of  the  rioters,^ 

^  Report  by  Messrs.  Killie,  Faris  and  Chalfant,  in  U.  S.  For.  ReL, 
1899,  Inc.  I  in  no.  142,  pp.  154-157. 

These  three  able  missionaries  later,  December  26,  1898,  sent  a  second 
report  to  Consul  Fowler  (Ibid.,  Inc.  6  in  no.  142,  pp.  159,  160),  saying 
in  part: 

"It  should  be  added  that  the  attacks  upon  the  Christians  (still  mean- 
ing the  native  converts)  are  of  a  most  vindictive  character.  .  .  .  The 
affair  (in  the  same  vicinity)  has  not  yet  assumed  the  proportions  of  an 
organized  rebellion,  but  is  rapidly  drifting  in  that  direction." 

They  were  also  of  the  opinion  that: 

"  I.  The  present  outbreak  shows  conclusively  that  the  military  force 
in  this  prefecture  is  not  adequate  enough  to  police  the  territory. 

"2.  The  country  south  of  us  is  in  a  constant  state  of  disturbance, 
owing  to  the  local  banditti  who  come  and  go  over  the  border  lines 
between  Shantung  and  Kiangsu. 

"  3.  There  is  now  a  state  of  famine  in  northern  Kiangsu  and  lawless 
outbreaks  are  occurring  there  and  in  the  extreme  southern  parts  of 
this  province. 

"  4.  It  is  quite  likely  that  some  of  the  German  syndicates  who  are 
visiting  our  city  from  time  to  time  may  attempt  to  buy  lands  and  open 
mines  here  in  the  spring,  a  proceeding  which,  however  commendable  in 
itself,  is  almost  sure  to  give  rise  to  local  disturbances." 

^"Upon  this  showing  (an  enumeration  of  what  Conger  had  accom- 
plished) the  Department  (of  State)  is  disposed  to  think  that,  while  the 
procedure  suggested  by  you  may  operate  to  bring  about  a  settlement 
of  this  particular  case  satisfactory  to  the  immediate  sufferers,  you 
have  foregone  a  convenient  opportunity  for  insisting  upon  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  local  authorities  of  I  Chou-fu,  whose  punishment  you 
might  have  continued  to  urge  on  the  lines  of  the  policy  laid  down  in  the 
instructions  heretofore  sent  to  the  legation  in  analogous  cases,  such 


8o  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [492 

this  particular  incident  was  regarded  as  closed/ 

Germany  meanwhile  received  a  welcome  opportunity  to 
display  her  military  organization.  A  punitive  expedition 
of  125  soldiers,  *'  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  order  and 
peace ",  penetrated  inland  to  within  fifteen  miles  of  the 
Ichoufu  disturbances,  and  with  characteristic  German  thor- 
oughness burned  two  small  villages  because  the  inhabitants 
had  attacked  a  German  lieutenant  and  engineer.  Another 
detachment  120  strong  marched  to  Jihchao  where  a  German 
Catholic  priest  had  been  maltreated,  and  quickly  restored 
order,  carrying  away,  it  was  reported,  a  number  of  the  local 
officials  and  gentry  to  be  held  as  hostages  until  the  inevitable 
indemnity  had  been  satisfactorily  arranged. 
V*  While  such  was  the  melancholy  prelude,  far  worse  dis- 
"  *turbances  characterized  the  closing  months  of  1899  in  this 
same  region.  The  lawlessness  was  now  distinctly  of  Boxer 
character,  the  combination  between  the  Fists  of  Righteous 
Harmony  and  the  Big  Sword  Societies  producing  a  new 
crop  of  riots,  looting  and  massacres.  It  seemed  that  the 
officials  made  hardly  an  effort  to  quell  the  disorders ;  in  fact, 
if  not  actually  encouraging  or  assisting,  they  sympatheti- 
cally delayed  or  ignored  the  prosecution  of  the  prominent 

punishment  being  in  complete  accord  with  Chinese  ideas,  and  being, 
moreover,  apparently  the  only  recognized  method  of  preventing  the 
recurrence  of  such  inquiries.  There  is  ground  for  apprehension  lest 
an  omission,  the  appropriate  case  arising,  to  strongly  bring  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  the  purpose  of  this  Government 
to  insist  upon  the  punishment  of  the  local  officials  rriay  tend  to  weaken 
any  representations  you  may  hereafter  be  called  upon  to  make  in  that 
sense  under  standing  instructions." 

Act. — ^Sec.  A.  A.  Adee  to  Min.  Conger,  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1899,  no. 
203,  p.  176. 

1  Ihid.,  no.  142  and  Inc.  i,  2,  3  and  Subinclosure,.  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  g,  10, 
II  and  12,  no.  148  and  Inc.  i  and  2,  nos.  151,  160,  181  and  Inc.  i  and  2, 
no.  186  and  Inc.,  nos.  191,  196,  211  and  Inc.  i,  2  and  3,  no.  215  and  Inc. 
I  and  Subinclosure,  no.  232  and  Inc.  i,  2,  3,  4  and  Subinclosure,  5,  6 
and  7,  no.  265  and  Inc.  and  Subinclosure. 


493]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  8 1 

malefactors.  The  indignation  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  at 
this  open  favoritism  to  the  Boxers  in  Shantung  and  else- 
where reached  such  a  pitch  that  the  Peking  Court  judged  it 
expedient  to  remove  the  Governor,  Yu  Hsien,  who  was 
called  to  the  capital  "  on  consultation ",  and  though  re- 
lieved of  his  duties  in  the  turbulent  province,  was  decor- 
ated with  the  character  Fu^  signifying  happiness,  "  because 
of  his  failure  to  protect  the  Christians  and  their  property"/ 
As  a  further  mark  of  favor,  he  was  transferred  as  Governor 
to  Shansi.  To  square  itself  with  the  aroused  diplomats,  the 
Court  appointed  Yuan  Shih-kai  Governor  of  Shantung,  the 
l^est  selection  possible,  whom  the  American  Minister  pro- 
nounced an  "  able,  brave,  courageous  man  ",  and  who  "  has 
mingled  much  with  foreigners,  and  it  is  believed  that  if  the 
right  kind  of  orders  are  given  him  from  the  Throne,  the 
rioting  will  be  stopped  and  order  restored  ".^  But  such 
orders  were  not  given,  and  the  new  Governor  was  too 
shrewd  a  statesman  to  work  his  individual  will  against  a 
movement  which  apparently  had  the  good  wishes  of  the  Im- 
perial Government.  Had  he  been  unhampered  by  advice 
from  Peking,  and  allowed  to  use  his  great  natural  abilities 
and  his  foreign-drilled  army  against  the  undisciplined 
hordes  opposing  all  authority,  the  Rebellion  would  have 
been  nipped  in  the  bud.  Possibly,  however,  Yuan  Shih-kai 
arrived  too  late.  Shortly  after  his  appearance  upon  the 
scene  in  Shantung  the  murder  of  the  British  missionary 
Brooks  vastly  complicated  the  situation,^  and  although  the 
courageous  Governor  did  all  in  the  limited  power  allowed 
him  to  undo  the  work  of  his  predecessor,  the  riots  had  al- 
ready reached  that  stage   (January,   1900)   which  clearly 

*  Minister  Conger,  in  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  no.  316,  pp.  93,  94. 

^  Ibid.,  no.  289. 

'  China  No.  3  (1900),  nos.  1-5,  9,  10,  18,  22,  26,  30,  31. 


82  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [494 

foreshadowed  the  international  catastrophe  of  the  same 
year.^ 

Meanwhile,  like  disturbances  were  taking  place  in  other 
parts  of  the  Empire,  separate  though  sympathetic  move- 
ments which,  growing  rapidly  worse  in  volume  and  inten- 
sity of  hatred  to  Christianity  and  the  foreigner,  finally  coal- 
esced through  their  affinity  of  purpose  in  the  tragedy  we 
know  as  the  Boxer  Rebellion.  There  was  the  riot  at 
Shashih,  directed  against  the  British  and  Japanese,  in  which 
"  nothing  was  spared  "  :  the  Custom  House,  Haikwan  Bank, 
Commissioner  of  Custom's  house,  China  Merchants'  prop- 
erty, Jardine,  Matheson  and  Co.'s  property  (one  of  the 
great  English  trading  companies  in  China),  and  the  Japan- 
ese Consulate — all  were  destroyed.^  There  were  the  riot 
in  Chihli,*  the  anti-foreign  and  anti-Christian  disturbances 
in  central  Szechwan,*  the  Kwangsi  insurrection,"  the  anti- 
missionary  riot  at  Foochow,^  the  trouble  in  Yunnanfu,^  the 
terrible  outbreaks  in  Paotingfu,*  the  Kienning  riots,^  the 
murder  of  the  British  missionary  Fleming,^®  of  Robinson 

^On  the  Shantung  disturbances,  see  China  No.  i  (1899),  no.  446; 
China  No.  i  {1900),  no.  401;  China  No.  3  (1900),  nos.  8,  9,  11,  16; 
U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  nos.  223,  228,  234,  246,  249,  252,  289,  307,  312, 
316,  332,  338,  339,  345,  356,  368. 

^  China  No.  i  (1900),  nos.  83,  170,  223,  269,  270,  346,  364,  411,  415, 
417,  419,  453,  458. 

^  China  No.  3  {1900),  nos.  11,  19,  21. 

^  China  No.  i  {1899),  nos.  330,  341;  China  No.  i  (1900),  no.  194. 
For  the  riots  in  Szechwan  in  1895,  see  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  iSgs,  nos.  87-172. 

'  China  No.  i  {1899),  nos.  230,  247,  298,  305,  315;  China  No.  i  {1900), 
no.  222. 

^  China  No.  i  (1900),  no.  181.  '  China  No.  3  (1900),  no.  40. 

^  China  No.  3  (1900),  nos.  37,  62. 

*  China  No.  i  {1900),  nos.  202,  205,  206,  210,  213,  214,  293,  313,  318, 
347,  355,  364,  384,  439. 

^^  China  No.  i  (1899),  nos.  393,  43i,  466,  471;  China  No.  i  {1900), 
nos.  5,  10,  49,  108,  118,  157,  170,  180,  193,  199,  207,  215,  216,  218,  219, 
237,  241,  249,  256,  265,  269,  326,  334,  338,  393,  407. 


495]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  83 

and  of  Norman/  These  calamities  were  all  contributory  to 
those  in  Shantung,  inspired  by  the  same  motives,  produc- 
ing the  same  results,  and  directed  towards  the  same  ends. 

Serious  trouble  in  Peking  itself  gave  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives their  first  unmistakable  hint  of  coming  misfor- 
tunes. As  early  as  September,  1898,  the  temper  of  the 
rabble  in  the  capital,  reinforced  as  they  were,  by  10,000 
Kangsu  troops  temporarily  quartered  there,  revealed  itself 
as  a  conclusive  index  to  the  future.  At  the  annual  mid- 
autumn  festivals  the  trouble  began,  simultaneously  in  four 
different  places.  To  quote  M.  Cologan,  Dean  of  the  Diplo- 
matic Corps: 

It  is  not  necessary  to  mention  them  (the  attacks)  in  detail.  It 
is  sufficient  to  state  that  the  father  of  a  member  of  the  Legation 
of  the  United  States  was  severely  wounded,  and  that  a  member 
of  the  British  Legation  and  an  English  lady,  a  French  citizen, 
and  two  Japanese  subjects  were  wounded  or  attacked  or  in- 
sulted— all  while  proceeding  from  the  railroad  station.*  / 

The  British  Minister  observed : 


There  were  a  large  number  of  bad  characters  in  the  streets, 
which,  to  a  certain  extent,  accounted  for  this  behavior  on  the 
part  of  the  mob,  but  there  has  been,  since  the  so-called  Coup ^ 
d'Etat,  a  very  considerable  amount  of  unrest  in  the  city,  mor^ 
especially  since  the  execution  of  six  of  the  reform  party. 
These  men  were  supposed  by  the  common  people  to  have  been 
put  to  death  by  order  of  the  Empress  Dowager  because  they 
had  dealings  with  foreigners.  It  was,  therefore,  considered 
safe  to  insult  foreigners  in  every  possible  way.* 

Sir  Claude  MacDonald  further  remarked  that  the  inci- 

*  China  No.  3  {1900),  nos.  ^,  70,  71,  75. 
"^  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1898,  Inc.  in  no.  81,  p.  233. 
^  China  No.  i  {1899),  no.  399. 


84  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [496 

dents  referred  to  were  due  not  to  individual  feeling  against 
the  persons  concerned  but  to  the  fact  that  they  were  Euro- 
peans, Americans,  and  Japanese;  in  other  words,  that  they 
represented  the  races  which,  as  the  populace  believed,  would 
soon  be  driven  out  of  China  forever.  Of  course  the  Yamen 
expressed  regret,  and  later  even  punished  those  responsible 
for  the  outrages.  What  makes  this  particularly  notable  is 
the  welcome  opportunity  it  gave  the  Ministers  of  object- 
ing to  the  presence  of  the  Kangsu  troops  in  the  capital  and 
also  of  demanding  Legation  guards.  As  these  two  factors 
may  be  considered  the  beginning  of  international  compli- 
cations with  China,  they  will  be  treated  in  the  next  part. 

In  closing,  it  is  pertinent  to  observe  how  singularly  the 
Europe  of  1899  misread  events.  None  looked  for  an  or- 
ganized resistance  of  the  Chinese  people,  much  less  of  the 
Chinese  Government,  and  the  possibilities  of  any  opposition 
to  the  wishes  or  acts  of  the  Powers  were  then  as  lightly 
entertained  as  later  they  were  tremendously  overestimated. 
The  journals  of  Europe  saw  in  the  approaching  storm  only 
incipient  riots  against  Christianity,  to  be  regarded  merely 
as  the  usual  pot-luck  attending  the  fortunes  of  missionaries 
in  the  Far  East.  The  deep,  underlying  cause  of  this  inter- 
national misunderstanding,  immensely  greater  than  the  mis- 
sionary or  religious  question,  to  wit,  the  recent  territorial 
aggressions  of  the  Powers,  in  fact,  the  conduct  of  Europe 
ever  since  1840,  entirely  escaped  notice.  Referring  to  the 
fears  of  the  British,  who  alone  seemed  to  have  an  inkling 
of  what  was  coming,  the  Ost  Asiatisches  Lloyd  (repro- 
duced by  the  BerHn  Post  of  March  20,  1900) ,  in  protesting 
against  the  "  attitude  of  certain  organs  of  the  English  and 
Chinese  press  that  have  circulated  the  most  incredible 
rumors  about  events  in  China  of  a  nature  to  make  people 
in  Europe  believe  that  China  is  either  on  the  threshold  of  a 
revolution  or  of  a  general  collapse  of  her  system  of  gov- 


497]  CAUSES  OF  THE  REBELLION  85 

One  could  heartily  laugh  over  the  whole  affair,  were  it  not 
that  the  question  has  undoubtedly  a  most  serious  side  to  it. 
The  reports  which  even  the  most  respectable  papers  have  pub- 
lished during  the  last  few  weeks  have  made  a  deep  impression 
which  will  not  be  easily  removed  upon  the  Chinese  population, 
and  more  especially  among  traders,  who  naturally  know  little 
about  the  dynastic  and  political  conditions  of  their  country, 
but  who  place  implicit  confidence  in  the  statements  of 
Europeans. 

The  wild  tales  that  are  telegraphed  to  Europe  and  America 
must  influence  the  value  of  Chinese  stock,  but  more  especially 
the  confidence  of  the  home  market  in  Chinese  affairs. 

Do  the  English  press  organs  realize  the  result  of  their 
attitude  ? 

Thus  English  newspapers  recently  announced  to  the  world 
the  sensational  news  of  the  dethronement  of  Huang- fu  (Kuang 
Hsu),  a  report  which  the  world  endeavored  to  better  by  adding 
that  perhaps  the  Emperor  had  committed  suicide.  Confidence 
in  the  stability  of  the  present  state  of  things  in  China  is  natur- 
ally seriously  shaken  by  such  rumors,  the  effect  of  which  is  al- 
ready making  itself  sufficiently  felt  in  the  Far  East.^ 

Equally  was  the  Chinese  character  misunderstood. 
Europe,  wholly  influenced  by  the  superficial  estimate  gath- 
ered from  the  results  of  the  Chino- Japanese  war  and  the 
ease  with  which  territory  had  been  filched  from  the  Em- 
pire, was  unable  to  entertain  a  contrary  opinion,  and  not 
until  the  siege  of  the  Legations  and  the  difficulties  of  the 
Allies  in  reaching  Peking  (a  curious  resemblance,  by  the 
way,  to  Lord  Wolseley's  advance  on  Khartoum),  was  it 
believed  that  such  a  display  of  patriotism  and  resolution  on 
the  part  of  the  alien  race  would  ever  have  been  possible, 
and  not  till  then  were  certain  capabilities  of  the  Chinese 
character  critically  regarded,  if  not  with  admiration,  at 
least  with  respect. 

*  China  No.  3  {1900),  no.  25. 


PART  II 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  OF 
THE  BOXER  REBELLION 


I 


PART  II 

The  International  Complications  of  the  Boxer 
Rebellion 

Question  of  the  Kangsu  Troops — First  Legation  Guards — ^Second 
Legation  Guards  —  Attitude  of  Chinese  Government  towards  the 
Boxers — Imperial  Decrees  concerning  Boxers — Distinction  between 
"  Good  and  Bad "  Societies — Instructions  to  Viceroys — 'Arrival  of 
Foreign  Warships  at  TaKu — Dynastic  Succession — Attitude  of  the 
Yangtse  Viceroysy^Policy  of  United  States — Bombardment  of  Taku 
— A  State  of  War  existing?  —  Seymour 7  Expedition  —  Capture  of 
Tientsin — Second  Allied  Army— Capture  of  Peking. 

From  an  international  standpoint  the  Boxer  Rebellion 
consists  of  four  parts : 

/      I.  Preliminary  diplomatic  affairs. 
^;     II.  Siege  of  the  Legations. 

III.  Efforts  of  the  Allies  to  reach  Peking. 

IV.  The  punishment  inflicted  upon  China, 

After  the  assault  upon  Mr.  Campbell,  Assistant  Chinese 
Secretary  of  the  British  Legation,  while  visiting  the  rail- 
way bridge  in  course  of  construction  at  Lukouchiao,  by  a 
party  of  the  Kangsu  troops  then  encamped  in  the  Imperial 
Hunting  Park  at  Peking,  the  British  Minister  addressed  a 
note  to  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  "  protesting  against  the  pres- 
ence of  these  uniformed  brigands  near  Peking  and  the  rail- 
way lines  ",  and,  "  in  view  of  their  well-known  anti-foreign 
professions  ",  he  demanded  "  their  removal  without  loss  of 
time  to  a  safe  distance  ".  He  insisted  further  "  on  a  thor- 
ough investigation  and  punishment  of  the  offenders  ".  The 
same  afternoon  he  repeated  his  demands. 

501]  89 


po  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^02 

The  Yamen  was  "  very  apologetic "  and  seemingly 
showed  every  disposition  to  conciliate  Minister  MacDon- 
ald.  They  informed  him  that  a  decree  had  already  been 
issued  to  inquire  into  the  affair,  and  they  promised  ''  that 
steps  would  be  taken  to  pen  the  whole  army  (between 
10,000  to  15,000  men)  temporarily  in  the  Hunting  Park, 
and  keep  them  out  of  mischief  until  they  were  drafted 
gradually  to  more  distant  stations  ".  As  MacDonald  added 
to  Lord  Salisbury :  "  There  can  also  be  little  doubt  that  the 
Chinese  Government  are  themselves  (in  addition  to  the 
Legations)  afraid  of  these  Mahommedan  brigands — for 
they  cannot  be  called  soldiers  ". 

That  was  on  October  24,  1898.  The  matter  was  brought 
up  at  a  meeting  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps,  October  27th,  ad- 
vising the  Yamen,  for  the  sake  of  peace  and  prevention  of 
further  outrages,  to  have  the  troops  removed  at  once.^  To 
this  collective  note  the  Yamen  replied  substantially  as  to 
the  British  Minister,  agreeing  that  if  the  troops  were  left 
in  Peking,  "  grave  disorders  might  ensue ".  Therefore, 
**  it  had  been  decided  to  send  these  troops  elsewhere  soon". 
In  the  opinion  of  the  Diplomatic  Body,  the  Yamen's  reply 
was  "  not  entirely  satisfactory  ",  and  "  further  and  more 
energetic  steps  "  must  be  taken  by  the  united  Ministers  to 
force  immediate  action. 

Two  of  the  soldiers  concerned  in  the  previous  attacks 
were  punished  by  the  authorities  quickly  enough.  But,  as 
the  Chinese  Government  "  had,  as  far  as  could  be  ascer- 
tained, taken  no  steps  whatever  for  the  removal  of  the 
Kangsu  troops  "  it  was  "  unanimously  decided  "  to  address 

*  In  conclusion  M.  Cologan,  the  Doyen,  said :  "  En  prevenant  le  Yamen 
a  temps,  le  Corps  Diplomatique  accomplit  un  acte  amical  et  il  s'efforce 
de  mettre  fin  a  une  situation  anormale,  qui  au  lieu  de  s'apaiser,  semble 
devenir  chaque  jour  plus  delicate  et  critique."  China  No.  i  (1899), 
Inc.  I  in  no.  422. 


503]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  91 

another  note  to  the  Yamen  of  a  more  peremptory  charac- 
ter, adding  that  ''  the  Kangsu  troops  should  quit  the  Prov- 
ince of  PechiH  not  later  than  the  15th  of  November,  and 
further  that  the  place  to  which  they  were  going  should  be 
stated  ".^  The  representatives  of  the  Powers  were  united 
in  this  demand.  The  Japanese  Minister,  M.  Fumio  Yano, 
informed  the  Diplomatic  Corps  that,  should  China  refuse 
to  accede  to  the  above  stipulations,  "  Japan  would  join  with 
the  other  Powers  in  compelling  them  (the  Yamen)  to 
do  so  ". 

In  answer  the  Yamen  pointed  out,  following  a  further 
note  of  November  nth,  that  "  it  has  now  been  settled  that 
these  troops  are  to  leave  in  detachments,  beginning  on  the 
15th  or  1 6th  instant,  until  they  have  been  withdrawn.  The 
troops  are  to  go  to  the  west  of  Chichow  and  to  be  stationed 
along  the  mountains  ".^  The  Diplomatic  Body  answered 
that  this  arrangement,  although  "  inspired  by  a  desire  to 
put  an  end  to  the  difficulties  which  have  arisen,  does  not 
completely  satisfy  them  ",  as,  "  contrary  to  one  of  the  de- 
mands made,  the  Kangsu  troops  will  not  leave  the  Province 

*  M.  Cologan,  Doyen  of  the  Diplomatic  Body,  to  the  Tsung-li  Yamen : 

"  En  s'inspirant  de  ces  idees,  le  Corps  Diplomatique  me  charge 
d'ecrire  cette  note  au  Yamen  pour  demander : 

"  I.  Que  ces  troupes  aient  au  plus  tard  le  15  November  quitte  la 
Province  du  Pechihli. 

"  2.  Que  la  destination  qui  leur  sera  donnee  soit  indiquee. 

"  3.  Si  ces  decisions  n'etaient  pas  prises  et  notifiees  au  Corps  Diplo- 
matique, ce  serait  pour  les  Gouvernements  etrangers  le  cas  d'aviser  aux 
mesures  necessaires  pour  garantir  la  siirete  des  etrangers  et  pour  as- 
surer la  circulation  sur  les  chemins  de  fer  et  la  liberte  des  communi- 
cations telegraphiques."     China  No.  i  {1899),  Inc.  i  in  no.  443. 

"^  "Although  they  (the  troops)  will  not  be  outside  the  territory  of 
Chih-li,  they  will  be  very  far  from  the  railway,  and  we  can  certainly 
assure  you  that  the  movements  of  the  officials  and  merchants  who 
travel  by  the  railway  will  in  future  not  be  interfered  with  in  any  way." 
The  Tsung-li  Yamen  to  the  Doyen  of  the  Diplomatic  Body,  China  No.  i 
(1899),  Inc.  I  in  no.  462. 


P 


g2  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [504 

of  Chihli  immediately  ".  Therefore,  at  the  end  of  their 
patience,  they  considered  it  "  their  duty  to  refer  the  matter 
to  their  Governments  ",  leaving  it  to  the  latter  to  decide 
what  should  be  done.  Then  Prince  Ching  and  the  Yamen 
likewise  considered  it  their  duty  ''  to  explain  this  matter  ". 
It  was  made  clear  to  the  Diplomatic  Corps  that  "the  Kangsu 
troops  came  here  (Peking)  to  be  reviewed.  They  are  more 
than  10,000  in  number,  and  were  sent  into  camp  at  Nan- 
yuan.  A  great  many  carts  are  required  for  the  march,  and 
the  troops  must  leave  gradually  in  detachments.  It  is  there- 
fore difficult  to  act  quickly  ".  But  it  was  resolved  that, 
"  when  the  day  for  their  departure  is  fixed  we  will  inform 
your  Excellency  (the  Doyen)  immediately ".  With  the 
question  of  these  ''  uniformed  bandits  "  thus  disposed  of 
in  a  half-way  satisfactory  manner,^  the  attention  of  the 
diplomats  was  taken  up  with  the  urgent  need  for  Legation 
guards,  which  was  equally  serious. 

The  necessary  precedent  for  armed  protection  of  the 
Legations  had  already  been  established  by  a  similar  situa- 
tion of  insecurity  during  the  Chino- Japanese  war.  There- 
fore the  Ministers  were  confident  that  without  undue  pres- 
sure brought  upon  the  Chinese  Government  their  request 
would  be  amicably  granted.  This  matter  had  been  care- 
fully reasoned  out  by  the  American  State  Department  in 
1895.  In  response  at  that  time  to  Minister  Denby's  state- 
ment that  "  the  question  of  the  right  of  the  Legations  to 
have  escorts  here  (Peking)  is  abstract  and  independent  of 
the  probability  of  its  exercise  ",  Secretary  of  State  Gres- 
ham  replied :  "  I  do  not  find  in  any  of  the  treaties  with 
China  provisions  authorizing  the  protection  of  the  Lega- 
tions by  foreign  troops  ".     But  the  Secretary  equally  ob- 

^  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1898,  Telegram  p.  225,  Telegram  p.  226,  no.  56  and 
Inc.  I  and  2,  no.  81  and  Inc.  i,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6;  China  No.  i  (1899),  nos. 
421,  422,  435,  442,  443,  450,  462;  Chitta  No.  i  (1900),  nos.  20,  28. 


505]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  93 

served  that  "  China,  Hke  any  other  Government,  is  bound 
to  offer  adequate  protection  ",  and  if  this  were  not  forth- 
coming, "  there  is  no  reason  why  the  Legation  should  court 
danger  "  by  remaining  defenceless.  Therefore  he  author- 
ized a  military  guard  to  be  sent  to  Peking  "  under  similar 
conditions  "  as  those  of  other  Powers,  in  accordance  with 
the  most- favored-nation  clause  of  the  American  treaties/ 

As  Legation  guards  were  again  an  urgent  necessity,  a 
meeting  was  held  by  the  Diplomatic  Corps,  October  4,  1898, 
in  which  it  was  decided  by  unanimous  vote  "  to  notify  the 
Chinese  Government  of  the  proposed  departure  from  Tien- 
tsin for  Peking  to-morrow  of  bodies  of  British,  German, 
and  Russian  marines,  and  to  ask  that  all  facilities,  includ- 
ing a  special  train,  should  be  extended  to  them  by  the 
Chinese  authorities ".  It  was  also  intimated  that  the 
French,  American,  Japanese,  and  Italian  marines  were  "  to 
come  straight  on  to  Peking  on  their  arrival  at  Tientsin  ". 
Of  course  China  objected,  and  the  Chinese  Minister  at  Lon- 
don denounced  the  contemplated  move  as  "  a  slur  upon  the 
Chinese  Government ".  The  Tsung-li  Yamen,  in  answer 
to  the  note  of  October  4th,  replied : 

We  hope  that  your  Excellency  (Cologan)  will  ask  your  col- 
leagues to  be  kind  enough  not  to  bring  their  soldiers  for  pro- 

^ "  The  President  sees  no  reason  why  the  Legation  should  court 
danger  by  remaining  at  Peking  in  the  face  of  imminent  or  threatening 
peril;  and  you  have  the  right  to  an  adequate  escort  to  assist  you  in 
avoiding  it  by  removal  to  a  place  of  safety  where  you  would  be  under 
the  immediate  and  legitimate  protection  of  your  own  flag.  Neverthe- 
less, in  view  of  your  telegram  of  the  i8th  instant,  reporting  that  other 
Legations  are  bringing  military  guards  to  Peking  with  the  consent  of 
the  Chinese  Government,  I  telegraphed  the  19th  instant,  as  follows: 

"  You  say  troops  have  arrived  with  China's  consent  to  protect  other 
Legations.  In  cooperation  with  Carpenter  you  are  authorized  to  bring 
up  marines  under  similar  conditions." 

U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1895,  vol.  i,  pp.  198,  199;  Moore's  Digest,  vol.  v,  p.  626. 


94  '^HE  BOXER  REBELLION  [506 

tection.  This  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  spirit  of  the 
people  from  being  excited,  the  circulation  of  false  rumors,  and 
provoking,  we  fear,  other  troubles. 

Later  followed  an  interview  with  the  British  Minister,  in 
which  Prince  Ching  begged  MacDonald  to  reconsider  his 
decision,  assuming  that  his  consent  "  would  be  sufficient  to 
stop  the  arrival  of  the  guard  of  all  the  Legations  ".  In  an- 
swer, MacDonald  advised  the  Prince  and  the  Ministers  of 
the  Yamen  ''  to  accept  the  inevitable,  and  to  accept  it  grace- 
fully ".  Then  he  promised  them  that,  ''  by  taking  stringent 
measures  to  insure  good  order,  they  might  hope  to  shorten 
the  stay  of  the  guards  in  Peking  ",  but  rem.arked  that  ''  op- 
position, while  it  would  be  futile,  would  certainly  increase 
the  number  of  the  guards  and  lengthen  their  stay  in  Peking". 
After  a  two-hour  discussion.  Prince  Ching  decided  to  "  ac- 
cept the  inevitable  ",  moreover,  did  it  "  gracefully  "  as  re- 
quested, for  arrangements  were  made  to  supply  a  train  in 
which  to  convey  the  foreign  detachments. 

The  British  guard  reached  Tientsin  first,  and  consisted 
of  an  officer,  25  men,  and  a  machine  gun.  On  October  4th 
the  Russians  arrived,  30  mounted  Cossacks  and  38  marines, 
with  a  small  field-gun.  The  Germans  disembarked  the  fol- 
lowing day,  with  30  marines.  It  was  the  intention  of  these 
three  divisions  to  leave  immediately  for  Peking,  but  they 
were  forbidden  to  do  so  by  the  Viceroy  of  Chihli  until  he 
had  orders  from  the  Yamen  to  that  effect.  When  they  did 
reach  Peking,  further  trouble  developed,  as  witnessed  by 
the  communication  of  the  Yamen  to  the  Doyen  of  the  Dip- 
lomatic Body: 

Peking,  October  7,  1898. 
From  an  official  communication,  it  was  stated  in  your  Ex- 
cellency's note  of  October  5,  instant,  that  the  number  of  soldiers 
composing  each  of  the  escorts  (Russian,  English,  and  German) 


507]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  95 

was  about  thirty.  But  the  detachments  arrived  today,  the 
Germans  had  thirty,  the  English  less  than  thirty,  and  the  Rus- 
sians alone  had  sixty-six. 

This  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  note  which  your  Ex- 
cellency sent  us. 

We  request,  therefore,  that  your  Excellency  will  be  kind 
enough  to  reply  immediately  and  explain  to  us  the  cause  of  it. 

This  is  important. 

M.  Cologan  got  out  of  the  difficulty  by  replying  that  he 
had  given  approximate  figures  only  to  facilitate  "  the  com- 
position of  the  train  "  which  the  Chinese  Government  was 
to  furnish.  However,  although  the  matter  was  dropped,  a 
decidedly  unpleasant  feeling  had  been  aroused,  and  the 
Ministers  of  the  Yamen  again  felt  that  they  had  been 
tricked. 

A  short  while  after,  the  American  contingent  arrived, 
"18  well-armed  marines  and  a  gatling-gun  ".  They  also 
rode  in  a  special  train.  ^  When  these  various  troops  ar- 
rived, the  "  demeanor  of  the  crowd  was  quiet  and  respect- 
ful ",  for  the  sufficient  reason  that  no  other  attitude  was 
possible.  As  it  was,  the  Diplomatic  Body  held  the  Yamen 
responsible  for  the  whole  affair,  particularly  because  at  the 
meeting  on  the  evening  of  the  4th  of  October,  a  despatch 
from  the  Yamen  was  read  in  which  the  assaults  on  for- 
eigners were  treated  ''  very  lightly  ",  and  neither  in  this 
despatch  nor  in  a  Red  Letter  which  accompanied  it  was 
there  the  least  expression  of  regret  for  what  had  occurred. 
This  decided  the  foreign  representatives  to  summon  their 
guards  at  once  from  Tientsin.  However,  MacDonald  was 
of  the  opinion,  ''  should  no  untoward  event  occur,  and  mat- 
ters remain  quiet  ",  that  the  guards  could  be  withdrawn  in 
three  weeks,  with  the  reservation  that  it  was  impossible  to 
predict  the  future  with  any  degree  of  accuracy. 

^  See  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1898,  vol.  i,  Inc.  10  and  11  in  no.  81. 


I 


96  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [508 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  troops  stayed  much  longer.  The 
Imperial  Government,  becoming  impatient,  early  in  Decem- 
ber requested  the  diplomats  "  to  decide  as  to  the  date  on 
which  the  guards  can  with  safety  be  withdrawn  ",  but  this 
request  "  received  no  encouragement  ".  It  is  amusing  how 
naive  the  diplomacy  of  China  and  the  Powers  was  every 
once  in  a  while  at  this  time,  not  alone  on  the  side  of  the 
Peking  Court  but  on  that  of  the  foreign  Ministers  as  well. 
Far  from  letting  the  question  rest,  the  Chinese  representa- 
tives at  the  European  capitals  and  at  Washington  continued 
insistent  in  their  demands  that  the  objectionable  troops  be 
removed.  Finally,  after  these  had  spent  a  quiet  winter  in 
Peking,  conditions  were  adjudged  such  that  their  presence 
was  no  longer  necessary,  and  in  early  spring,  1900,  com- 
parative order  and  security  having  been  restored,  these 
initial  defenders  of  the  Legations  evacuated  their  respec- 
tive compounds  and  marched  away  to  the  coast.^ 

But  the  situation  in  China,  though  for  a  brief  period  qui- 
escent, except  here  and  there  an  explosion  of  wrath  against 
the  foreigner  and  his  proselytism,  came  to  take  a  decided 
turn  for  the  worse.  The  cloud  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion,  at 
first  a  mere  speck  upon  the  horizon,  spread  slowly  but  surely, 
gaining  momentum  and  magnitude  with  every  fresh  out- 
break of  unbridled  fury  and  misguided  patriotism.  From 
Shantung,  where  the  energetic  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  enforced 
a  sort  of  armed  tranquility,  the  activities  of  the  Boxers 
spread  to  the  neighboring  provinces,  leaving  death  and  de- 
struction in  their  wake,  and  setting  the  country  around, 
even  to  the  gates  of  Peking,  in  a  turmoil.  The  foreign 
Ministers  were  not  blind  to  what  was  going  on,  but  hoped 
that  the  Central  Government  would  eventually  suppress  the 

^  China  No.  i  {1899),  nos.  345,  348-350,  355,  357,  400,  402,  405,  406, 
414,  425;  China  No,  i  {1900),  nos.  12,  145;  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1898,  pp. 
228-232,  2ZS-^AA' 


I 


509]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  97 

unexampled  lawlessness  growing  daily  more  unrestrained. 
In  this  the  authorities  failed  absolutely,  and  the  publication 
of  ineffective  decrees,  the  disinclination  to  denounce  the 
Boxers,  and  the  laxity  of  the  Imperial  troops  and  officials 
in  punishing  or  even  in  apprehending  the  rioters  convinced 
the  diplomats  that,  after  an  absence  of  guards  for  over  a 
year,  it  was  again  imperative  to  have  the  security  of  the 
Legations  insured  by  the  presence  of  their  own  nationals. 

Their  decision  came  quickly,  through  the  force  of  imme- 
diate events.  As  Conger  reported  to  the  Department  of 
State :  Xr 

To  the  consternation  of  all,  on  Monday  the  28th  (of  May,' 
1900),  word  came  that  the  railroad  was  attacked,  two  bridges 
and  two  stations  burned  on  the  Paoting-fu  line,  and  that  all  the 
foreigners  connected  with  the  line  had  fled  to  Tientsin,  or  were 
besieged  in  their  homes.  Later  in  the  day  it  was  learned  that 
Fengtai,  the  second  station  on  the  Tientsin  line,  only  10  miles 
from  Peking,  and  where  are  located  the  railroad  machine  shops, 
was  being  burned,  no  trains  were  running  between  Tientsin  and 
Peking,  and  the  Boxers  were  reported  marching  on  Peking.^ 

This  disastrous  news  stirred  the  Diplomatic  Body  to  in- 
stant action. 

A  hurried  meeting  was  called,  in  which  "  it  was  decided 
to  bring  the  Legation  guards  to  the  city  without  delay  ". 
The  following  letter  was  addressed  to  the  Tsung-li  Yamen : 

Peking,  May  28,  1900.       \ 
Your  Highness  and  Your  Excellencies: 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  your  Highness  (Prince  Ching) 
and  your  Excellencies  that  the  representatives  of  Germany, 
England,  Austria- Hungary,  United  States,  France,  Italy,  Japan, 
and  Russia  have  decided  at  a  meeting  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps 
to  bring  immediately  some  detachments  of  troops  to  Peking. 

^  U.  S.  For.  Rel,  1900,  no.  z^3,  pp.  132,  133. 


gS  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [510 

1  am  instructed  to  request  of  you,  in  the  name  of  my  col- 
leagues, to  give  the  necessary  instructions,  that  the  detach- 
ments, whose  arrival  is  expected  at  once,  may  find  at  Tangku 
the  trains  to  bring  them  to  this  capital. 

It  goes  without  saying,  that  this  decision  of  the  Ministers 
does  not  authorize  the  Chinese  Government  to  avoid  taking  the 
measures,  which  the  Ministers  have  demanded  for  so  long  a 
time,  necessary  to  put  an  end  to  the  rebellion  for  which  it  is 
responsible  and  the  continuance  of  which  can  only  aggravate 
the  present  situation  in  China. 

Accept,  etc.,  Cologan,  Doyen.^ 

In  reply  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  called  the  attention  of  the 
diplomats  to  the  fact  that  the  Chinese  Government  "  had 
already  sent  troops  to  investigate  and  take  the  necessary 
action  ".  But  this  communication  lost  all  its  force  by  their 
admission  that  these  troops  were  recruited  from  the  Hou 
Chen  Ying,  the  camp  commanded  by  the  violent  reactionary 
Prince  Tuan,  and  from  the  Wu  Wei  Kun,  the  army  of  Jung 
Lu.  As  both  of  these  armies  and  also  Prince  Tuan  were 
notoriously  pro-Boxer  and  anti- foreign,  all  hope  was  elimi- 
nated from  that  quarter.  But  the  Yamen  did  beg  the  Min- 
isters to  delay  their  requisitions  for  guards  at  least  three  or 
four  days,  by  which  time  the  measures  of  the  Imperial 
Government  would  be  "  crowned  with  success  ".  The  Min- 
isters waited  two  days,  with  no  change  for  the  better  in  the 
situation.  Then  followed  an  interview  in  person  with  the 
Yamen,^  in  which  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  opening  the  meet- 
ing, asked  "  that  permission  be  granted  and  facilities  be 
offered  to  transport  guards  to  Peking  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting  the  Legations  ".     He  assured  the  members  of 

^U.  S.  For.  Rel,  1900,  Inc.  8  in  no.  383,  p.  137;  China  No.  4  {1900), 
Inc.  5  and  Trans,  in  no.  i. 

2  The  Ministers  of  Great  Britain,  Russia,  France  and  the  United 
States  were  present. 


51 1 ]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  99 

K 

the  Yamen  present  ^  that  it  was  a  '*  friendly  request ",  but, 
should  it  be  refused,  *'  the  guards  would  come  up  without 
permission  and,  no  doubt,  in  larger  numbers  than  at  present 
intended  ".  The  interview  terminated  with  the  threat  of 
the  Ministers  that  they  would  have  their  guards  "  permis- 
sion or  no  permission  ".  On  the  first  of  June  the  Yamen 
gave  their  official  consent,  but  begged  to  state  that  there 
was  "  really  no  necessity  "  for  such  action,  "  but  if  the  for- 
eign representatives  insist  on  this  step  the  Yamen  will  on 
their  part  interpose  no  obstacles  ".  It  was  stipulated,  how- 
ever, that ''  each  Legation  should  have  twenty  to  thirty  men 
on  an  average,  and  no  more  ",  the  same  as  eighteen  months 
previous. 

XThe  Ministers  lost  no  time  in  communicating  with  Tien- 
tsm,  and  the  first  train-load  of  guards,  instead  of  the  regu- 
lation 20  to  30  as  permitted  by  the  Yamen,  brought  75  Rus- 
sians, 75  British,  75  French,  50  Americans,  40  Italians  and  \ 
25  Japanese.  The  German  and  Austrian  contingent  ar-  ! 
rived  the  following  day.  In  all  there  was  at  Peking  during 
the  siege  a  total  of  21  officers  and  429  men.^     It  was  fortu-  ^ 

^  Hsu  Yung-i,  Hsu  Ching-cheng,  Yuan  Chang,  Liao  Shou-heng,  and 
Lien  Yuan. 

"^  Total  of  guards  present,  by  nationality : 

OfUcers  Men 

American 3  S3 

Austrian 5  30 

British 3  79 

French 3  45 

German i  50              > 

ItaHan i  28 

Japanese i  24 

Russian 2  79 

Total 19  388 

French i  30 

Italian i  il 

Grand  total 21  429 

U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  Inc.  2  in  no.  399,  p.  190. 


< 


lOO  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [512 

nate  for  every  nation  concerned,  equally  including  China, 
that  these  troops  were  at  Tientsin  awaiting  the  order  to  ad- 
vance. Had  they  not  arrived  at  Peking  to  take  part  in  the 
International  Episode  which  began  a  few  days  later,  no 
relief  of  the  Legations  would  have  been  necessary,  as  the 
Legations  would  have  ceased  to  exist/ 

Now  as  to  the  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Government 
towards  the  outbreaks,  first  against  the  native  Christians 
and  later  including  the  foreigners.  To  begin  with,  the  Em- 
press Dowager  had  no  particular  antipathy  against  the 
west,  but  was  forced  to  ally  herself  with  the  reactionaries 
in  order  to  crush  Kang  Yu-wei  and  the  reform  party,  whose 
program  necessarily  demanded  her  complete  retirement 
from  Chinese  politics.  Her  activities  against  the  Emperor 
and  his  friends  were  thus  inspired  by  purely  personal  mo- 
tives, ambition  being  her  motive  at  all  times  and  not  hatred 
of  Europe.  When  the  disturbances  in  Shantung  began, 
she  was  undoubtedly  in  favor  of  stamping  out  the  riots,  in 
fact,  started  out  by  instructing  the  Government  and  people 
by  Imperial  decrees  to  that  effect.  But  the  inefficient 
methods  of  the  army  and  the  administration,  and  the  half- 
hearted manner  in  which  punishment  was  meted  out,  and 
then  only  when  such  action  was  absolutely  necessary,  con- 
vinced the  shrewd  Tzu  Hsi  that  the  sympathies  of  the  popu- 
lation lay  with  the  disturbers  of  the  peace  and  not  with  the 
restoration  of  order  or  the  imposition  of  penalties  such  as 
Europe  demanded.  A  skillful  prognosticator  of  current 
events,  she  was  more  than  anxious  at  this  period  to  con- 
ciliate her  subjects  and  to  meet  their  desires  because  of  the 
telling  blows  which  had  been  dealt  the  Manchu  monarchy 
by  the  Chino- Japanese  war,  the  signing-away  of  territorial 

ipor  review  see  China  No.  3  (1900),  nos.  50,  53-5^,  58-60,  65,  69,  72; 
China  No.  4  (1900),  no.  i  and  Inc.  5  and  6  in  no.  i;  U.  S.  For.  Rel., 
1900,  pp.  129,  131-133,  137-139,  142,  144,  190. 


513]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  jqi 

and  economic  concessions,  and  the  overturning  of  prece- 
dents and  other  acts  which  had  offended  custom  and  tradi-    y 
tion.     For  the  sake  of  the  Throne,  the  wishes  of  the  ma-.    1 
jority  of  the  people,  whatever  they  were,  must  be  upheld,\ 
for  Her  Majesty  was  well  versed  in  the  history  of  the  pre- 
ceding dynasties.     Also,  the  Manchu  family  quarrel  had 
ended  with  the  elevation  of  Prince  Tuan,  bitterly  anti-for- 
eign, as  spokesman  for  the  Government,  ably  assisted  by  a 
host  of  the  old-fashioned.     The  result  was  a  complete  re-, 
versal,  helped,  of  course,  by  contemporary  incidents,  of  the' 
policy  of  the  Court  during  the  Rebellion.    At  the  beginning 
of  the  disorders  it  was  deemed  best,  for  the  sake  of  a  good 
understanding  with  the  Powers,  to  proceed  energetically 
against  the  rioters,  in  words  if  not  in  deeds.    But  the  rebels, 
far  from  dispersing,  increased  in  numbers.    As  the  Rebel- 
lion changed  at  different  periods,  gradually  acquiring  na- 
tional character,  it  finally  reached  that  point  where  the 
Chinese  Government  could  not  have  subdued  it  even  if  they 
had  so  wished,  and  with  this  increase  of  the  Rebellion  in 
magnitude  and  power  the  policy  of  the  _Court  was  altered 
until  at  last,  instead  of  suppressing,  the  authorities  wereH 
actually  organizing,  financing,  and  directing  the  war  against  \ 
the  world. ^ 


%x 


I 


However,  judging    by    appearances,    the    first    decrees  \^ 
seemed  entirely  satisfactory.     Regarding  the  initial  disor-      \ 
ders  in  Shantung  the  edict  of  O^^bcr  6r-x8a8.  declared:. 

Ever  since  foreign  nations  have  had  commercial  relations 

*  Minister  Conger  to  Secretary  Hay,  September  3,  1900 :  "  That  the  V     y 
Throne  indorsed  and  encouraged  the  Boxers  in  their  attacks  against  ^^ 
foreigners,  organized  them,  placed  princes  and  ministers  in  command/^    •■ 
of  them,  paid  them,  exhorted  them,  extolled  them,  and  made  common 
cause   with   them   is    abundantly   confirmed    by   the    Imperial    decrees 
transmitted  in  my  dispatch  no.  395  of  August  17,  and  is  therefore  re- 
sponsible for  the  whole  movement  and  its  results." 

U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  no.  400,  p.  190. 


I02  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [514 

with  China  there  has  been  no  difference  in  their  treatment. 
The  local  officials  have  been  repeatedly  instructed  to  protect  all 
missionaries  in  China.  Both  officials  and  gentry  in  all  the  pro- 
vinces should  respect  the  desire  of  the  Court  to  treat  all  alike. 
They  should  exhibit  sincerity  and  honesty  and  be  without 
doubt  and  suspicion,  in  order  that  there  may  be  continual  and 
mutual  peace,  etc.^ 

Somewhat  later  appeared  a  more  explicit  decree : 

The  customs  and  government  orders  of  western  nations  are 
different  from  those  in  China.  Although  these  differences 
exist,  yet  the  adoption  of  western  methods  in  military  affairs, 
agriculture  and  commerce  have  proved  really  beneficial. 
Therefore,  if  what  is  good  is  selected  and  carried  out  in  order, 
the  benefits  will  increase  daily,  etc. 

Western  people  have  come  from  afar  and  across  many 
oceans  to  China  for  the  special  purpose  of  exhorting  people  to 
do  right.  Therefore  they  (meaning  the  missionaries)  should 
be  protected,  according  to  treaty,  in  order  that  friendly  rela- 
tions may  be  preserved.  Moreover,  it  is  to  be  feared  that 
ignorant  and  foolish  persons  will  make  false  conjectures  which 
will  prove  misleading.  They  surely  do  not  bear  in  mind  that 
the  Empress  Dowager  is  at  all  times  earnestly  striving  to 
prosper  her  country,  and  so  she  is  kind  to  the  people  from 
distant  lands,  and  her  treatment  of  foreigners  and  Chinese  is 
the  same. 

The  people  and  missionaries  of  this  province  (Shantung) 
have  lived  together  amicably  for  a  long  time.  The  saying 
"  do  not  forget  to  entertain  strangers  "  should  be  considered, 
and  more  than  this,  strangers  should  be  treated  with  great 
courtesy.  Moreover,  Christians  and  natives,  who  live  in  the 
same  village  and  drink  from  the  same  well,  are  friends.  Who, 
with  heaven  over  their  head  and  earth  beneath  their  feet  are 
not  the  sons  of  the  Court  ?  How  much  more  even  should  they 
be  mutual  friends  and  not  cherish  any  enmity  or  suspicion ! 

^U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1899,  p.  158. 


515]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  103 

In  addition  to  instructing  the  local  authorities  to  exhort  the 
people,  proclamations  have  been  issued  for  their  enlightenment. 
KThis  proclamation  has  been  issued  for  the  purpose  that  all 
the  soldiers  and  people  of  this  province  may  understand  that 
hereafter  they  must  obey  the  decrees  which  have  frequently 
been  promulgated  in  order  that  the  missionaries  and  native 
Christians  may  all  be  treated  as  friends.  Moreover,  if  any 
dare  disobey  and  spread  rumors  and  cause  trouble  by  inciting 
the  populace,  they  must  be  immediately  apprehended  and 
severely  punished,  and  will  not  be  shown  any  leniency. 

Beware !  ^ 

Judged  by  a  strict  literal  interpretation,  the  above  edicts 
left  little  to  be  desired.  They  expressed  in  forcible  terms 
clearly  set  forth  and  admitting  of  no  cavil  the  Government's  ^ 
disapproval  of  the  revolutionary  movement,  and  the  appar- 
ently sincere  efforts  of  the  Court  to  enforce  a  settlement. 
But  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  were  Oriental  de- 
crees, not  the  proclamations  of  western  Powers,  and  ad-  ^^ 
dressed  to  an  Oriental  audience,  not  to  a  European. '^Y^Too-^ 
often  they  were  to  be  construed  in  a  sense  directly  opposite 
to  the  wording  of  the  text.  Again,  even  if  intended  to  the 
letter,  they  had  to  contend  with  the  maladministration  and 
corruption  of  the  Government,  with  the  sympathy  of  the 
ruling  Manchus  for  the  disturbing  masses,  with  the  covert 
hostility  of  almost  every  one  at  this  time,  from  the  highest 
to  the  lowest,  to  Europe  and  Europe's  ways.  True,  had 
Yuan  Shih-kai  been  allowed  to  play  his  part  alone,  he 
would  have  ended  the  Boxer  Rebellion  only  a  little  while 
after  it  began,  but  he  was  hampered  by  secret  instructions 
from  the  Court  and  the  Yamen,  by  orders  in  direct  contra- 
diction to  those  intended  for  publication.     Consequently, 

1  U.  S.  For.  Rel,  1890^  p.  158. 

2  See  Smith's  fine  criticism  of  the  decrees  in  China  in  Convulsion, 
vol.  i,  pp.  188,  189. 


1 04  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [516 

when  the  ablest  Governor  failed,  it  goes  without  saying  that 
others  failed  likewise  in  crushing  the  revolt.  Moreover, 
these  edicts  seemed  primarily  to  be  designed  for  the  pur- 
pose of  satisfying  the  demands  of  the  Diplomatic  Body,  of 
"jihrowing  dust  in  their  eyes,  a  plan  which,  though  excel- 
lently in  accord  with  Manchu  statescraft,  did  not  work 
very  successfully.  The  tone  of  the  foreign  representatives 
towards  these  ineffective  efforts  to  restore  order  soon  be- 
came decidedly  pessimistic,  due  to  long  and  continued  asso- 
ciation with  the  tortuous  methods  ot  the  Chinese  govern- 
mental and  diplomatic  policy. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Italy  had  appHed  in  1899  for 
a  lease  of  Sanmen  Bay  and  had  been  refused,  to  the  wonder 
of  the  world.  Italy  did  not  press  her  demand,  preferring 
to  let  the  matter  drop,  but  the  consequent  effect  of  this 
slight  diplomatic  victory  on  the  Peking  Court  was  immense, 
and  was  magnified  out  of  all  proportion  to  its  real  import- 
ance, which  was  after  all  very  slight.  Italy,  had  she  wished, 
could  have  made  short  shrift  of  Chinese  opposition,  but 
not  caring  much  either  way,  had  been  counseled  to  refrain 
from  all  attempts  at  force  and  thus  save  annoyance  and  pos- 
sible embarrassment  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  result  was 
unfortunate  for  China  because  of  the  false  estimate  of  hav- 
ing beaten  Europe  at  its  own  game.  Notice  the  tone  of 
the  following  edict  : 

As  the  Italians  have  not  had  their  ambition  gratified  in  re- 
spect to  the  cession  of  Sanmen  Bay  to  them,  it  is  apprehended 
that  they  may  try  to  seek  opportunity  for  seizing  other  por- 
tions of  the  coast.  Moreover  the  arbitrary  and  aggressive 
methods  of  the  French  at  Kuang-chouan,  where  they  are 
stirring  up  disturbances  in  order  to  obtain  pretexts  for  de- 
manding further  concessions  from  the  Imperial  Government, 
may  lead  to  actual  hostilities  between  China  and  France.  It 
behooves  us,  therefore,  to  exercise  the  utmost  vigilance  and 


c^iy-j  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  105 

watchfulness  to  guard  against  sudden  aggression  and  to  be 
always  prepared  to  resist  an  enemy.  .  .  .  This  Yamen  has 
received  the  special  commands  of  Her  Imperial  Majesty  the  \ 
Empress  Dowager  and  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Emperor  to  /\ 
grant  you  full  power  and  liberty  to  resist  by  force  of  arms  all 
aggressions  upon  your  several  jurisdictions,  proclaiming  a  state 
of  war,  if  necessary,  without  first  asking  for  instructions  from 
Peking,'^  for  this  loss  of  time  may  be  fatal  to  your  security  and 
enable  the  enemy  to  make  good  his  footing  against  your 
forces,  etc.^ 

Before  commenting  on  this  decree,  it  may  be  advisable  to 
add  the  secret  edict  issued  November  21,  1899,  to  the  Vice- 
roys, Governors,  Tatar  Generals  and  provincial  command-' 
ers,  a  communication  even  more  significant  than  the  above : 

Our  Empire  is  now  laboring  under  great  difficulties,  which 
are  becoming  daily  more  serious.  The  various  Powers  cast 
upon  us  looks  of  tiger-like  voracity,  hustling  each  other  in  their 
endeavors  to  be  the  first  to  seize  upon  our  innermost  terri- 
tories. They  think  that  China,  having  neither  money  nor 
troops,  would  never  venture  to  go  to  war  with  them.  They 
fail  to  understand,  however,  that  there  are  certain  things 
which  this  Empire  can  never  consent  to,  and  that,  if  hardly 
pressed  upon,  we  have  no  alternative  but  to  rely  upon  the  jus- 
tice of  our  cause,  the  knowledge  of  which  in  our  breasts 
strengthens  our  resolves  and  steels  us  to  present  a  united  front 
against  our  aggressors.  No  one  can  guarantee  under  such  cir- 
cumstances who  will  be  the  victor  and  who  the  conquered  in 
the  end.  But  there  is  an  evil  habit  which  has  become  almost  a 
custom  among  our  Viceroys  and  Governors  which,  however, 
must  be  eradicated  at  all  costs.  For  instance,  whenever  these 
high  officials  have  had  on  their  hands  cases  of  international  dis- 

^  The  italics  are  the  author's. 

"^Circular  dispatch  from  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  to  the  Viceroys  and 
Governors  of  the  Maritime  and  Yangtse  provinces.  U.  S.  For.  Rel.y. 
1900,  p.  85. 


X 


Io6  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [518 

pute  all  their  actions  seem  to  be  guided  by  the  belief  in  their 
breasts  that  such  cases  would  eventually  be  "  amicably  ar- 
ranged." These  words  seem  never  to  be  out  of  their  thoughts ; 
hence  when  matters  do  come  to  a  crisis,  they  of  course  find 
themselves  utterly  unprepared  to  resist  any  hostile  aggressions 
on  the  part  of  the  foreigner.  We,  indeed,  consider  this  the 
most  serious  failure  in  the  duty  which  the  high  provincial  au- 
thorities owe  to  the  Throne,  and  we  now  find  it  incumbent 
upon  ourselves  to  censure  such  conduct  in  the  most  severe 
terms. 

It  is  our  special  command,  therefore,  that  should  any  high 
official  find  himself  so  hard  pressed  by  circumstances  that  noth- 
ing short  of  war  would  settle  matters,  he  is  expected  to  set 
himself  resolutely  to  work  out  his  duty  to  this  end.  Or  per- 
haps it  would  be  that  war  has  already  actually  been  declared; 
under  such  circumstances  there  is  no  possible  chance  of  the 
Imperial  Government  consenting  to  an  immediate  conference 
for  the  restoration  of  peace.  It  behooves,  therefore,  that  our 
Viceroys,  Governors,  and  Commanders-in-Chief  throughout  the 
whole  Empire  unite  forces  and  act  together  without  the  dis- 
tinction of  particularizing  of  jurisdictions  so  as  to  present  a 
combined  front  to  the  enemy,  exhorting  and  encouraging  their 
officers  and  soldiers  in  person  to  fight  for  the  preservation  of 
their  homes  and  native  soil  from  the  encroaching  footstep  of 
the  foreign  aggressor.  Never  should  the  word  "  peace  "  fall 
from  the  mouths  of  our  high  officials,  nor  should  they  even 
allow  it  to  rest  for  a  moment  within  their  breasts.  With  such 
a  country  as  ours,  with  her  vast  areas  stretching  out  several 
tens  of  thousands  of  li,  her  immense  natural  resources,  and 
her  hundreds  of  millions  of  inhabitants,  if  only  each  and  all 
of  you  would  prove  his  loyalty  to  his  Emperor  and  love  of 
country,  what,  indeed,  is  there  to  fear  from  any  invader? 
Let  no  one  think  of  making  peace,  hut  let  each  strive  to  pre- 
serve from  destruction  and  spoliation  his  ancestral  home  and 
graves  from  the  ruthless  hands  of  the  invader.^  Let  these  our 
words  be  made  known  to  each  and  all  within  our  domain.^ 

*  The  italics  are  the  author's. 

2  U.  S.  For.  Rel,  1900,  pp.  85,  86. 


-19]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  107 

The  foreign  diplomats  were  not  aware  of  these  two  de-.r 
crees  until  the  beginning  of  1900,  over  a  month  after  they/  i 
had  been  issued  to  the  Viceroys.     On  the  second  of  Janu-[ 
ary,  Conger,  the  American  Minister,  transmitted  them  to 
the  Department   of   State.     Although  they  had,   he   said, 
"  only  just  come  to  light ",  yet  it  seems  that  they  should 
have  given  the  Diplomatic  Body  fair  and  sufficient  warning 
of  the  coming  catastrophe,  appearing  as  they  did  almost  half 
a  year  before  the  Legations  were  finally  in  a  state  of  siege. 

With    such    unmistakable    indications    of    the    disasters 
rapidly  approaching,  why  were  the  second  Legation  guards 
not  ordered  until  the  end  of  May  ?^  Why  was  there  not 
sufficient  discernment  to  have  these  troops  in  Peking  by  the 
new  year,  thus  taking  time  by  the  forelock,  producing  the 
'*  salutary  effect "  so  much  desired,  and  sparing  China  her 
international  disgrace?    However,  there  is  nothing  so  easy 
as  to  prophesy  the  future  when  it  is  already  past  history. 
The  whole  world  at  that  time,  diplomats,  travelers,  schol- 
ars, merchants,  saw  only  the  China  of  the  Japanese  war, 
the  "  China  in  decay  ",  the  "  break-up  of  China  ",  the  "dis- 
appearing Empire  " ;  and  the  other  China,  the  one  that  was 
soon  to  oppose  the  united  energies  of   Europe,  was  not 
thought  of  by  even  the  boldest  imagination.     The  reason  r 
was  that  China  had  as  yet  shown  herself  incapable  of  reA  j 
sistance  in  an  organized  and  national  way  to  the  despoilers    i 
from  over  the  seas.     It  was  believed  that  such  resistance    \ 
was  not  only  improbable  but  actually  impossible.     As  a 
refutation  of  this  fallacious  theory  the  Boxer  Rebellion  is 
alone  noteworthy,  for  it  revealed  to  mankind  the  then  as- 
tonishing and  partly  unwelcome  fact  that  China  as  a  politi- 
cal entity  was  destined  to  endure  the  same  as  racially ;  that 
the  period  from  1840  to  1900  could  never  be  repeated  by 
either  side;  that  the  Boxer  outbreak,  failure  though  it  was    '}\- 
when  judged  by  material  advantages,  yet  agam  gamed  for 


./ 


/  io8  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^20 

China  that  respect  due  a  sovereign  power  which  had  been 
denied  to  the  Empire  during  the  preceding  few  years.  Opin- 
ions of  the  Far  East  in  1901  were  in  many  ways  the  an- 
tithesis of  those  not  only  firmly  believed  in  but  put  into 
practice  in  1900  and  before.  China,  unwittingly  enough, 
had  gained  a  moral  victory,  in  which  was  concealed  the 
foundation  for  future  greatness. 

One  cannot  help  admiring  in  the  above  decree  the  ef- 
fective manner  in  which  the  grandiloquent  style  aptly  char- 
acterized the  recent  activities  of  Europe.  No  better  criti- 
cism of  European  territorial  aggression  has  been  expressed 
than  this,  where  the  Powers,  amusingly  enough,  are  repre- 
sented as  casting  upon  the  defenceless  Empire  looks  of 
"  tiger-like  voracity  ",  and  the  accusation  that  they  were 
"  hustling  each  other  "  to  gather  in  the  harvest  of  leases 
and  concessions  was  equally  and  painfully  true. 

The  most  di^scussed decxee.  of  all,  which  aroused,  most 

anger  and  comment  among  the diplomats.,.and__foreigners, 

was  the  on^which'discnminated^^ to  ''good  and  bad 

socfeties  "7  which""6rdered  that  certain  organizations,  mean- 
ing the  two  essentially  composing  the  Boxer  union, ^  must 
not  be  confounded  in  the  public  mind  along  with  the  ban- 
ditti and  other  outlaws.  The  style  of  this  edict  was  par- 
ticularly ambiguous,  more  than  typically  Oriental,  and  was 
expressly  designed  to  defeat  what  seemed  at  first  glance 
to  be  its  ostensible  purpose.  By  reading  between  the  lines 
of  this  extraordinary  communication,  or  having  it  carefully 
explained  to  them  by  the  literati,  well  versed  in  such  gov- 
ernmental hypocrasies,  the  Boxers  naturally  were  charmed 
with  its  contents,  as  it  effectively  encouraged  them  in  future 
acts  of  bloodshed  and  pillage  and  offered  them  immunity 
from  that  punishment  which  heretofore  had  dampened  their 

*  The  "Fists  of  Righteous  Harmony"  and  the  "Great  Knife"  societies. 


Y 


52l]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  109 

enthusiasm  and  spoiled  the  thoroughness  of  their  work. 
Said  the  edict  in  part : 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  a  discrimination 
should  be  made  in  the  nature  or  object  of  leagues  or  societies. 
There  are  reckless  and  worthless  fellows  who  associate  them- 
selves together  and  become  joined  in  sworn  brotherhood  and, 
relying  on  their  numbers,  create  trouble  and  make  disturbances. 

If  law-abiding  and  loyal  people,  attending  to  their  proper 
duties  of  life,  should  combine  together  to  study  and  practice 
the  skill  of  experts  in  any  art  of  science  (of  militia)  for  the 
purpose  of  serving  their  own  protection,  or  where  villagers 
band  together  for  the  mutual  protection  and  guarding  of  their 
villages  and  hamlets,  this  is  moreover  nothing  more  or  less 
than  carrying  out  the  duty  of  keeping  watch  and  rendering 
mutual  help. 

Should  the  local  officers,  when  cases  occur,  not  exercise 
extra  care  in  making  a  due  discrimination  between  them,  and 
carelessly  listen  to  rumors,  and^regard  all  societies  as  being  V 
composed  of  evil  doers  and  punish  men  recklessly  with  death,  '^ \ 
this  would  result  in  there  being  no  discrimination  made  be- 
tween the  good  and  the  bad.  The  people's  minds  would  there- 
fore be  in  fear  and  doubt,  as  the  good  and  the  bad  would  be 
treated  alike.  Not  only  would  the  temper  of  the  people  be 
disquieted,  but  the  action  of  the  officials  would  be  bad  and 
improper,  etc.^ 

The  natural  result  followed.  The  Boxers,  immune  from 
punishment  by  their  Imperial  protection,  became  bolder  and 
before  long  appeared  in  the  vicitlitY  of  the  capital  itself. 
However,  as  it  was  necessary  for  the  Government  to  save 
its  face  with  the  Diplomatic  Corpa.and  the  world  at  large, 
admonitions  exhorting  the  officials  to  act  against  the  dis- 
turbers continued  to  be  issued.  But  these  had  no  effect 
whatever,  and  instead  of  alkviating  the  situation,  in  reality 

1 U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  88,  89. 


\, 


no  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [522 

made  it  worse.  The  decree  of  May  17,  1900,  though  strin- 
gent enough  in  tone,  was  absolufely  useless,  as  the  preced- 
ing edict  had  already  informed  the  Boxers  that  any  com- 
mand against  them  was  but  a  dead  letter  and  need  not  be 
feared  nor  obeyed.     Said  the  edict : 

The  society  called  the  "Fists  of  Righteous  Harmony"  having 
spread  to  Peking,  we  some  time  ago  issued  our  instructions 
direct  from  the  Palace  to  the  office  of  the  gendarmerie  to  take 
\     action  in  good  earnest  to  prohibit  its  operation. 

We  have  now  learned  that  wicked  and  malicious  persons,  un- 
der the  name  of  the  Society  of  Boxers,  have  posted  placards  ^ 
containing  false  statements  everywhere  in  the  inner  and  outer 
cities  of  Peking,  the  object  being  to  create  suspicion  and  dis- 
turb the  minds  of  the  people,  which  it  is  greatly  to  be  feared 
will  result  in  stirring  up  trouble. 

Let  the  office  of  the  commandant  of  the  gendarmerie,  the 
Governor  of  Peking,  and  the  police  censors  of  the  Wu  Cheng 
(the  five  divisions  of  the  city  and  suburbs  of  Peking)  confer 
together  as  to  the  best  manner  of  taking  protective  measures 
to  search  out  and  prohibit  this  society  and  to  decide  upon 
some  satisfactory  rules  to  be  put  into  operation  at  once.  The 
result  of  their  deliberations,  however,  must  first  be  submitted 
to  us  in  a  memorial. 

Let  Yu  Lu  (Viceroy  of  Chihli)  in  like  manner  take  action  to 
stringently  prohibit  this  society.^ 


> 


Again,  on  May  29,  the  Court  expressed  itself  as  follows : 

Lately,  in  the  vicinity  and  neighborhood  of  our  Court,  the 
villagers  and  rustics  have  been  practicing  boxing  and  their 
physical  strength.  There  are  the  good  and  the  evil-minded 
scattered  together,  and  as  we  entertained  great  fear  that  trouble 
would  happen,  we  issued  our  commands  repeatedly  to  the  vari- 

'   *  For  books  and  proclamations  against  foreigners  and  Christirjiity^ 
■see  U.  iS.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  123-125. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  134- 


523]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  m 

ous  Yamens,  both  inside  and  outside  of  Peking,  to  strictly 
prohibit  them  from  practicing. 

We  have  now  learned  that  the  Boxers  are  very  numerous, 
and  that  there  are  traces  of  disbanded  soldiers  and  rebels  being 
among  them;  that  they  have  recklessly  created  disturbances 
and  brought  about  disorder;  and  they  have  even  extended 
their  outrageous  acts  to  killing  a  military  officer,  burning  and 
destroying  the  telegraph  poles  and  railway.  We  are  grieved 
that  they  do  not  obey  the  law.  And  what  is  the  difference 
between  them  and  the  rebels?  etc.^ 

Again,  on  June  8,  came  a  plainly-worded  decree : 

On  account  of  the  Boxers  having  created  trouble  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  capital,  and  the  minds  of  the  people  hav- 
ing become  excited,  and  a  feeling  of  unrest  prevailing,  we  re- 
peatedly issued  our  commands  that  stringent  measures  be  taken 
to  investigate  and  deal  with  the  matter.  But  of  late  there 
are  vagabonds  and  rowdies  armed  with  swords  and  weapons 
who  roam  about  the  streets  and  market  places  in  gangs  of  from 
three  to  five  persons.  They  assemble  together  and  disperse 
at  uncertain  times,  and  if  they  are  not  at  once  stringently  pro- 
hibited a  state  of  disorder  will  certainly  prevail.  The  gen- 
darmerie, the  Governor  of  Peking,  and  the  police  censors  of  the 
five  cities  are  charged  with  and  responsible  for  the  arrest  of 
outlaws  and  patrolling  and  guarding  the  place.  How  is  it 
that  this  class  of  persons  are  allowed  to  band  together  at  the 
very  gates  of  our  Court  and  cause  excitement  in  the  minds  of 
the  people?  etc.^ 

It  is  not  necessary  to  quote  further.  As  affairs  in  China 
approached  a  climax  the  Empress  Dowager,  partly  from 
necessity  and  partly  from  choice,  came  more  and  more 
under  the  influence  of  Prince  Tuan  and  the  reactionaries 
and  anti-foreigners.    The  Boxers,  at  first  discouraged,  then 

'   1  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  p.  134. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  147. 

/ 


112  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [524 

secretly  countenanced,  finally  were  openly  aided  by  the 
Court,  and  byjune  20th,  less  than  a  fortnight  after  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  preceding  decree,  we  find  them  actually  paid 
and  provisioned  by  the  Imperial  Government.  Said  an 
edict  in  this  regard : 

Whereas  the  Boxers  have  now  assembled  together  in  Peking, 
the  Prince  and  Ministers  (of  the  Tsung-li  Yamen)  are  col- 
lecting contributions  of  silver  and  rice  in  order  to  enable  them 
to  accomplish  the  loyal  and  patriotic  object  they  have  in  view, 
and  render  it  convenient  for  them  to  attack  and  exterminate 
(the  foreigners  and  Christians).  The  Prince  and  Ministers 
have  recently  heard,  however,  that  there  are  persons  who  have 
no  sense  of  shame,  who  impersonate  others  and  fraudulently 
solicit  contributions  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  seeking  their 
own  profit.  This  practice  is  certainly  detrimental  to  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Boxers,  etc.^ 

As  if  that  was  not  enough,  telegraphic  instructions  were 
sent  out  a  week  later  from  the  station  at  Paotingfu  to  the 
Viceroys  and  Governors  in  south  and  central  China,  as  fol- 
lows: 

Whereas  open  war  has  now  broken  out  between  China  and 
the  foreign  Powers,  and  the  Boxer  Society  around  Tientsin,  and 
throughout  Chihli,  cooperating  with  the  Imperial  troops  have 
been  victorious, — we  have  already  issued  decrees  praising  their 
bravery.  These  loyal  people  are  to  be  found  throughout  the 
Empire,  and  all  Governors  and  Viceroys,  if  they  can  raise 
forces  from  their  number,  can  rely  on  them  to  oppose  insolence 
of  the  foreigners  with  greatest  success.  The  higher  provincial 
authorities  shall,  therefore,  memorialize  immediately  regarding 
their  plans  of  campaign.  The  Viceroys  of  the  Yangtse  and 
coast  provinces  are  hereby  commanded  to  use  their  most  strenu- 
ous endeavors  to  put  these  instructions  into  effect.^ 


X 


1  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  p.  192. 
^  China  No.  3  (zgoo),  no.  240. 


525]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  113 

Meanwhile,  what  was  the  attitude  of  the  foreign  diplo- 
mats in  regard  to  the  ''  Fists  of  Righteous  Harmony  "  ?  ^ 
Their  interview  with  the  Yamen  soon  convinced  them  that  ~ 
little  help  towards  a  mutual  understanding  was  to  be  ex- 
pected from  that  quarter,  as  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  had 
stubbornly  refused  at  first  to  publish  decrees  against  the 
Boxer  society,  and  when  finally  forced  by  diplomatic  pres- 
sure to  comply,  had  responded  with  the  ineffectual  docu- 
ments cited  above.  There  seemed  little  else  for  Jhie^diplo- 
mats  to  do  than  to  suggest  a  naval  demonstration  of  the 
P(5W'ers,  in  order  Jo  bring,  ibe.  Peking  Court  to  its  senses. 
But  to  such  action  the  Russian  Minister,  M.  de  Giers,  wasj^ 
strongly  opposed,  as  ^^a^  the  least  it  was  an  extreme  step 
arid  might  "  give  rise  to  unknown  eventualities  ".*  There- 
fore it  was  decided  to  bring  guards  to  "tlie  capital  instead, 
in  the  hope  that  this  would  have  tKg  "Hke  "  salutary  ef- 
fect' '''.  However,  to  make  doubly  sure.  Vice- Admiral  Sey- 
ifibuf  of  the  China  Station  telegraphed  "to  the  Admiralty 
that,  as  affairs  at  Peking  were  "  becoming  more  serious  ", 
he  was  proceeding  to  Taku  with  the  warships  Centurion 
and  Whiting,  while  the  Fame  and  Endymion  would  shortly 
follow.  On  June  6th,  a  further  addition,  the  Phoenix  and 
Aurora,  arrived  from  Weihaiwei.  A  meeting  of  the  Allied 
commanders  of  the  warships  in  the  harbor  was  held  on 
board  the  Centurion,  in  order  "  to  discuss  (the)  situation 
and  arrange  concerted  action  if  necessary  ".  But  to  any 
"  concerted  action  "  of  a  hostile  nature  the  American  com- 
mander. Admiral  Kempff,  was  of  opinion  contrary  to  the 
rest  of  the  Allied  officers.  This  was  because  of  the  rather 
anomalous  attitude  of  the  United  States  towards  China, 

^  In  the  opinion  of  the  British  Minister,  the  term  "  League  of 
Patriotic  Union"  was  "the  nearest  equivalent  of  the  later  Chinese 
designation  of  the  Boxers."    China  No.  4  (1900),  no.  2,  p.  21. 

^  China  No.  3  (1900),  no.  43. 


114  ^^^  BOXER  REBELLION  [526 

resulting  from  its  traditional  friendship  for  that  country 
and  its  disinclination  to  become  embroiled  with  Europe  in 
Far  Eastern  hostilities.  This  attitude  of  the  American  Ad- 
miral, which  was  not  his  personal  view,  as  he  was  simply 
following  the  dictates  of  the  Department  of  State,  later 
subjected  him  in  particular,  and  the  United  States  in  gen- 
eral, to  much  adverse  criticism.  At  present  it  is  acknowl- 
edged that  the  stand  of  the  UnitecT  States  was  the  correct 
"  n  one  at  the  time  under  discussion,  before  the  attack  on  the 
r.X  Taku  Forts.  Admiral  Seymour  was  unhampered  by  in- 
/^\l  structions,  the  British  Government  telegraphing  him  as  fol- 
lows :  "  The  situation  is  difficult,  and  your  discretion  must 
be  quite  unfettered.  You  may  take  precisely  what  meas- 
ures you  think  expedient ".  An  identical  message  was  sent 
the  same  day,  June  7,  1900,  to  Sir  Claude  MacDonald  at 
Peking.' 

As  the  time  had  now  arrived  when  coming  events  were 
casting  their  shadows  before,  the  foreign  representatives  at 
the  Chinese  capital  acted  with  energy  and  decision.  As  a 
final  effort  to  come  to  a  definite  understanding  before  it  was 
too  late,  MacDonald  proposed  that  the  Diplomatic  Corps 
demand  an  audience  with  the  Emperor  and  the  Empress 
Dowager.  There  was  no  longer  any  doubt  how  matters 
stood  at  Court.  The  unfortunate  Kuang  Hsu  was  at  last 
reduced  to  a  complete  nonentity^...  In  an  Imperial  decree  of 
January  24,  1900,  conveniently  labeled  ''by  the  Emperor's 
own  pien  ",  he  had  been  forced  to  declare  that,  "  since  last 
year  we  have  suffered  from  ill  health  ",  with  the  result  that 
"  affairs  of  State  have  increased  in  magnitude  and  perplex- 
ity, and  we  have  lived  in  constant  dread  of  going  wrong  ". 
For  this  reason,  "  we  therefore  implored  the  Empress  Dow- 
ager to  aid  us  in  the  Government.     This  was  more  than  a 

^  China  No.  3  (1900),  nos.  82  and  Inc.,  84. 


527]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  II5 

year  ago,  but  we  have  never  been  restored  to  health,  and  we 
have  not  the  strength  to  perform  in  person  the  great  sacri- 
fices at  the  altar  of  Heaven  and  in  the  temples  of  the  spirits 
of  the  land  ".  With  affairs  in  this  melancholy  state,  ac- 
cording to  the  judgment  of  the  Old  Buddha  and  her  crowd, 
it  was  discovered  that  ''  we  (the  Emperor)  suffer  from  an 
incurable  disease  ".  Therefore,  "  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
beget  a  son  ",  which  meant  that  "  the  Emperor  Mu  Tsung 
Yi  (the  preceding  Emperor  Tung  Chih)  has  no  posterity  ", 
and,  as  a  result,  "  the  consequences  to  the  lines  of  succes- 
sion are  of  the  utmost  gravity ".  After  "  sorrowfully 
thinking  on  this  ",  in  addition  to  being  browbeaten  into  sub- 
mission, the  puppet  Emperor  "  humbly  implored  Her  Sacred 
Majesty  carefully  to  select  from  among  the  near  branches 
of  our  family  a  good  and  worthy  member  ",  the  same  to  be 
the  Heir  Apparent.  And  so,  "  after  repeated  entreaties  ", 
Tzu  Hsi  ''  deigned  to  grant  her  consent  that^_Pu_Chun^^.sgn 
of  Tsai  Yi,  Prince  Tuan,  should  be  adopted  as  tjie^  son  of 
the  late  Emperor  MuTsting  Yi ''.^^ The  immediate  effect 
of  this  declaration  was  to  eliminate  Kuang  Hsu  entirely 
from  Chinese  politics,  and,  as  if  that  was  not  enough,  the 
reign  of  China's  reform  Emperor  was  further  passed  over 
and  ignored  as  if  he  had  never  existed.  Typical  Oriental 
despotism  here,  where,  for  the  sake  of  personal  ambition, 
the  interests  of  the  country  and  the  welfare  of  the  people 
were  lost  sight  of  through  Palace  intrigues,  by  the  sordid 
gains  and  aggrandizements  of  the  few  at  the  cost  of  the 
many.  Had  the  Empress  Dowager  really  been  actuated  by 
sincere  patriotism  this  act  might  be  forgiven  because  of 
existing  conditions,  but  such  was  not  the  case.  Instead  of 
^hoosing  a  virile,  able  successor,  for  instance  like  Prince  Pu 

^  China  No.  3  (1900),  nos.  28,  29;  U.  S.  For,  ReL,  1900,  pp.  91-93'- 
Pu  Chun  was  deposed  as  Heir  Apparent  by  a  decree  of  Nov.  30,  1900,  - 
on  the  ground  that  he  was  lacking  in  respect  for  Her  Majesty. 


t 


Il6  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [528 

Lun,  she  merely  took  care  that  the  Heir  Apparent  should 
be  one  of  tender  years,  so  that  her  own  continuance  in 
power  as  long  as  she  was  destined  to  live  would  not  be  en- ' 
dangered. 

By  this  arrangement  of  the  dynastic  succession  the  Court 
committed  itself  to  the  Boxe;r  cause,  and  this  meant  that 
sooner  or  later  collusion  with  the  enemies  of  western  civili- 
zation was  unavoidable.  Indications  of  an  abrupt  change 
in  the  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Government  were  soon  mani- 
fest. On  June  8th  the  situation  had  become  so  threaten- 
ing that  the  foreign  diplomats  petitioned  the  Yamen  for 
permission  to  increase  their  guards.  Their  request  met 
with  a  peremptory  refusal.     The  next  day  the  Court  delib- 

^erately  allied  itself  with  the  revolutionary  movement  by 
appointing  four  new  members  to  the  Tsung-li  Yamen, 
Prince  Tuan  as  President  to  succeed  the  able  Prince  Ching, 
and  three  new  Ministers,  Chi  Hsiu,  Pu  Hsing,  and  Na 
Tung,  all  reactionaries  of  the  extreme  type.  With  Prince 
Tuan  as  head  of  the  Foreign  Office  there  was  no  doubt  that 
'iharmony  with  the  Throne  would  be  assured,  but,  as  Conger 
remarked,  his  appointment  as  virtual  Premier  of  China  was 
*'  extremely  unfortunate  ".  The  American  Minister  at  this 
early  stage   (June   nth)    drew  a  correct  portrait  of  the 

;  Prince : 

He  is  known  to  be  malignantly  antiforeign,  a  patron  of  the 
Boxers,  and  has  many  of  them  in  his  division  of  the  army. 
His  policy  toward  them  cannot,  therefore,  be  expected  to  be  a 
repressive  one,  but  must  mean  continual  persecution  and  at- 
tacks upon  missionaries  and  their  followers,  destruction  of 
their  property,  hindrance  of  trade,  and  constant  menace  and 
danger  to  all  foreigners  and  foreign  interests.^ 

1  See  China  No.  3  {1900),  nos.  61,  186,  222,  225;  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900, 
pp.  145,  154. 


529]  INTERNA TIONAL  COMPLICA TIONS  1 1 7 

Within  a  month  Prin^^uan  was  in  practical  control  of 
the  capital,  for  the  time  being  reducing  even  the  Empress 
Dowager  to  a  secondary  position. 

Of  course  that  ended  all  hopes  of  an  Imperial  audience 
of  the  Diplomatic  Corps.  But  a  temporary  concession  was 
granted  the  foreign  representatives  when  three  Ministers 
of 'the  Yamen  paid  a  visit  to  Conger  in  the  already  barri- 
caded American  Legation.  In  the  interview  which  fol- 
lowed, Conger  reproached  the  Government  as  being  directly 
responsible  for  the  outbreak.  He  wanted  to  know  "  why 
the  Chinese  troops  did  not  fire  upon  the  Boxers  instead  of 
trifling  with  them ;  nothing  but  killing  them  could  ever  bring 
about  order  ".  The  Ministers  acknowledged  that  the  "  na- 
tive troops  were  practically  useless  ",  and  Conger  retorted 
in  a  burst  of  pardonable  pride  that  with  one  thousand  Amer- 
ican soldiers  he  could  kill  every  Boxer  in  Peking.  It 
seemed  about  all  that  the  Chinese  Ministers  wanted  was  in- 
formation concerning  the  first  relief  expedition  to  Peking; 
but  in  this  they  were  not  enlightened.  That  was  the  last 
personal  interview;^  even  by  that  time  (June  17th)  the 
diplomats  and  their  families  were  "  completely  besieged  " 
in  their  vSHous  Legation  compounds,  ''  with  the  entire  city 
in  possession  of  a  rioting,  murdering  mob  ",  and  "  with  no 
visible  effort  being  made  by  the  Government  in  any  way  to 
restrain  it  ".^  This  report  was  not  received  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  until  September  25th,  for  by  June  13th  the 
curtain  had  practically  been  rung  down  on  affairs  in  Peking. 

The  incidents  of  the  siege  of  the  Legations  and  of  their 

*  See  Memorandum  of  interview  in  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  152,  153. 

^Ibid.,  no.  392,  p.  154.  Conger  reports,  June  15,  that,  "we  are  simply 
trying  to  quietly  defend  ourselves  until  reinforcements  arrive,  but 
nearly  100  Boxers  have  already  been  killed  by  the  various  Legation 
guards." 


Il8  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [530 

relief  have  been  told  by  enough  inters/  so  that  it  would 
be  superfluous  to  add  to  the  mass  of  already  available  ma- 
terial. In  conclusion  we  will  note  some  of  the  instances 
which  demand  comment  in  a  work  of  this  kind. 

Efforts  were  made  from  the  first  to  restrict  the  field  of 
operations  to  Peking  and  Tientsin,  and  instrumental  in 
bringing  about  this  position  was  the  Consular  Body  in  cen- 
tral and  south  China.  At  Shanghai  the  Consuls  issued  a 
proclamation  to  the  wavering  inhabitants  which  was  written 
in  Chinese  and  designed  as  much  as  possible  to  conform  to 
the  Oriental  mode  of  expression  and  thought.  Such  action 
was  imperative  as  all  trade  had  stopped  because  of  the 
fighting  in  the  north,  and  because,  with  eight  foreign  war- 
ships in  the  harbor,  with  steamboat  service  discontinued, 
and  with  cotton  mills  idle,  conditions  were  peculiarly  those 
which  incite  the  ignorant  and  lawless  of  the  population  to 
mob  violence  and  looting.  Therefore,  to  reassure  the 
timid  and  to  persuade  them  to  remain,  after  thousands  al- 
ready had  left  the  city,  the  Consular  Body  published  the 
following : 

^A  graphic  description  of  the  siege  of  the  Legations  is  found  in 
Smith's  China  in  Convulsion.  Thomson,  China  and  the  Powers:  A 
Narrative  of  the  Outbreak  of  1900  (London,  1902),  gives  a  detailed 
account  of  the  attack  on  the  Taku  Forts,  the  siege  of  Tientsin  and  the 
two  expeditions.  See  also  Allen,  The  Siege  of  the  Peking  Legations 
(London,  1901)  ;  Hooker,  Behind  the  Scenes  in  Peking,  being  Ex- 
periences during  the  Siege  of  the  Legations  (London,  1910)  ;  Landor, 
China  and  the  Allies,  2  vol.  (New  York,  1901)  ;  Martin,  The  Siege  in 
Peking:  China  against  the  World,  by  an  Eye-Witness  (New  York, 
1900)  ;  Oliphant,  Diary  of  the  Siege  of  the  Legations  in  Peking  during 
the  Summer  of  igoo  (London,  1901)  ;  Russel,  Story  of  the  Siege  of 
Peking  (London,  1901)  ;  Simpson,  B.  L.  ( Putnam- Weale),  Indiscreet 
Letters  from  Peking;  being  the  Notes  of  an  Eye-Witness  (New  York, 
1911)  ;  Viaud,  L.  M.  J.  (Pierre  Loti),  The  Last  Days  of  Peking,  trans, 
from  the  French  (Boston,  1902).  For  sources  see  MacDonald's  Cor- 
respondence of  the  Siege  in  Peking,  China  N^o.  4  (1900).  See  also 
China  No.  3  (1901)  ;  China  No.  4  (1901)  ;  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  passim; 
Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  516-537. 


53l]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  119 

Owing  to  the  troubles  in  the  north,  many  rumors  have  been 
circulated  in  Shanghai  which  have  unsettled  the  minds  of  the 
people.  In  their  ignorance  of  the  true  state  of  affairs  they 
have  frightened  themselves  and  each  other,  and  in  fleeing  home- 
ward from  Shanghai  have  in  many  cases  fallen  a  prey  to 
robbers. 

We,  the  Consular  Body  at  Shanghai,  have  consulted  with 
the  Chinese  authorities  regarding  the  protection  of  life  and 
property  in  this  neighborhood,  and  have  agreed  to  act  in  co- 
operation in  putting  down  any  disturbances  that  may  occur. 
The  municipal  council  holds  the  volunteer  corps  in  readiness 
for  the  protection  of  the  (foreign)  Settlement,  and  our  war- 
ships have  taken  up  their  positions  in  ^^^dyer  for  the  same 
purpose,  and  for  that  alone.  ^^^^ 

With  such  precautions,  both  on  shor^Br  afloat,  and  with 
the  cordial  cooperation  of  the  Chinese  authorities,  there  is  no 
reason  why  the  troubles  in  the  north  need  spread  into  these 
parts.  There  is  no  cause  for  alarm,  and  we  hereby  give  notice 
to  all  that  the  presence  of  foreign  men-of-war  in  the  river  is 
only  a  measure  of  precaution  for  the  protection  of  the  Settle- 
ment, and  that  there  is  no  foundation  of  truth  in  the  idle 
rumors  with  which  many  persons  are  now  exciting  themselves. 
JoAQuiM  Maria  Travassos  Valdez, 
Consul-General  for  Portugal  and  Senior  Consul.^ 

It  was  necessary  above  all  to  obtain  the  assistance  of  the 
leading  Viceroys,  Governors  and  taotais  if  peace  in  the 
south  was  to  be  preserved.  Fortunately  for  China  and  the 
world,  it  so  happened  that  some  of  the  greatest  Chinese 
statesmen  were  then  serving  in  provincial  administrative 
capacities,  among  them  Li  Hung-chang  as  Acting  Viceroy 
of  the  Two  Kwangs  (Kwangtung  and  Kwangsi  provinces)  ; 
Liu  Kun-yi  as  Viceroy  of  Kiangsu,  Kiangsi  and  Anhwei; 
Chang  Chih-tung,  Viceroy  of  Hunan  and  Hupeh;  Yuan 

*  U.  S.  For.  Rei,  1900,  p.  250. 


I 


I20  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^32 

Shih-kai  as  Governor  of  Shantung,  Wang  Chih-chun  as 
Governor  of  Anhwei,  and  Yu  Lien-san  as  Governor  of 
Hunan.  The  Viceroy  of  Chekiang  was  undecided  at  first, 
as  he  had  already  pubHshed  Prince  Tuan's  edict  to  the 
people  calling  for  active  participation  against  the  foreign 
Powers;  but  he  came  around  in  due  time.  Yuan  Shih-kai' s 
position  was  particulary  difficult.  That  he  was  more  or  less 
on  the  fence  at  the  beginning  of  the  troubles  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at,  but  his  attitude,  though  seemingly  contra- 
dictory in  some  respects,  was  clear  enough  to  the  observant 
foreigner.  His  province  of  Shantung  had  cradled  the 
Boxer  movement^|d  was  situated  next  door  to  Chihli  prov- 
ince. Moreove^^^^Governor,  like  Li  Hung-chang,  was 
on  good  terms  ^BRhe  Empress  Dowager  and  even  with 
the  reactionary  Court  officials.  And  Yuan  was  too  shrewd 
a  statesman  and  too  clever  a  politician  openly  to  alienate 
the  sympathy  or  support  of  either  party,  or,  above  all,  to 
become  persona  non  grata  to  the  rulers  of  his  country. 
However,  Yuan  Shih-kai's  course,  as  has  been  intimated, 
was  correctly  read  by  the  diplomats  and  consuls;  in  fact, 
he  rendered  invaluable  aid.  As  the  confidant  of  the  Court, 
he  was  the  only  one  in  touch  with  the  situation  in  Peking, 
but  just  how  he  got  his  news  no  one  seemed  to  know.  He 
faithfully  transmitted  his  scraps  of  information  to  the 
foreigners  in  central  and  south  China  and  to  the  Admirals 
at  Taku,  and  through  his  agency  the  world  knew  that  the 
tragedy  in  the  capital  was  being  strung  out  instead  of 
ended  at  a  single  blow,  as  most  had  feared. 

No  less  remarkable  in  preventing  the  spread  of  the  anti- 
foreign  movement  was  Liu  Kun-yi,  the  Viceroy  of  Nanking, 
at  this  time  yy  years  of  age,  having  for  35  years  served 
in  this  high  official  rank.  He  was  regarded  as  the  leader 
of  the  Hunanese,  the  most  warlike  Chinese  in  the  central 
provinces.     Having  been  summoned  to  Peking  for  an  Im- 


533]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  I2i 

perial  audience,  he  had  the  rare  courage  to  tell  the  Em- 
press Dowager  in  outspoken  terms  that  her  policy  would 
be  the  ruin  of  the  country.  He  succeeded  in  incurring  the 
enmity  of  Prince  Tuan,  Kang  Yi  and  all  the  reactionaries. 
These  tried  their  best  to  prevent  his  reappointment  in  the 
south,  but  Liu  Kun-yi  was  too  firmly  established  in  the 
friendship  of  Tzu  Hsi,  and  so  was  permitted  to  resume  his 
duties.  He  was  instrumental  in  arranging  the  league  of 
the  Viceroys  in  south  and  central  China,  which  was  now 
responding  so  favorably  to  the  views  of  the  foreign  Min- 
isters and  Consuls.  More  than  that,  he  associated  himself 
at  the  capital  with  the  liberals,  in  opposition  to  the  reac- 
tionaries. That  the  unfortunate  Rebellion  did  not  spread 
throughout  the  Empire  was  due  to  these  half-dozen  Vice- 
roys and  Governors,  who  saw  beyond  the  events  of  the 
moment  and  were  not  blinded  by  hate  or  prejudice  in  their 
views  as  to  what  was  best  for  China  and  the  Chinese. 
I^^^It^was  not  to  be  expected  that  all  of  the  provinces  af-  .  / 
fected  would  unite  against  the  Boxers.  Honan  and  Shansi 
joined  the  anti- foreign  movement,  which  was  natural,  con- 
sidering their  proximity  to  Chihli  province  and  the  influ- 
ence of  the  reactionary  party  upon  their  leaders. 

The  Chinese  Minister  at  London  had  despatched  a 
memorandum  to  the  Downing  Street  Office  which  read  in 
part: 

The  Viceroy  (of  Huquang)  tenders  his  grateful  acknowledg- 
ments to  Lord  Salisbury  for  his  friendly  offer  (of  sending 
ships  and  also  giving  asylum  for  the  Viceroys  on  board 
British  vessels  in  case  of  personal  danger),  and  will  gladly 
ivail  himself  of  it  in  case  of  need.  He,  however,  is  persuaded 
that  he  and  his  colleague,  the  Viceroy  of  Nanking,  with  whom 
he  has  been  in  communication  on  the  subject,  will  be  more  than 
able  to  cope  with  the  **  Boxers  "  or  any  other  elements  of  dis- 
order who,  contrary  to  his  expectations,  may  attempt  to  dis- 
irb  the  peace  and  tranquility  of  the  Yangtse  provinces. 


122  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^34 

To  the  British  offer  of  troops  to  assist  in  quelling  any  out- 
breaks, the  answer  was : 

The  Viceroys  have  at  their  disposal  very  sufficient,  well- 
equipped  and  well-disciplined  forces,  on  which  they  can  im- 
plicitly depend,  and  these  they  will  so  dispose  and  employ  as 
to  give  the  fullest  measure  of  protection  to  all  residing  within 
their  respective  jurisdictions,  whether  native  or  foreigners, 
and  of  whatever  religion. 

The  Viceroys  well  knew  that  any  display  of  force  on  the 
part  of  the  Powers  in  central  and  south  China  would  imme- 
diately inflame  the  passions  of  the  people.  Therefore,  they 
"  would  deprecate  any  obtrusive  demonstration  of  British 
naval  force  on  the  Yang-tse  as  being  calculated  rather  to 
make  difficulties  for  the  Chinese  authorities  than  to  aid 
them  in  maintaining  tranquility  and  good  order  in  the 
riverine  provinces "/  Lord  Salisbury  credited  these 
Chinese  officials  with  understanding  the  peculiarities  of  the  ^ 
situation,  and  so  refrained  from  any  demonstration  or  show 
of  force  for  the  purpose  of  intimidation.^  But  to  make 
doubly  sure,  the  Hermione  was  ordered  to  Nanking  "  to 
communicate  with  the  Viceroy,  assuring  him  of  the  sup- 
port of  her  Majesty's  Government  in  preserving  order  and 
protecting  British  interests  ".^  For  the  same  purpose,  the 
Linnet  was  ordered  to  Hankow  and  the  Undaunted  to  Woo- 
sung. 

By  Julyjrd,  the  Viceroys  Liu  Kun-yi_arid  Chang  Chih- 
,  tung  made  the  ToTlo wing  definite_£ledge; 

^  China  No.  3  (1900),  no.  I53- 

'^When  the  revolt  began,  the  natural  inference  had  been  at  first  that 
the  best  way  to  prevent  its  spread  would  be  by  an  "  adequate  force " 
to  prevent  "possible  disturbances."  This  force  would  undoubtedly 
have  been  much  larger  than  the  few  ships  sent  had  not  the  Viceroys 
effectively  discouraged  such  action  and,  by  proving  it  to  be  highly 
injurious,  prevented  undue  augmentation. 

'  China  No.  3  {1900),  Inc.  in  no.  140. 


535]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  123 

\^e,  the  Viceroys  of  the  Liang  Kiang  and  Liang  Hu  prov- 
inces, undertake  to  hold  ourselves  responsible  f of  the  secur- 
ity of  foreign  life  and  property  within  our  respective  juris- 
dictions, as  well  as  in  the  province  of  Chekiang,  so  long  as  the 
Treaty  Powers  do  not  land  troops  in  either  the  Yang-tse 
Valley  or  the  province  of  Chekiang.^ 

The  American  Department  of  State  observed  with  pleas- 
ure the  trend  of  events  in  central  and  south  China,  and,' 
Secretary  Hay  informed  the  Chinese  Minister  at  Washing-| 
ton,  Wu  '^^ng^ng,  that  the  President  was  "  much  grati-f 
fied  at  the  asslrances  contained  in  these  telegrams  (as  th^ 
one  above)  ".^  Hay  further  informed  Wu  that  the  United 
States  had  ''  no  intention  of  sending  any  military  or  naval 
forces  into  regions  where  their  presence  is  not  needed  ".I 
In  addition,  the  position  of  the  United  States  in  this  matter « 
was  communicated  to  the  American  Ambassadors  at  Lon- 
don, Paris,  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  and  to  the  American 
Minister  at  Tokyo. 

The  Consular  Body  at  Shanghai  was  able  to  inform  the 
Taotai,  Yu  Lien-yuen,  that  the  Admirals  at  Taku  were  ex- 

1  China  No.  3  (1900),  no,  244. 

'  A  further  cable  was  sent,  June  25,  in  part  as  follows : 

"As  no  war  decree  has  been  received  by  any  of  the  Viceroys  or 
Governors  (thus  ignoring  Prince  Tuan's  Edict  of  June  20,  already 
referred  to),  it  is  evident  that  the  Imperial  Government  has  no  in- 
tention of  breaking  off  friendly  relations.  .  .  .  The  Viceroys  and 
Governors  of  the  provinces  bordering  on  the  Yang-tse  and  the  coast 
have  assumed  full  responsibility  and  are  doing  all  in  their  power  to 
afford  protection  (to  life  and  property).  Foreigners  of  all  nationali- 
ties need  fear  no  solicitude.  If  there  should  be  further  conflict  of 
arms  in  or  about  Tientsin  it  would  necessarily  follow  that  southern 
China  would  also  be  involved.  .  .  .  The  above  has  the  concurrence  of 
all  the  Viceroys  and  Governors,  and  a  like  message  has  been  com- 
municated, by  cable,  to  the  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  dif- 
ferent countries." 

Cable  from  Chang  Chih-tung  to  Minister  Wu  Ting-fang  at  Wash- 
ington.   U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  pp.  274,  275. 


124  ^^^  BOXER  REBELLION  [^36 

erting  themselves  likewise  to  restrict  the  field  of  operations, 
that  ''  they  only  fight  against  the  Boxers  and  those  who 
strive  to  prevent  the  rescue  of  the  foreigners  in  danger  at 
Peking  and  other  places  "/  The  Consuls  were  able  to  re- 
assure the  Viceroys  with  the  further  comforting  statement : 

Our  Governments  have  had  no  intention,  and  now  have  no 
intention,  either  individually  or  collectively,  to  take  any  hostile 
action  or  land  any  hostile  force  in  the  Yangtse  Valley  so  long 
as  their  Excellencies  are  able  to,  and  do,  maintain  the  rights 
of  the  foreigners  in  their  provinces  as  provided  for  in  the 
treaties  with  the  Government  of  China.^ 

The  prompt  action  of  the  Viceroys  and  Governors  and 
the  fair  spirit  in  which  Europe  and  America  met  their  ad- 
vances and  adhered  to  their  wishes  received  its  reward. 
Barring  a  few  outlying  skirmishes  and  riots,  the  Boxer 
Rebellion  was  thus  confined  to  the  siege  of  the  Legations, 
to  the  capture  of  Taku  and  Tientsin,  to  the  two  relief  ex- 
peditions, and  to  various  punitive  expeditions  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  the  above  places.  Though  consequently  limited 
to  a  comparatively  small  area  and  to  relatively  few  ob- 
jectives, this  was  a  large  enough  task,  as  the  Allies  soon 
found  out,  and  a  great  deal  more  than  they  had  anticipated. 
Of  course,  had  all  the  Eighteen  Provinces  joined  in  the 
anti-foreign  movement,  the  result  in  the  end  would  have 
been  exactly  the  same,  with  a  still  greater  humiliation  for 

*  Taku,  June  20,  1900. 

The  Admirals  and  senior  officers  of  the  Allied  Powers  in  China 
desire  to  let  it  be  known  to  all  Viceroys  and  authorities  on  coast, 
river  provinces,  and  cities  in  China,  that  they  intend  use  of  their  arms 
only  against  the  Boxers  and  those  people  who  oppose  them  in  their 
march  to  Peking  for  the  rescue  of  their  fellow  countrymen. 

Published  by  request  of  the  Senior  Admiral  at  Taku. 

U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  pp.  251,  252;  China  No.  3  {1900),  Inc.  in  no.  164. 

'  U.  S.  For.  Rel,  1900,  no.  267,  p.  249. 


537]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  125 

China  and  an  indemnity  not  only  greater  but  possibly  in- 
cluding territory.  But  in  that  case,  with  a  united  revolt 
from  one  end  of  the  vast  Empire  to  the  other,  such  as  very 
nearly  took  place,  its  subjugation  would  have  been  infinitely 
more  arduous  and  the  loss  of  life  and  destruction  of  prop- 
erty immeasurably  greater.  The  attitude  of  China's  great 
Viceroys  simplified  the  situation.  Had  they  joined  the 
Boxers,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  with  their  support  the  Court, 
the  Yamen  and  the  reactionaries  would  have  thrown  off  all 
restraint,  and  every  member  of  the  Legations  would  have 
shared  the  fate  of  Baron  von  Ketteler  and  the  Japanese 
Chancellor.^ 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  throughout  this  period 
did  not  deviate  a  hair's  breadth  from  the  one  consistently 
followed  ever  since  it  was  enunciated  in  Webster's  instruc- 
tions to  Cushing.  In  fact,  the  Far  Eastern  program  of 
the  Department  of  State  may  be  favorably  compared  in 
definiteness  and  singleness  of  purpose  to  the  attitude  of 
Great  Britain  in  always  opposing  the  strongest  power  on 
the  mainland  of  Europe.  Both  these  policies  seem  to  have 
become  permanent  fixtures  in  international  politics  and 
diplomacy.  The  American  Minister  at  Peking,  while  given 
authority  to  cooperate  with  the  Diplomatic  Body  in  the  de- 
mand for  an  Imperial  audience  and  in  other  matters,  was 
nevertheless  told  to  "  act  independently  in  protection  of 
American  interests  when  practicable,  and  concurrently  with 
representatives  of  other  Powers  if  necessity  arise  ".  Later 
followed  the  most  definite  of  instructions : 

We  have  no  policy  in  China  except  to  protect  with  energy 

lU.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  248-252,  265,  273,  274,  276,  277;  China 
No.  3,  {1900),  nos.  128,  130,  135,  137,  140,  161,  162,  165,  166,  168,  172, 
177,  179,  194-196,  198,  199,  204,  205,  222,  226,  240,  244,  249,  251,  261, 
262,  270,  271. 


126  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  ^^2,^ 

American  interests,  and  especially  American  citizens  and  the 
Legation.  There  must  be  nothing  done  which  would  commit 
us  to  future  action  inconsistent  with  your  (Conger's)  stand- 
ing instructions.     There  must  be  no  alliances.^ 

Thus  the  national  dictum  of  the  United  States,  first  enun- 
ciated by  Washington  and  thoroughly  established  in  Ameri- 
can diplomacy  by  the  Genet  experience  and  the  mistakes  of 
the  treaty  of  1776  with  France,^  has  been  followed  with 
scarcely  a  deviation  ever  since.  This  policy  is,  in  effect,  to 
avoid  all  entangling  alliances  and  to  keep  American  foreign 
affairs  distinct  and  separate  from  the  interests  of  Europe. 
The  Circular  of  July  3rd,  sent  by  Secretary  Hay  to  the 
American  representatives  at  London,  Paris,  Berlin,  Vienna, 
Rome,  St.  Petersburg  and  Tokyo  for  presentation  to  the 
respective  Foreign  Offices  epitomized  the  course  the  United 
States  would  pursue  at  present  and  upon  the  restoration  of 
order : 

Department  of  State, 

Washington,  July  3,  1900. 
In  this  critical  posture  of  affairs  in  China  it  is  deemed  ap- 
propriate to  define  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  as  far  as 
present  circumstances  permit  this  to  be  done.  We  adhere  to 
the  policy  initiated  by  us  in  1857  (the  Reed  treaty),  of  peace 
with  the  Chinese  nation,  of  furtherance  of  lawful  commerce, 
and  of  protection  of  lives  and  property  of  our  citizens  by  all 
means  guaranteed  under  extraterritorial  treaty  rights  and  by 
the  law  of  nations.  If  wrong  be  done  to  our  citizens  we  pro- 
pose to  hold  the  responsible  authors  to  the  uttermost  accoun- 
tability.    We  regard  the  condition  at  Peking  as  one  of  virtual 

^  U.  S,  For.  Rel.,  1900,  p.  143. 

2  Another    exception    to    the   general    American    policy   was    Article 
XXXV  of  the  treaty  with  New  Granada  (Colombia)  in  1846. 


539]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  127 

anarchy,  whereby  power  and  responsibility  are  practically  de- 
volved upon  the  local  provincial  authorities.  So  long  as  they 
are  not  in  overt  collusion  with  rebellion  and  use  their  power 
to  protect  foreign  life  and  property  we  regard  them  as  repre- 
senting the  Chinese  people,  with  whom  we  seek  to  remain  in 
peace  and  friendship.  The  purpose  of  the  President  is,  as  it 
has  been  heretofore,  to  act  concurrently  with  the  other  Powers, 
first,  in  opening  up  communication  with  Peking  and  rescuing 
the  American  officials,  missionaries,  and  other  Americans  who 
are  in  danger;  secondly,  in  affording  all  possible  protection 
everywhere  to  American  life  and  property ;  thirdly,  in  guard- 
ing and  protecting  all  legitimate  American  interests;  and 
fourthly,  in  aiding  to  prevent  a  spread  of  the  disorders  to  the 
other  provinces  of  the  Empire  and  a  recurrence  of  such  dis- 
asters. It  is,  of  course,  too  early  to  forecast  the  means  of 
attaining  this  last  result ;  but  the  policy  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  is  to  seek  a  solution  which  may  bring  about 
permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China,  preserve  Chinese  terri- 
torial and  administrative  entity,  protect  all  rights  guaranteed  ^ 
to  friendly  Powers  by  treaty  and  international  law,  and  safe-  j 
guard  for  the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and  impartial  trade  ^ 
with  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

You  will  communicate  the  purport  of  this  instruction  to  the 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Hay.^ 

*  It  is  necessary  to  remark  that  the  general  principles  outlined  in 
Hay's  Circular  of  July  3,  were  on  that  same  day  and  again  on  July  8 
enunciated  by  Delcasse  in  the  French  Chamber,  and  that  for  the  pre- 
ceding month  Delcasse  had  made  this  position  of  France  clear  to  the 
diplomatic  world.  The  American  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Mr.  Horace 
Porter,  in  sending  to  Hay  the  statements  of  the  French  Minister, 
remarked  that  "his  (Delcasse's)  definition  of  the  policy  of  France 
in  China  substantially  agrees  with  us." 

Said  Delcasse  on  July  3  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies :  "  I  have 
in  my  previous  declarations,  particularly  last  month,  clearly  explained 
the  tendencies  of  our  policy  in  China.  The  Chamber  will  remember 
that  during  the  past  two  years  I  have  repeatedly  stated  that  France, 
as  mistress  of  Indo-China,  has  no  interest  in  provoking  or  desiring 
the  break-up  of  China,  which  is,  perhaps  without  sufficient  reflection,. 


I 


128  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [540 

This  statement  of  the  various  purposes  of  the  American 
diplomatic  policy,  being  in  the  main  already  well-known, 
met  with  no  opposition  in  Europe/  ( I  The  only  difficulty 
seems  to  have  been  experienced  with  tne  Allied  Admirals 
at  Taku,  when  it  was  decided  in  conference  to  attack  and 

spoken  of.  What  I  can  affirm  is  that  France  has  no  wish  for  war  with 
China,  but  she  cannot  evade  the  duty  of  protecting  her  citizens  and 
of  obtaining  for  her  merchants  the  guaranties  obtained  by  others.  It 
is  for  this  and  this  alone  that  the  Government  has  taken  the  measures 
necessitating  these  credits.  France  is  certainly  anxious  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  equilibrium  in  the  Far  East.  She  will  see  that  it  is 
not  broken  to  her  detriment,  but  she  cherishes  no  secret  designs.  I 
know  not,  moreover,  who  could  have  particular  objects.  What  I 
see  is  that  a  common  peril  demands  a  common  aim,  and  this  is  com- 
prehended by  all  the  Powers.  This  is  the  reassuring  feature  of  the 
situation,  the  difficulties  of  which  it  would  be  as  childish  to  deny  as  it 
would  be  to  be  disturbed  by  them.  I  descend  the  Tribune  after  re- 
peating the  assurance  that  France,  whose  efforts  are  already  employed 
in  facilitating  the  rapprochement  of  the  Powers,  will  continue  to 
neglect  nothing  for  maintaining  and  strengthening  those  sentiments  of 
internal  and  humane  solidarity  which  would  prevent  them,  if  necessary, 
from  thinking  of  what  might  divide  them."  *• 

See  U.  iS.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  312,  313. 

As  far  as  Germany's  plans  in  China  were  concerned,  these  had  been 
sufficiently  expressed  by  Count  von  Biilow  in  the  Reichstag  as  far 
back  as  April  27,  1898.  Said  the  Count :  "  Mention  has  been  made  of 
the  partition  of  China.  Such  a  partition  will  not  be  brought  about  by 
us,  at  any  rate.  All  we  have  done  is  to  provide  that,  come  what  may, 
we  shall  not  go  empty-handed";  then  adding,  with  the  characteristic 
German  fondness  for  proverbs:  "The  traveller  cannot  decide  when 
the  train  is  to  start,  but  he  can  make  sure  not  to  miss  it  when  it  does 
start.  The  devil  takes  the  hindmost."  By  this  the  Count  intimated 
that  the  Powers  could  take  the  initiative  in  the  partition  of  China,  and 
what  they  would  do,  that  likewise  would  be  the  course  pursued  by 
Germany,  who  was  prepared  for  any  event.  See  China  No.  i  (1899), 
p.  67. 

Naturally  it  was  to  the  interest  of  Japan  to  have  a  free  and  united 
China  as  neighbor,  with  the  hope  of  future  domination,  if  not  politi- 
cally at  least  commercially.  Russia  on  her  part  was  slowly  advancing 
at  this  time  by  exceedingly  shrewd  and  brilliant  moves  in  the  diplomatic 
conquest  of  Manchuria. 

1  Ibid.,  p.  299. 


54l]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  129 

capture  the  Forts.  To  this  action  the  American  commander. 
Admiral  .ivempff,  was  opposed,  on  fiie  ground  "tfiat  there 
had  been  no  declaration  of  war  against  China,  and  that  the 
attack  would  be  tantamount  to  such  declaration.  In  the 
bombardment  which  followed,  Junej[6th,  he  had  the  cour- 
age to  stand  aside  and  take  no  part  in  the  action  or  in  the 
capture  which  followed.  He  reasoned  correctly.  The  im- 
mediate effect  of  the  injudicious  conduct  of  the  Allied  Ad- 
nitrarrw^s  to  place  "tte"^  then 

about  half-way  to  Peking,  in  an  exceedingly  perilous  posi- 
tion from  which  it  emerged  with  difficulty.  The  attack  on 
Taku  further  gave  the  Chinese  troops  the  necessary^  ex- 
cuse for  joining  the  Boxers ;  in  fact,  it  united  the  Govern- 
ment at  Peking,  the  Imperial  army,  and  the  Boxer  sympia-  \/^ 
thizers  against  the  Powers,  with  the  convenient  argument.'? 
that  Europe  had  started  the  war.  It  is  significant  to  note 
that  immediately  after  the  Chinese '(?ourt  received  news  of 
the  bombardment  and  loss  of  the  Forts,  an  edict .i^  was  pub- 

^     '^  ~"" ,.r:,;:.::::.:-v-....,....,,.., 

^  From  the  Edict  of  June  29 : 

"To  our  surprise  on  the  20th  of  the  fifth  moon  (June  16)  foreign 
(naval?)  officers  at  Taku  called  upon  Lo  Jung-kwang,  the  General 
commanding,  and  demanded  his  surrender  of  the  Forts,  notifying  him 
that  failing  to  receive  compliance  they  would,  at  2  o'clock  the  next 
day,  take  steps  to  seize  the  Forts  by  force.  Lo  Jung-kwang  being  bound 
by  the  duties  of  his  office  to  hold  the  Forts,  how  could  he  yield  to  the 
demand?  On  the  day  named  they  actually  first  fired  upon  the  Forts 
(this  was  not  true;  the  Forts  fired  first),  which  responded  and  kept 
up  a  fighting  all  day  and  then  surrendered.  Thus  the  conflict  of 
forces  began,  but  certainly  the  initiative  did  not  come  from  our  side. 
Even  supposing  that  China  were  not  conscious  of  her  true  condition, 
how  could  she  take  such  a  step  as  to  engage  in  war  with  all  the  Powers 
simultaneously,  and  how  could  she,  relying  upon  the  support  of  an 
anarchistic  populace,  go  into  war  with  the  Powers?  Our  position  in 
this  matter  ought  to  be  clearly  understood  by  all  the  Powers. .  The 
above  is  a  statement  of  the  wrongs  we  have  suffered,  and  how  China 
was  driven  to  the  unfortunate  position  from  which  she  could  not 
escape." 

U.  S.  For,  ReL,  1900,  pp.  277,  278. 


\ 


130  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^42 

(  lushed  which  meant  practical  affihation  with  the  Boxers/ 
\  while  coincidently  all  members  of  the  Legations  were  sum- 
jrnarily  ordered  to  leave  Peking ;  and  a  few  days  afterwards 
joccurred  the  distressing  murder  of  the  German  Minister.^ 
/Admiral  Kempff  had  defended  his  position  on  the  ground 
that  neither  his  Government  nor  that  of  any  other  Power 
was  at  war  with  China ;  that  China  could  not  be  considered 
I  otherwise  than  at  peace  with  the  world,  in  spite  of  internal 
\  disorders  over  which  the  Chinese  Government  presumably 
\jiad  no  control.  In  this  he  was  supported  by  the  ^Adminis- 
tration at  Washington. 

The  refusal  of  the  American  Admiral  to.  join  the  AUied 
fleett  in  the  bombardment  of  Taku  raises  the  very  interest- 
ing question  whether  war  existed  between  China  and  the 
Powers.  It  seems  that  the  solution  of  the  argument  must 
be  left  with  tHe  individual  reader.  We  have  seen  that  the 
United  States  was  reluctant  to  make  such  interpretation  of 
the  difficulties,*  and  that  China  herself  did  not  regard  the 
disturbances  as  approaching  the  dignity  and  magnituife  of 
an  armed  conflict  until  forced  to  do  so  by  the  warships  of 

/   *This   soon   developed  into   a   certainty.    A   decree   issued   June  25 
announced  that  "  a  sum  of  100,000  taels  is  granted  in  reward  to  each\ 
I   of  the  following  army  corps :  Sheng  Tzu  Ying,  Fu  Shang  Ying,  and  ' 
\  the  corps  of  the  Boxers,  etc." 
'^  In  addition,  four  edicts  on  June  27  each  promised  pecuniary  rewards 
t"Q  the  Boxers,  "  as  a  stimulus  to  exertion." 
See  ibid.,  pp.  169,  170. 

'Von  Ketteler  entered  upon  his  last  visit  to  the  Yamen  against  the 
advice  of  the  entire  Diplomatic  Corps.  For  a  graphic  account  of  the 
murder,  see  China  No.  4  (1900),  no.  2,  pp.  22,  23^  As  MacDonald 
observed,  the  event  strengthened  the  position  of  "  a  powerful  party 
determined  on  war  at  all  hazards,"  since  now  there  was  no  escape 
from  it. 

^  Secretary  Hay  told  Lord  Pauncefote  that  the  United  States  "  did 
not -think  that  a  state  of  war  necessarily  exTsts."  China  No.  3  {1900), 
no.  178. 


543]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  131 

Europe.  Lord  Salisbury  was  of  the  opinion,  June  22d,  that, 
'*  if  the  Forts  at  Taku  fired  without  orders  from  the  Gov- 
ernment at  Peking,  and  the  attacks  on  the  international : 
troops  (Seymour's  expedition)  are  without  authority,  there/ 
is  no  reason  that  it  should  be  considered  that  a  state  of 
war  exists  "/  Count  Lamsdorff  of  the  Russian  Foreign/ 
Office  was  then  of  the  same  opinion.  Later,  however,  the 
relief  measures  changed  to  a  distinct  state  of  hostilities, 
call  it  a  punitive  expedition  or  international  police  or  what 
not.  This  was  inevitable  when  it  gradually  leaked  out  that 
the  Legations  were  surrounded  by  Imperial  troops)  that  the 
Court  had  sided  with  the  Boxers;  that  the  authorities  had 
ordered  the  Ministers  from  Peking;  had  endeavored  to 
entice  them  into  the  open  by  false  promises;  had  tried  to 
ambush  them;  and  had  subjected  them  from  June  21st  to 
July  27th  to  a  continued  storm  of  shot,  shell  and  firecrack- 
ers. From  then  on  the  attacks  became  more  intermittent. 
Possibly  the  Court  realized  the  futility  of  trying  to  exter- 
minate the  diplomats ;  at  any  rate,  on  July  2 1  st  the  hungry 
defenders  received  "  three  bags  of  flour,  a  few  watermelons, 
cucumbers,  eggplants,  and  squashes  ",  but  nothing  more, 
"  no  arms  or  any  other  defence  ".^  The  situation  was 
doubly  curious  because  of  the  half-hearted  policy  of  the 
Chinese  Government,  alternately  striving  to  feed  and  to 
destroy  the  Legations,  thus  trying,  so  it  appeared,  to  be 
both  at  war  and  at  peace  with  the  world.  No  doubt  what 
held  the  Court  back  from  decisive  action  were  the  momen- 
tary spasms  of  fear  at  the  terrible  price  which  eventually 
would  have  to  be  paid.  Especially  hesitating  and  spasmodic 
grew  the  attacks  when  it  was  realized  that  China  could  not 
possibly  be  victorious.     What  all  this  really  amounted  to 

1  China  No.  3  {igoo),  no.  176.    See  also  nos.  173-175. 
^  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  p.  199. 


132  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [544 

was  well  expressed  by  Count  Lamsdorff  in  conversation 
with  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  Said  the 
Count : 

/  We  were  at  present  dealing  with  a  country  which  was  in  a 
\^  complete  state  of  anarchy,  and  which  had  no  Government  or 
/  constituted  authority  which  it  could  be  useful  to  menace,  or 
^even  address,  but  we  were  in  a  state  of  war  with  anarchists, 
/and  not  with  China. ^ 

jT^y  these  ''  anarchists  "  Count  Lamsdorff  was  referring  to 
I  Prince  Tuan  and  the  reactionaries ;  yet  these,  it  must  in  all 
candidness  be  admitted,  were  for  the  time  being  in  complete 
possession  of  the  Chinese  Government. 

The  first  expedition  of  the  Allies  from  Tientsin  to  the 
relief  of  the  Legations  was  prompted  to  hasty  action  by.  a 
\Xtelegram,  June  loth,   from  MacDonald,  which  dissipated 
any  favorable  illusions  the  Admirals  may  have  entertained 
concerning   the   state   of .  affairs.      "  Situation   extremely 
grave '',  wrote  the  British  Minister,  "  unless  arrangements 
are  made  for  immediate  advance  to  Peking  it  will  be  too 
late  ".^      That  was  sufficient  warning,  and  all  discussions 
were  dropped  in  the  hurry  of  the  moment.    TJjis  initial  re- 
lief column,,  with  Admiral  Seymour  as  Commander  and 
\^     the  Riissian  Colonel  as  Chief-of-Staff,  consisted  of  900 
X  British,"  500   French,    200   Germans,    200   Russians,    120 
Americans,^  100  Italians,  25  Austrians,  and  200  Japanese. 
Later,  a  party  of  65  Frenchmen  overtook  them  by  rail.* 

^  Count^Lamsdorff  to  Sir  C.  Scott,  China  No.  3  (1900),  no.  246. 

^  China  No.  3  (1900),  Inc.  in  no.  103, 

'Under  command  of  Captain  McCalla  of  the  Newark. 

*Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  508,  509:  "  Le  n  juin,  le  commandant 
de  Marolles,  du  d'Entrecasteaux,  avec  50  hommes  et  un  cannon,  re- 
monte  a  Tien-tsin,  trouve  I'admiral  Seymour  parti,  et  le  rattrappe  avec 
65  hommes  par  chemin  de  fer," 


545]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  133 

With  little  difficulty  they  penetrated  inland  to  the  half-way 
points,  Langfang,  Lofa  Station  and  Anting,  and  there  they 
were  decisively  checked.  It  was  impossible  to  advance 
further,  with  every  village  full  of  Boxers,  with  Imperial 
troops  barring  the  way,  with  the  railway  line  from  there 
on  utterly  destroyed,  with  scarcity  of  food  and  drink  and 
the  knowledge  that  it  was  courting  annihilation  to  persist 
because  of  the  unexpected  and  overwhelming  forces  op- 
posing them.  In  fact,  though  they  marched  30  miles  the 
first  day,  on  the  second  they  covered  only  three,  while  it 
took  almost  every  available  man  to  care  for  the  sick  and 
wounded.  There  was  no  alternative  but  to  retreat,  greatly 
to  the  disajfjpointment  of  the  officers  and  men,  who  feared 
that  the  return  to  the  coast  would  seal  the^^  of  the 

Legations.l^_jBdeed,  the  outlook  for  the  besieged  Ministers 
and  their  families  was  gloomy  enough,  when,  assembled  at 
the  railway  station  to  welcome  the  expected  Allies,  they  met 
instead  the  taunts  and  jeers  of  the  Boxer  crowd  and  their 
sympathizers.  The  abortive  expedition,  hard  pressed  on 
the  way  back,  was  forced  to  deflect  its  course  so  as  to  cap- 
ture the  Imperial  Hsiku  Arsenal,  a  few  miles  from  their 
objective^  where  they  found  a  goodly  supply  of  arms,  am- 
munition and  provisions.^     Here  they  were  augmented  by 

^  Minister  Conger :  "  It  is  now  eight  days  since  the  relief  party  under 
Admiral  Seymour  and  Captain  McCalla  left  Tientsin.  We  know  they 
have  been  within  thirty  miles  of  Peking,  and  we  can  not  understand 
why,  if  they  find  it  impossible  to  readily  repair  the  railway,  they  do 
not,  with  the  larger  part  of  their  command,  march  directly  here." 
U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  p.  151.  Conger  was  of  course  unaware  of  the 
opposition  offered  Seymour,  both  Boxer  and  Imperial  troops,  in  addi- 
tion to  an  already  inadequate  commissary. 

^ "  The  capture  of  this  Arsenal  virtually  saved  the  force  from  al- 
most certain  annihilation  (there  were  only  a  few  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion left  per  man),  for  in  it  they  found  abundance  of  three  things  of 
which  they  were  most  in  need — ammunition,  food,  and  medical  stores." 
H.  C.  Thomson,  China  and  the  Powers,  p.  15.  See  also  China  No.  s 
{1900),  nos.  206,  227. 


134  T^HE  BOXER  REBELLION  [546 

a  mixed  force  of  1,800  men  commanded  by  the  Russian 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Shirinsky,  who  had  hastened  to  rein- 
force their  weakened  ranks,  and  together  they  retreated 
safely  to  Tientsin,  reaching  that  city  on  the  26th  of  June. 
Admiral  Seymour's  column  had  been  in  the  field  for  16 
days,  some  of  which  had  been  spent  in  hard  fighting  and 
in  imminent  peril,  and  returned  with  the  respectable  casu- 
alty list  of  62  killed  and  228  wounded/  It  was  a  noble 
effort  but  failed  because  Chinese  resistance,  which  no  one 
had  thought  at  all  likely  or  possible  in  such  degree,  was 
underestimated. 

It  was  fortunate  for  the  small  number  of  Allies  then  at 
Tientsin  that  the  1,800  Russian  troops  on  thei^  way  from 
Port  Arthur  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  join  Seymour's  col- 
umn, as  had  been  intended.  Their  coming  too  late  was  a 
stroke  of  fortune,  for  on  June  17th,  at  three  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  the  Chinese  attacked  in  force  the  foreign  con- 
cessions in  the  city  and  reduced  them  to  a  state  of  siege. 
The  day  before,  at  one  in  the  morning,  the  great  Roman 
Catholic  Cathedral  had  been  burned  and  scores  of  native 
Christians  butchered.  This  siege  of  the  concessions  in  Tien- 
tsin was  glorious  enough  in  itself,  a  companion  act  to  the 
drama  which  was  being  so  curiously  strung  out  in  Peking. 

*  The  killed  and  wounded  of  the  Seymour  expedition : 

Killed  Wounded 

British 27  97 

American  4  25 

French i  10 

German 12  62 

Italian 5  3 

Japanese  2  3 

Austrian I  i 

Russian 10  27 

Total  62  228 

Report  of  Seymour  to  Admiralty,  China  No.  3  (ipoo),  no.  219. 


547]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  135 

Only  2,500  soldiers  and  marines  were  on  hand  to  maintain 
a  position  some  ten  miles  in  length,  with  all  communica- 
tion with  the  fleet  cut  off  for  a  considerable  time.  But  the 
troops  of  the  Powers  were  being  rushed  to  the  scene  with 
the  utmost  dispatch  possible.  Not,  however,  until  July 
14th  ^  had  enough  reinforcements  arrived  from  the  coast 
to  relieve  after  severe  fighting  the  beleaguered  force  and  to 
capture  the  entire  city,  which  was  indispensable  as  a  base 
of  operations  against  Peking.^ 

Then  came  another  distressing  wait  before  the  advance 
on  the  capital  could  begin.  This  was  largely  on  account  of 
the  changed  opinions  regarding  Chinese  valor  and  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  their  resistance  to  the  Seymour  expedition. 
As  it  was,  the  Allies  would  have  tarried  at  Tientsin  for 
additional  reinforcements  some  weeks  longer  had  not 
the  British  and  American  commanders  threatened  to  pro- 
ceed alone  with  their  contingents  and  risk  the  consequences. 
Although  it  was  felt,  so  had  the  estimation  of  Chinese 
prowess  been  increased,  that  at  least  50,000  troops  were 
necessary,  some  thought  70,000,  successfully  to  invade  the 
interior,  the  second  relief  expedition  to  Peking  finally  got 
under  way,  August  4th,  with  an  impressive  total  of  18,800 
men.  This  number  included  8,000  Japanese,  3,000  British, 
4,500  Russians,  2,500  Americans,  and  800  French.  The 
Germans  were  unrepresented,  as  it  was  judged  best  to  re- 
serve some  strength  for  Kiaochau  and  the  coast,  in  case  of 

^  About  200  Americans  and  300  Russians  on  June  22  made  a  desperate 
attempt  to  enter  Tientsin  by  following  the  railway.  When  within  two 
miles  they  were  ambushed  and  forced  to  retire,  the  Americans  losing 
3  killed  and  13  wounded.  But  upon  receiving  reinforcements  they  re- 
turned on  the  24th  and  forced  their  way  in,  causing  the  Chinese  to 
withdraw  from  their  position  on  the  east,  which  enabled  the  besieged 
again  to  have  communication  with  Taku. 

^  See  the  interesting  Report  by  U.  S.  Consul  Ragsdale  on  the  "Siege 
of  Tientsin  "  in  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  268-273. 


136  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [548 

the  failure  to  relieve  Peking  and  the  need  of  further  hos- 
tilities. For  the  same  reasons  the  British  concentrated  half 
their  number  at  Hong  Kong  and  elsewhere.  To  Germany, 
however,  fell  the  honor  of  commanding  the  Allied  forces 
in  China, ^  and  the  choice  of  Field-Marshal  Count  von 
Waldersee  as  Generalissimo,  to  please  the  Kaiser,  gave  en- 
tire satisfaction. 

The  start  was  made  at  last,  and  once  having  been  put  in 
motion,  the  Allied  army  progressed  rapidly  enough,  in  spite 
of  the  determined  opposition  of  the  Boxers  and  Imperial 
troops  en  route,  especially  at  Pehtang  and  Yangtsung. 
With  the  object  of  the  expedition  constantly  in  mind,  the 
Allies  kept  up  a  persistent  advance,  undiscouraged  by  hun- 
ger, thirst,  heat,  and  the  discomforts  of  a  trying  climate. 
In  two  days,  by  August  13th,  Peking  was  reached,  stormed 
at  different  points  and  entered,  and  the  Legations  relieved, 
or  rather  what  was  left  of  them.^  The  following  day  the 
work  of  conquest  was  completed;  the  entire  city,  Tatar 
and  Chinese,  was  occupied  by  the  invaders,  and  the  war  of 
China  with  the  world  was  over. 

^  Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  536,  537 :  "Au  commencement  d'aout, 
I'Empereur  d'Allemagne  presentait  les  gouvernements  au  sujet  de  la 
nomination  du  feld-marechal  comte  Waldersee  comme  commandant 
en  chef  des  troupes  Internationales  en  Chine.  L'Empereur  Nicolas 
repondit  qu'etant  donnees  la  si  grave  offense  faite  a  I'Allemagne  par 
I'assassinat  de  son  ministre  en  Chine  et  la  haute  situation  militaire  du 
comte  d'Waldersee,  li  ne  voyait  pas,  en  ce  qui  le  concernait,  d'incon- 
venient  a  cette  designation.  L'ltalie  le  9  et  I'Angleterre  le  10  aout 
accepterent  la  creation  d'un  generalissime  et  le  choix  propose  du 
marechal  de  Waldersee. 

^  The  Belgian,  Austrian,  Italian,  Dutch,  and  most  of  the  French 
Legations  had  been  burned;  also  the  Post  Office,  three  foreign  banks, 
the  houses  and  offices  of  all  the  customs  officials,  and  all  the  mission- 
ary compounds  except  the  Peitang  (Catholic  Cathedral).  The  Lega- 
tion forces  had  lost  65  killed,  135  wounded,  and  7  deaths  by  disease. 

See  Report  of  Minister  Conger  to  Secretary  Hay,  U.  S.  For.  Rel., 
igoo,  pp.  161-167. 


PART  III 

THE    RESTORATION    OF  ORDER  AND   THE 
PEACE  PROTOCOL  OF  SEPTEMBER,  1901 


PART  III 

The  Restoration  of  Order  and  the  Peace  Protocol  of 
September^  1901 

Letter  of  Emperor  of  China  to  President  McKinley — Reply  of  the 
President  —  Letters  to  Europe  and  Replies  —  Li  Hung-chang  ap- 
pointed Commissioner — His  Proposed  Armistice — Prince  Ching  Co- 
Plenipotentiary — Their  Credentials — Renewal  of  Punitive  Expedi- 
tions— Paotingfu — ^Chuchow — Situation  at  Shanghai — Proposed  Re- 
sumption of  Hostilities — Foreign  Extensions  at  Tientsin — Attitude 
of  the  United  States — ^Occupation  of  Imperial  Palace  at  Peking — 
Beginning  of  Negotiations — The  German  Proposal  for  Punishment — 
iReplies  of  the  Powers — Edict  of  September  25  Inadequate — The 
French  Proposals — Acceptance  by  the  Powers — Bases  of  Negotia- 
tions— The  Joint  Note — Elaboration  by  Diplomatic  Body  at  Peking — 
Further  Imperial  Decrees — Final  Protocol  of  September  7,  1901. 

On  July  19,  1900,  with  the  Boxer  comphcations  at  their  *"^ 
height  and  the  conviction  already  rooted  in  the  mind  of  the 
Chinese  Court  that  a  heavy  reckoning  with  the  Powers 
would  assuredly  come  in  the  near  future,  there  was  ad- 
dressed to  President  McKinley,  in  the  name  of  the  Em- 
peror, a  letter  which  again  illustrated  that  trusting  faith  in 
American  friendship  and  fairness  which  China  had  ex- 
pressed since  her  international  relations  began: 

China  has  long  maintained  friendly  relations  with  the  United 
States,  and  is  deeply  conscious  that  the  object  of  the  United 
States  is  international  commerce.  Neither  country  entertains 
the  least  suspicion  or  distrust  toward  the  other.  Recent  out- 
breaks of  mutual  antipathy  between  the  people  and  Christian 
missions  caused  the  foreign  Powers  to  view  with  unwarranted 
suspicion  the  position  of  the  Imperial  Government  as  favorable 
to  the  people  and  prejudicial  to  the  missions,  with  the  result 
551]  139 


I40  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^^^ 

that  the  Taku  Forts  were  attacked  and  captured.  Conse- 
quently, there  has  been  clashing  of  forces,  with  calamitous  con- 
sequences. The  situation  has  become  more  and  more  serious 
and  critical.  We  have  just  received  a  telegraphic  memorial 
from  our  envoy,  Wu  Ting-fang,  and  it  is  highly  gratifying  to 
us  to  learn  that  the  United  States  Government,  having  in  view 
the  friendly  relations  between  the  two  countries,  has  taken  a 
deep  interest  in  the  situation.  Now  China,  driven  by  the  ir- 
resistible course  of  events,  has  unfortunately  incurred  well- 
nigh  universal  indignation.  For  settling  the  present  difficulty 
China  places  special  reliance  in  the  United  States.  We  address 
this  message  to  your  Excellency  in  all  sincerity  and  candidness, 
with  the  hope  that  your  Excellency  will  devise  measures  and 
take  the  initiative  in  bringing  about  a  concert  of  the  Powers  for 
the  restoration  of  order  and  peace.  The  favor  of  a  kind  reply 
is  earnestly  requested  and  awaited  with  the  greatest  anxiety.^ 

July  23rd,  President  McKinley,  through  Secretary  Hay, 
answered  this  appeal  for  help  by  a  skillfully  constructed 
letter  which  intimated  plainly  enough  that  it  was  within 
China's  power  to  remedy  her  situation,  and  that  this,  once 
done,  would  lead  to  immediate  and  universal  peace: 

I  have  received  Your  Majesty's  message  of  the  19th  of  July, 
and  am  glad  to  know  that  Your  Majesty  recognizes  the  fact 
that  the  Government  and  people  of  the  United  States  desire  of 
China  nothing  but  what  is  just  and  equitable.  The  purpose  for 
which  we  landed  troops  in  China  was  the  rescue  of  our  Lega- 
tions from  serious  danger  and  the  protection  of  the  lives  and 
property  of  Americans  who  were  sojourning  in  China  in  the 
enjoyment  of  rights  guaranteed  them  by  treaty  and  by  inter- 
national law.  The  same  purposes  are  publicly  declared  by  all 
the  Powers  which  have  landed  military  forces  in  Your 
Majesty's  Empire. 

I  am  to  infer  from  Your  Majesty's  letter  that  the  male- 

^U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  p.  294. 


553]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  I4I 

factors  who  have  disturbed  the  peace  of  China,  who  have 
murdered  the  Minister  of  Germany  and  a  member  of  the 
Japanese  Legation,  and  who  now  hold  besieged  in  Peking  those 
foreign  diplomatists  who  still  survive,  have  not  onlyjiot  re- 
ceiv£d_anyJ[avor  or  encouragement  from  Your  Majesty,  but 
are  actually  in  rebellion  against  the  Imperial  authqrit}^.  If  this 
be  the  case,  I  most  solemnly  urge  upon  Your  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment to  give  public  assurance  whether  the  foreign  Ministers 
are  alive,  and  if  so,  in  what  condition. 

2.  To  put  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  Powers  in 
immediate  and  free  communication  with  their  respective  Gov- 
ernments and  to  remove  all  danger  to  their  lives  and  liberty. 

3.  To  place  the  Imperial  authorities  of  China  in  communi- 
cation with  the  relief  expedition  so  that  cooperation  may  be 
secured  between  them  for  the  liberation  of  the  Legations,  the 
protection  of  foreigners,  and  the  restoration  of  order. 

If  these  objects  are  accomplished  it  is  the  belief  of  this 
Government  that  no  obstacles  will  be  found  to  exist  on  the 
part  of  the  Powers  to  an  amicable  settlement  of  all  the  ques- 
tions arising  out  of  the  recent  troubles,  and  the  friendly  good 
offices  of  this  Government  will,  with  the  assent  of  the  other 
Powers,  be  cheerfully  placed  at  Your  Majesty's  disposition 
for  that  purpose.^ 

To  this  guarded  response  there  was  no  immediate  reply, 
and  there  the  matter  rested.  Chiik,  was  of  course  unable 
to  conform  to  the  President's  stipulations,  as  by  July  19th 
the  policy  pursued  against  the  Boxers,  at  first  one  of  indi- 
rection and  inactivity,  then  indifference,  and  finally  open 
encouragement  to  the  rebels,  had  resulted  in  the  movement 
reaching  the  proportions  of  a  whirlwind  which  not  even  a 
united  Imperial  Court  could  have  quelled.  It  was  necessary 
for  the  revolt  to  burn  itself  out  and  then  trust  to  the  mag- 
nanimity of  the  Powers  when  the  time  for  settlement  came. 

P  *  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  pp.  294,  295.    See  also  China  No.  i  (igoi),  ] 
Tio.  74. 


( 


142  ^^£  BOXER  REBELLION  [^24 

The  principal  Powers  received  communications  similar 
to  the  letter  to  America.  The  President  of  France  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  occasion  to  outline  terms  such  as  the  French 
later  insisted  upon  as  bases  of  negotiations/  The  responses 
of  France  and  the  United  States  were  made  quickly,  and 
answers  from  the  other  Powers  came  in  due  time.  Lord 
Salisbury  informed  the  Chinese  Minister  in  the  course  of  a 
conversation : 

Whenever  the  European  Ministers  should  return  to  us  unhurt, 
we  should  be  very  glad  to  discuss,  and  to  discuss  in  the  most 
favorable  manner,  any  appeal  which  the  Imperial  Government 
of  China  might  have  to  make  to  Her  Majesty's  Government, 
but  as  long  as  there  remained  this  terrible  doubt  as  to  the  fate 
which  they  might  have  incurred  at  the  hands  of  the  Chinese 
soldiery  or  the  Boxers,  it  was  impossible  for  Her  Majesty's 
Government  to  enter  into  further  negotiations  with  that  of  the 
Empire.^ 

Count  von  Biilow,  in  his  note  verhale  to  the  Chinese  Lega- 
tion at  Berlin,  was  not  able  to 

find  himself  in  a  position  to  submit  this  telegram  (the  Em- 
peror's letter)  to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  and  King  so  long 

*"  1°  Qu'une  protection  efficace  et  I'entiere  liberte  de  leurs  communi- 
cations avec  leurs  Gouvernements  sont  assurees  au  representant  de  la 
Republique  et  a  ses  collegues  du  corps  diplomatique : 

"  2°  Que  le  prince  Touan  et  les  hauts  f onctionnaires  responsables  des 
evenements  actuels  ont  ete  eloignes  du  Gouvernement,  en  attendant  le 
chatiment  inevitable : 

"  3°  Que  les  autorites  et  les  corps  de  troupes,  dans  toute  I'etendue 
de  I'Empire,  ont  regu  I'ordre  de  cesser  les  hostilites  contre  les 
etrangers." 

"  4°  Que  des  mesures  ont  ete  prises  pour  la  repression  rigoureuse 
du  mouvement  insurrectionnel  des  Boxeurs : 

Cordier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  522,  523.  See  also  China  No.  i  (igoi)^ 
Inc.  in  no.  79  and  Trans.,  Letter  to  the  President  of  France,  reprinted 
from  "Agence  Havas"  of  July  25,  1900. 

^  China  No.  i  (1901),  no.  69. 


555J  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  14^ 

as  the  fate  of  the  foreign  Missions  shut  up  in  Peking  and  of 
the  other  foreigners  there  has  not  been  cleared  up,  and  so  long 
as  the  Imperial  Chinese  Government  have  not  made  atonement 
for  the  outrageous  murder  of  the  Imperial  Minister,  and  given 
adequate  guarantees  that  their  conduct  in  the  future  will  be  in 
accordance  with  the  law  of  nations  and  with  civilization.^ 

Russia,  reluctant  to  let  the  splendid  chance  for  diplomacy 
slip  by,  returned  an  answer  which  was  at  once  a  declina- 
tion and  a  veiled  acceptance.  The  Official  Gazette  of  Au- 
gust 2nd  published  the  reply  of  the  Russian  Government 
to  Kuang  Hsu's  letter  begging  the  Czar  to  take  the  initia- 
tive in  securing  a  cessation  of  hostilities  (as  the  Chinese 
Court  similarly  begged  the  other  Powers).  The  Russian 
statement  was  to  the  effect  that  the  Government,  while 
"  deploring  the  serious  events  now  happening  in  China  ", 
found  that  '*  the  absence  of  news  respecting  the  fate  of  the 
Russian  and  foreign  representatives  "  rendered  "  all  idea 
of  mediation  in  favor  of  China  very  difficult  at  the  present 
time  ".    However,  in  spite  of  all  this : 

The  efforts  of  Russia  have  but  one  object  in  view,  namely,  to 
assist  in  the  re-establishment  of  order  and  tranquility  in  the 
Chinese  Empire,  and,  inspired  by  their  traditional  friendship 
for  China,  the  Imperial  Government  have  decided  to  render 
to  the  Chinese  Government  every  assistance  with  a  view  to 
repressing  the  present  troubles.^ 

Japan  returned  a  curt  refusal.  Viscount  Aoki  replying 
through  the  Chinese  Minister  at  Tokyo  that  '*  the  gravest 
breach  of  international  law  which  any  country  could  com- 
mit was  an  attack  on  diplomatic  representatives  ",  and  that, 
*'  until  the  suppression  of  the  insurrection  there  could  be 
no  question  of  amicable  negotiations  ".*     Thus  there  was 

1  China  No.  i  (1901),  no.  79  and  Inc. 

^  Ibid.,  no.  105.  ^Ibid.,  no.  51. 


144  ^^^  BOXER  REBELLION  [^56 

small  consolation  in  these  responses  to  the  letters  and  tele- 
grams which  Governor  Yuan  Shih-kki  had  sent  over  the 
world  at  the  bidding  of  the  Peking  Court.  A  crumb  of 
comfort  might  have  been  found  in  the  Russian  answer 
were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  China  was  already  becoming 
wary  of  Russia's  constant  "  traditional  friendship  "  with 
"  but  one  object  in  view  ",  especially  when  applied  to  a  case 
such  as  the  present,  where  China  had  been  so  grievously  at 
fault/ 

^  Later,  October  14,  1900,  the  Emperor,  or  rather  the  Chinese  Court, 
sent  another  letter  to  McKinley: 

"We  are  extremely  grateful  to  your  Excellency  for  taking  the 
initiative  in  the  withdrawal  of  troops  (from  Peking)  and  for  con- 
senting, in  the  interest  of  friendly  relations,  to  use  your  kindly  offices 
between  China  and  the  friendly  Powers  who  have  been  offended  on 
account  of  the  recent  unexpected  uprising  in  China. 

"  We  therefore  especially  delegate  our  Envoy  Extraordinary  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary,  Wu  Ting-fang,  to  personally  deliver  this 
telegraphic  letter  to  your  Excellency  conveying  our  sincere  expres- 
sions of  thanks. 

"  We  beg  that  your  Excellency,  in  the  interest  of  peace  and  inter- 
national good  relations,  will  exert  your  friendly  influence  with  the 
other  Powers  toward  the  complete  effacement  of  all  ill  feeling  and  the 
speedy  determination  on  their  part  to  negotiate  for  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment. For  this  we  shall  feel  unbounded  gratitude  toward  your  Ex- 
cellency, whose  good  offices  we  are  now  earnestly  beseeching." 

To  which  the  President  replied: 

"I  cordially  share  Your  Majesty's  wish  that  there  may  be  a  peaceful 
settlement  of  all  questions  between  China  and  the  Powers  whose  inter- 
ests and  nationals  have  so  grievously  suffered  wrong  in  Your  Majesty's 
dominions,  and  that  the  outcome  may  be  the  complete  effacement  of 
ill  feeling  between  them.  The  desire  of  this  Government  that  such  a 
settlement  may  be  brought  about  speedily  has  been  made  known  to  all 
the  Powers,  and  I  trust  that  negotiations  may  begin  so  soon  as  we  and 
the  other  offended  Governments  shall  be  effectively  satisfied  of  Your 
Majesty's  ability  and  power  to  treat  with  just  sternness  the  principal 
offenders,  who  are  doubly  culpable,  not  alone  toward  the  foreigners,  but 
toward  Your  Majesty,  under  whose  rule  the  purpose  of  China  to  dwell 
in  concord  with  the  world  has  hitherto  found  expression  in  the  welcome 
and  protection  assured  to  strangers." 

See  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  295,  296. 


557]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  I45 

Obviously,  the  first  prerequisite  of  universal  peace  would '  * 
be  the  appointment  on  the  part  of  China  of  plenipotentiaries 
to  treat  with  the  Powers,  and  for  this  delicate  and  extremely 
difficult  task  Li  Hung-chang,  the  grand  old  man  of  Chinese 
diplomacy,  was  again  called  upon  to  aid  his  country  in  its  I 
extremity.  As  early  as  August  8th,  roughly  speaking  a  I 
week  before  the  Legations  were  relieved,  an  Imperial  edict  J 
announced : 

We  hereby  appoint  Li  Hung-chang  as  our  Envoy  Plenipoten- 
tiary, with  instructions  to  propose  at  once  by  telegraph  to  the 
Governments  of  the  several  Powers  concerned  for  the  imme- 
diate cessation  of  hostile  demonstrations  pending  negotiations 
which  he  is  hereby  authorized  to  conduct  for  our  part  for  the 
settlement  of  whatever  questions  may  have  to  be  dealt  with. 
The  questions  are  to  be  severally  considered  in  a  satisfactory 
manner  and  the  result  of  the  negotiations  reported  to  us  for 
our  sanction.^ 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  was  particularly 
well  pleased  with  the  appointment  of  Li,  partly  because  of 
the  fact  that,  aside  from  Prince  Ching  and  probably  Yuanl 
Shih-kai,   the  hero  of   Shimonoseki  was  one  of  the   few  J 
statesmen  in  the  Empire,  if  not  the  only  one,  who  possessed 
the  requisite  ability,  training  and  characteristics  to  press 

*  Imperial  Edict  forwarded  by  the  Privy  Council  at  Peking,  Aug.  8-, 
to  Governor  Yuan  Shih-kai  at  Tsinan,  Shantung,  and  transmitted  by 
him,  Aug.  II,  to  the  Taotai  at  Shanghai,  by  whom  it  was  re-transmitted 
to  Minister  Wu  at  Washington,  who  received  it  on  the  night  of  the 
same  day  (Aug.  11).     See  U.  S.  For.  Rei,  1900,  pp.  285,  286. 

The  same  edict  is  given  with  different  wording  in  China  No.  i  (ipoi), 
no.  167.  As  to  the  need  for  negotiations,  says  the  decree:  "The 
present  hostilities  between  certain  Chinese  subjects  and  foreign  nations 
are  caused  partly  by  the  misunderstandings  of  the  foreign  Powers  and 
partly  by  the  mismanagement  of  the  Chinese  local  authorities.  It 
would  be  a  misfortune  to  the  whole  world,  and  contrary  to  the  wishes 
of  China,  should  such  a  complication  be  allowed  to  evolve  out  of 
itself."     Therefore  the  appointment  of  Li. 


146  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^^g 

such  negotiations  on  China's  part  as  much  as  possible  to  a 
successful  conclusion.  The  Department  of  State,  it  was 
declared,  "  learned  with  satisfaction  of  the  appointment  of 
Earl  Li  Hung-chang  as  Envoy  Plenipotentiary  to  conduct 
negotiations  with  the  Powers,  and  will,  on  its  part,  enter 
upon  such  negotiations  with  a  desire  to  continue  the  friendly 
relations  so  long  existing  between  the  two  countries  ".^ 
Other  Powers  also  seemed  satisfied,  and  offered  no  objec- 
tion if,  as  M.  Delcasse  expressed  it,  Li  "  really  can  furnish 
bona  fide  credentials  ".  That  was  an  important  point,  con- 
sidering the  state  of  governmental  affairs  in  China,  and 
later  will  be  touched  upon  again. 

Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  on  being  sounded  by  Downing 
Street  as  to  Li's  appointment,  replied  that  Li  seemed  to 
have  "  full  powers  to  arrange  all  matters  with  the  Foreign 
Officers  of  the  Powers  ".  MacDonald  must  have  realized 
the  possible  trend  of  the  preliminary  negotiations  in  his 
warning  that  the  "  march  of  troops  on  Peking  should  not 
be  delayed  by  any  negotiations  whatever  ".  This  message, 
dated  from  Peking  August  loth,  goes  on  to  say:  "  We  are 
still  being  fired  at  daily,  and  our  supplies  are  and  have  been 
entirely  cut  off,  so  that  we  must  surrender  unless  we  are 
shortly  relieved  ".^  Things  turned  out  as  the  British  Min- 
ister feared,  for  as  early  as  July  30th  (unknown  of  course 
to  MacDonald  because  of  the  siege)  Li  had  made  a  "  sug- 
gestion to  the  United  States  "  that  "  the  Ministers  might 
be  sent  under  safe  escort  to  Tientsin,  provided  the  Powers 
would  engage  not  to  march  on  Peking  ".  The  Secretary  of 
State  gave  a  skillful  answer  to  this  proposition,  and  also 
to  the  proposal  of  Li  that  the  march  on  Peking  should  be 
halted  during  the  negotiations.    He  said : 

*  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  p.  286;  China  No.  i  (1901),  no.  328. 
2  Peking,  August  10,  viu  Shanghai  August  14;   received  telegraphic 
at  London,  August  14.    China  No.  i  {1901),  no.  192. 


559]  -^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  147 

I  do  not  think  it  expedient  to  submit  the  proposition  of 
Earl  Li  to  the  other  Powers  (at  this  time  the  United  States  was 
the  only  one  approached)  ;  free  communication  with  our  repre- 
sentatives in  Peking  is  demanded  as  a  matter  of  absolute  right, 
and  not  as  a  favor.  Since  the  Chinese  Government  admits  that 
it  possesses  the  power  to  give  communication,  it  puts  itself  in 
an  unfriendly  attitude  by  denying  it.  No  negotiations  seem 
advisable  until  the  Chinese  Government  shall  have  put  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  Powers  in  full  and  free  com- 
munication with  their  respective  Governments,  and  removed 
all  danger  to  life  and  liberty.  We  would  urge  Earl  Li  earnestly 
to  advise  the  Imperial  authorities  of  China  to  place  themselves 
in  friendly  communication  and  cooperation  with  the  relief 
expedition;  they  are  assuming  heavy  responsibility  in  acting 
otherwise.^ 

That  ended  the  matter  for  the  time  being,  as  Lord  Salis- 
bury, on  being  approached  by  Ambassador  Choate,  found 
that  he  ''  entirely  concurs  in  the  terms  of  the  reply  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  ".^' 

At  this  early  stage  of  affairs,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
Li  was  at  Canton  and  had  received  at  that  place  the  notifi- 
cation of  his  designation  as  peace  commissioner.  Commu- 
nication with  the  north  was  uncertain  and  news  of  the 
progress  of  the  Allies  very  meagre;  and  for  some  time  Li 
remained  unaware  of  the  capture  of  Peking  by  the  Allied 
forces  on  August  14th.  From  Canton,  Li  went  to  Shanghai 
and  there,  August  15th,  sent  a  message  to  Sir  Chihchen 
Lofenglu,  Chinese  Minister  at  London,  in  which  he  stated 
that  by  this  time  it  must  be  certain  "  the  treaty  Powers 
fully  appreciate  the  difficult  position  in  which  both  the  Em- 
peror and  Empress  Dowager  are  now  situated  ".  He  was 
under  the  impression  that  so  far  the  Allies  had  only  reached 

1  China,  No.  i  {1901),  no.  99. 
^Ihid.,  no.  108. 


148  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [560 

the  village  of  Tungchow,  on  the  road  to  Peking.  There- 
fore he  asked  the  British  Government  ''most  respectfully" 
not  to  proceed  further,  assuring  Salisbury  that  to  persist 
would  "  shed  the  blood  of  innocents  "  and  "  cause  irre- 
parable damage  to  the  present  dynasty  ",  and  in  addition 
would  ''  hurt  the  feelings  of  400,000,000  of  the  Chinese 
population  "/  The  same  request  was  telegraphed  to  Rus- 
sia, France,  Germany,  the  United  States  and  Japan. 

The  proposed  armistice  met  with  no  favor.  To  Li's 
suggestion  that  the  Legations  be  sent  to  Tientsin  (a 
suggestion  later  elaborated  by  Russia),  Great  Britain 
replied  that,  "  until  the  British  Legation  has  been  al- 
lowed to  return  to  Tientsin  under  the  escort  of  an  ade- 
quate European  force.  Her  Majesty's  Government  can 
enter  into  no  such  negotiations  ".^  The  actual  removal  of 
the  Legation  from  Peking,  Downing  Street  seems  never  to 
have  considered  seriously,  and  Minister  MacDonald  dis- 
tinctly discouraged  the  idea.  Delcasse,  in  his  answer  to  Li, 
said  that,  *'  the  only  means  of  proving  the  good  faith  shown 
by  the  Chinese  Government  in  their  arrangements  with  re- 
gard to  the  foreign  Ministers  was  to  command  the  soldiers 
to  give  in  to  the  international  troops  ".^  Russia  would  act 
only  as  the  other  Powers  acted.*  The  United  States  never 
considered  the  idea  of  removing  the  Legation.^ 

'Eater,  the  idea  of  leaving  Peking  and  thus  sparing  as 
much  as  possible  the  feelings  of  China  met  with  much  favor 
with  the  Russian  Foreign  Office  and  was  adopted  as  one  of 
the  cardinal  points  of  the  Russian  program.  With  this 
end  in  view  the  Russian  Legation  was  for  a  time  actually 

^Chind  No.  i  (1901),  no.  202. 
^Ibid.,  no.  209. 

*  Ibid.,  no.  213. 

*  Ibid.,  no.  245. 

*  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  p.  204. 


561]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  I49 

removed  to  Tientsin/  But  Russia's  method  of  thus  ingra- 
tiating herself  with  China  was  frowned  upon  by  the  other 
Powers.  They  considered  it  a  serious  diplomatic  mistake 
to  leave  Peking,  as  it  certainly  was.  Said  Lord  Salisbury, 
in  commenting  on  the  Russian  proposal  for  this  purpose: 
"The  present  moment  (September  29th)  did  not  seem  to 
me  opportune  for  the  withdrawal  to  Tientsin  of  Her  Ma- 
jesty's Minister  ".^  Italy  likewise  did  **  not  favor  the  pro- 
posal ",  but  was  willing  to  join  the  Powers  in  united  action; 
while  the  United  States  had  no  "  present  intention  "  to  ac- 
commodate the  Russian  Government  in  this  regard.  All 
the  foreign  Ministers  at  Peking,  except  the  Russian  repre- 
sentative, agreed  with  Sir  Claude  MacDonald  in  his  opinion 
that,  "  the  departure  of  the  Legations  now  would  be  most 
inexpedient,  and  I  think  that  their  withdrawal  from  the 
capital  would  hinder  future  negotiations  ".^  But  Russia 
had  a  purpose,  and  in  spite  of  these  adverse  replies  pro- 
ceeded with  her  plan.  By  October  19th,  having  produced 
the  desired  effect  upon  Chinese  sympathies,  the  Russian 
Minister,  M.  de  Giers,  received  instructions  to  return,  bag 
and  baggage,  to  Peking.* 

Li  Hung-chang,  meanwhile,  was  at  Shanghai  on  his  jour- 
ney to  the  north,  which  seemed  to  be  much  delayed.  Dif- 
ferences soon  arose  because  of  the  divergent  views  held  by 

'^Journal  de  Saint-Petershourg,  Sep.  12  (25)  :  "Several  members  of 
the  Russian  Legation  and  the  first  divisions  of  the  expeditionary  de- 
tachments have  already  started  for  Tientsin;  the  departure  of  the  rest 
of  the  troops  is  being  gradually  carried  out,  and  will  be  completed  as 
soon  as  the  local  conditions  permit." 

Reprinted  in  China  No.  i  {1901),  no.  397  and  Inc. 

'  Ibid.,  no.  401. 

*  Ibid.,  no.  z^7- 

*  On  the  removal  of  the  Russian  Legation  to  Tientsin,  see  China  No.  i 
(1901),  nos.  140,  172,  281,  287,  318,  327,  356,  383,  397,  403;  China  No.  5 
(1901),  nos.  64,  77;  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  pp.  205,  214,  375-377- 


150  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^62 

Li  and  the  foreign  Ministers.  Naturally,  it  was  Li's  ambi- 
tion to  begin  the  peace  proposals  at  once,  the  sooner  the 
better,  but  to  this  plan  the  British  Minister  was  strongly  op- 
posed. At  this  date,  August  24th,  the  situation  in  Peking 
was  described  by  MacDonald  as  "  very  complicated  ",  while 
"  rumors  of  intended  attacks  are  prevelant".  He  continued : 
*'  It  is  useless  to  attempt  serious  negotiations  with  the 
Chinese  Government  until  the  Chinese  military  power  is 
disheartened  and  completely  crushed,  and  communications 
with  Tientsin  are  made  thoroughly  secure  ".^ 

Then  it  developed  that  Li's  powers  to  negotiate  were  in- 
complete, and  ''we  (the  Ministers)  must  ask  him  to  produce 
fresh  powers  ",  or  at  least  have  his  credentials  re-affirmed. 
Japan  was  unwilling  to  recognize  Li's  powers  on  the  ground 
that  there  was  no  responsible  and  ''  no  representative  Gov- 
ernment in  Peking  ". ,  These  difficulties  were  removed  by 
two  decrees,  one  of  which,  August  24th,  said :  ''  Li  Hung- 
chang  must  act  at  Plenipotentiary,  and  make  the  best  terms 
he  can  as  quickly  as  possible.  Being  at  this  distance 
(Sianfu)  we  (the  Court)  will  not  interfere  ".^  Three  days 
later  another  edict  announced :  "  We  hereby  summon  the 
Grand  Secretary,  Li  Hung-chang,  who  has  been  furnished 
with  full  powers  to  negotiate  with  the  Plenipotentiaries  of 
the  Allied  Powers,  to  come,  without  delay,  to  Peking,  in 
order  to  cooperate  with  Prince  Ching  in  the  transaction  of 
important  State  affairs  ".^ 

Li  had  announced  that  he  would  leave  Shanghai  for  Tien- 
tsin after  the  Chinese  festival  of  September  8th.  Why  the 
Grand  Secretary  delayed  his  arrival  at  Peking  in  this 
fashion  it  is  somewhat  hard  to  understand,  all  the  more 

^  China  No.  i  ( 1901) ,  no.  240. 
2  Ibid.,  no.  313. 
^Ibid.,  no.  319. 


563]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  i^I 

since  everyone  in  the  capital  was  on  edge  to  receive  him. 
However,  the  two  decrees  just  mentioned,  ordering  him  to 
proceed  "  without  delay ",  settled  the  matter,  as  a  com- 
mand from  the  Court  was  not  to  be  disobeyed.  In  explana- 
tion of  Li's  dilatory  tactics,  it  must  be  remembered  that  at 
this  time  he  was  a  very  old  man  who  had  sacrificed  his 
health  and  strength  in  the  service  of  his  country.^  Consid- 
ering the  unsettled  conditions,  with  all  sorts  of  rumors  fly- 
ing around  in  south  China  of  the  terrible  events  in  the 
north,  it  was  but  natural  that,  at  his  advanced  age,  Li  should 
have  had  serious  misgivings  in  undertaking  the  journey. 
As  a  precaution  he  applied  to  both  the  British  and  Ameri- 
can Governments  for  protection  in  case  his  person  was  not 
respected,  and  both  Powers  gave  him  their  generous  sup- 
port. -  Finally,  September  14th,  under  a  safe-conduct  fur- 
nished by  Sir  Robert  Hart,  Li  at  last  set  sail  in  a  British 
vessel  for  Tientsin,  the  "  steamer  flying  a  flag  denoting  that 
he  is  a  Plenipotentiary  ".  He  arrived  without  mishap  in 
Peking,  where  Prince  Ching,  escorted  by  "  Bengal  and 
Japanese  cavalry  ",  had  already  preceded  him. 

One  side  was  by  this  time  about  as  impatient  as  the  other 
to  begin  negotiations.  Already  a  whole  month  had  passed 
since  Peking  had  been  relieved  and  as  yet  nothing  had  been 
done.  One  Power  seemed  to  be  waiting  for  another  to  act 
decisively.  The  news  that  Prince  Ching  had  also  been  ap- 
pointed peace  commissioner  ^  gave  universal  satisfaction, 
for  the  Prince  was  highly  esteemed  by  Europe  as  a  diplomat 
and  broad-minded  Chinese  statesman. 

But  the  question  of  credentials  was  not  yet  settled.  It 
seemed  that  Japan  was  the  most  dubious  of  all  over  the  ade- 

^  Li  Hung-chang's  death  occurred  on  Nov.  7,  1901. 

2  Li    had    memorialized    the    Throne    for    co- Plenipotentiaries.     See 

China  No.  i  {1901),  nos.  282,  285. 


152  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [564 

quacy  of  Li's  and  Ching's  ''  full  powers  ".  The  British 
representative  at  Tokyo  wrote  Lord  Salisbury  of  the  fol- 
lowing conversation  with  Viscount  Aoki : 

Viscount  Aoki  went  on  to  say  that  the  only  credentials  which 
could  be  considered  satisfactory  would  be  a  document  signed 
by  the  Emperor  of  China  himself.  The  Chinese  Imperial  edicts 
were  usually  issued  in  the  name  of  the  Emperor  by  some  of  the 
Ministers  or  by  some  Board,  but  his  Excellency  thought  that 
in  this  case  the  Emperor's  autograph  signature  should  be  in- 
sisted on.  At  the  same  time,  unless  some  Government  had 
been  formed  and  had  gained  power  in  China,  from  which  the 
violently  anti-foreign  elements,  such  as  Prince  Tuan,  Kang-yi^ 
and  General  Tung  had  been  eliminated,  and  unless  Li  Hung- 
chang  could  show  that  he  represented  such  a  Government, 
negotiations  with  him  would  be  quite  useless.  The  above- 
named  men,  who  were  to  blame  for  the  recent  disturbances^ 
would  keep  their  hold  upon  the  persons  of  the  Emperor  and 
the  Empress  Dowager  as  long  as  they  possibly  could,  and  no 
other  authoritative  Government  could  be  formed  so  long  as 
they  succeeded  in  doing  so.^ 

Li  had  applied  first  to  Japan  for  a  warship  to  carry  him 
north,  but  Viscount  Aoki  had  answered  that  '*  he  would  do 
better  to  apply  to  Her  Majesty's  Government  for  such  es- 
cort ".  At  the  same  time  Aoki  "  once  more  warned  him 
against  proceeding  to  the  north  without  fresh  credentials, 
as  he  might  thereby  lay  himself  open  to  humiliating  re- 
buffs ".^  But  now  it  appeared  that  Japan  would  be  satis- 
fied provided  Li's  credentials  were  satisfactory  to  Great 
Britain.  MacDonald  intimated  to  Lord  Salisbury :  "  We 
had  better,  I  should  say,  accept  both  above-mentioned  (Li 
and  Ching),  with  an  understanding  that  these  are  purely 
preliminary  negotiations,  and  reference  will  be  made  to  the 

^  China  No.  5  {1901),  no.  31.  "^  Ibid.,  no.  126. 


565]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 53 

Governments  of  the  Powers  "/  To  which  Downing  Street 
replied,  September  27th :  "If  the  powers  of  Prince  Ching 
and  Li  Hung-chang  are  deemed  sufficient  and  on  clear  un- 
derstanding that  negotiations  are  purely  preliminaries  for 
reference  to  Governments,  you  are  authorized,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  your  colleagues,  to  commence  negotiations  with 
them  ".^ 

The  final  outcome  of  this  tiresome  but  highly  important 
discussion  was  that  the  sufficiency  of  the  powers  of  the 
Chinese  Plenipotentiaries  ^  should  be  determined  by  the 
Diplomatic  Corps  of  the  Powers  at  Peking.  This  was  really 
not  done  until  late  in  December,  when  the  demands  of  the 
Powers  were  first  handed  to  Prince  Ching  and  Li  Hung- 
chang.  The  Grand  Secretary  unfortunately  was  prevented 
by  illness  from  attending  the  meeting  mentioned,  so  Prince 
Ching  exchanged  all  formalities.  Upon  being  requested 
to  produce  his  credentials,  Prince  Ching  submitted  eleven 
documents,  one  of  which  was  given  to  each  of  the  Minis- 

^  China  No.  i  (1901),  no.  372.  ^Ibid.,  no.  396. 

'By  an  Edict  of  August  31,  the  Viceroys  of  Nanking  and  Wuchang 
were  ordered  to  cooperate  with  Prince  Ching  and  Earl  Li.  The  Decree 
of  September  9  further  appointed  Jung  Lu,  Yuan  Shih-kai's  blood 
brother,  as  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  assist  Li,  Ching,  and  the 
Yangtse  Viceroys. 

Jung  Lu  was  reluctant  to  serve  but  obeyed  the  summons.  The 
British  Minister  did  not  relish  his  appointment,  "  several  of  whose 
troops  were  killed  by  us  on  the  barricades  opposed  to  us  during  the 
siege."  Furthermore,  "  one  of  Ching's  standards  was  also  captured  by 
us,"  yet  to  Prince  Ching  there  seemed  to  be  no  objection  on  the  part 
of  the  British  Minister.  Li  came  to  the  rescue  with  the  suggestion 
that  Jung  Lu  "  confess  his  complicity "  in  the  Legation  attacks  and 
then  see  whether  the  Powers  would  have  him. 

By  the  Edict  of  September  12,  Prince  Ching  was  made  Plenipotentiary 
with  full  powers,  the  same  as  with  Li,  while  the  Yangtse  Viceroys  were 
made  Ministers  Plenipotentiary,  the  same  as  Jung  Lu.  These  were  all 
admonished  to  **  loyally  cooperate  one  with  the  other,  and  to  have  no 
differences." 

See  China  No.  i  (1901),  nos.  323,  331 ;  China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  112. 


154  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [566 

ters,  and  then  he  asked  ''  that  they  might  be  examined  and 
returned  to  him  ".  After  that  was  done,  Prince  Ching 
naturally  demanded  their  powers  in  return  and  a  curious 
situation  developed,  a  situation  almost  laughable  when  we 
consider  the  ado  the  Powers  had  made  over  the  credentials 
of  the  Chinese  commissioners.  All  of  the  foreign  repre- 
sentatives, with  the  sole  exception  of  the  German  Minister, 
were  ''  equally  unprepared  ",  in  other  words,  had  neglected 
to  bring  their  papers  with  them.  The  following  interesting 
predicament  was  brought  to  light : 

The  French  and  Russian  Ministers  have  received  telegraphic 
full  powers,  and  documentary  full  powers  are  on  their  way  to 
the  Italian  Minister;  the  others  seem  disposed  to  rely  on  the 
fact  that  they  have  formerly  presented  letters  of  credence  in  the 
usual  manner.^ 

However,  as  this  was  but  a  preliminary  meeting,  with  no 
treaty  to  sign,  the  conclusion  was  reached  that  the  matter 
did  "  not  seem  to  press  for  a  solution  ",  although  there  is 
no  denying  the  fact  that  the  Diplomatic  Body  was  at  fault 
for  the  very  thing  for  which  they  had  been  holding  China 
"  to  a  strict  accountability  ".  And  so  ended,  at  the  last 
moment  to  the  advantage  of  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries, 
the  long  and  wearisome  dispute  over  credentials,  in  which  it 
seemed  throughout  that  the  Powers  were  as  much  sparring 
for  time  in  formulating  their  demands  as  they  were  con- 
cerned over  the  authority  of  Prince  Ching  and  Li  Hung- 
chang  to  negotiate  with  them.^ 

^  China  No.  6  (1901),  no.  91. 

'  On  the  question  of  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries,  see  China  No.  i 
(1901),  nos.  31,  35,  4'5,  46,  99,  108,  132,  166,  167,  173,  176,  190,  192,  202, 
209,  213,  225,  230,  238-240,  245,  254,  268,  276,  292,  302,  313.  314,  318-320, 
323,  326,  328,  331,  333,  341,  356,  357,  371,  372,  374,  382,  385,  39^;  China 
No.  5  (1901),  nos.  31,  68,  iii,  112,  125,  126,  200,  207,  209,  216,  226,  252; 
China  No.  6  (1901),  no.  91 ;  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  161,  200,  202,  259, 
285,  286,  291-293. 


c^Sy]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  155 

With  the  two  leading  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries  now  at 
Peking  ready  for  business,  it  was  felt  that  at  last  the  nego- 
tiations for  settlement  could  begin  in  earnest.  But  such 
was  not  to  be  the  case.  North  China  was  yet  far  from  paci- 
fied, and  proposals  for  peace  were  temporarily  sidetracked 
by  the  renewal  of  punitive  expeditions  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  capital.  Most  prominent  of  these  was  the  military 
excursion  of  the  Allied  troops  to  Paotingfu  and  Cheng- 
tingfu,^  October  12,  1900.  Some  4,000  soldiers  partici- 
pated, under  the  command  of  von  Waldersee,  the  German 
Commander-in-chief  of  the  international  forces  in  China. 
At  first  Li  Hung-chang  could  not  do  otherwise  than  order 
the  Imperial  troops  "  not  to  oppose  the  advance  on  any  ac- 
count ".^  Later,  November  5th,  he  changed  his  attitude 
and  complained  of  the  ''conduct  of  the  international  troops", 
alleging  that  the  "  villages  had  been  attacked  by  Chinese 
Christians  "  and  that  these  primarily  were  to  blame  for  the 
initial  disturbances.  This  note  of  remonstrance  was  re- 
turned by  the  German,  British  and  Italian  Ministers  with 
the  answer  that  they  "  were  unable  to  accept  it  ".®  The 
French  Minister  followed  with  similar  action.*  The  other 
representatives  contented  themselves  with  stating  that  they 
would  "  merely  refrain  from  acknowledging  its  receipt  ".'^ 
The  expedition  itself  was  of  course  a  huge  success.     The 

*  In  Chihli  province,  southwest  of  Peking. 

L     ^  China  No.  5  {190 1),  no.  80. 

3  Minister  Congee,  though  acting  in  unison  with  the  other  diplomats, 
feared  that  "negotiations  will  be  delayed"  by  the  expedition.  U.  S. 
For.  Rel.,  1900,  p.  213. 

*  The  news  that  the  French  Minister  agreed  in  being  "  unable  to 
accept"  the  note  was  sent  by  Lord  Salisbury  in  a  Circular  to  the 
British  Ambassadors  at  Paris,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  St.  Petersburg 
and  Washington. 

*  The  Russian  Minister  seems  at  first  to  have  objected  to  the  expedition. 


156  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^6g 

imperiled  Christians  were  relieved;  a  fine  of  100,000  taels 
was  levied  on  Paotingfu  with  a  month  to  pay  it  in;  and  it 
was  decided  to  execute  three  officials  of  high  rank  and  to 
quarter  German  and  French  troops  upon  the  town  for  the 
duration  of  the  winter/ 

This  expedition  and  others  either  following  or  contem- 
plated were  not  regarded  with  any  excess  of  favor  by  the 
I  Powers.  It  was  well  known  that  the  United  States  was 
I  disinclined  towards  further  punitive  measures ;  and  as  re- 
vgarded  Great  Britain,  the  Marquis  of  Lansdowne,  who 
had  succeeded  Lord  Salisbury  as  head  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  judged  it  highly  desirable  that  "  pending  negotia- 
tions, no  further  expeditions  should  take  place  unless  the 
conduct  of  the  Chinese  should  render  them  necessary  ".^ 
Count  Lamsdorff  deprecated  the  advance  into  Chihli,  as  it 
offered  the  *'  danger  of  utterly  destroying  the  independence 
and  traditional  prestige  of  the  only  central  authority  which 
the  Chinese  recognized,  and  of  putting  in  its  place  a  titular 
puppet  Government  acting  under  foreign  dictation  and  com- 
pulsion, and  imposed  by  foreign  bayonets  ",^  which  was  a 
strikingly  apt  observation.  Great  Britain  agreed  with 
Lamsdorff  in  "  deprecating  the  renewal  of  military  activity 
in  Pechihli,  unless  there  be  urgent  reasons  ".  The  British 
Foreign  Office  also  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  since 
October  no  British  troops  had  taken  part  in  any  punitive 
expeditions.* 

Still  more  serious  than  in  the  north  was  the  situation  at 
Chuchow,  south  of  Shanghai  in  Chekiang  province.     In  a 

^  See  China  No.  5  (iQOi),  nos.  29,  54,  80,  118,  119,  123,  210,  257; 
China  No.  6  (igoi),  no.  40. 

^  Ibid.,  no.  I. 

'  China  No.  6  (rgoi),  nos.  60,  61. 

*  Which  was  slightly  incorrect.  A  small  military  surveying  party  had 
been  sent  by  Gen.  Gaselee  with  the  Paotingfu  expedition. 


569]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  157 

Boxer  outbreak  which  occurred  as  far  back  as  July  28, 
1900,  nine  British  subjects  had  been  killed/  in  addition  to 
the  magistrate  of  Hsinan,  who  met  his  death  in  attempting 
to  pacify  the  mob.  The  British  Foreign  Office  immediately 
demanded  redress  of  Li  Hung-chang,  while  Sir  Ernest 
Satow  informed  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiary  that  "  such 
misdeeds  should  be  wiped  out  by  a  fitting  expiation  ".  The 
Yamen  acted  quickly  enough  in  dismissing  the  Governor 
from  office,  removing  him  on  November  30th,  and  thus 
getting  rid  of  the  "  prime  cause  of  the  massacres  ".  China 
did  not  seem  inclined  to  do  more,  however,  and  the  result 
was  that  the  "  gentry  and  other  ill-disposed  people  "  in  the 
province,  so  Acting  Consul-General  Warren  informed  the 
Home  Office,  "  are  being  encouraged  to  further  acts  of  vio- 
lence by  the  delay  which  has  taken  place  in  punishing  the 
officials  and  others  who  are  responsible  for  the  murders  ". 
It  was  made  clear  to  the  Chinese  authorities  that  drastic 
action  was  necessary.  Final  British  demands  took  the  form 
of  the  "  banishment  and  degradation  of  the  ex-Governor 
(Liu  Shu-tang)  and  the  ex-Provincial  Judge;  their  prop- 
erty to  be  confiscated  " ;  and  in  addition  the  confinement  of 
the  Brigadier,  "  who  is  out  of  his  mind  ",  the  execution  of 
the  Taotai  and  of  the  Commandant  of  the  Volunteers,  the 
degradation  and  imprisonment  of  the  Prefect,  and  finally 
the  degradation  and  banishment  of  three  gentry  concerned 
and  the  confiscation  of  their  property.  Though  the  out- 
break was  deplorable  enough,  possibly  Great  Britain  was 
demanding  too  much  at  this  stage  of  affairs.  The  Chinese 
peace  commissioners  were  exerting  their  utmost  to  readjust 
the  entire  situation,  and  in  consequence  were  overwhelmed 
with  the  demands,  notes,  and  opinions  of  the  foreign  repre- 

*  Total  victims  were  eleven  in  number ;   two  men,  six  women   and 
three  children.     Nine  of  these  were  British  and  two  American. 


/ 


158  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^70 

sentatives.  In  this  mass  of  correspondence  the  items  for 
punishment  were  considerable,  and  these  further  formed 
the  prelude  for  extension  of  these  same  negotiations.  Also, 
each  new  or  recent  disturbance  added  a  fresh  quota  of  vic- 
tims to  the  long  list  of  Chinese  already  indicted,  which  list, 
steadily  growing,  all  the  more  delayed  the  final  settlement. 
At  any  rate,  the  "  fitting  expiation  "  which  China  paid  for 
the  Chuchow  grievances  was  a  long  time  in  coming,  and 
this  through  no  fault  of  Prince  Ching  and  Li  Hung-chang, 
laboring  as  they  did  under  great  disadvantages.^ 

Shanghai  at  this  time  similarly  exhibited  a  lack  of  tran- 
quility. The  alarm  had  been  general  throughout  the  re- 
volt because  of  ominous  reports  that  Boxer  influence  was 
spreading  southward,  and  during  the  reconstruction  these 
fears  remained  manifest.  It  was  felt  in  middle  1900  that 
troops  would  have  to  be  sent  by  the  Powers  to  keep  the 
Yangtse  region  in  order.  Fortunately,  Viceroy  Chang 
Chih-tung  saw  no  reason  for  a  large  force  but  agreed  to  a 
moderate  one  from  Great  Britain,  say  about  3,000.  At  the 
same  time,  as  has  previously  been  noted,  the  Yangtse  Vice- 
roys vigorously  opposed  the  idea  of  sending  troops  inland, 
or  stationing  warships  on  the  Yangtse  or  at  the  riverine 
ports.  In  this  contention  they  received  the  support  of  Ad- 
miral Seymour  of  the  China  Station.  As  regarded  Shang- 
hai, the  British  were  in  favor  of  garrisoning  that  city,  as 
such  a  concentration  of  military  power  would  be  far  better 
*'  than  keeping  a  force  at  a  distant  spot  such  as  Weihaiwei", 
which  was  in  reality  entirely  outside  British  influence  and 
had  been  leased  only  as  a  check  on  Russia  at  Port  Arthur, 
directly  opposite.  The  Powers  finally  arrived  at  a  sort  of 
international  agreement  in  sending  troops  and  warships  to 

^  On  the  Chuchow  massacre  and  negotiations,  see  China  No.  i  {igoi), 
nos.  82,  119,  127,  329,  393;  China  No.  5  (1901),  nos.  12,  20,  132,  145, 
190,  218,  219,  221 ;  China  No.  6  (igoi),  nos.  36,  38,  86,  146,  147,  223,  229. 


571  ]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 59 

Shanghai,  though  none  to  the  riverine  ports/  and  these, 
the  majority  of  which  were  British  ships  and  a  regiment 
of  native  Indian  soldiers,  produced  that  wholesome  effect 
needed  to  prevent  entire  Chekiang,  in  spite  of  the  Chuchow 
massacre,  from  following  the  example  of  the  northern  prov- 
inces/ 

The  Rebellion,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  early  been 
kept  under  control  in  Shantung,  which  province,  under  the 
discipline  of  the  energetic  Yuan  Shih-kai,  was  kept  in  a  fair 
state  of  order  during  the  remaining  period  of  the  disturb- 
ances. However,  the  Powers  for  the  sake  of  security  de- 
cided to  hold  Tientsin  and  seven  districts  to  the  south,  all 
bordering  on  Shantung.  This  led  to  the  belief  that  Shan- 
tung itself  was  again  to  be  invaded  and  occupied  by  Allied 
troops.  The  Consular  Body  at  Shanghai  was  quick  in  its 
disapproval.     So  also  the  Yangtse  Viceroys,  who  said : 

Yuan  Shih-kai  frequently  memorialized  the  Throne  to  sup- 
press the  rebels  and  rescue  the  Ministers,  and  joined  with  them- 
selves (the  Viceroys  of  Nanking  and  Wuchang)  in  refusing 
to  be  a  party  to  the  Rebellion,  so  that  they  are  unable  to  sit  by 
and  see  his  dominions  endangered  without  speaking  on  his 
behalf.^ 

^  Vice-Admiral  Seymour  intimated  to  the  Foreign  Office  that  if  ships 
and  troops  were  sent  through  the  Yangtse  region,  the  Chinese  popu- 
lation "  might  think  foreigners  had  come  to  seize  their  country,"  and 
if  such  fears  were  once  aroused,  "  the  Chinese  would  fight  to  prevent 
their  country  being  taken  away  from  them."  This  was  also  the  view 
of  Viceroy  Chang  Chih-tung. 

See  China  No.  i  (1901),  no.  no. 

^  Ibid.,  nos.  50,  68,  72,  89,  94,  104,  106,  109,  no,  117,  125,  137,  145, 
162,  177,  178,  198,  201,  205,  208,  214,  273,  283,  286,  295,  366;  China  No.  5 
(790/),  nos.  30,  148. 

*  Acting  Consul-General  Warren  to  Marquis  of  Salisbury,  October 
10,  1900,  China  No.  5  {igoi),  no.  27- 


l6o  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [572 

Fortunately,  no  such  move  was  made,  or  even  contemplated 
by  the  Allies,  as  it  was  clearly  recognized  that  Yua/i  Shih- 
kai  had  accomplished  all  that  was  possible  at  the  tii 

The  province  of  Shansi  likewise  was  in  doubt,  ilue  par- 
ticularly to  the  brutality  and  unconcealed  hostilitk^  of  the 
Governor,  the  infamous  Yu  Hsien,  toward  the  mission- 
aries and  foreigners.  In  Shansi  alone,  up  to  October  2, 
1900,  the  foreign  death  list  had  reached  140,  mainly  British. 
As  the  disturbances  seemed  to  continue,  an  expedition  to 
Shansi  was  contemplated  late  in  the  year.  To  this  the 
Viceroys  of  Nanking  and  Hankow  strongly  objected,  and 
wrote,  November  28th,  to  Sir  Chihchen  Lofenglu,  the 
Chinese  Minister  at  London,  deprecating  the  intention  of 
the  Allies,  as  they  "  feared  that  new  difficulties  might  crop 
up  at  any  time  ".  At  this  opportune  moment  they\further 
advised  the  British  Foreign  Office  to  "  stick  to  the  peace 
agreement  of  the  southern  and  eastern  provinces  V,  and 
better  yet,  "  to  hasten  the  opening  and  conclusion  of  peace 
negotiations  ".  They  explained  that  the  new  Governor  ( Yu 
Hsien  had  been  removed,  soon  to  be  decapitated)  was  doing 
all  he  could  and  already  had  *'  executed  more  than  eighty 
of  the  Boxer  insurrectionists  ".  Lord  Lansdowna  was  able 
to  assure  the  Viceroys  that  he  was  "  not  aware  of  Vny  pro- 
posal for  an  expedition  to  Shansi  ",  and  in  case  ohe  was 
contemplated,  he  would  use  British  influence  to  the\con- 
trary.^  i 

Thus  it  can  be  seen  that  affairs  in  China  were  far  trom 
tranquil  for  a  long  time  after  the  Legations  had  been  re- 
lieved and  China  apparently  had  been  crushed.  B/^cause 
of  these  punitive  expeditions  and  their  inevitable  ^conse- 

1  China  No.  5  {1901),  nos.  37,  5^,  53,  95,  I59,  217. 

^  China  No.  i  {igoi),  nos.  220,  344;  China  No.  5  {1901),  nos.  4,  15, 
28,  62,  179,  183^  184.     See  also  ibid.,  Inc.  2  and  Subinc.  1-5  in  no.  62. 


573]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  l6l 

quences,  namely,  prolonging  the  period  of  uncertainty  and  1 
unrest  and  delaying  the  peace  negotiations,  China  remained 
in  an  unsatisfactory  state  even  after  the  year  1901  was 
well  advanced.  So  serious  was  the  outlook  that  it  was 
deemed  possible  by  some  to  alleviate  the  situation  only  by  a 
renewal  of  hostiHties.  This  impression  was  intensified  as 
the  months  flew  past  with  little  or  nothing  accomplished. 
The  most  critical  period  was  apparently  the  middle  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1 901.  At  that  time  it  became  known  that  Field- 
Marshal  von  Waldersee,  "  in  view  of  the  dilatory  and  ob- 
structive tactics  of  the  Chinese  ",  considered  that  "  renewal 
of  operations  on  a  large  scale  may  become  necessary  ",  and 
General  Sir  A.  Gaselee  telegraphed  to  Downing  Street  for 
instructions/ 

Minister  Conger  did  not  take  kindly  to  the  proposed  re- 
newal of  punitive  expeditions,  and  came  out  with  the  fol- 
lowing declaration : 

A  report  is  current  that  the  possibility  of  an  early  active 

*  See  despatch  of  Lieut.-Gen.  Sir  A.  Gaselee  to  Lord  Hamilton  of  the 
India  Office,  Feb.  18,  1901,  China  No.  6  {1901),  no.  100. 

Following  is  the  Army  Order  of  Feb.  15,  issued  by  Field  Marshal 
von  Waldersee : 

"Although  the  peace  negotiations  still  continue  to  be  carried  on,  their 
course,  up  to  the  present,  induces  me  to  point  out  that  a  resumption 
of  larger  operations  may  shortly  become  necessary.  I  request,  there- 
fore, that,  as  the  favorable  season  is  approaching,  such  prompt  measures 
be  taken  as  to  insure  the  mobilization  of  all  the  troops  by  the  end  of  the 
month.  It  will  be  necessary  in  the  first  place  to  take  care  that  the 
troops  possess  sufficient  means  of  transport  to  carry  with  them  about 
eight  days'  military  stores  and  provisions  on  difficult  mountain  roads. 

"Although  the  greater  portion  of  the  Commissariat  can  be  supplied 
from  the  field  of  operations,  the  circumstances  are  not  sufficiently 
known  to  allow  of  this  being  counted  on  with  certainty.  Transport 
columns  for  sending  on  the  necessary  additional  supplies  should  there- 
fore be  formed  and  fitted  out,  such  as  will  be  capable  of  surmounting 
considerable  difficulties  of  ground." 

Ibid.,  no.  105. 


1 62  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [574 

resumption  of  operations  by  the  military  on  a  large  scale,  on 
account  of  the  course  taken  by  the  peace  negotiations,  is  being 
discussed  by  some  of  the  military  commanders,  and  that  pre- 
parations are  being  made.  Criticism  of  the  military  authori- 
ties is  far  from  my  intention,  but  it  is  hardly  competent  that 
any  of  the  Powers  should,  seeing  that  negotiations  for  a  peace- 
ful settlement  have  been  jointly  commenced  by  all  the  Govern- 
ments, take  such  action  as  to  endanger  the  concert,  disturb  the 
harmony,  or  place  the  result  of  the  peace  negotiations  in 
jeopardy — i.  c,  by  the  resumption  of  military  operations  with- 
out the  consent  of  all  parties. 

At  the  time  of  the  signature  of  the  joint  note  formulating 
our  demands,  I  made,  in  signing  it,  an  express  stipulation  that 
my  Government  should  thereby  in  no  way  be  committed  to 
undertake  further  military  operations.  When  our  British  col- 
league's addition  to  the  last  clause  was  adopted  on  the  declared 
understanding  that  it  limited  the  military  operations  to  the 
occupation  of  Peking  and  this  province  (Chihli),  the  note  was 
finally  agreed  to. 

I  would  propose,  supposing  that  the  report  I  have  heard 
proves  true  with  regard  to  the  proposed  military  operations, 
and  if  my  colleagues  agree  with  me,  that  we  should  recommend 
either  to  our  Governments  or  to  our  respective  military  com- 
manders to  wait  till  the  peace  negotiations  have  arrived  at 
such  a  stage  as  to  warrant,  in  the  united  opinion  of  the  Gov- 
ernments, the  resumption  of  military  operations  as  now 
contemplated.^ 

Sir  Ernest  Satow  informed  Minister  Conger  that  "  no 
official  information  "  of  this  extreme  step  had  reached  him. 
However,  he  found  it  necessary  first,  as  Conger  had  inti- 
mated, to  consult  the  Foreign  Office  at  home.  M.  Pichon, 
the  French  Minister,  seemed  decidedly  in  favor  of  an 
avowed  resumption  of  military  operations,  and  thought  that 

^  China  No.  6  {1901),  no.  105. 


575]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  163 

"  such  a  warning  might  be  of  assistance  to  the  negotia- 
tions ".  Furthermore,  he  discovered  that  some  35,000 
Chinese  ''  were  threatening  the  French  troops  in  the  south 
of  the  province",  and  that  their  advance  (from  Shansi 
presumably,  for  in  that  neighboring  province  von  Wal- 
dersee  seemed  disposed  to  renew  hostihties)  has  to  be  kept 
in  check  ".  The  idea  of  a  punitive  expedition  appealed  to 
him,  and  he  did  not  think  that  "  we  ought  to  make  any  en- 
gagements not  to  take  military  movements,  and  thus  tie  our 
hands  ".  The  Russian  Minister  agreed  that  the  situation 
was  ''  a  grave  one  ",  yet  was  of  the  opinion  that  *'  the  Gov- 
ernments ought  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  regard 
to  the  question  now  raised  ",  thus  placing  himself  in  favor 
of  the  fundamental  idea  underlying  Minister  Conger's  dec- 
laration/ 

This  serious  difficulty  seems  to  have  arisen  mainly  from 
the  exasperation  of  the  military  at  the  way  in  which  nego- 
tiations were  being  dragged  out,  although  this  cannot  be 
considered  a  sufficient  provocation.  The  final  stand  of 
Downing  Street  was  in  opposition,  although  it  was  inti- 
mated that  "  we  were  sincerely  anxious  to  give  Count  Wal- 
dersee  all  the  support  in  our  power  ",  and  for  this  reason 
the  Foreign  Office  would  "  regret  very  much  to  spoil  the 
effect  of  any  demonstration  which  he  might  deem  neces- 
sary by  an  appearance  of  disapproval ".  But  Lord  Lans- 
downe  made  it  clear  that  Great  Britain  was  "  not  prepared 
to  sanction  employment  of  force  under  your  (Gaselee's) 
command  on  expeditions  to  places  remote  from  the  capi- 
tal ".^  It  soon  developed  that  Count  von  Waldersee  "  acted 
without  special  instructions  from  the  German  Government". 
But  Count  Hatzfeldt  informed  Lord  Lansdowne  that  the 
object  of   the  Commander-in-Chief   "  was   to   induce  the 

1  China  No.  6  (1901),  no.  105.  ^  Ibid.,  nos.  no,  118. 


I  ^ 


1 64  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [576 

Chinese  Government  to  comply  with  the  demands  of  the 
Powers  ",  and  he  "  earnestly  trusted  "  that  the  British  For- 
eign Office  would  not  refuse  support  if  such  action  became 
necessary.  Lord  Lansdowne  replied  that  "  His  Majesty's 
Government  was  most  anxious  to  avoid  any  appearance  of 
reluctance  to  support  Count  Waldersee  ",  yet  was  disin- 
clined to  join  and  did  not  desire  to  join  unless  no  other 
course  were  possible/ 

No  doubt  the  German  Commander-in-Chief  intended  his 
order  as  nothing  more  than  a  threat  to  China,  to  make  it 
clear  to  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries  that  the  patience  of 
the  Powers,  both  diplomatic  and  military,  was  well-nigh 
exhausted.  If  such  were  the  case,  a  *'  good  effect "  was 
immediately  produced  by  the  proposal,  "  to  which  pub- 
licity was  given,  and  by  the  movement  of  troops,  for  a  tele- 
gram urging  prompt  acceptance  of  our  demands  with  re- 
gard to  punishment  (of  officials  and  Boxers)  has  been  sent 
by  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries  to  Hsi-an  "  (Sianfu),^  the 
city  in  Shensi  where  the  Imperial  Court  was  sojourning 
during  the  occupation  of  Peking. 

Before  reviewing  the  final  peace  negotiations,  it  is  ad- 
visable to  consider  the  situation  at  Tientsin  and  its  out- 
come. With  the  capture  of  that  city,  the  Allied  army  re- 
mained in  possession,  and  after  the  fall  of  Peking  still  re- 
mained. Ulterior  motives  of  the  European  Governments 
developed  about  the  middle  of  November,  1900.  The  fol- 
lowing month,  Minister  Conger  "  confirmed  "  his  previous 
telegrams  that  the  Powers  were  seeking  permanent  exten- 
sions to  the  concessions  which  they  already  occupied. 
Conger  rightly  regarded  this  action  as  a  *'  dangerous  prece- 
dent ",  and  added  his  opinion  that  "  all  extensions  of  for- 

1  China  No.  6  (1901),  no.  120. 
^Ibid.,  no.  105. 


^yy-\  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  i6^ 

eign  settlements  should  be  international "/  As  Russia 
had  started  the  fracas,  Conger  directed  the  United  States 
consul  at  Tientsin,  Mr.  Ragsdale,  to  "  enter  a  protest ", 
while  he  himself  prepared  to  remonstrate  with  the  Russian 
Minister  at  Peking.^  These  proposed  extensions  of  the 
Russians  and  Belgians,  and  those  later  demanded  by  the 
Germans,  French,  Austrians,  and  Japanese,  were  denounced 
by  the  American  representative  as  a  ''  grab  game  "  which 
was  "  neither  fair  nor  consistent ".  It  may  be  remarked 
in  passing  that  throughout  his  tenure  of  office,  in  this  most 
difficult  period  of  modern  Chinese  history.  Minister  Conger 
was  an  able  exponent  of  the  American  policy,  as  followed 
from  the  beginning  and  elaborated  by  Secretary  Hay,  of 
friendship  for  and  justice  to  China,  and  of  unselfish  pro- 
tection of  American  and  Chinese  interests,  especially  at  this 
time  when  China  was  practically  friendless  and  knew  not 
what  to  do  or  where  to  turn.  Of  course,  in  this  Tientsin 
affair,  Conger  admitted  that,  "since  there  are  so  many  regu- 
larly established  concessions  at  Tientsin  an  international 
one  is  hardly  to  be  expected  ",  but  he  contended  that  "  all 
action  in  relation  to  securing  new  or  extending  old  conces- 
sions should  be  deferred  until  order  is  restored,  the  Chinese 
Government  re-established,  and  the  rights  and  interests  of 
all  can  be  considered  ". 

As  regarded  the  policy  of  the  United  States  in  this  mat- 
ter. Conger  remarked : 

It  would  be  advantageous  to  us  in  many  ways  to  have  an 
American  concession  at  Tientsin,  but  we  have  learned  by  ex- 
perience that  it  takes  both  money  and  citizens  to  own  and  oper- 
ate a  concession.  We  have  not  enough  there  of  either.  The 
Department  (of  State)  is  familiar  with  our  former  efforts  to 

^  Like  the  one  at  Shanghai. 
'  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1901,  p.  39. 


1 66  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [378 

sustain  the  desirable  concession  which  had  to  be  abandoned  in 
1896.  If,  however,  the  United  States  Government  can  in  any 
way  take  upon  itself  part  of  the  burden,  as  the  other  Govern- 
ments do,  it  may  be  advisable  for  us  to  demand  consideration 
of  our  rights  to  a  concession  while  the  others  are  taking  and 
dividing  up  all  available  territory.^ 

It  was  plainly  Conger's  intention  to  play  safe  until  the 
matter  had  been  definitely  determined. 

The  Russian  Circular  announcing  the  occupation  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  Peiho  river,  opposite  the  foreign  conces- 
sions already  established,  was  the  first  to  appear,  early  in 
November.    Said  this  typically  Russian  document : 

Since  the  17th  of  June  last  the  Imperial  Chinese  troops  have 
joined  the  rioters  (Boxers)  who  attacked  the  foreign  conces- 
sions and  the  railway  station  occupied  by  the  Russian  troops, 
and  that  on  the  23d  of  June  the  Russian  reinforcements,  who 
came  to  raise  the  blockade,  swept  the  left  bank  of  the  Peiho 
.  .  .  and  have  established  themselves  there  hy  right  of  con- 
quest ^  in  having  taken  possession  by  force  of  arms  and  at  the 
price  of  Russian  blood  spilled,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Chinese 
from  returning  to  resume  the  firing.  His  Excellency  (Lieu- 
tenant-General  Linevitch)  considers  all  this  tract  of  land  .  .  . 
as  having  become  the  property  of  the  Russian  troops  on  the 
23d  of  June  by  act  of  war. 

The  Russian  flags  have  been  planted,  and  notice  posted  upon 
boards  in  many  places  within  the  territory,  which  has  been 
occupied  and  protected  by  the  Russian  military  authorities. 
Therefore  his  Excellency  can  not  and  will  not  recognize,  ex- 
cept by  his  special  authorization,  any  cession  whatever  of  this 
territory  of  which  he  has  taken  entire  and  complete  possession,^ 

On  November  20th,  the  French  Consul-General,  G.  du 

1  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1901,  p.  40. 
'  The  italics  are  the  author's. 
»U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1901,  p.  41. 


579]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  167 

Chaylard,  who  also  was  the  president  of  the  municipal  coun- 
cil of  Tientsin,  undertook  "  to  warn  foreign  residents 
against  the  consequences  they  would  expose  themselves  to 
by  buying  ground  in  the  quarter  presently  annexed  to  the 
French  concession  ",  and  declared  that  he  would  not  ''recog- 
nize as  valid  any  contract  subsequent  to  June  17th,  the 
date  on  which  hostilities  began ".  However,  "  all  land 
holders,  bearers  of  regular  titles  issued  before  the  17th  of 
June  ",  were  '*  requested  to  exhibit  them  at  the  French  Con- 
sulate, where  they  shall  be  duly  verified  and  registered  "/ 
Then  followed  a  designation  of  the  area  of  the  proposed 
extension. 

Belgium  likewise  grabbed  all  in  sight  that  was  possible 
for  so  small  a  kingdom,  and  "  appropriated  to  its  sole  use 
and  benefit "  a  large  tract  east  of  the  Peiho  river.  Then 
followed  the  other  Powers,  each  in  every  instance  with  its 
additions  carefully  defined  and  all  others  solemnly  warned 
not  to  interfere  with  its  squatter  rights.^  Here  again  we 
find  that  Russia  was  the  prime  mover  and  set  the  example 
for  the  rest,  and  that  then  as  now,  when  there  is  any  terri- 
torial complication  in  the  Far  East  as  well  as  in  cer- 
tain other  parts  of  the  world,  it  is  advisable  first  to  ex- 
amine the  Russian  attitude.  Generally,  it  will  be  the  key 
to  the  whole  situation. 

The  United  States,  in  its  not  altogether  enviable  position 
as  guardia'i  of  Chinese  territorial  integrity,  soon  had  its 
hands  full  and,  rather  to  its  regret,  was  forced  to  take  a 
seemingly  inconsistent  stand  which  needs  careful  explana- 
tion to  be  seen  in  the  right  light.  On  February  26,  1901, 
Minister  Conger  reported  to  the  Department  of  State  that, 

1  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1901,  p.  42. 

'For  the  Belgian  circular  see  ibid.,  p.  42;  Austrian,  p.  46;  Italian, 
p.  47;  Ja])anese,  p.  47;  German,  p.  52. 


\ 


l68  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^go 

notwithstanding  his  protests,  all  available  territory  except 
the  small  tract  which  in  1896  had  formed  the  American 
concession,  had  been  seized  by  the  land-hungry  Powers. 
With  an  eye  to  the  future,  Conger  found  it  necessary  to  in- 
struct Consul  Ragsdale  to  serve  notice  on  the  other  Consuls 
that  "  that  tract  must  be  left  for  part  of  an  international 
settlement  or  a  United  States  concession,  which  will  be  de- 
termined when  order  is  restored  ".  He  emulated  the  Euro- 
pean notes  in  finalty  of  argument  by  adding,  as  they  had 
done  in  every  instance,  ''  that  the  United  States  will  not 
recognize  seizure  or  adverse  occupation  ".^  This  was  the 
wisest  course,  considering  the  circumstances,  and  was  fully 
approved  by  Secretary  Hay. 

Minister  Conger  strengthened  his  position  by  submitting 
to  the  Department  of  State  a  communication  solicited  from 
Major-General  Chaffee,  commanding  the  American  troops 
in  China.     The  General  was  of  the  following  opinion : 

Owing  to  recent  events  in  this  section  of  China  and  with  a 
view  to  the  future  expansion  of  trade  by  the  United  States 
at  Tientsin  and  adjacent  country,  I  think  it  not  improbable 
our  Government  would  be  willing  to  recover,  if  it  can  be  done 
without  friction,  its  old  concession  at  Tientsin.  Further,  it 
might  wish  or  consent  to  do  so  for  a  few  yean-  at  least,  as  a 
military  necessity,  in  order  to  afford  undisputel  footing  for 
its  troops  and  stores  in  case  of  renewal  of  disturb.ince  pending 
a  few  years  of  trial  of  the  Chinese  Government  ta  restore  and 
maintain  public  order. 

********* 

It  is  my  opinion  that  our  Government  should  recover  this 
concession  if  it  can  do  so  at  once  and  without  senous  diffi- 
culty. I  leave  the  subject  with  you  (Conger),  hovxver,  to 
represent  to  Washington.  As  the  matter  is  now  in  s  ich  con- 
dition that  delay  might  bring  about  the  threatened  absorption 

1 U.  'S.  For.  ReL,  1901,  p.  58. 


i 


^8i]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  169 

before  report  could  be  made  and  received  by  mail,  the  dis- 
position of  the  Government  might  be  obtained  by  using  the 
cable.  ^ 

Minister  Conger  v^as  careful  to  inform  Consul  Ragsdale 
in  regard  to  this  delicate  matter :  ^ 

*  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1901,  p.  49.  Major  Foote  of  the  American  force 
at  Tientsin  gives  further  information,  ihid.,  pp.  49,  50.  Reply  of 
Minister  Conger  to  General  Chaffee,  ihid.,  pp.  51,  52. 

'  The  history  of  the  American  "  concession "  is  an  interesting  one. 
According  to  Consul  'Ragsdale  (to  Major  Foote)  it  is  as  follows: 

"  Sir :  With  reference  to  the  old  American  concession  at  Tientsin, 
and  in  compliance  with  your  request,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  that 
in  the  year  1869  there  was  laid  out  at  Tientsin  three  tracts  of  land  for 
English,  French,  and  American  residents,  and  that  for  some  years 
our  Government  exercised  in  a  way  jurisdiction  over  the  same. 

"  On  October  12,  1880,  the  concession  was  relegated  to  its  former 
status  (meaning  back  to  China)  "with  the  understanding  that  if  at 
some  future  time  it  shall  become  desirable  to  establish  suitable  muni- 
cipal regulations  therein  it  shall  be  competent  for  the  consular  au- 
thorities to  do  so." 

"  Under  date  of  October  14,  1880,  the  Taotai  Cheng  acknowledged 
receipt  of  the  dispatch  sent  to  him  by  the  Consul  two  days  before, 
and  it  stated  that  if  any  American  consul  in  future  should  "  desire 
to  have  the  settlement  revert  to  the  present  system  of  administration 
he  must  first  arrange  with  the  customs  taotai  as  to  the  mode  of  admin- 
istration, and  if  there  be  nothing  objectionable  in  same  there  should 
be  nothing  to  prevent  the  settlement  from  reverting  to  the  original 
Government." 

"  Sometime  in  the  year  1896  a  movement  was  on  foot  to  cede  this 
territory  to  the  Germans,  against  which  action  a  protest  was  filed  and 
correspondence  in  relation  thereto  with  the  State  Department  followed, 
and  finally  on  April  2,  1896,  the  Minister  (Denby)  advised  that  all 
jurisdiction  over  the  property  be  abandoned,  and  on  June  2^  instructed 
the  United  States  Consul  at  Tientsin  to  advise  the  taotai  to  that 
effect." 

Then  Consul  Ragsdale  gives  an  opinion  of  his  own.  "  It  has  never 
been  the  policy  of  our  Government  to  acquire  territory  abroad,  and 
that  policy  may  be  a  wise  one  in  most  instances,  but  at  Tientsin  I 
think  it  would  be  wise  for  our  Government  to  have  some  place  over 
which  they  could  exercise  some  control.  The  trouble  in  north  China 
is  not  over  (this  was  Feb.  15,  1901),  and  final  settlement  day  is  a  long 
ways  off,  etc." 


170  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [582 

It  is  against  the  declared  policy  of  our  Government  in  any  way 
to  make  the  military  movement  in  China  a  pretext  for  seizing 
or  obtaining  territory;  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  I  have 
instructed  you  to  make  the  protests  which  you  have  made 
against  the  seizures  by  other  Powers. 

Then  came  the  first  definite  announcement  of  the  American 
policy : 

But  in  order  that  we  may  prevent  every  possible  place  being 
occupied  by  others,  so  that  if  the  Government  desires  to  apply 
for  a  concession  after  order  is  restored,  we  may  be  able  to 
reoccupy  at  least  the  small  tract  that  was  formerly  the  United 
States  concession,  or,  preferably,  have  it  included  in  an  inter- 
national settlement,  and  still  be  consistent  with  the  position  we 
have  already  taken  (meaning  the  protests  to  the  other  Powers), 
you  may  send  the  enclosed,  in  the  form  of  a  note  from  your- 
self, to  each  of  your  colleagfues.^ 

The  "  inclosed  "  was  a  brief  communication  stating  that 
the  United  States  had  revived  its  right  to  its  former  con- 
cession, to  be  used  either  as  such  or  as  part  of  an  inter- 
national one.^ 

(Continued  from  previous  page.)     See  U.  S.  For,  Rel.,  1901,  p.  50. 

Minister  Denby,  October  15,  1896,  made  a  pertinent  observation: 
"As  there  is  no  record  showing  that  any  concession  was  ever  actually 
made  to  the  United  States,  and  in  view  of  the  further  fact  that  we, 
many  years  ago,  relinquished  whatever  control  we  may  have  been 
allowed  to  exercise  over  the  land,  it  would  seem  that  we  are  not  in  a 
position  to  maintain  that  we  are  entitled  to  resume  jurisdiction  over 
the  tract,  even  if  it  is  considered  desirable  to  do  so."    Ibid.,  p.  50. 

1  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1901,  p.  51. 

2  Copy  of  Notice  to  be  Served  on  Foreign  Consuls  by  United  States 

Consul  at  Tientsin  Relative  to  Preservation  of  the  Tract  of 

Land  Known  as  the  United  States  Concession  in  Tientsin. 

For  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  tract  of  land  known  as  the  United 

States  concession  in  Tientsin,  to  be  with  other  tracts  organized  into  an 

international  settlement  if  possible,  but,  if  not,  then  at  the  proper  time 

whenever  it  may  legally  be  done,  to  be  reoccupied  as  a  United  States 


^ 


583]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  171 

However,  the  United  States  seemed  disinclined  to  ap- 
propriate this  ground,  ahhough  it  was  occupied  temporarily 
in  the  hope  that  it  could  be  converted  into  an  international 
settlement.  As  the  other  Powers  did  not  care  for  such  an 
arrangement,  it  was  next  proposed  to  come  to  terms  with 
Great  Britain.  Immediate  action  was  imperative,  as  this 
"  no  man's  land  "  was  "  rapidly  filling  up  with  bad  charac- 
ters, making  some  control  absolutely  necessary  ".^  Sir 
Ernest  Satow  offered  to  arrange  the  matter  on  these  con- 
ditions to  be  observed : 

1.  The  United  States  Government  to  reserve  the  right  to 
exercise  exclusive  military  control  over  the  concession  in  case 
of  necessity. 

2.  The  United  States  Government  to  reserve  the  right  to 
moor  a  gunboat  or  gunboats  at  the  bund  of  the  United  States 
concession  in  case  of  necessity. 

3.  At  least  one  American  citizen  to  be  on  the  extra  conces- 
sion council.  In  the  event  of  there  being  no  American  citizen 
on  the  extra  concession  council  in  the  ordinary  way,  the  United 
States  Consul  should  have  the  right  to  nominate  one  by  virtue 
of  this  arrangement. 

4.  All  transfers  of  land  in  the  United  States  concession  to 
be  registered  at  the  United  States  Consulate. 

5.  No  special  regulations  which  apply  to  the  United  States 
concession  and  not  to  other  parts  of  the  British  extra  con- 
cession to  be  made  without  the  approval  of  the  United  States 
Consul. 

concession,  the  undersigned,  by  direction  of  the  United  States  Legation 
at  Peking,  hereby  serves  this  formal  notice  of  such  intention  on  the 
part  of  his  Government,  and  requests  that  it  be  in  every  way  respected. 
No  adverse  seizure  or  occupancy  of  any  part  of  this  tract  can  be 
recognized  or  allowed. 

James  W.  Ragsdale, 

United  States  Consul. 

1  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1901,  p.  53- 


1^2  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [584 

6.  The  United  States  Government  to  reserve  the  right  to 
terminate  the  arrangement  with  the  British  extra  concession 
on  giving  one  year's  notice  and  assuming  any  financial  Habili- 
ties  which  may  have  been  incurred  for  the  development  of  the 
concession  with  the  consent  of  the  United  States  Consul.^ 

-'-'The  next  step  was  the  formal  application  of  Minister 
Conger  for  a  retrocession  of  this  land  to  the  United  States. 
Quite  unexpectedly,  difficulties  arose.  Foreign  interests, 
Li  Hung-chang  explained,  were  in  possession;  at  any  rate, 
it  seemed  certain  that  some  foreign  concerns  were  decidedly 
adverse  to  having  the  United  States  resume  its  former  title. 
Li  Hung-chang  offered  to  compromise  the  matter  by  urging 
Conger  to  "  accept  a  much  larger  and  unoccupied  tract  a 
long  way  down  the  river  ",  but  this,  the  American  Minister 
insisted,  "  would  not  satisfy  us  ",  since  the  other  tract,  even 
with  its  present  occupants,  "  exactly  suited  our  purpose  and 
was  the  only  tract  we  desired  ".  The  "  present  occupants", 
according  to  Li,  were  "  some  of  the  foremost  and  wealthiest 
Chinese  in  the  Empire  ".  However,  it  seems  certain  that 
some  foreign  investment  companies  were  causing  the  real 
difficulty.  Minister  Conger  wore  himself  out  over  the 
matter,  and  finally  Secretary  Hay  likewise  became  dis- 
gusted, as  the  land  after  all  was  of  little  value.  Therefore, 
November  27th,  he  notified  Conger  that  "  it  seems  unde- 
sirable to  press  the  matter  further  at  present ",  in  view  of 
the  difficult  situation  which  had  arisen  since  the  United 
States  had  relinquished  possession.^  It  was  indeed  curious 
that  when  the  United  States,  through  force  of  circum- 
stances, endeavored  to  deviate  just  a  hair's-breath  from  its 
traditional  policy,  this  was  found  to  be  impossible.     Fate 

*U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1901,  pp.  53,  54. 

'  See  especially  ibid.,  Inc.  no.  769,  pp.  54-56,  also  the  correspondence 
with  the  Chinese  officials,  pp.  56-58,  and  Secretary  Hay's  reply  of 
November  27,  1901,  pp.  58,  59. 


r 


585]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 73 

seemed  to  have  decreed  that  the  American  Power,  to  its 
everlasting  credit,  should  be  utterly  landless  in  China. 

We  can  now  turn  to  Peking  and  follow  the  many  and 
complicated  issues  confronting  China  and  the  Powers  to 
their  conclusion  in  the  Peace  Protocol  of  September  7, 
1 90 1.  China  was  now  completely  cowed  into  submission, 
the  final  touch  having  been  given  by  the  occupation  of  the 
Imperial  City  where  the  court  palaces  and  grounds  were 
situated,  and  into  which  heretofore  no  ordinary  mortal  had 
entered.  At  first  the  Allies  were  a  bit  dubious  about  at- 
tacking this  hallowed  quarter,  and  deemed  such  action  be- 
yond their  military  instructions.  So  the  Generals  left  the 
matter  with  the  Diplomatic  Body  for  settlement,  and  the 
latter  were  "  of  unanimous  conviction  that  failure  to  crush 
the  resistance  of  the  Chinese  troops,  holding  the  Forbidden 
City,  would  have  disastrous  consequences  in  prolonging  a 
state  of  anarchy,  and  diminishing  the  chances  for  peace  ". 
Therefore  it  was  decided  to  take  the  Imperial  Palace,  but 
before  the  attempt  could  be  made  the  Chinese  troops  evacu- 
ated it.  Nevertheless,  the  Generals  decided  to  march  the 
Allied  army  through  it,  "  lest  the  Chinese,  with  their  in- 
finite capacity  for  misrepresentation,  should  infer  that  some 
supernatural  power  had  intervened,  so  that  the  Allied  forces 
had  been  affected  by  fear  of  the  consequences  of  invading 
the  sacred  precincts  ".  The  final  decision  was  to  go  through 
the  Imperial  Palace  in  complete  military  array,  then  close 
the  gates  and  keep  them  closed  until  the  Court,  which  had 
gone  "  westward  on  a  tour  ",  in  other  words  fled  the  city, 
should  come  back.  On  August  28th,  the  impressive  cere- 
mony was  gone  through,  to  the  infinite  humiliation  of  the 
Chinese  populace,  which  had  never  heard  of  nor  witnessed 
such  an  act  of  sacrilege.  That  the  harsh  conduct  of  the 
Allies  was,  however,  both  necessary  and  desirable  is  beyond 
dispute.     The  British  Minister  wisely  refrained  from  giv- 


I 


174  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [586 

ing  a  graphic  description  of  the  event,  as  he  would  "  not 
attempt  to  compete  with  the  numerous  newspaper  corres- 
pondents who  took  part  in  the  ceremony  "/ 
'  The  Summer  Palace  of  the  Emperor,  a  short  distance 
from  the  capital,  likewise  came  in  for  its  share  of  attention. 
.  A  report  had  reached  the  Russian  military  authorities  that 
\  the  Boxer  bands  in  the  neighborhood  were  using  the  Pal- 
ace as  a  sort  of  target,  firing  volleys  into  it  every  night. 
^  The  Russians,  by  the  way,  had  occupied  the  Palace  imme- 
j  diately  after  the  capture  of  Peking,  but  in  their  policy  of 
j  making  friends  with  China  they  left  no  stones  unturned, 
I  particularly  in  actions  such  as  these,  to  bring  about  desired 
results.  Therefore,  on  their  own  initiative  and  without 
consulting  the  Allies,  they  had  marched  out  and  handed 
over  both  the  Summer  and  the  Winter  Palaces  to  the  Chi- 
nese. Field-Marshal  von  Waldersee  though  this  the  best 
plan,  but  the  British  Minister  emphatically  objected  to  it 
as  "  most  undesirable  "  at  this  juncture  of  affairs.  The 
upshot  of  the  matter  was  that  the  British  decided  to  move 
into  the  Summer  Palace  themselves  and  hold  it  until  order 
was  restored.  Probably  in  order  to  have  some  company 
they  extended  an  invitation  to  the  Italian  contingent  to  join 
them,  and  these  welcomed  the  opportunity  to  take  part. 
That  some  minor  Chinese  officials  were  already  in  posses- 
sion might  have  seemed  rather  embarrassing  at  first  glance, 
but  it  further  developed  that  the  native  custodians  '*  were 
only  too  glad  to  hand  the  Palace  over  ",  as  they  were  "  un- 
armed, and  had  also  nothing  to  eat ".  Minister  MacDon- 
ald  considered  it  his  duty  to  take  over  the  Palace  upon 
evacuation  by  the  Russians  "  in  order  to  maintain  the  con- 
sistent attitude  which  the  combination  of  western  Powers 
had  assumed  ",  which  attitude,  so  it  appeared,  would  not 

^  See  China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  209.    See  also  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900, 
p.  198. 


I 


IF 


587]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 75 

allow  of  the  abandonment  of  any  action  or  precedent  after' 
it  had  once  been  established/ 

By  the  acceptance  of  the  credentials  of  Prince  Ching  and 
Li  Hung-chang  the  situation  had  at  last  reached  the  point 
where  definite  negotiations  could  begin.  Naturally,  the 
punishment  of  the  guilty  was  the  question  uppermost  in  the 
earliest  stage  of  settlement.  In  regard  to  this,  the  first  at- 
tempt at  solution,  the  German  Government  had  the  honor 
of  making  the  first  move.  Count  von  Biilow  was  of  the 
conviction  that,  "  before  entering  into  negotiations  for 
peace,  public  opinion  in  Germany  would  require  that  the 
Government  should  obtain  some  satisfaction  for  the  out- 
rages committed  in  China  ".^  For  argument  von  Biilow 
harked  back  to  the  times  of  i860  and  said  that  if  the  leaders 
responsible  for  the  outrages  of  that  period  had  been  '*  ade- 
quately punished  ",  the  present  lamentable  state  of  affairs 
would  never  have  occurred. 

Accordingly,  September  18,  1900,  the  Gerg;ian  Charge 
at  Washington  presented  a  Circular  to  the  Department  of 
State  as  follows : 

The  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  considers  as  a 
preliminary  condition  for  entering  into  diplomatic  negotiations 
with  the  Chinese  Government  a  surrender  of  such  persons  as 
are  determined  upon  as  being  the  first  and  real  perpetrators  of 
the  crimes  committed  in  Peking  against  international  law.  The 
number  of  perpetrators  who  served  as  tools  is  too  great;  a 
wholesale  execution  would  be  adverse  to  the  civilized  con- 
science. Furthermore,  circumstances  would  not  allow  that 
even  the  group  of  leaders  could  be  completely  ascertained. 
But  the  few  among  them  whose  guilt  is  notorious  should  be 
urrendered  or  punished.     The  representatives  of  the  Powers 


^  See  China  No.  5  (1901),  nos.  75,  208,  211  and  Inc.  i  and  2  in  no.  211. 
*  China  No.  i  (1901),  no.  365. 


176  I'HE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^88 

in  Peking  will  be  in  a  position  to  make  or  adduce  in  this  in- 
vestigation fully  valid  testimony.  The  number  of  those  pun- 
ished is  of  less  importance  than  their  character  as  principal 
instigators  and  leaders.  The  Government  of  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  believes  that  it  can  depend  in  this  matter  upon  the 
concurrence  of  all  the  Cabinets;  for  indifference  toward  the 
idea  of  a  just  expiation  would  be  equivalent  to  indifference 
toward  a  repetition  of  the  crime. 

Germany  further  proposed  that  the  Diplomatic  Body  at 
Peking  should  "  designate  the  principal  Chinese  personages 
whose  guilt  in  the  instigation  or  execution  of  the  crimes  is 
beyond  a  doubt  ".^ 

To  which  Acting  Secretary  David  J.  Hill  replied : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  from  the  outset 
proclaimed  its  purpose  to  hold  to  the  uttermost  accountability 
the  responsible  authors  of  any  wrongs  done  in  China  to  citizens 
of  the  United  States  and  their  interests,  as  was  stated  in  the 
Government's  circular  communication  to  the  Powers  of  July 
3  last.  These  wrongs  have  been  committed  not  only  in  Peking, 
but  in  many  parts  of  the  Empire,  and  their  punishment  is  be- 
lieved to  be  an  essential  element  of  any  effective  settlement 
which  shall  prevent  a  recurrence  of  such  outrages  and  bring 
about  permanent  safety  and  peace  in  China.  It  is  thought, 
however,  that  no  punitive  measures  can  be  effective  by  way  of 
reparation  for  wrongs  suffered  and  as  deterrent  examples  for 
the  future  as  the  degradation  and  punishment  of  the  respon- 
sible authors  by  the  supreme  Imperial  authority  itself ;  and  it 
seems  only  just  to  China  that  she  should  be  afforded  in  the 
first  instance  an  opportunity  to  do  this,  and  thus  rehabilitate 
herself  before  the  world.  Believing  thus,  and  without  abating 
in  any  wise  its  deliberate  purpose  to  exact  the  fullest  accoun- 
tability from  the  responsible  authors  of  the  wrongs  we  have 
suffered  in  China,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  not 

^U.  S.  For.  Re!.,  1900,  p.  341.     See  also  p.  306. 


589]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 77 

disposed,  as  a  preliminary  condition  to  entering  into  diplomatic 
negotiations  with  the  Chinese  Government,  to  join  in  a  demand 
that  said  Government  surrender  to  the  Powers  such  persons 
as,  according  to  the  determination  of  the  Powers  themselves, 
may  be  held  to  be  the  first  and  real  perpetrators  of  those 
wrongs.  On  the  other  hand,  this  Government  is  disposed  to 
hold  that  the  punishment  of  the  high  responsible  authors  of 
these  wrongs,  not  only  in  Peking,  but  throughout  China,  is 
essentially  a  condition  to  be  embraced  and  provided  for  in  the 
negotiations  for  a  final  settlement.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this 
Government  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment  to  name  its 
plenipotentiaries  for  negotiating  a  settlement  with  China,  and 
in  the  meantime  to  authorize  its  Minister  in  Peking  to  enter 
forthwith  into  conference  with  the  duly  authorized  represen- 
tatives of  the  Chinese  Government  with  a  view  to  bringing 
about  a  preliminary  agreement  whereby  the  full  exercise  of 
the  Imperial  power  for  the  preservation  of  order  and  the  pro- 
tection of  foreign  life  and  property  throughout  China  pending 
final  negotiations  with  the, Powers  shall  be  assured.^ 

The  American  reply  was  the  most  unfavorable  and  about 
the  only  one  out  and  out  opposed  to  the  proposal  of  the  Ger- 
man Government.  This  was  because  the  Department  of 
State  frankly  doubted  the  advisability,  or  even  the  success, 
of  this  preliminary  diplomatic  procedure. 

Replies  from  the  other  Powers  were  more  reassuring  to 
the  German  Government.  Austria,  as  of  course  everyone 
expected,  accepted  the  German  proposition  "  without  re- 
serve ".^  Japan  also  believed  that  punishment  should  first 
take  place  and  so  was  ready  to  cooperate  in  the  spirit  sug- 
gested by  Germany,  although  the  Tokyo  Government  anti- 
cipated "  grave  difficulties  "  in  this  undertaking.^     Count 

^U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  pp.  341,  342.    See  also  China  No.  i  (iQOi), 
10.  385. 
'U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  p.  394.  *  China  No.  i  (1901),  no.  370. 


178  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [590 

Lamsdorff  answered  unofficially  for  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment at  one  of  his  famous  weekly  receptions  in  St.  Peters- 
burg. The  Count  intimated  that  the  German  proposals 
were  *'  somewhat  vague  "  as  to  whether  the  prescribed  per- 
sons were  to  be  punished  by  the  Powers  or  by  China.  As 
far  as  he  was  concerned,  he  ''  would  prefer  that  the  role  of 
executioner,  if  necessary,  should  be  undertaken  by  the  Chi- 
nese Government,  who  appeared  to  have  a  special  aptitude 
for  such  a  task  ".  But  no  more  than  Russia,  it  may  be  re- 
marked, in  the  light  of  the  massacre  of  Blagovestchensk  in 
July,  1900,  when  the  progress  of  the  Amur  was  choked  by 
the  corpses  of  5,000  unoffending  civilian  Chinese,  driven 
into  the  river  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  Count  Lams- 
dorff  was  of  opinion  that  exile  would  be  sufficient  punish- 
ment for  those  Boxer  leaders  and  sympathizers  of  high 
rank  who  might  be  declared  guilty.  Later,  September  26th, 
the  Russian  Government  agreed  "  in  principle  "  to  the  Ger- 
man proposal,  which  the  United  States  practically  had  not 
done.  But  Russia  asked  for  more  particulars  on  the  subject 
of  surrender  of  the  guilty,  whether  these  were  to  be  handed 
over  to  the  Diplomatic  iJody  or  were  to  be  punished  by 
China. ^  Italy  "  accepted  the  German  note  in  principle 
and  replied  to  that  effect  ".^  Naturally,  the  entire  Triple 
Alliance  would  adhere  to  the  policy  suggested  by  its  leader. 
Lord  Salisbury  wanted  time  ''  for  a  few  day's  reflec- 
tion ".  He  admitted  that  the  proposal  awakened  * 'profound 
sympathy"  as  to  contents,  and  that  the  retribution  sug- 
gested was  "  not  only  richly  deserved,  but  that  an  element 
of  security  for  the  future  will  be  lost  if  that  punishment 
cannot  be  inflicted  ".     Although  France  had  given  an  affir- 

'^  China  No.  i  {1901),  nos.  376.  z^^,  395. 
2  Ihid.,  no.  398. 


59 1 ]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 79 

mative  reply/  Lord  Salisbury  decided  that,  while  ordinarily 
he  would  have  given  "  an  unreserved  assent  ",  yet  the  nature 
of  the  proposal  was  of  such  consequence  that  first  he  wished 
to  communicate  with  the  British  Minister  at  Peking  on  the 
following  points : 

1.  Whether  he  (Minister  MacDonald)  and  the  other  foreign 
representatives  could  with  any  certainty  and  on  clear  evidence 
designate  those  who  were  really  responsible  for  the  recent 
outrages. 

2.  Whether,  in  the  event  of  the  Chinese  Government  refusing 
to  surrender  or  to  punish  these  persons,  or  returning  evasive 
answers,  it  would  be  practicable  to  seize  them.^ 

To  which  MacDonald  replied,  September  29th: 

1.  It  is  quite  possible  to  designate  the  guilty  with  certainty, 
and  is  likely  that  the  list  of  each  of  my  colleagues  would  be 
identical  with  the  others. 

2.  Prince  Tuan,  being  one  of  the  chief  offenders,  and  seem- 
ing to  be  de  facto  the  Chinese  Government  at  the  present  time, 
it  will  be  most  difficult  to  seize  the  guilty.^ 

On  the  same  day  that  the  British  Foreign  Office  received 
these  answers  from  Peking,  the  second  of  which  must  be  re- 
garded as  rather  unfavorable  to  the  German  proposal,  the 
news  also  came  of  a  Chinese  edict,  promulgated  September 
25th,  in  which  punishment  was  defined  and  prescribed  for  a 
number  of  the  most  guilty.  Evidently,  China  was  doing 
the  best  under  the  circumstances  to  anticipate  the  German 
action  and  to  propitiate  the  Powers.     The  edict  read : 

*  Delcasse  approved  "  with  much  satisfaction  of  the  German  Circular  " 

as  it  practically  coincided  with  his  own  views  as  he  had  expressed 
them  to  the  Chinese  Government  in  July  last.  China  No.  i  (1901), 
no.  394- 

2  Ibid.,  nos.  386,  3^7- 

^Ibid.,  no.  399. 


l8o  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^^2 

The  present  troubles  have  been  occasioned  against  the  will 
of  the  Throne.  The  Boxer  brigands  have  been  incited  by 
Princes  and  Ministers,  and  war  with  friendly  natives  (na- 
tions?) has  been  the  result.  The  Court  has  had  to  flee  (to 
Sianfu),  and  although  the  Throne  is  itself  to  blame,  the  Princes 
and  Ministers  are  largely  culpable  in  various  degrees.  Ac- 
cordingly, four  Imperial  Princes  are  deprived  of  office  and 
rank.  Prince  Tuan  is  degraded  from  office,  but  given  the 
privilege  of  trial  by  the  Clansmen's  Court.  Kang  Yi  and 
Chao  Shu-chiao  are  handed  over  to  the  Censorate  for  pun- 
ishment.^ 

1  China  No.  i  (1901),  no.  400.     See  also  China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  9. 

Regarding  the  Edict  of  September  25,  Lord  Salisbury  expressed  to 
the  Chinese  Minister  at  London  his  "  satisfaction  with  the  results  that 
had  so  far  been  attained  by  the  issue  of  the  Edict  of  the  Emperor  of 
China  in  regard  to  the  most  guilty  of  the  Chinese  statesmen."  But 
Lord  Salisbury  admitted  that  the  edict's  "  real  value  would  ultimately 
be  decided  by  the  practical  eflfect  which  the  Chinese  Government  should 
give  to  its  provisions."    China  No.  5  (ipoi),  no.  6. 

Sir  Claude  MacDonald  was  not  so  sure.  "  The  various  Boards  (of 
the  Yamen)  are  left  to  decide  the  penalties  to  be  inflicted."  He  noticed 
too  that,  although  punishment  of  Prince  Tuan  was  included,  "  Yu 
Hsien,  Governor  of  Shansi,  Tung  Fu-hsiang  and  others  are  omitted." 
In  criticism  of  the  Edi^t  he  said:  "Although  this  decree  does  not  in 
itself  prove  that  the  Throne  has  either  the  will  or  the  power  to  inflict 
adequate  punishment,  it  may  be  accepted  as  a  step  in  the  right  direc- 
tion."   China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  16. 

Said  Acting  Consul-General  Warren  at  Shanghai:  "This  (referring 
to  the  Edict  of  September  25),  in  the  opinion  of  the  Wuchang  Viceroy, 
is  the  first  step  in  the  real  policy  of  the  Court."  Unfortunately,  "  the 
general  impression  among  Chinese  here  is  that  these  edicts,  professing 
to  punish  the  reactionaries,  are  really  intended  only  to  mislead  the 
foreign  Powers  as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  Court's  regret,  and  there  is 
evidence  to  support  this  idea."  Also,  "  the  fact  that  Yu  Hsien  should 
be  awarded  no  punishment,  and  that  Prince  Tuan  should  be  replaced 
by  an  official  equally  as  bad  as,  if  not  worse  than,  himself,  seems  to 
show  that  the  Court  has  not  the  power  to  punish  those  who  deserve 
punishment  most.  The  immunity  from  censure  enjoyed  by  Jung  Lu 
and  Tung  Fu-hsiang,  both  qf  whom  are  supported  by  large  forces  of 
troops,  is  also  an  argument  in  favor  of  this  conclusion."    Ibid.,  no.  18. 


593]  -^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  l8i 

The  appearance  of  the  above  decree  altered  the  situation 
to  an  appreciable  extent  and  forced  Germany  to  add  to  her 
note  the  following  questions,  asking  the  Powers  for  a  con- 
sideration and  opinion  of  them: 

1.  Whether  the  list  of  persons  to  be  punished,  as  contained 
in  the  Chinese  edict  (the  above  decree  of  September  25)  is  suf- 
ficient and  correct. 

2.  Whether  the  proposed  punishments  are  suitable. 

3.  In  what  manner  the  Powers  will  be  able  to  control  the 
execution  of  these  punishments.^ 

As  regarded  these  questions,  Italy  decided  "  to  accept ", 
but  would  "  reserve  the  right  of  instructing  their  represen- 
tative in  Peking  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  his  col- 
leagues as  to  the  manner  of  ascertaining  these  three 
points".^  France  notified  her  Charge  at  Berlin  "to  inform 
the  German  Government  that  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public accept  the  proposals  made  by  them  in  connection  with 
China  ".^  The  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  Sir  F.  Las- 
celles,  was  able  to  inform  von  Biilow  on  October  4th,  "  on 
the  arrival  of  the  Queen's  messenger  ",  that  Lord  Salis- 
bury substantially  agreed  with  the  German  views.*  Japan 
also  expressed  approval,  in  fact  was  very  friendly  about  it, 
assuring  von  Biilow  that  he  had  "  the  cordial  support  and 
approval  of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  '\  which 
would  be  "  pleased  "  to  have  him  "  accept  that  assurance  as 

1  China  No.  5  (7901),  Inc.  in  no.  5,  giving  French  version  and  trans. 
For  "the  same  in  German  and  trans.,  see  no.  10,  Inc. 

'Further:  "The  Italian  Government  do  not  desire  to  put  themselves 
in  a  prominent  position  in  China  in  view  of  their  slight  interests  there, 
but  to  maintain  the  concert  by  giving  such  replies  to  proposals  of  the 
other  Powers  (France  and  Russia  up  to  this  date)  as  nelp  in  this 
direction."    Ibid.,  no.  14. 

3  Ibid.,  no.  19. 

*Ibid.,  no.  25. 


l82  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [594 

a  full  and  satisfactory  response  to  the  proposal  ".  How- 
ever, Japan  suggested  "  that  the  sphere  of  usefulness  of  the 
foreign  representatives  in  Peking  would  be  greatly  enlarged 
if  all  the  questions  which  are  to  serve  as  the  basis  of  nego- 
tiations with  China  were  to  be  presented  to  them  for  col- 
lective examination  ".  In  this,  it  may  be  remarked,  Japan 
anticipated  a  later  development  in  the  negotiations.  But  as 
regarded  Germany's  efforts,  Japan  was  convinced  they  were 
"  a  step  in  the  right  direction  ",^  which  was  comforting  to 
von  Billow,  as  the  United  States  in  particular  did  not  re- 
gard them  as  such. 

Meanwhile,  the  Diplomatic  Body  at  Peking  held  a  meet- 
ing to  consider  the  three  German  questions,  and  the  follow- 
ing answers  were  unanimously  ^  adopted : 

1.  As  far  as  it  goes  the  list  is  a  correct  one,  though  the 
names  of  Tung  Fu-hsiang  and  Yu  Hsien  should  be  inserted. 

2.  The  penalties  imposed  are  not  sufficiently  severe. 

3.  It  is  advisable  that  the  punishments  be  carried  out  in 
Peking  in  the  presence  of  the  military  or  civil  foreign  rep- 
resentatives.® 

September  27th,  Count  Lamsdorff  gave  the  definite  reply 
of  Russia  to  the  German  note.  As  regards  the  first  two 
points,  these  Russia  "accepted  in  principle",  but  the  ^'modus 
procedendi,  as  traced  in  the  German  Circular,  presented, 
however,  certain  difficulties  ".  Lamsdorff  did  not  believe 
that  China  would  hand  over  the  principal  offenders  to  the 
Powers  for  punishment,  "  since  the  guilty  persons  would 
probably  be  found  to  be  in  the  entourage  of  the  Emperor 

1  China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  60  and  Inc.  i  in  no.  60. 

'The  Russian  Minister  was  not  present,  as  at  this  time  the  Russian 
Legation  staff  was  sojourning  at  Tientsin.  Germany  and  Austria  were 
represented  by  their  Charge  d' Affaires. 

'  Ibid.,  no.  35. 


595]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 83 

and  Dowager  Empress  ".  /\nd  so,  ''  as  their  surrender 
would  almost  certainly  be  refused,  the  negotiations  would 
be  indefinitely  postponed  ".  As  the  best  way  out  of  the 
difficulty,  in  the  opinion  of  Count  Lamsdorff : 

The  punishment  of  the  leaders  of  the  movement  should,  during 
the  course  of  the  negotiations,  be  demanded  from  the  Chinese 
Plenipotentiaries  as  one  of  the  guarantees  to  be  exacted  from 
the  Emperor  of  China  as  security  against  any  further  repetition 
of  the  attacks  on  the  representatives  of  foreign  Powers,  and 
upon  the  lives  and  property  of  foreigners  in  China. 

Lamsdorff  further  remarked : 

Apart  from  the  anomaly  of  asking  China  to  hand  over  its  sub- 
jects to  the  foreign  Powers  for  punishment  .  .  .  their  punish- 
ment by  the  central  Imperial  authority  would  have  a  far  greater 
effect  throughout  the  whole  of  the  Chinese  Empire  than  the 
infliction  by  the  Allied  Powers  of  just  retribution  upon  the 
guilty — a  task  which,  to  the  Russian  Government  at  least, 
would  be  extremely  distasteful. 

The  British  Ambassador,  Mr.  C.  Hardinge,  then  ventured 
to  suggest  to  Lamsdorff  that,  ''  for  all  practical  purposes, 
the  views  of  the  Russian  Government  coincided  with  those 
of  the  United  States  ".  This  drew  from  the  Count  the  re- 
ply that,  "  the  Russian  Government  had  by  no  means  re- 
jected the  German  proposal,  nor  had  replied  to  it  in  such 
categorical  terms  as  those  in  which  the  American  reply  had 
been  couched  ".^ 

Germany,  however,  had  at  least  succeeded  in  starting  the 
negotiations,  which  was  accomplishing  not  a  little;  but 
now  the  German  note  was  overshadowed  in  importance  by 
the  French  proposals.  These  were  more  inclusive  and  to 
the  point  than  the  single  proposition  advanced  by  Germany. 

^  China  No.  5  {190 1),  no.  22. 


184  I^HE  BOXER  REBELLION  [^96 

The  suggestions  of  France  as  a  basis  for  negotiations  read 
as  follows : 

1.  Punishment  of  the  principal  culprits,  to  be  designated  by 
the  representatives  of  the  Powers  at  Peking. 

2.  Maintenance  of  the  prohibition  of  import  of  arms. 

3.  Equitable  indemnities  for  States,  Societies,  and  in- 
dividuals. :        ' 

4.  Establishment  of  a  permanent  Legation  guard  at  Peking. 

5.  Dismantlement  of  the  Forts  at  Taku. 

6.  Military  occupation  of  two  or  three  points  on  the  road 
from  Tientsin  to  Taku,  which  would  thus  be  always  open  in  the 
event  of  the  Legations  wishing  to  reach  the  sea,  or  for  forces 
coming  from  the  sea  with  the  object  of  proceeding  to  the 
capital.^ 

The  simplest  way  of  discussing  these  French  proposals 
would  be  to  run  them  through  to  their  acceptance  by  the 
'Powers  ^  and  China,  and  then  to  take  them  up  in  detail, 

^  China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  11  and  Trans.;  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  p.  322. 

'  Notice  the  following  version  of  the  French  note  as  desired  by  the 
Russian  Government,  given  by  the  Russian  Embassy  at  Washington, 
September  21   (October  4)  to  Secretary  Hay: 

"  In  the  opinion  of  the  Imperial  Government,  as  well  as  of  the 
Government  of  the  French  Republic,  the  programme  upon  which  the 
several  Cabinets  may  succeed  in  reaching  an  accord  should  comprise : 

"First.  The  punishment  of  the  principal  authors  or  instigators  of 
the  outrages  committed  in  China,  and  notably  of  Prince  Tuan,  the 
dignitaries  Tung  Fu-hsiang,  Kang  Yi,  Li  Ping-heng,  and  the  Governor 
of  Shansi,  Yu  Hsien. 

"  Second.  The  continued  interdiction  of  the  importation  of  arms 
into  China. 

"  Third.  The  granting  to  the  Governments,  corporations,  and  private 
individuals  of  all  indemnities,  the  adjustment  of  which,  in  the  event 
of  protracted  divergence,  might  be  confided  to  the  International  Peace 
Bureau  at  The  Hague. 

"  Fourth.  Guarantees  for  the  future,  as  to  which  it  would  be  per- 
missible to  consult  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  Powers  in 
China.  My  French  colleague  has  doubtless  specified  in  the  note  he  has 
addressed  to  you  what  these  guarantees  might  be." 

M.  de  Wollant  to  Secretary  Hay,  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  pp.  381,  382. 


597]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  185 

along  with  the  suggestions  and  propositions  from  other 
nations. 

Said  the  United  States,  October  loth: 

The  President  is  glad  to  perceive  in  the  bases  of  negotiations 
put  forward  in  the  memorandum  of  October  4  the  spirit  that 
has  animated  the  declaration  heretofore  made  by  all  the  Powers 
interested,  and  would  be  pleased  to  see  the  negotiations  begun 
immediately  upon  the  usual  verification  of  credentials. 

Regarding  clause  i,  comment  was  made:  "The  Chi- 
nese Government  has  already  indicated  its  intention  to  pun- 
ish a  number  of  those  responsible  for  the  recent  disorders.^ 
The  representatives  of  the  Powers  at  Peking  may  suggest 
additions  to  that  list  when  negotiations  are  entered  upon  ". 
As  regards  clause  2:  "  It  is  not  understood  (by  the  Depart- 
ment of  State)  that  this  interdiction  (against  the  importa- 
tion of  arms)  is  to  be  permanent,  and  the  duration  of  it  and 
the  details  of  its  regulation  seem  a  proper  subject  of  dis- 
cussion by  the  negotiators  ".     As  regards  clause  3  : 

This  (equitable  indemnity)  is  an  object  desired  by  all  the 
Powers.  The  Russian  Government  has  suggested  that  in  case 
of  protracted  divergence  of  views,  the  matter  might  be  com- 
mended to  the  consideration  of  the  International  Court  of 
Arbitration  of  the  Hague.  The  President  thinks  this  sugges- 
tion worthy  the  attention  of  the  Powers. 

As  regards  clause  4  (Legation  guards)  :  "  The  Government 
of  the  United  States  is  unable  to  make  a  permanent  engage- 
ment of  this  nature  without  the  authorization  of  the  legis- 
lative branch,^  but  in  the  present  emergency  we  have  sta- 
tioned in  Peking  an  adequate  Legation  guard  ".    As  regards 

*  Referring  here  to  the  Imperial  Edict  of  September  25. 
'^This  would  be  an  act  of  a  military  nature  requiring  the  consent 
of  Congress.  '^ 


1 86  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [598 

clause  5  (dismantling  the  Taku  Forts)  :  "  The  President 
reserves  the  expression  of  his  opinion  as  to  this  measure, 
pending  the  receipt  of  further  information  in  regard  to  the 
situation  in  China  "/  As  regards  clause  6  (on  military 
occupation  of  points  between  Tientsin  and  Peking)  :  The 
same  observation  here  as  in  clause  4,  i.  e.,  the  President  ''is 
unable  to  commit  the  United  States  to  a  permanent  partici- 
pation in  such  occupation  'V  although  it  was  thought  de- 
sirable that  "  the  Powers  shall  obtain  from  the  Chinese 
Government  the  assurance  of  their  right  to  guard  their 
Legations  in  Peking  and  to  have  the  means  of  unrestricted 
access  to  them  whenever  required  ". 

It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  all  of  the  above  was  only  a 
detailed  criticism  of  the  French  note  and  not  a  condemna- 
tion. In  fact,  Secretary  Hay  expressed  the  hope  that  "  the 
Government  of  France  and  the  other  Powers  will  see  in  the 
reserves  we  have  made  here  no  obstacle  to  the  initiation  of 
negotiations  on  the  lines  suggested  ".^  A  week  later  the 
French  Government  announced  at  Washington  that  it 
"  highly  appreciated  "  the  attitude  of  the  Department  of 
State,  and  Secretary  Hay  replied  that  he  was  '*  gratified  to 
learn  that  all  the  interested  Powers  have  adhered  to  the  es- 
sential principle  of  the  French  note  of  October  4th  ".  He 
trusted  that  the  reservations  made  by  the  United  States 
and  other  nations  would  "  prove  no  embarrassment  to  the 
progress  of  the  negotiations,  in  the  course  of  which  they 

^The  answer  of  the  Department  of  State  to  this  clause  remained  un- 
favorable during  the  entire  negotiations.  This  was  because  the  Powers 
later  stood  for  the  destruction  of  the  Taku  Forts,  while  the  United 
States  only  desired  their  dismantlement.  In  art.  viii  of  the  Final 
Protocol  it  was  agreed  that  these  famous  forts  were  to  be  razed. 

2  Again  the  desire  of  the  United  States,  as  with  Minister  Reed  in 
1858  and  Admiral  Kempff  at  Taku,  to  avoid  all  entanglements  or  tem- 
porary alliances  of  a  military  nature  with  Europe. 

'  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  322,  323 ;  Chhta  No.  5  (1901),  Inc.  in  no.  100. 


599]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  ig^ 

can  be  frankly  discussed  with  a  view  to  a  common  agree- 
ment "/  These  various  reservations  had,  of  course,  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  acceptance  by  all  concerned  of  the  French 
note  as  the  basis  of  negotiations.  However,  M.  Delcasse  did 
not  count  upon  unqualified  adherence  by  the  Powers.  The 
most  he  hoped  for  was  their  assent  in  general.^  Delcasse's 
sole  purpose  was  to  embody  the  "  collective  ideas  of  the 
Powers  in  a  compendious  form  ".  In  doing  so,  he  had  "  no 
wish  to  push  his  country  into  the  foremost  place  ",^  nor  had 
he  "  any  unavowed  objects  to  serve  ".  But  he  "  dreaded 
the  mischief  that  might  be  caused  by  allowing  events  to 
drag  on  ",  and  therefore  he  was  of  the  opinion  that  "  expe- 
dition should  be  used  in  defining  the  objects  and  methods 
upon  which  the  Powers  interested  might  agree  ".*  Del- 
casse's efforts  deserved  and  received  the  hearty  commenda- 
tion and  support  of  Europe  and  America. 

Great  Britain  agreed  likewise,  excepting  the  last  point. 
Lord  Salisbury  was  of  the  opinion,  regarding  the  road  from 
Peking  to  Taku  being  held  by  an  international  force,  that 
it  was  "  safer  and  more  effective  that  each  Power  that 
wished  should  hold  a  fort  of  its  own,  which  should  be  within 
reach  of  the  sea  so  far  as  practicable  ".^     The  Russian  views 

^  U.  S.  For.  Rel.,  1900,  pp.  2,2^,  324. 

'  Sir  E.  Monson  to  Lord  Salisbury,  Paris,  Oct.  10,  China  No.  5  {1901), 
no.  z6. 

^  Neither  had  Germany  for  that  matter,  although  Germany's  griev- 
ances were  aggravated  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  others  by  the  murder 
of  Minister  von  Ketteler.  American  and  British  policies  were  also 
unselfish,  but  with  Russia  there  is  more  doubt,  as  Russia  almost  always 
had  either  ulterior  motives  in  view  or  an  eye  to  future  developments 
favorable  to  the  Russian  Government.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
at  this  period  the  Government  at  St.  Petersburg  was  assiduously  culti- 
vating the  friendship  of  China  in  order  to  cloak  Russian  territorial 
ambitions. 

*  China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  42. 

5  Ibid.,  no.  43. 


1 88  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [6oo 

were  identical  with  the  British,  also  as  regarded  the  single 
British  objection.  Furthermore,  Russia  "  had  always  con- 
sidered that  each  Power  should  have  its  own  guard  for  its 
Legation  "/  Italy  accepted,  "  subject  to  such  modifications 
as  may  be  rendered  necessary  by  the  unforeseen  in  the  de- 
velopment of  negotiations  with  China  ".^  Japan  expressed 
"  general  agreement,  observing,  however,  that  in  a  perma- 
nent prohibition  of  arms  (clause  2)  China  might  find  a  dif- 
ficulty as  regards  the  fulfilment  of  her  treaty  obligations  to 
protect  foreigners  and  maintain  order,^  or  at  least  an  ex- 
cuse for  her  failure  to  do  so  ".  Further,  Japan  considered 
"  impracticable  the  organization  of  an  international  guard",, 
but  would  agree  to  separate  guards  ".* 

1  China  No.  i  (igoi),  no.  90.  ^  Ibid.,  no.  55. 

'  A  very  good  point.  It  must  be  remembered  that,  because  of  the 
Boxer  movement,  not  a  single  Power  believed  in  China's  immediate 
regeneration,  although  this  actually  happened.  Therefore  the  possibil- 
ity of  the  Chinese  military  patterning  entirely  after  Yuan  Shih-kai's 
foreign-drilled  and  equipped  troops  was  incomprehensible  to  Europe 
at  this  time.  Also,  Japan's  idea  for  only  a  temporary  prohibition  of 
arms  was  not  an  altruistic  one  regarding  China  but  merely  to  afford 
greater  security  to  foreigners. 

*  China  No.  5  (jpoi),  no.  60. 

Mr.  Whitehead  reported  to  Lord  Salisbury  from  Tokyo,  October  5, 
that,  in  an  interview  with  Viscount  Aoki,  the  Japanese  statesman  in- 
formed him:  "Japan  would  demur  to  the  second  point  in  the  French 
proposals,  viz.,  the  maintenance  of  the  prohibition  to  import  arms  and 
ammunition,  because  such  prohibition,  if  effective,  would  deprive  the 
Chinese  authorities  of  the  means  of  maintaining  order. 

Mr.  Whitehead  continued :  "  His  Excellency  added,  however,  that 
he  did  not  think  the  prohibition  was  likely  to  be  effective,  because  it 
would  be  impossible  to  prevent  the  Chinese  Government  from  engag- 
ing foreign  instructors  and  manufacturing  what  they  required  in  the 
interior  of  the  country.  Viscount  Aoki  stated  further  that  he  agreed 
to  the  proposal  to  destroy  the  Forts  at  Taku.  As  regards  the  organi- 
zation of  a  guard  for  the  Legations  at  Peking,  he  thought  that  if  this 
meant  a  body  of  troops  recruited  from  different  nationalities,  the  idea 
was  impracticable,  but  that  there  would  be  no  objection  if  it  meant  that 
each  Legation  was  to  have  its  own  guard."    China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  196. 


6oi]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  jgg 

The  Powers  having  agreed  to  accept  the  French  pro- 
posals ^  as  bases  for  negotiations,  they  were  next  taken  up 
by  the  Diplomatic  Body  at  Peking,  by  whom  they  were 
finally  to  be  presented  to  the  Qiinese  Plenipotentiaries.  A 
meeting  of  the  foreign  representatives  was  called,  October 
loth,  by  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  at  which  the  Russian  Min- 
ister was  absent,  still  at  Tientsin,  while  the  Austrian  and 
Netherlands  Legations  were  unrepresented. 

The  French  proposals  were  threshed  out  in  a  very  satis- 
factory manner.  Regarding  punishments  of  the  "  princi- 
ple offenders  designated  by  the  representatives  of  the 
Powers  ",  it  was  suggested  that  the  condemnations  "should 
include  all  officials  who  took  an  active  part,  in  country  dis- 
tricts, and  in  abetting  massacres;  the  foreign  representa- 
tives to  ascertain  their  names  subsequently  ".  Still  more 
important  was  the  proposal  that  "  there  should  be  no  offi- 
cial examinations  held  during  five  years  in  districts  and 
towns  where  foreigners  had  suffered  maltreatment  ".  This 
in  itself  was  felt  to  afford  an  effective  check  on  the  disaf- 
fected localities  against  further  outbreaks,  as  it  would  strike 
at  the  root  of  the  entire  Chinese  system  and  public  life. 

At  the  meeting  of  October  i6th,  after  some  discussion, 
the  diplomats  reached  the  following  unanimous  agreement : 

The  penalty  to  be  demanded  in  the  case  of  the  persons  guilty 
of  directing  the  attacks  on  the  Legations  and  the  massacre  of 
foreigners  ^  in  the  interior  ought  to  be  capital  punishment,^'  and 

*  On  the  introduction  and  acceptance  of  the  French  proposals,  see 
China  No.  5  (1901),  nos.  11,  17,  3<5,  42-45,  55,  60,  66,  67,  70,  71,  73,  81, 
83,  84,  86,  90,  94,  99,  100,  104,  109,  117,  154-156,  196. 

'At  the  meeting  on  October  31  it  was  decided  to  add  to  the  above 
the  words  "  or  have  suffered  cruel  treatment "  after  the  phrase  "  mas- 
sacre of  foreigners." 

'  The  italics  are  the  author's.  This  question  of  capital  punishment 
later  caused  a  prolonged  correspondence  among  the  Powers. 


190  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [5o2 

that  the  list  should  include,  besides  the  Princes  and  officials 
mentioned  in  the  Imperial  edict/  the  names  of  Tung  Fu-hsiang 
and  Yu  Hsien  ^  ...  To  these  we  considered  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  add  the  names  of  the  officials  responsible  for  the  murder 
and  cruel  treatment  of  foreigners  at  Paotingfu,  in  this  pro- 
vince (Chihli),  and  Chuchow,  in  the  province  of  Chekiang, 
which  are  gradually  being  ascertained,  as  well  as  others  equally 
guilty  that  may  be  authentically  reported  to  us. 

At  the  meeting  of  October  31st,  Minister  Conger  of  the 
United  States  pointed  out  to  the  Diplomatic  Body : 

Although  protection  was  promised  by  the  treaties  to  foreigners 
residing  in  China,  innumerable  cases  had  occurred  in  recent 
years  of  attacks  against  their  lives  and  property,  for  which 
no  adequate  reparation  had  been  obtained.  When  the  dis- 
missal of  officials,  who,  by  connivance  or  apathy,  had  favored 
such  attacks,  had  been  obtained,  they  had  usually  been  trans- 
ferred elsewhere,  and  even  promoted. 

Therefore  Conger  proposed  as  addition  to  base  no.  i  the 
following  clause : 

As  a  further  guarantee  against  future  trouble,  an  Imperial  edict 
shall  be  issued  and  published  everywhere  in  the  Empire,  mak- 

^  Edict  of  September  25. 

^  Sir  Qaude  MacDonald :  "  The  former  of  these  is  the  General  re- 
sponsible for  the  continuance  of  the  bombardment  of  the  Legations 
at  the  same  time  that  assurances  were  being  communicated  to  your 
Lordship  (Salisbury),  and  to  the  Governments  of  the  other  Powers, 
that  the  Chinese  Government  continued  to  protect  the  foreign  Minis- 
ters. The  latter  is  the  notorious  Governor  of  Shansi,  who  is  reported 
to  have  boasted  to  the  Chinese  Government  that  he  had  caused  fifty- 
one  foreigners  to  be  killed  in  his  Yamen  at  Tai  Yuan-fu."  Resent- 
ment against  Yu  Hsien  was  particularly  bitter  because  of  the  public 
beheading  of  many  of  his  victims  in  this  instance  cited  by  MacDonald. 

Sir  E.  Satow  had  succeeded  MacDonald  at  the  time  this  dispatch 
was  forwarded  (November  8),  but  he  reported  it,  as  he  said,  almost 
literally  in  words  of  the  former  Minister. 


I 


603]  'THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  191 

ing  all  Viceroys,  provincial  and  local  officials  responsible  for 
order  in  their  respective  jurisdictions,  and,  whenever  anti- 
foreign  disturbances  or  any  infractions  of  treaty  occur  therein, 
they,  the  said  officials,  shall  be  immediately  removed,  and  for- 
ever prohibited  from  holding  any  office  or  honor. 

This  clause  was  accepted  by  the  Diplomatic  Body/ 

Regarding  base  no.  2 :  It  has  already  been  mentioned 
that  the  foreign  representatives  had  decided  it  to  be  "  very 
necessary  to  prohibit  the  importation  of  arms  ".  In  addi- 
tion it  was  unanimously  agreed  to  refer  to  their  respective 
governments  ''  to  determine  subsequently  the  duration  of 
the  prohibition,  as  we  (the  Ministers)  conceived  that  it  is 
intended  to  prevent  the  importation  of  ammunition  and  any 
substances  exclusively  intended  for  use  in  its  manufacture". 
Regarding  base  no.  3 :  The  conclusion  reached  was  that 
the  Powers  "  should  come  to  a  preliminary  agreement  as  to 
the  extent  of  indemnities  ",  which  should  include  compen- 
sation to  friendly  and  Christian  Chinese  "  who  have  lost  by 
their  connection  with  foreigners  ".^  As  to  the  manner  of 
payment  and  the  necessary  guarantees,  it  was  suggested  that 
"  an  institution  might  be  created  in  the  nature  of  a  Caisse 
de  la  Dette  " ,  although  this  need  not  include  all  revenues. 

The  idea  of  the  indemnity  claims  "  to  be  investigated  by 
a  commission  composed  of  Consuls  of  each  nation  con- 
cerned "  did  not  appeal  to  Minister  MacDonald,  who  sug- 
gested instead  that  the  claims  "  should  be  entrusted  to  a 
commission  of  persons  not  resident  in  China  to  be  sent  out 

*  Later  amended  by  inserting  "  which  are  not  forthwith  suppressed 
and  the  guilty  persons  punished  "  after  "  occur  therein." 

"^ "  It  seemed  obviously  right  to  demand  compensation  in  the  case  of 
Chinese  writers  and  servants  in  the  employ  of  the  Legations,  foreign 
residents  of  Peking,  or  it  may  be  elsewhere,  who  have  suffered,  as  also 
for  those  refugees  whose  labor  on  the  defences  of  the  Legation  so 
greatly  contributed  to  rendering  resistance  effectual  against  the  attacks 
of  the  besiegers." 


192  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [604 

from  neutral  countries,  such  as  Switzerland,  Denmark,  and 
Sweden  ".  Such  a  commission  would,  of  course,  work  far 
better.  The  British  Minister  evidently  was  of  the  opinion 
that  the  various  Consuls  would  be  too  biased  in  their  indi- 
vidual governmental  perspectives.  It  was  then  mentioned 
by  Conger  that  the  United  States  had  received  a  proposal 
from  Russia  to  send  these  claims  to  the  Hague  Tribunal, 
and  this  was  received  with  favor. 

Regarding  base  no.  4,  for  permanent  Legation  guards : 
It  was  suggested  that  "  a  defensible  Legation  quarter  would 
be  a  useful  addition  ".  The  formula  finally  adopted  by 
unanimous  vote  was  the  "  right  of  each  Power  to  maintain 
for  its  Legation  a  permanent  guard,  and  of  putting  the 
Legation  in  a  defensible  position,  while  the  right  of  resi- 
dence therein  would  not  be  accorded  to  Chinese ''.  It  will 
be  noticed  that  the  Diplomatic  Body  placed  itself  on  record 
in  favor  of  separate  Legation  guards. 

As  regards  base  no.  5  :  Several  of  the  diplomats  were  of 
the  opinion  that  the  expression  "  Taku  Forts  "  should  as 
well  include  others,  as  from  Taku  to  Tientsin,  and  from 
Tientsin  to  Peitang  (halfway  to  Peking).  This  would 
make  secure  the  entire  route  of  communication  from  the 
coast  to  the  capital.  The  formula  was  accordingly  amended 
to  include  the  whole  distance. 

In  regard  to  keeping  the  route  from  Taku  to  Peking  open, 
etc. :  the  Diplomatic  Body  observed : 

Taku  is  inaccessible  from  the  sea  during  at  least  the  three 
months  of  December,  January  and  February,  and  that  the  only 
practicable  landing-places  at  that  season  are  Chinwangtao  and 
Shanhaikwan.  Also  that  as  the  distance  from  Peking  to  Taku 
is  107  miles,  and  of  Shanhaikwan  153  miles  more,  fortified 
posts  in  the  vicinity  of  these  two  places  would  not  help  us  much. 

Therefore  the  British  Minister  offered  this  opinion,  given 
to  him  "  by  a  high  military  authority  *' : 


6o5]  ^^^  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 93 

The  establishment  of  a  garrison  at  Tientsin  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  some  principal  railway  station  from  Peking  to  Shan- 
haikwan  for  some  months  to  come  would  probably  meet  the 
case.  ...  In  order,  therefore,  to  have  these  points  entirely 
free  to  be  determined  hereafter  by  the  Governments,  the  follow- 
ing alteration  was  suggested:  The  Powers  may  arrange  be- 
tween themselves  for  the  military  occupation  of  certain  points 
for  the  maintenance  of  communication  between  the  capital 
and  the  sea. 

This  suggestion  of  Sir  E.  Satow  ^  met  with  unanimous  ap- 
proval. 

So  much  for  the  criticism,  extension  and  final  adoption 
of  the  French  proposals  by  the  foreign  representatives  at 
Peking.  It  developed,  however,  that  the  Diplomatic  Body 
had  certain  ideas  distinctly  its  own,  as  follows : 

Base  no.  7 :  It  should  be  agreed  by  the  Chinese  Government 
to  post  for  two  years  in  every  district  an  Imperial  Edict,  pro- 
hibiting, under  pain  of  death,  any  membership  of  "  Boxer  " 
Societies,  and  stating  what  punishments  had  been  inflicted,  in- 
cluding the  suspension  of  examinations  suggested  above. 

Base  no.  8:  A  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  should  be  ap- 
pointed, and  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  abolished. 

Base  no.  9:  Relations  with  the  Court  on  a  sensible  basis 
should  be  established. 

The  seventh  proposal  was  agreed  to  without  a  dissenting 
voice.  Sir  E.  Satow  reported  that,  at  the  meeting  of  Oc- 
tober 31st,  some  of  the  diplomats  were  under  the  impres- 
sion that  a  proclamation  of  religious  liberty  had  been  incor- 
porated, but  Satow,  in  looking  through  MacDonald's  notes, 
happily  found  no  such  suggestion.    Therefore  the  religious 

^  Sir  E.  Satow  succeeded  Sir  C.  MacDonald,  October  25,  as  British 
Minister,  and  himself  directed  the  British  policy  on  Oct.  26,  28,  31, 
Nov.  5,  while  MacDonald  was  present  Oct.  10  and  17. 


I 


194  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [606 

idea  was  not  adopted,  as  the  diplomats  wisely  resolved  to 
steer  clear  of  the  missionary  question  and  its  many  unnec- 
essary complications. 

The  eighth  and  ninth  proposals,  originally  offered  by  M. 
Salvago  Raggi,  the  Italian  Minister,  were  "  generally  ac- 
cepted in  principle  ".  There  was  some  doubt,  however,  as 
to  whether  these  two  provisions  should  be  inserted  "  in  the 
note  which  we  are  to  present  in  the  name  of  our  Govern- 
ments ".  Austria-Hungary,  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Italy 
and  the  United  States  voted  for  the  inclusion,  while  France, 
Japan  and  Russia  voted  contra.  Belgium  and  Spain  did 
not  vote,  preferring  to  recommend  their  Governments  to 
adopt  the  view  which  would  ultimately  be  taken  by  the  ma- 
jority of  the  Powers. 

At  the  meeting  of  November  5th,  A.  von  Mumm,  the 
German  Minister,  came  forward  with  the  following  addi- 
tional article: 

The  dispatch  of  a  special  mission  to  Berlin,  headed  by  an 
Imperial  Prince,  in  order  to  express  the  regret  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  and  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment with  respect  to  the  murder  of  Baron  von  Ketteler. 

On  the  spot  where  the  murder  was  committed  the  erection 
of  a  monument  to  the  memory  of  the  deceased  Minister,  appro- 
priate to  his  rank,  and  bearing  an  inscription  in  Latin,  German 
and  Chinese  expressing  the  regret  of  the  Emperor  of  China 
for  the  murder  committed. 

There  was  no'  discussion  over  the  German  addition  and 
it  was  accepted  unanimously. 

However,  this  proposed  monument  to  von  Ketteler  led 
the  Japanese  Minister  to  make  a  similar  addition  to  com- 
memorate the  Japanese  Chancellor,  Mr.  Sugiyama,  who 
also  lost  his  life  during  the  siege.  It  was  agreed  that  the 
Diplomatic  Body  would  support  his  request  in  similar 
fashion. 


6o7]  T^HE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  I95 

Next,  Sir  E.  Satow  was  of  the  opinion  that  an  article 
should  be  inserted  ''  which  would  entitle  the  Powers  to  ob- 
tian  a  satisfactory  revision  of  the  existing  treaties  of  com- 
merce and  navigation,  and  a  settlement  of  various  pending 
questions  of  importance  to  commercial  interests  "/  The 
Russian  Minister  was  of  the  belief  that  commercial  ques- 
tions did  not  enter  into  these  negotiations.  Satow  replied 
that  the  Rebellion  had  resulted  in  ''  the  destruction  of  the 
foreign  settlements  at  Tientsin  and  to  the  complete  sever- 
ance of  all  foreign  commercial  relations  with  every  part 
of  the  country  ".  On  putting  the  article  to  vote,  the  Min- 
isters of  Austria-Hungary,  Belgium,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan, 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  were  in  favor  of  it.  The 
Russian  Minister  maintained  his  objection,  and  was  sup- 
ported by  the  French  Secretary  of  Legation,  acting  in  the 
absence  of  the  French  Minister. 

On  October  loth,  the  Italian  Minister,  recurring  to  base 
no.  3,  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that,  as  China's  "  existing  Cus- 
toms revenue  is  almost  entirely  absorbed  by  the  service  of 
existing  foreign  loans  ",  therefore,  "  in  order  to  provide  for 
the  indemnities  which  China  will  be  called  upon  to  Govern- 
ments and  subjects  ",  it  would  be  necessary  that  "  other 
sources  of  income  will  have  to  be  appropriated  ".  To  meet 
this  difficulty  he  proposed : 

China  will  take  financial  measures  on  the  lines  which  will  be 
indicated  by  the  Plenipotentiaries  in  order  to  guarantee  the 
payment  of  the  indemnities  and  the  service  of  the  loan. 

The  Russian  Minister  thought  that  this  clause  was  un- 
necessary, "  considering  that  the  Plenipotentiaries  would 
concert  among  themselves  the  means  of  insuring  the  pay- 

*  This  clause  explains  why  so  many  commercial  treaties  were  entered 
into  by  China  and  other  countries  in  the  years  immediately  following 
the  adoption  of  the  Boxer  Peace  Protocol. 


196  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [608 

ment  of  the  indemnities  when  fixed  ".  The  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment "  reserved  "  by  its  Minister's  action  ''  the  expres- 
sion of  an  opinion  on  this  point ".  All  the  rest  recom- 
mended M.  Raggi's  proposal  to  their  respective  Foreign 
Offices  as  desirable  of  adoption.^ 
|\  This  ended  the  discussions  of  and  additions  to  the  French 
\\  proposals  by  the  Diplomatic  Body.^  Lastly,  a  committee 
was  appointed,  consisting  of  the  Ministers  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Italy  and  the  Secretary  of  the  French  Legation,  to 
draft  a  preamble  to  this  Joint  Note  which  should  recount 
China's  violations  of  international  law  and  their  results.^ 

However,  it  soon  developed  that  there  was  great  differ- 
ence of  opinion  among  the  Powers  as  to  several  provisions 
of  this  Joint  Note  to  the  Chinese  Government.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  as  yet  China  had  not  been  consulted  in 
the  matter.  All  discussions  had  been  among  the  various 
foreign  governments  and  among  their  representatives  at 
Peking.  It  had  been  felt  in  the  beginning  by  the  Diplomatic 
Body  that  this  Joint  Note  should  be  a  sort  of  "  ultimatum  " 
with  "  irrevocable  conditions ",  which  China  should  be 
forced  to  accept  unconditionally  and  without  reserve.  With 
such  object  in  view,  it  was  fortunately  seen  in  time  that 
some  of  the  provisions  were  entirely  too  severe,  in  particu- 
lar as  regarded  the  "  irrevocable  "  nature  of  the  Note  and 
the  punishment  of  the  Boxer  leaders.     The  punishment 

*  Later,  the  proposal  of  the  Italian  Minister  was  amended,  and  "finan- 
cial measures  acceptable  to  the  Powers"  was  substituted  for  "on  the 
lines  which  the  Powers  will  indicate." 

This  made  a  unanimous  agreement  among  the  Ministers  as  to  the 
entire  proposals  and  additions.  See  China  No.  5  (iQOi),  no.  i73- 
See  also  no.  117. 

2  The  meeting  of  the  Diplomatic  Body  for  the  above  discussions  and 
proceedings  relative  to  the  French  bases  for  negotiations  are  re- 
ported in  ibid.,  nos.  107  and  255. 

3  For  the  text  of  the  Joint  Note  see  Appendix  I,  reprinted  from 
China  No.  5  {1901),  no.  188. 


609]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  1 97 

clause  especially  was  overdrawn,  the  diplomats  in  their  zeal 
having  condemned  princes  of  the  blood  to  death  for  com- 
plicity in  the  Rebellion  when  calm  reflection  should  have 
convinced  them  that  China  never  would  have  agreed  to  so 
drastic  a  retribution  for  members  of  the  royal  family.  In 
general  the  tone  of  the  Joint  Note  was  too  harsh,  and  after 
the  various  provisions  had  circulated  among  the  Powers  for 
a  few  months,  this  was  clearly  seen  to  be  the  case.  Modifi- 
cations urgently  needed  were  fortunately  agreed  upon, 
helped  and  encouraged,  of  course,  by  hints  from  and  dis- 
cussions with  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries. 

Germany  was  strongly  opposed  to  referring  any  of  the 
questions  involved  to  the  Hague  Tribunal  for  settlement. 
The  United  States  objected  to  "  irrevocable "  conditions 
and  instructed  Minister  Conger  to  that  effect.  The  two 
great  Yangtse  Viceroys,  of  Nanking  and  Hankow,  firm 
friends  of  the  Powers  during  the  darkest  days  of  the  Re- 
bellion, pointed  out  that  the  death  sentence  for  members  of 
the  Imperial  family  should  be  commuted  to  perpetual  ban- 
ishment, which  was  punishment  enough.  Commissioners 
Li  Hung-chang  and  Prince  Ching  were  not  at  all  disposed 
to  agree  to  articles  no.  6  and  1 1  of  the  Joint  Note  relating 
to  indemnities  and  the  amendment  of  the  existing  commer- 
cial treaties.  Because  of  their  objection  to  these  two  clauses 
the  United  States  proposed  to  refer  the  articles  to  a  con- 
ference at  Washington.  This  idea  found  no  favor  with 
Germany,  who  preferred,  instead,  a  commission  of  financial 
and  commercial  experts  to  meet  at  Peking.  Japan  agreed 
with  Germany  on  this  point,  and  because  of  this  opposition 
the  United   States  withdrew  its  proposal.^     Austria  was 

1  Marquis  of  Lansdowne  to  Sir  E.  Satow  (Circular),  Jan.  11,  1901 : 
"  I  am  informed  by  the  United  States'  Ambassador  that  the  President 
withdraws  his  proposal  for  a  conference  to  deal  with  points  6  and  11 
of  the  peace  conditions,  owing  to  the  decided  opposition  of  the  German 
and  Japanese  Governments."  China  No,  6  (1901,  no.  27).  For  the 
Japanese  objections,  see  ibid.,  no.  28. 


198  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [610 

loath  to  see  the  death  penalty  of  all  the  Boxer  leaders  dis- 
pensed with,  while  Russia  was  of  the  opinion  that,  in  refer- 
ence to  this,  the  proposed  phrase  la  peine  de  plus  severe 
might  be  construed  to  mean  death  after  all,  a  construction 
the  connections  of  which  it  is  a  little  difficult  to  see.  Ger- 
many, of  course,  because  of  the  murder  of  von  Ketteler, 
wanted  the  existing  phrase  la  peine  de  mort  to  stand  with- 
out change.  France,  like  the  United  States,  "  never  liked  " 
the  word  *' irrevocable ",  while  Great  Britain  desired  it. 
It  was  finally  agreed  that  the  word  "  irrevocable  "  as  to  the 
contents  of  the  Joint  Note  should  be  withdrawn,  only  to  be 
replaced  afterwards,  while  the  phrase  la  peine  de  mort 
should  be  changed  to  la  peine  de  plus  severe. 

On  December  19,  1900,  the  Joint  Note  was  signed  by  all 
the  foreign  Ministers  at  Peking,  with  the  exception  of  Mr. 
Conger,  who  misread  the  instructions  from  Washington 
regarding  ^'  irrevocable  ",  but  who  signed  later. 

So  much  for  the  Joint  Note,^  as  far  as  its  composition 
was  concerned.  Several  of  its  provisions  were  carried 
through  readily  enough  with  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries, 
but  with  others  there  was  much  difficulty,  as  was  to  be  ex- 
pected. From  the  first,  the  Powers  were  united  on  pre- 
senting the  Note  jointly,  and  solemnly  warned  the  Chinese 
commissioners  against  concluding  any  separate  agreements.^ 
The  understanding  as  to  the  prohibition  of  import  of  arms 
gave  trouble  until  it  was  decided  that  the  clause  should  be 
only  temporay  in  nature.     To  have  made  it  permanent 

*  On  the  Joint  Note,  see  China  No.  5  (1901),  nos.  69,  88,  137,  I53,  i77, 
188,  192-194,  198,  199,  201-206,  220,  224,  225,  227-229,  231-234,  236-244, 
258,  261,  265,  266;  China  No.  6  (1901),  nos.  2,  4,  7,  8,  10,  12,  18-28,  32, 
33,  37,  39,  47,  49,  5i,  54.  56,  63,  70-73,  82,  90,  91,  96,  98,  117,  U3,  US, 
178,  180,  185,  201,  234;  China  No.  i  (1902),  nos.  41,  114,  172;  U.  S. 
For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  235,  237,  238,  240-243,  246,  248. 

*  On  the  warnings  to  China  against  concluding  separate  agreements, 
see  China  No.  6  (1901),  nos.  79,  80,  loi,  106,  153,  164,  197,  202,  213. 


6 1 1  ]  THE  RESTORA  TION  OF  ORDER  1 99 

would  have  been  nonsensical,  an  utter  impossibility  in  the 
nature  of  things/ 

The  demands  for  punishment  and  the  indemnity  ques- 
tion caused  the  greatest  difficulties.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  the  decree  of  September  25th,  visiting  punishment 
upon  several  of  the  Boxer  leaders,  was  regarded  by  the 
Powers  as  inadequate  and  incomplete.  Therefore  a  new 
edict  appeared  on  November  13th,  which  was  more  strin- 
gent in  tone  than  the  preceding.  According  to  its  com- 
mands, Prince  Tuan  and  Prince  Chuan  were  to  be  deprived 
of  their  offices  and  rank  and  immured  for  life  at  Moukden. 
Prince  Yi  and  Secondary  Prince  Tsai  Yin  were  likewise 
to  suffer  life  imprisonment.  Secondary  Prince  Tsai  Lien 
was  to  be  deprived  of  his  hereditary  rank  and  confined  to 
his  house.  Duke  Tsai  Lan  was  to  be  degraded  one  step  in 
rank  and  was  to  lose  all  his  emoluments.  Kang  Yi  was 
dead,  therefore  penalty  was  waived  in  his  case.  Ying  Nien 
was  to  be  degraded,  likewise  Chao  Shu-chiao,  who  was  to 
lose  his  nominal  rank  but  was  to  remain  in  office.  Yu 
Hsien  was  to  be  banished  to  the  most  remote  frontier  and 
put  to  work  on  the  most  distant  military  post  road.  The 
punishment  of  Tung  Fu-hsiang,  "  on  account  of  his  being 
in  command  of  Imperial  troops  ",  was  to  be  reserved  for 
future  consideration.^ 

But  this  new  decree  gave  little  satisfaction  to  Europe, 

^  It  had  early  been  recognized  that  it  would  have  been  undesirable 
to  have  allowed  an  unrestricted  importation  of  arms  into  China  for 
some  period  after  the  Boxer  troubles.  Of  course  the  Powers  realized 
that  they  could  not  prevent  China  from  manufacturing  arms  and 
ammunition,  but  all  outside  supplies  were  to  be  cut  off  until  the  entire 
Empire  again  was  in  a  state  of  peaceful  intercourse  with  the  world. 

See  China  No.  i  (1901),  nos.  97,  115,  116,  129,  142,  186,  206,  345; 
China  No.  5  (iQOi),  nos.  73,  151;  China  No.  6  (iQoi),  no.  131;  China 
No.  I  {1902),  nos.  12,  145,  159,  210,  220. 

"^  China  No.  5  (/poj),  nos.  140,  142. 


200  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [612 

and  the  Diplomatic  Body  pronounced  it  ''  inadequate  and 
absurd  ".  Particularly  was  criticism  directed  against  the 
alleged  mild  sentences  of  Prince  Tuan,  the  arch-conspira- 
tor, and  the  infamous  Yu  Hsien,  Governor  of  Shansi, 
whose  acts  during  the  Rebellion  had  been  peculiarly  atro- 
cious. An  ultimatum  was  contemplated  by  the  represen- 
tatives at  Peking,  by  which  they  would  refuse  to  consider 
further  negotiations  until  the  death  sentence  had  been  pro- 
nounced against  all  the  Boxer  leaders,  including  Yu  Hsien 
and  Tung  Fu-hsiang.  Japan  was  strongly  opposed  to  this 
ultimatum  idea,  and  doubted  whether  China  would  sanction 
such  wholesale  penalties.  Further,  if  China  were  to  refuse, 
the  Powers  by  virtue  of  the  ultimatum  would  be  placed  in 
an  embarrassing  position.  Less  eager  than  Japan  for  these 
extreme  punishments  was  the  United  States,  in  fact,  had 
declared  so  throughout  the  negotiations.  Russia  was  also 
opposed,  to  extreme  punishment  and  to  the  ultimatum,  *'for 
how  was  such  a  demand  to  be  enforced?".  The  Triple 
Alliance  Ministers  were  in  favor  of  punishment  as  outlined, 
although  willing  to  compromise.  The  situation  was  some- 
what relieved  when  it  was  reported  that  Yu  Hsien  had 
committed  suicide  by  ''  swallowing  gold  ".^  But  concern- 
ing the  guilty  Princes,  Li  Hung-chang  made  it  clear  that 
the  Empress  Dowager  would  never  consent  to  their  death 
because  of  their  rank,  much  less  those  who  were  in  command 
of  the  Imperial  troops.  Li  was  frank  in  admitting  that  per- 
sonally he  had  suffered  risk  by  denouncing  them  to  the 
Throne  at  the  behest  of  the  Diplomatic  Body. 

The  final  agreement  was  a  compromise,  as  follows :  ^ 

Imperial  Edicts  of  the   13th  and  21st  of  February,   190 1 

*  The  report  of  the  death  of  Yu  Hsien  was  untrue;  he  was  finally 
executed  February  22,  1901. 
2  Article  II  of  the  Protocol  of  September  7,  1901. 


I 


613]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  201 

(Annexes  nos.  4,  5  and  6  to  the  Peace  Protocol),  inflicted  the 
following  punishments  on  the  principal  authors  of  the  outrages 
and  crimes  committed  against  the  foreign  Governments  and 
their  nationals : 

Tsai-I  Prince  Tuan  and  Tsai  Lan  Duke  Fu-kuo  were  sen- 
tenced to  be  brought  before  the  autumnal  court  of  assize  for 
execution,  and  it  was  agreed  that  if  the  Emperor  saw  fit  to 
grant  them  their  lives,  they  should  be  exiled  to  Turkestan  and 
there  imprisoned  for  life,  without  the  possibility  of  commuta- 
tion of  these  punishments.^ 

Tsai  Hsun  Prince  Chuang,  Ying  Nien,  President  of  the 
Court  of  Censors,  and  Chao  Shu-chiao,  President  of  the  Board 
of  Punishments,  were  condemned  to  commit  suicide. 

Yu  Hsien,  Governor  of  Shansi,  Chi  Hsiu,  President  of  the 
Board  of  Rites,  and  Hsu  Cheng-yu,  formerly  Senior  Vice- 
President  of  the  Board  of  Punishments,  were  condemned  to 
death. 

Posthumous  degradation  was  inflicted  on  Kang  Yi,  Assistant 
Grand  Secretary,  President  of  the  Board  of  Works,  Hsu  Tung, 
Grand  Secretary,  and  Li  Ping-heng,  formerly  Governor-Gen- 
eral of  Szechwan. 

An  Imperial  Edict  of  February  13th,  1901  (Annex  no.  7), 
rehabilitated  the  memories  of  Hsu  Yung-yi,  President  of  the 
Board  of  War,  Li  Shan,  President  of  the  Board  of  Works,  Hsu 
Ching-cheng,  Senior  President  of  the  Board  of  Works,  Lien 
Yuan,  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  Grand  Council,  and  Yuan  Chang, 
Vice-President  of  the  Court  of  Sacrifices,  who  had  been  put 
to  death  for  having  protested  against  the  outrageous  breaches 
of  international  law  of  last  year. 

Prince  Chang  committed  suicide  the  21st  of  February,  1901, 
Ying  Nien  and  Chao  Shu-chiao  the  24th,  Yu  Hsien  was  exe- 
cuted the  22nd,  Chi  Hsiu  and  Hsu  Cheng-yu  on  the  26th. 
Tung  Fu-hsiang,  General  in  Kansu,  has  been  deprived  of  his 

*  Prince  Tuan  went  no  farther  than  Manchuria  for  exile,  and  was 
heard  of  there  in  1908.  Tung  Fu-hsiang*s  sentence  was  made  banish- 
ment (to  Turkestan,  presumably),  but  he  came  back  to  Kansu  province 
in  1906,  and  lived  there  in  harmless  old  age. 


202  THE  BOXER  REBELLION  [614 

office  by  Imperial  Edict  on  the  13th  of  February,  1901,  pend- 
ing the  determination  of  the  final  punishment  to  be  inflicted 
on  him. 

Imperial  Edicts  dated  the  20th  of  April  and  19th  of  August, 
190 1,  have  inflicted  various  punishments  on  the  provincial 
officials  convicted  of  the  crimes  and  outrages  of  last  summer.^ 

/      Now  as  to  the  indemnity  v^hich  China  was  to  pay  for 
I  her  brief  excursion  into  lawlessness.     The  Powers  early 
j  decided  that  this  was  to  be  paid  in  a  lump  sum,  which  the 
f  various  Governments  would  later  divide  among  themselves. 
The  United  States,  from  information  gathered  at  Wash- 
ington, was  of  the  opinion  that  China  could  not  possibly 
pay  more  than  around  $150,000,000,  and  Special  Commis- 
sioner Rockhill  ^  was  instructed  to  demand  $25,000,000  as 
the  share  of  the  American  Government.^     Instead  of  this 
severe  enough  indemnity,  the  total  for  all  the  Powers  leaped 
to  450,000,000  Haikwan  taels,  or  $333,900,000.*     This  in- 

*  On  the  question  of  punishments,  see  China  No.  5  {1901),  nos.  6, 
9,  16,  18,  6^,  96,  98,  102,  105,  106,  121,  122,  140-142,  144,  150,  151,  157, 
158,  163-167,  172,  180-182,  186,  187,  207,  220,  22(>,  248,  251 ;  China  No. 
6  {1901),  nos.  16,  42,  48,  49,  52,  55,  57.  ^3,  64,  67,  69,  77,  78,  83,  103, 
104,  108,  114,  119,  121-123,  126,  127,  135,  232-234;  China  No.  1  (1902), 
no.  21,  39,  40,  42,  88,  112,  146,  186,  243,  245,  246,  256,  257,  259;  U.  S. 
For.  ReL,  1900,  pp.  210,  211,  213,  214,  220,  221,  223,  224,  226-229,  232, 
297,  298. 

^  Commissioner  Rockhill's  Report  is  contained  in  U.  S.  For.  ReL, 
1901,  Appendix  I. 

*  The  United  States  remitted  about  $10,000,000  of  its  share  of  the 
Boxer  indemnity,  and  China  as  a  mark  of  gratitude  agreed  to  use  the 
funds  in  sending  Chinese  students  to  this  country  every  year  for  edu- 
cation. See  U.  S.  6oth  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  Hse.  Kept.,  no.  1107;  U.  S. 
60th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  Hse.  Doc,  no.  1275. 

*  Gardner  L.  Harding,  in  his  "The  Peril  of  China,"  Century,  July, 
1915,  estimates  that  the  Boxer  indemnity  "  will  have  swelled  to  some- 
thing between  $650,000,000  and  $700,000,000  by  the  time  the  usurious 
methods  of  juggling  its  deferred  interest  by  annual  payments  stretch- 
ing to  1939  are  fully  worked  out."     P.  459. 


6i5]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  203 

eluded  everything  due  to  the  foreign  Governments,  to  com- 
panies, societies,  private  individuals,  missionaries  and  na- 
tive Chinese.  The  interest  to  be  paid  was  fixed  at  4  per 
cent  per  annum,  capital  and  interest  to  be  paid  by  China  in 
thirty-nine  years,  with  amortization  beginning  January  i, 
1902,  and  ending  in  the  year  1940.  The  amortizations  were 
to  be  paid  annually,  the  first  payment  to  be  made  on  Janu- 
ary I,  1903/  The  revenues  set  aside  as  security  for  China's 
bond  were  the  following : 

1.  The  balance  of  the  revenues  of  the  Imperial  Maritime 
Customs,  after  the  payment  of  the  interest  and  amortization 
of  preceding  loans  secured  on  these  revenues,  plus  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  raising  of  five  per  cent  effective  of  the  present 
tariff,  on  maritime  imports,  including  articles  until  now  on 
the  free  list  but  exempting  foreign  rice,  cereals,  flour,  gold 
and  silver  bullion  and  coin. 

2.  The  revenues  of  the  native  customs,  administered  in 
the  open  ports  by  the  Imperial  Maritime  Customs. 

3.  The  total  revenue  of  the  salt  gabelle,  exclusive  of  the 
fraction  previously  set  aside  for  other  foreign  loans. 

With  punishment  and  indemnity  out  of  the  way  the  great- 
est difficulties  were  removed.  All  the  other  provisions  of 
the  bases  for  negotiations,  built  up  by  the  Diplomatic  Body 
from  the  French  proposals,  were  agreed  to  in  their  en- 
tirety. In  addition  to  the  mission  to  Germany  to  apologize 
for  the  murder  of  the  German  Minister,  Baron  von  Ketteler, 
a  like  mission  of  regret  was  despatched  to  Japan  to  offer 
reparation  for  the  death  of  Mr.  Sugiyama,  the  Japanese 
Chancellor  of  Legation  at  Peking.  It  was  also  arranged 
that  the  Forts  of  Taku  were  to  be  razed.  On  this  point 
the  United  States  had  objected,  having  stood  merely  for 

*  On  amortization,  see  China  No.  i  {1902),  nos.  107,   124.  175,   176, 
180,  183-185,  187,  189,  199. 


204  *  ^^^  BOXER  REBELLION  [6i6 

dismantlement,  but  without  success.  Lastly,  the  famous 
Tsung-li  Yamen,  a  sort  of  -foreign  council  established 
through  the  pressure  of  the  Powers  in  i860,  was  trans- 
formed into  a  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  called  the  Wai- 
wupu  (now  the  Waichiaopu),  which  has  at  last  become  a 
most  important  division  of  the  Chinese  Government.  At- 
tached to  the  final  Protocol  were  nineteen  annexes,  fully 
explaining  the  preceding  articles  and  also  containing  the 
various  decrees  on  punishment,  etc.,  referred  to  in  the  main 
body  of  the  document. 

In  consideration  of  the  above,  the  Powers  agreed  that, 
with  the  exception  of  the  new  Legation  guards  provided 
for  in  article  VIII  of  the  Protocol,  the  international  troops 
would  evacuate  Peking  on  September  17,  1901,  and  also 
from  the  other  points  which  they  were  holding,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  those  mentioned  in  article  IX,  where  they  were 
to  maintain  open  communication  between  the  capital  and 
the  sea  until  order  was  completely  restored. 

iThe  Boxer  Rebellion  was  the  last  protest  of  China 
against  the  inevitable,  and,  in  the  completeness  of  its  fail- 
ure, was  the  final  lesson  necessary  in  that  series  of  inter- 
national events  ever  since  1840  to  teach  China  that,  how- 
ever excellent  her  civilization  may  be  in  some  respects,  it 
was  inadequate  when  judged  by  the  spirit  and  achievements 
of  the  XXth  century.  Through  the  agency  of  unparalleled 
national  disasters,  it  was  finally  brought  home  to  the  intel- 
ligent classes  and  in  a  lesser  degree  to  the  entire  people  that, 
successfully  to  withstand  European  aggression,  it  was  nec- 
essary to  have  recourse  to  Europe's  ways,  to  adopt  in  the 
new  scheme  of  things  whatever  heretofore  had  been  lack- 
ing, whether  for  good  or  for  evil.(  The  awakening  did  not 
come  all  at  once.  For  the  ensuing  two  or  three  years  China 
remained  crushed  by  the  succession  of  humiliations  heaped 
upon  her  since  1895.    It  even  fell  to  other  nations,  notably 


6i7]  THE  RESTORATION  OF  ORDER  205 

Japan,  to  save  China  from  Russian  ambitions,  the  result  of 
which  was  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  fought  equally  in  Chi- 
nese interests,  on  Chinese  territory,  and  with  the  violation 
of  Chinese  integrity  and  neutrality.  This  momentous  con- 
flict, in  which  an  Oriental  race  triumphed  over  one  of  the 
greatest  of  European  Powers,  besides  changing  the  course 
of  history  in  the  Far  East,  left  an  indelible  impression  upon 
the  Chinese  national  consciousness,  and  from  then  on  the 
awakening:  of  China  began  in  a  truly  nationalized  ^forui. 
Once  fairly  started,  the  advance  was  rapid  enough,  too 
rapid  in  some  respects  to  suit  the  convenience  of  Europe. 
What  part  the  modern  China  will  play  in  the  international 
economics,  politics  and  diplomacy  of  the  future  it  would  be 
presumptuous  to  predict.  China  is  not  yet  ready  for  such 
a  role,  nor  will  be  ready  for  many  years  to  come.  But  the 
possibilities  of  China  are  almost  limitless,  considering  the 
wealth  and  resources  of  the  country  and  the  national  char- 
acteristics of  the  Chinese  themselves.  However,  the  future 
historian,  in  examining  and  estimating  the  causes  and  events 
which  gave  rise  to  this  new  Far  Eastern  power,  will  look 
back  to  the  period  from  1895  to  1902  and  the  subsequent 
years  to  trace  those  ideals,  ambitions  and  sacrifices  which 
took  the  world  by  surprise  in  the  revolution  of  191 1,  a  revo- 
lution which  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  present 
Republic,  and  which,  most  significant  fact  of  all,  was 
pressed  by  Chinese  arms  alone  to  a  successful  conclusion. 


I 


APPENDIX  I 

The  Joint  Note  ^ 

During  the  months  of  May,  June,  July,  and  August  of  the 
present  year,  serious  disturbances  broke  out  in  the  northern 
provinces  of  China,  and  crimes  unprecedented  in  human  his- 
tory, crimes  against  the  law  of  nations,  against  the  laws  of 
humanity  and  civilization,  were  committed  under  peculiarly 
odious  circumstances.  The  principal  of  these  crimes  were  the 
following  ; 

1.  On  the  20th  of  June,  His  Excellency  Baron  von  Ketteler, 
German  Minister,  proceeding  to  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  was  mur- 
dered while  in  the  exercise  of  his  official  duties  by  soldiers  of 
the  regular  army  acting  under  orders  of  their  chiefs. 

2.  The  same  day  the  foreign  Legations  were  attacked  and 
besieged.  These  attacks  continued  without  intermission  until 
the  14th  of  August,  on  which  date  the  arrival  of  foreign 
troops  put  an  end  to  them.  These  attacks  were  made  by 
regular  troops  who  joined  the  Boxers  and  who  obeyed  orders 
of  the  Court,  emanating  from  the  Imperial  Palace.  At  the 
same  time  the  Chinese  Government  officially  declared  by  its 
representatives  abroad  that  it  guaranteed  the  security  of  the 
Legations. 

3.  The  nth  of  June,  Mr.  Sugiyama,  Chancellor  of  the  Lega- 
tion of  Japan,  in  the  discharge  of  an  official  mission,  was  killed 
by  regulars  at  the  gates  of  the  city.  At  Peking  and  in  several 
provinces  foreigners  were  murdered,  tortured,  or  attacked  by 
Boxers  and  regular  troops,  and  only  owed  their  safety  to  their 
determined  resistance.  Their  establishments  were  pillaged 
and  destroyed. 

1  Version  in  English  agreed  upon  by  the  British  and  American  Min- 
isters.    See   U.    S.   For.   ReL,    1900,    p.   244;    Moore's   Digest,   vol.   v. 
pp.  514-516;  China  No.  5  (1901),  no.  188;  iRockhill,  op.  cit.,  pp.  63-65. 
619]  207 


208  APPENDIX  I  [620 

4.  Foreign  cemeteries,  at  Peking  especially,  were  desecrated, 
the  graves  opened,  the  remains  scattered  abroad. 

These  events  led  the  foreign  Powers  to  send  their  troops 
to  China  in  order  to  protect  the  lives  of  their  representatives 
and  their  nationals,  and  to  restore  order.  During  their  march 
to  Peking  the  Allied  forces  met  with  the  resistance  of  the 
Chinese  armies,  and  had  to  overcome  it  by  force.  China  hav- 
ing recognized  her  responsibility,  expressed  her  regrets,  and 
manifested  the  desire  to  see  an  end  put  to  the  situation  created 
by  the  disturbances  referred  to,  the  Powers  have  decided  to 
accede  to  her  request  on  the  irrevocable  conditions  enumerated 
below,  which  they  deem  indispensible  to  expiate  the  crimes  com- 
mitted and  to  prevent  their  recurrence : 

I.  (A)  Dispatch  to  Berlin  of  an  extraordinary  mission, 
headed  by  an  Imperial  Prince,  to  express  the  regrets  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  and  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, for  the  murder  of  his  Excellency  the  late  Baron  von 
Ketteler,  German  Minister. 

(B)  Erection  on  the  place  whjsre  the  murder  was  committed 
of  a  commemorative  monument  suitable  to  the  rank  of  the  de- 
ceased,  bearing   an   inscription   in   the   Latin,    German,    and 
'Chinese  languages,  expressing  the  regrets  of  the  Emperor  of 
China  for  the  murder. 

II.  (A)  The  severest  punishment  in  proportion  to  their 
crimes  for  the  persons  designated  in  the  Imperial  Decree  of 
September  25,  1900,  and  for  those  whom  the  representatives  of 
the  Powers  shall  subsequently  designate. 

(B)  Suspension  of  all  official  examinations  for  five  years 
in  all  the  towns  where  foreigners  have  been  massacred  or  have 
been  subjected  to  cruel  treatment. 

III.  Honorable  reparation  shall  be  made  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  the  Japanese  Government  for  the  murder  of  Mr. 
Sugiyama,  Chancellor  of  the  Japanese  Legation. 

IV.  An  expiatory  monument  shall  be  erected  by  the  Im- 
perial Chinese  Government  in  each  of  the  foreign  or  interna- 
tional cemeteries  which  have  been  desecrated,  and  in  which  the 
graves  have  been  destroyed. 


621]  APPENDIX  I  209 

V.  Maintenance,  under  conditions  to  be  settled  between  the 
Powers,  of  the  prohibition  of  the  importation  of  arms,  as  well 
as  if  material  used  exclusively  for  the  manufacture  of  arms 
and  ammunition. 

VI.  Equitable  indemnities  for  governments,  societies,  com- 
panies, and  private  individuals,  as  well  as  for  Chinese  who 
have  suffered  during  the  late  events  in  person  or  in  property 
in  consequence  of  their  being  in  the  service  of  foreigners. 
China  shall  adopt  financial  measures  acceptable  to  the  Powers 
for  the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  the  payment  of  said  indemni- 
ties and  the  interest  and  amortization  of  the  loans. 

VII.  Right  for  each  Power  to  maintain  a  permanent  guard/ 
for  its  Legation  and  to  have  the  Legation  quarter  in  a  de- 
fensible condition.     Chinese  shall  not  have  the  right  to  reside 
in  this  quarter. 

VIIL  The  Taku  and  other  forts  which  might  impede  free 
communication  between  Peking  and  the  sea  shall  be  razed. 

IX.  Right  of  military  occupation  of  certain  points,  to  be  / 
determined  by  an  understanding  between  the  Powers,  for  keep- 
ing open  communication  between  the  capital  and  the  sea. 

X.  (A)  The  Chinese  Government  shall  cause  to  be  pub- 
lished during  two  years  in  all  subprefectures  an  Imperial 
decree  embodying — 

Perpetual  prohibition,  under  pain  of  death,  of  membership 
in  any  anti-foreign  society. 

Enumeration  of  the  punishments  which  shall  have  been  in- 
flicted on  the  guilty,  together  with  the  suspension  of  all  official 
examinations  in  the  towns  where  foreigners  have  been  mur- 
dered or  have  been  subjected  to  cruel  treatment. 

(B)  An  Imperial  decree  shall  be  issued  and  published  every- 
where in  the  Empire,  declaring  that  all  governors-general,  gov- 
ernors, and  provincial  or  local  officials  shall  be  responsible  for 
order  in  their  respective  jurisdictions,  and  that  whenever  fresh 
anti- foreign  disturbances  or  any  other  treaty  infractions  occur, 
which  are  not  forthwith  suppressed  and  the  guilty  persons  pun- 
ished, they,  the  said  officials,  shall  be  immediately  removed  and 
forever  prohibited  from  holding  any  office  or  honors. 


2IO 


APPENDIX  I 


[622 


XL  The  Chinese  Government  shall  undertake  to  reform 
the  Office  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  to  modify  the  Court  cere- 
monial relative  to  the  reception  of  foreign  representatives  in 
the  manner  which  the  Powers  shall  indicate. 

Until  the  Chinese  Government  have  complied  with  the  above 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Powers  the  undersigned  can  hold  out 
no  expectation  that  the  occupation  of  Peking  and  the  province 
of  Chihli  by  the  general  forces  can  be  brought  to  a  conclusion. 

Peking,  December  22,  ipoo. 


For  Germany: 

For  Austria-Hungary: 

For  Belgium: 

For  Spain: 

For  United  States  of  America: 

For  France: 

For  Great  Britain: 

For  Italy: 

For  Japan: 

For  Netherlands: 

For  Russia: 


A.  MUMM. 
M.  CZIKANN. 
JOOSTENS. 

B.  F.  De  Cologan. 

E.  H.  Conger. 

S.   PiCHON. 

Ernest  Satow. 
Salvago  Raggi, 
T.  Nissi. 

F.  M.  Knobel. 
Michel  De  Giers. 


APPENDIX  II 

Reply  of  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries  to  the  Joint 
Note  of  December  22,  1900  ^ 

peking^  january  l6,  i9oi 

\Translation\ 

Under  date  of  December  24,  1900,  the  Plenipotentiaries  of 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Belgium,  Spain,  the  United  States, 
France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands,  and 
Russia,  have  sent  Us  the  following  Note : 

(The  Joint  Note  is  here  quoted  textually  and  in  its  entirety)  : 

We  hastened  to  transmit  the  full  text  of  this  note  to  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  who,  having  taken  cognizance  of  it,  ren- 
dered the  following  decree: 

"  We  have  taken  cognizance  of  the  whole  of  the  telegram  of 
Yi  Kuang  (Prince  Ching)  and  Li  Hung-chang.  It  behooves 
Us  to  accept,  in  their  entirety,  the  twelve  articles  which  they 
have  submitted  to  Us." 

Consequently,  we,  Ching,  Prince  of  the  first  rank.  Plenipo- 
tentiary, President  of  the  Council  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Li, 
Earl  of  the  first  rank,  Su-yi,  Plenipotentiary,  Tutor  to  the 
Heir  Apparent,  Grand  Secretary  of  the  Wen-hua  Tien  Throne 
Hall,  Minister  of  Commerce,  Superintendent  of  trade  for  the 
northern  ports,  Governor-General  of  Chihli, 

Declare  that  we  accept  in  their  entirety  the  twelve  articles 
which  we  have  been  requested  to  insure  the  transmission  of 
to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor. 

In  witness  of  which  we  have  signed  the  present  protocol 

1  Rockhill,  op.  cit.,  p.  (£. 
^Z\  211 


212  APPENDIX  II  [624 

and  we  transmit  to  the  foreign  Plenipotentiaries  a  copy  of  the 
Edict  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  bearing  the  Imperial  Seal. 
It  is  understood  that  in  case  of  disagreement,  the  French 
text  shall  be  authoritative. 
Peking,  16  January,  ipoi. 

(Signed)  Yi  Kuang 

(Prince  Ching). 
[L.  S.]  Li. 


APPENDIX  III 
Peace  Protocol  of  September  7,  1901  ^ 

The  Plenipotentiaries  of  Germany,  His  Excellency  M.  A. 
Mumm  von  Schwarzenstein ;  of  Austria-Hungary,  His  Excel- 
lency M.  M.  Czikann  von  Wahlborn;  of  Belgium,  His  Ex- 
cellency M.  Joostens;  of  Spain,  M.  B.  J.  de  Cologan;  of  the 
United  States,  His  Excellency  M.  W.  W.  Rockhill ;  of  France, 
His  Excellency  M.  Paul  Beau;  of  Great  Britain,  His  Excel- 
lency Sir  Ernest  Satow;  of  Italy,  Marquis  Salvago  Raggi;  of 
Japan,  His  Excellency  M.  Jutaro  Komura ;  of  the  Netherlands, 
His  Excellency  M.  F.  M.  Knobel;  of  Russia,  His  Excellency 
M.  M.  de  Giers ;  and  of  China,  His  Highness  Yi-Kuang  Prince 
Ching  of  the  first  rank.  President  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  His  Excellency  Li  Hung-chang,  Earl  of  Su-i  of  the 
first  rank,  Tutor  of  the  Heir  Apparent,  Grand  Secretary  of 
the  Wen-hua  Throne  Hall,  Minister  of  Commerce,  Superin- 
tendent of  the  northern  trade,  Governor-General  of  Chihli, 
have  met  for  the  purpose  of  declaring  that  China  has  complied 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Powers  with  the  conditions  laid  down 
in  the  note  of  the  226.  of  December,  1900  (the  Joint  Note), 
and  which  were  accepted  in  their  entirety  by  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  China  in  a  decree  dated  the  27th  of  December. 
(Annex  No.  i). 

1  U.  S.  For.  ReL,  1901,  Appendix  I,  pp.  306-312  for  official  French 
version  and  pp.  312-339  for  English  with  the  19  Annexes;  Chines? 
Maritime  Customs,  III,  no.  30,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  1-49  for  French  and 
Chinese  texts ;  Cordier,  Histoire  des  Relations,  etc.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  537-545 
for  official  French  copy;  Moore's  Digest,  vol.  v,  pp.  517-524;  Rockhill, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  66-96  for  text  and  Annexes;  U.  S.  Consular  Reports,  vol. 
Ixviii  (Washington,  1902),  pp.  19-26. 

625]  213 


214  APPENDIX  III  [626 

ARTICLE  I^ 

By  an  Imperial  Edict  of  the  9th  of  June  last  (Annex  no.  2), 
Tsai  Feng,  Prince  Chun,  was  appointed  Ambassador  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China,  and  directed  in  that  capacity 
to  convey  to  His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor  the  expression 
of  the  regrets  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  and  of  the 
Chinese  Government  for  the  assassination  of  his  Excellency 
the  late  Baron  von  Ketteler,  German  Minister. 

Prince  Chun  left  Peking  the  12th  of  July  last  to  carry  out 
the  orders  which  had  been  given  him. 

ARTICLE  i^ 

The  Chinese  Government  has  stated  that  it  will  erect  on 
the  spot  of  the  assassination  of  his  Excellency  the  late  Baron 
von  Ketteler  a  commemorative  monument,  worthy  of  the  rank 
of  the  deceased,  and  bearing  an  inscription  in  the  Latin,  Ger- 
man, and  Chinese  languages,  which  shall  express  the  regrets 
of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  for  the  murder  com- 
mitted. 

Their  Excellencies  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries  have  in- 
formed his  Excellency  the  German  Plenipotentiary,  in  a  letter 
dated  the  22nd  of  July  last  (Annex  No.  3)  that  an  arch  of  the 
whole  width  of  the  street  would  be  erected  on  the  said  spot, 
and  that  work  on  it  was  begun  the  25th  of  July  last. 

ARTICLE  11^ 

Imperial  Edicts  of.  the  13th  and  21st  of  February,  1901 
(Annexes  nos.  4,  5,  and  6),  inflicted  the  following  punish- 
ments on  the  principal  authors  of  the  outrages  and  crimes 
committed  against  the  foreign  Governments  and  their  nationals : 

Tsai-I  Prince  Tuan  and  Tsai  Lan  Duke  Fu-kuo  were  sen- 
tenced to  be  brought  before  the  autumnal  court  of  assize  for 
execution,  and  it  was  agreed  that  if  the  Emperor  saw  fit  to 
grant  them  their  lives,  they  should  be  exiled  to  Turkestan 
and  there  imprisoned  for  life,  without  the  possibility  of  com- 
mutation of  these  punishments. 

Tsai  Hsun  Prince  Chuang,  Ying  Nien,   President  of  the 


627]  APPENDIX  III  215 

Court  of  Censors,  and  Chao  Shu-chiao,  President  of  the  Board 
of  Punishments,  were  condemned  to  commit  suicide. 

Yu  Hsien,  Governor  of  Shansi,  Chi  Hsiu,  President  of  the 
Board  of  Rites,  and  Hsu  Cheng-yu,  formerly  senior  Vice- 
President  of  the  Board  of  Punishments,  were  condemned  to 
death. 

Posthumous  degradation  was  inflicted  on  Kang  Yi,  Assis- 
tant Grand  Secretary,  President  of  the  Board  of  Works,  Hsu 
Tung,  Grand  Secretary,  and  Li  Ping-heng,  formerly  Governor- 
General  of  Szechwan. 

An  Imperial  Edict  of  February  13th,  1901  (Annex  no.  7), 
rehabilitated  the  memories  of  Hsu  Yung-yi,  President  of  the 
Board  of  War,  Li  Shan,  President  of  the  Board  of  Works,  Hsu 
Ching-cheng,  senior  Vice-President  of  the  Board  of  Works, 
Lien  Yuan,  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  Grand  Council,  and  Yuan 
Chang,  Vice-President  of  the  Court  of  Sacrifices,  who  had 
been  put  to  death  for  having  protested  against  the  outrageous 
breaches  of  international  law  of  last  year. 

Prince  Chuang  committed  suicide  the  21st  of  February,  1901, 
Ying  Nien  and  Chao  Shu-chiao  the  24th,  Yu  Hsien  was  exe- 
cuted the  22nd,  Chi  Hsiu  and  Hsu  Cheng-yu  on  the  26th. 
Tung  Fu-hsiang,  General  in  Kansu,  has  been  deprived  of  his 
office  by  Imperial  Edict  of  the  13th  of  February,  1901,  pend- 
ing the  determination  of  the  final  punishment  to  be  inflicted 
on  him. 

Imperial  Edicts  dated  the  29th  of  April  and  19th  of  August, 
1 90 1,  have  inflicted  various  punishments  on  the  provincial 
officials  convicted  of  the  crimes  and  outrages  of  last  summer. 

ARTICLE  11^ 
An  Imperial  Edict  promulgated  the  19th  of  August,  1901 
(Annex  no.  8),  ordered  the  suspension  of  official  examinations 
for  five  years  in  all  cities  where  foreigners  were  massacred 
or  submitted  to  cruel  treatment. 

ARTICLE  III 

So  as  to  make  honorable  reparation  for  the  assassination  of 


2l6  APPENDIX  III  [628 

Mr.  Sugiyama,  Chancellor  of  the  Japanese  Legation,  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  by  an  Imperial  Edict  of  the 
i8th  of  June,  1901  (Annex  no.  9),  appointed  Na  Tung,  Vice- 
President  of  the  Board  of  Revenue,  to  be  his  Envoy  Extra- 
ordinary, and  specially  directed  him  to  convey  to  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Japan  the  expression  of  the  regrets  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  and  of  his  Government  at  the 
assassination  of  the  late  Mr.  Sugiyama. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  Chinese  Government  has  agreed  to  erect  an  expiatory 
monument  in  each  of  the  foreign  or  international  cemeteries 
which  were  desecrated  and  in  which  the  tombs  were  destroyed. 

It  has  been  agreed  with  the  representatives  of  the  Powers 
that  the  Legations  interested  shall  settle  the  details  for  the 
erection  of  these  monuments,  China  bearing  all  the  expenses 
thereof,  estimated  at  ten  thousand  taels  for  the  cemeteries  at 
Peking  and  within  its  neighborhood,  and  at  five  thousand 
taels  for  the  cemeteries  in  the  provinces.  The  amounts  have 
been  paid  and  the  list  of  these  cemeteries  is  enclosed  here- 
with.    (Annex  no.  10.) 

ARTICLE  v 

China  has  agreed  to  prohibit  the  importation  into  its  ter- 
ritory of  arms  and  ammunition,  as  well  as  of  materials  ex- 
clusively used  for  the  manufacture  of  arms  and  ammunition. 

An  Imperial  Edict  has  been  issued  on  the  25th  of  August, 
1901  (Annex.no.  11),  forbidding  said  importation  for  a  term 
of  two  years.  New  Edicts  may  be  issued  subsequently  extend- 
ing this  by  other  successive  terms  of  two  years  in  case  of 
necessity  recognized  by  the  Powers. 

ARTICLE  VI 

By  an  Imperial  Edict  dated  the  29th  of  May,  1901  (Annex 
no.  12),  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  agreed  to  pay  the 
Powers  an  indemnity  of  four  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of 
Haikwan  Taels.  This  sum  represents  the  total  amount  of  the 
indemnities  for  States,  companies  or  societies,  private  individ- 


629]  APPENDIX  III  217 

uals,  and  Chinese  referred  to  in  Article  VI  of  the  note  of 
December  22nd,  1900. 

(a)  These  four  hundred  and  fifty  millions  constitute  a  gold 
debt  calculated  at  the  rate  of  the  Haikwan  tael  to  the  gold 
currency  of  each  country,  as  indicated  below : 

Haikwan  tael  =  marks 3-055 

=  Austro-Hungary  crown 3-595 

=  gold  dollar 0.742 

=  francs 3-750 

=  pound  sterling 3s.  od. 

=  yen 1.407 

=:  Netherlands  florin 1-796 

=  gold  rouble  ( 17.424  dolias  fine)  . . .  1.412 

This  sum  in  gold  shall  bear  interest  in  4  per  cent  per  annum, 
and  the  capital  shall  be  reimbursed  by  China  in  thirty-nine 
years  in  the  manner  indicated  in  the  annexed  plan  of  amortiza- 
tion.    (Annex  no.  13.) 

Capital  and  interest  shall  be  payable  in  gold  at  the  rates 
of  exchange  corresponding  to  the  dates  at  which  the  differ- 
ent payments  fall  due. 

The  amortization  shall  commence  the  ist  of  January,  1902, 
and  shall  finish  at  the  end  of  the  year  1940.  The  amortiza- 
tions are  payable  annually,  the  first  payment  being  fixed  on 
the  1st  of  January,  1903. 

Interest  shall  run  from  the  ist  of  July,  190 1,  but  the  Chinese 
Government  shall  have  the  right  to  pay  off  within  a  term  of 
three  years,  beginning  January,  1902,  the  arrears  of  the  first 
six  months,  ending  the  31st  of  December,  1901,  on  condition, 
however,  that  it  pays  compound  interest  at  the  rate  of  four 
per  cent  per  annum  on  the  sums  the  payment  of  which  shall 
have  thus  been  deferred.  Interest  shall  be  payable  semi- 
annually, the  first  payment  being  fixed  on  the  ist  of  July,  1902. 

(b)  The  service  of  the  debt  shall  take  place  in  Shanghai,  in 
the  following  manner : 

Each  Power  shall  be  represented  by  a  delegate  on  a  com- 
mission of  bankers  authorized  to  receive  the  amount  of  inter- 


2l8  APPENDIX  III  [630 

est  and  amortization  which  shall  be  paid  to  it  by  the  Chinese 
authorities  designated  for  that  purpose,  to  divide  it  among  the 
interested  parties,  and  to  give  a  receipt  for  the  same. 

(c)  The  Chinese  Government  shall  deliver  to  the  Doyen 
of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  at  Peking  a  bond  for  the  lump  sum, 
which  shall  subsequently  be  converted  into  fractional  bonds 
bearing  the  signatures  of  the  delegates  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment designated  for  that  purpose.  This  operation  and  all  those 
relating  to  issuing  of  the  bonds  shall  be  performed  by  the 
above-mentioned  commission,  in  accordance  with  the  instruc- 
tions which  the  Powers  shall  send  their  delegates. 

(d)  The  proceeds  of  the  revenues  assigned  to  the  payment 
of  the  bonds  shall  be  paid  monthly  to  the  commission. 

(e)  The  revenues  assigned  as  security  for  the  bonds  are 
the  following: 

1.  The  balance  of  the  revenues  of  the  Imperial  Maritime 
Customs  after  payment  of  the  interest  and  amortization  of 
preceding  loans  secured  on  these  revenues,  plus  the  proceeds 
of  the  raising  to  five  per  cent  effective  of  the  present  tariff  on 
maritime  imports,  including  articles  until  now  on  the  free  list, 
but  exempting  foreign  rice,  cereals,  and  flour,  gold  and  silver 
bullion  and  coin. 

2.  The  revenues  of  the  native  customs,  administered  in  the 
open  ports  by  the  Imperial  Maritime  Customs. 

3.  The  total  revenues  of  the  salt  gabelle,  exclusive  of  the 
fraction  previously  set  aside  for  other  foreign  loans. 

The  raising  of  the  present  tariff  on  imports  to  five  per  cent 
effective  is  agreed  to  on  the  conditions  mentioned  below. 

It  shall  be  put  in  force  two  months  after  the  signing  of  the 
present  protocol,  and  no  exceptions  shall  be  made  except  for 
merchandise  shipped  not  more  than  ten  days  after  the  said 
signing. 

I.  All  duties  levied  on  imports  "  ad  valorem  "  shall  be  con- 
verted as  far  as  possible  and  as  soon  as  may  be  into  specific 
duties.  This  conversion  shall  be  made  in  the  following  man- 
ner: The  average  value  of  merchandise  at  the  time  of  their 
landing  during  the  three  years  1897,  1898,  and  1899,  that  is  to 


631]  APPENDIX  III  219 

say,  the  market  price  less  the  amount  of  import  duties  and  in- 
cidental expenses,  shall  be  taken  as  the  basis  for  the  valuation 
of  merchandise.  Pending  the  result  of  the  work  of  conversion, 
duties  shall  be  levied  "  ad  valorem." 

2.  The  beds  of  the  rivers  Peiho  and  Whangpu  shall  be  im- 
proved with  the  financial  participation  of  China. 

ARTICLE  VII 

The  Chinese  Government  has  agreed  that  the  quarter  occu- 
pied by  the  Legations  shall  be  considered  as  one  specially  re- 
served for  their  use  and  placed  under  their  exclusive  control, 
in  which  Chinese  shall  not  have  the  right  to  reside  and  which 
may  be  made  defensible. 

The  limits  of  this  quarter  have  been  fixed  as  follows  on 
the  annexed  plan  (Annex  no.  14)  : 

On  the  west,  the  line  i,  2,  3,  4,  5. 

On  the  north,  the  line  5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  10. 

On  the  east,  Ketteler  street  (10,  11,  12). 

Drawn  along  the  exterior  base  of  the  Tatar  wall  and  follow- 
ing the  line  of  the  bastions,  on  the  south  the  line  12.  i. 

In  the  protocol  annexed  to  the  letter  of  the  i6th  of  January, 
190 1,  China  recognized  the  right  of  each  Power  to  maintain 
a  permanent  guard  in  the  said  quarter  for  the  defence  of  its 
Legation. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

The  Chinese  Government  has  consented  to  raze  the  forts  of 
Taku  and  those  which  might  impede  free  communication  be- 
tween Peking  and  the  sea ;  steps  haVe  been  taken  for  carrying 
this  out. 

ARTICLE  IX 

The  Chinese  Government  has  conceded  the  right  of  the 
Powers  in  the  protocol  annexed  to  the  letter  of  the  i6th  of 
January,  1901,  to  occupy  certain  points,  to  be  determined  by 
an  agreement  between  them,  for  the  maintenance  of  open 
communication  between  the  capital  and  the  sea.  The  points 
occupied  by  the  Powers  are: 


220  APPENDIX  III  [632 

Huangtsun,  Langfang,  Yangtsun,  Tientsin,  Chunliangcheng, 
Tangku,  Lutai,  Tangshan,  Lanchou,  Changli,  Chinwangtao, 
Shanhaikwan. 

ARTICLE  X 

The  Chinese  Government  has  agreed  to  post  and  to  have 
pubHshed  during  two  years  in  all  district  cities  the  following 
Imperial  Edicts: 

(a)  Edict  of  the  ist  of  February  (Annex  no.  15),  prohibit- 
ing forever,  under  pain  of  death,  membership  in  any  anti- 
foreign  society. 

(b)  Edicts  of  the  13th  and  21st  February,  29  April,  and 
19th  August,  enumerating  the  punishments  inflicted  on  the 
guilty. 

(c)  Edict  of  the  19th  August,  1901,  prohibiting  examin- 
ations in  all  cities  where  foreigners  were  massacred  or  sub- 
jected to  cruel  treatment. 

(d)  Edict  of  the  ist  of  February,  1901  (Annex  no.  16),  de- 
claring all  governors-general,  governors,  and  provincial  or  local 
officials  responsible  for  order  in  their  respective  districts,  and 
that  in  case  of  new  anti-foreign  troubles  or  other  infractions 
of  the  treaties  which  shall  not  be  immediately  repressed  and 
the  authors  of  which  shall  not  have  been  punished,  these  offi- 
cials shall  be  immediately  dismissed,  without  possibility  of  be- 
ing given  new  functions  or  new  honors. 

ARTICLE  XI 

The  Chinese  Government  has  agreed  to  negotiate  the  amend- 
ments deemed  necessary  by  the  foreign  Governments  to  the 
treaties  of  commerce  and  navigation  and  the  other  subjects 
concerning  commercial  relations,  with  the  object  of  facilitat- 
ing them. 

At  present,  and  as  a  result  of  the  stipulation  contained 
in  Article  VI,  concerning  the  indemnity,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment agrees  to  assist  in  the  improvement  of  the  courses  of 
the  rivers  Peiho  and  Whangpu,  as  stated  below. 

(a)  The  works  for  the  improvement  of  the  navigability  of 
the  Peiho,  begun  in  1898  with  the  cooperation  of  the  Chinese 


633]  APPENDIX  III  221 

Government,  have  been  resumed  under  the  direction  of  an  inter- 
national commission.  As  soon  as  the  administration  of  Tien- 
tsin shall  have  been  handed  back  to  the  Chinese  Government, 
it  will  be  in  a  position  to  be  represented  on  this  commission, 
and  will  pay  each  year  a  sum  of  sixty  thousand  Haikwan  taels 
for  maintaining  the  works. 

(b)  A  conservancy  board,  charged  with  the  management  and 
control  of  the  works  for  straightening  the  Whangpu  and  the 
improvement  of  the  course  of  that  river,  is  hereby  created. 

This  board  shall  consist  of  members  representing  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Chinese  Government  and  those  of  foreigners  in  the 
shipping  trade  of  Shanghai.  The  expenses  incurred  for  the 
works  and  the  general  management  of  the  undertaking  are 
estimated  at  the  annual  sum  of  four  hundred  and  sixty  thous- 
and Haikwan  taels  for  the  first  twenty  years.  This  sum 
shall  be  supplied  in  equal  portions  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment and  the  foreign  interests  concerned.  Detailed  stipula- 
tions concerning  the  composition,  duties,  and  revenues  of  the 
conservancy  boards  are  embodied  in  Annex  no.  17. 

ARTICLE  XII 

An  Imperial  Edict  of  the  24th  of  July,  1901  (Annex  no.  18), 
reformed  the  Office  of  Foreign  Affairs  (Tsung-li  Yamen), 
on  the  lines  indicated  by  the  Powers,  that  is  to  say,  transformed 
it  into  a  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (Waiwupu,  and  now 
called  the  Waichiaopu),  which  takes  precedence  over  the  six 
other  Ministries  of  State.  The  same  Edict  appointed  the 
principal  members  of  this  Ministry. 

An  agreement  has  also  been  reached  concerning  the  modifi- 
cation of  Court  ceremonial  as  regards  the  reception  of  for- 
eign representatives,  and  has  been  the  subject  of  several  notes 
from  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries,  the  substance  of  which  is 
embodied  in  a  memorandum  herewith  annexed  (Annex  no.  19). 

Finally,  it  is  expressly  understood  that  as  regards  the  de- 
clarations specified  above  and  the  annexed  documents  originat- 
ing with  the  foreign  Plenipotentiaries,  the  French  text  only 
is  authoritative. 


222  APPENDIX  III  [634 

The  Chinese  Government  having  thus  complied  to  the  satis- 
faction of  the  Powers  with  the  conditions  laid  down  in  the 
above-mentioned  note  on  December  22nd,  1900  (the  Joint 
Note),  the  Powers  have  agreed  to  accede  to  the  wish  of  China 
to  terminate  the  situation  created  by  the  disorders  of  the  sum- 
mer of  1900.  In  consequence  thereof  the  foreign  Plenipoten- 
tiaries are  authorized  to  declare  in  the  names  of  their  Gov- 
ernments that,  with  the  exception  of  the  Legation  guards  men- 
tioned in  Article  VII,  the  international  troops  will  completely 
evacuate  the  city  of  Peking  on  the  17th  of  September,  1901, 
and  with  the  exception  of  the  localities  mentioned  in  Article 
IX,  will  withdraw  from  the  province  of  Chihli  on  the  22d  of 
September. 

The  present  final  Protocol  has  been  drawn  up  in  twelve 
identical  copies  and  signed  by  all  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  the 
conteacting  countries.  One  copy  shall  be  given  to  each  of  the 
foreign  Plenipotentiaries,  and  one  copy  shall  be  given  to  the 
Chinese  Plenipotentiaries. 

Peking,  yth  September  ipoi. 


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INDEX 


Abolition  of  queue,  proposed  by  Wang 
Chao,  52 

Adee,  A.  A.,  to  Min.  Conger,  79  n.,  80  n. 

Amoy,  21  n.,  34  and  n. 

Anhwei,  119 

Anting,  133 

Annam,  34 

Aoki,  Viscount,  reply  to  Kuang  Hsu's 
letter,  143;  objections  to  Li's  creden- 
tials, 152;  interview  of  Mr.  White- 
head with,  188  n. 

"  Arrow  "  war,  23 

Austria,  concession  at  Tientsin,  165, 
167  n.;  accepts  German  proposal  for 
punishment,  177;  on  proposals  of 
Diplomatic  Body,  194,  195 

Balfour,  Mr.,  on  Russia's  efforts  for  ice- 
free  harbor,  30 

Beau,  Paul,  213 

Belgium,  concession  at  Tientsin,  167 
and  n.;  on  proposals  of  Diplomatic 
Body,  194,  195 

Berlin,  29,  32  n.,  38,  123,  126,  142, 
155  n.,  181,  194,  208 

Berlin  Post,  84,  85 

"  Big  Sword  "  Society.  See  Boxer  Re- 
bellion. 

Biagovestchensk,  Russian  massacre  of 
Chinese  at,  178 

Boxer  indemnity,  in  French  proposals, 
184  and  n.;  United  States  to  France 
regarding,  185;  discussion  of  by 
Diplomatic  Body,  191  and  n.,  192; 
final  agreement,  202  and  n.,  203, 209, 
216-219 

Boxer  Rebellion,  meaning  of,  15,  16; 
overthrow  of  reform  a  vital  cause  of, 
69,  70;  other  causes,  70-72;  mission- 
ary question,  72-75;  initial  disturb- 
ances in  Shantung,  76-82;  in  Pe- 
king, 83,  84;  four  parts  to,  89;  ques- 
tion of  Legation  guards,  92-100; 
edicts  and  decrees  concerning  Boxers, 
101-112;  dynastic  succession,  114- 
116,    situation   in   South   China,  at 

647] 


Shanghai,  1 18, 1 19,  in  Yangtse  region, 
120-124;  policy  of  United  States 
during,  125-129;  attack  on  Taku 
Forts,  129-132;  Seymour  expedition, 
132,  134;  siege  of  Tientsin,  134, 135; 
second  Allied  expedition,  135,  136; 
renewal  of  punitive  expeditions,  155, 
156,  160-164;  version  of  in  edict  of 
September  25,  1900,  180;  in  preamble 
to  Joint  Note,  207,  208.     See  China 

Brooks,  murder  of,  81 

Billow,  Count  von,  on  the  German  pol- 
icy, 128  n.;  note  verbale  in  answer  to 
Kuang  Hsu's  letter,  142,  143;  on 
German  proposal  for  punishment, 
175,182 

Burlingame,  Anson,  mission  of  1868, 
2Ty  and  n.;  criticism  of,  24 

Cambodia,  34 

Campbell,  Mr.,  assault  on,  89 

Canton,  18,  21  n.,  35,  47,  70  n.,  147 

Catholics  in  China,  72  and  n. 

Cassini  Convention,  provisions  of,  27, 

28,  28  n. 
Chaffee,  Maj.-Gen.,  168,  169  and  n. 
Chang  Chih-tung,  119,  123,  158,  159  n. 
Chang  In-huan,  decree  denouncing,  62; 

efforts  in  his  behalf,  63 
Changli,  220 

Chao  Shu-chiao,  180,  199,  201,  215 
Chaylard,  G.  du,  166,  167 
Chefoo,  26,  78  n. 
Chekiang,    proclamation    of    Viceroys 

concerning,    123   and   n.;    Chuchow 

outbreak  in,  156-159 
Cheng  (Tientsin  Taotai),  169  n. 
Chengtingfu,  155  and  n. 
Chen  Kung-liang,  77 
Chichow,  91 
Chihli,  91,  92,94,  112,  120,  121,  155  n., 

162,  190,  210,  213,  222 
Chi  Hsiu,  116,  201,  215 
China,  meaning  of  Boxer  Rebellion,  15, 

16;  early  relations  with  Europe,  17- 

19;  Opium  war,  20,  21;  policy  after 

235 


236 


INDEX 


[648 


Opium  war,   22;    "Arrow"  war  and  ! 
Allied  expedition  to  Peking,  23;  Bur- 
lingame,  23,  24;   China  to  1895,  24, 
25;  view  of  Chino-Japanese  war,  25, 
26,    territorial     aggressions    of    the 
Powers,  26-36;    Hay    note  of   Sep-  | 
tember,  1899,  37,  38;  China  in  1899, 
38, 39;  reforms  of  Kuang  Hsu,  39-54; 
Coup   a"    Etat^   54-56;    criticism   of  i 
reformers,    56-60;    reaction    against  \ 
reform,  60-66:   reception  to  wives  of  ! 
diplomats,  66,  67;  health  of  Emperor,  j 
67,  68;   overthrow  of  reform  a  vital 
cause  of  rebellion,  69,  70;   other  im-  ; 
mediate    causes,    70-72;     missionary 
question,  72  75;  results  of  European  ' 
aggressions,  75,  76;   first  Boxer  dis-  \ 
turbances,    76-84;     Kangsu    troops,  i 
89-92;     Legation    guards,    92-100;  ' 
edicts  and  decrees  concerning  Boxers,  ! 
IOI-II2;    dynastic   succession,    114- ' 
116;  situation  in  South  China,  118- | 
125;    policy  of   United  States,  125- 
129;  Allied  attack  on  Taku,  129-132; 
Seymour  expedition,  132-134;  siege 
of  Tientsin,  134,  135;  second  Allied 
expedition,     135,     136;     letters    to  i 
Powers  and  replies,  139-144;  question  i 
of    plenipotentiaries,    145-154;    re- j 
newal  of  punitive  expeditions,   155,  ; 
156;   Chuchow,  156-158;   Shanghai,  j 
158, 159;  Shantung,  159,  160;  Shansi  j 
160;  aggressions  of  Powers  at  Tien-  ! 
tsin,  164-173;  occupation  of  Peking,  i 
173-175;   German  proposal  for  pun-  I 
ishment  of  Boxers,  175-183;   French  ! 
proposals,    183-189;    discussions   by ; 
Diplomatic     Body,     189-196;     Joint  ' 
Note,    196-198;     final   punishments,  I 
199-202;  indemnity,  202,  203;  other  j 
provisions,  203,  204;  China  after  the  | 
Rebellion,  204,  205 

Chinanfu,  78  | 

Ching,  Prmce,  as  apologist  for  Tzu  Hsi,  ^ 
68;   concerning  Kangsu  troops,  92;  1 
concerning  Legation  guards,  94,  98,  i 
succeeded    as    President  of  Tsungli 
Yamen    by  Prince  Tuan,    116;     ap- 
pointed   peace    commissioner,    150- 
154,  175;  objection  to  part  of  Joint 
Note,  197,  198;   reply  to  Joint  Note, 
211,  212 

Chino-Japanese  war,  25,  26,  85,  92,  100 

Chinwangtao,  192,  220 

Choate,  Rufus,  147 

Christianity,    decrees    protecting,    41; 


Wang  Chao's  proposal,  52;  the  mis- 
sionary question,  72-75;  decrees  con- 
cerning missionaries,  101-103,  no  n, 

Chuchow,  156  and  n.,  158  and  n.,  190 

Chun,  Prince,  214 

Chunliangcheng,  220 

Cochin-China,  34 

Cockburn,  Henry,  estimate  of  Kang  Yu- 
wei,  59,  60 

Cologan,  M.,  on  beginning  trouble  in 
Peking,  83 ;  on  Kangsu  troops,  90-92 ; 
regarding  first  Legation  guards,  94, 95 

Confucius,  15,  66 

Conger,  E.  H.,  opinion  of  Tzu  Hsi's 
reception  to  wives  of  diplomats,  67; 
negotiations  with  Yamen  concerning 
Ichoufu  disturbances,  79  and  n.,  80; 
estimate  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  81;  on 
Boxer  outbreak  near  Peking,  97;  to 
Hay  on  policy  of  Court,  loi  n. ;  esti- 
mate of  Prince  Tuan,  116;  interview 
with  Yamen  Ministers,  117  and  n.; 
his  instructions  during  Rebellion,  1 26, 
127;  concerning  Seymour  expedition, 
133  n.;  on  renewal  of  punitive  expe- 
ditions, 155;  Satow  to  Conger,  162; 
on  Tientsin  aggressions,  164-166; 
regarding  a  U.  S.  concession  at  Tien- 
tsin, 168,  169  and  n.,  171  and  n.;  ar- 
rangement with  Satow,  171,  172; 
failure  to  obtain  concession,  172, 
173;  proposed  addition  to  French 
proposals,  190,  191 ;  indemnity  to 
Hague  tribunal,  192;  to  object  to 
"  irrevocable "  conditions  of  Joint 
Note,  197,  198 

Constantinople,  16,  30 

Coup  d''  Etat,  54-56 

Cushing,  Caleb,  negotiations  with  China, 
21  n.,  22  n.,  125 

Czikann,  M.,  210 

Dairen  (Dalny),  and  Cassini  Conven- 
tion, 27,  28;  leased  to  Russia,  30,  31, 
36 

Decrees,  for  protection  of  Christianity, 
41 ;  dismissing  Weng  Tung-ho,  43 
and  n.;  reform  decree  of  June  ii, 
1898,  44;  to  '*  Viceroys  and  Govern- 
ors of  the  Empire,"  46;  on  commerce, 
etc.,  47;  other  reform  decrees,  48, 
df<'\  decree  of  Sept.  5,  1898,49-51; 
denouncing  Kang  Yu-wei,  61; 
against  reforms,  63-65;  edict  of  Sept. 
25  concerning  Kuang  Hsu's  illness, 
68;  on  Shantung  disturbances,  loi- 


649J 


INDEX 


^2>7 


103;  criticism  of  decrees,  103,  104; 
edict  concerning  Italy,  France,  etc., 
104,  105;  edict  of  Nov.  21,  1899,  105, 
106;  distinction  between  "good  and 
bad"  societies,  108,  109;  concerning 
Boxers,  no,  1 1 1 ;  supporting  Boxers, 
112,  130  n.;  dynastic  succession,  115; 
on  bombardment  of  Taku  Forts,  129 
n.;  appointing  l.i  peace  commis- 
sioner, 145  and  n.,  150;  additional 
peace  commissioners,  153  n.;  edict 
of  Sept.  25,  for  punishment,  178,  i 


and  n.,  208;  decree  of  Nov.  13 
punisiimen?i'  199;  of  Feb.  13  and  21, 
1901,  200-202,  215,  220;  April  20 
and  Aug.  19,  202,  210,  220;  on  pub- 
lication of  punishment  decree,  209; 
Feb.  I,  1901,  prohibiting  membership 
in  Boxer  societies,  220;  May  29,  1901, 
on  indemnity,  216-219 

Delcasse,  Theophile,  defines  French 
policy,  127  n.,  128  n.;  on  appoint- 
ment of  Li,  146;  on  removal  of  Le- 
gation to  Tientsin,  158;  on  German 
proposal  for  punishment,  179  n.;  on 
French  proposals,  187 

Denby,  Charles,  as  to  Legation  guards 
in  1895,  92>  93  and  n.,  Tientsin  con- 
cession, 169  n.,  170  n 

Denmark,  192 

Detheve,  Dr.,  to  examine  Kuang  Hsu, 
69 

Embassies  to  China,  18;  sources  on,  19 
n. 

Europe,  first  contact  with  China,  16; 
renewed  intercourse,  18,  19;  policy 
after  Opium  war,  24;  at  period  of  Re- 
bellion, 75,  79;  erroneous  ideas  con- 
cerning China  before  Rebellion,  84, 
85,  107,  108;  condition  of  Legations 
after  siege,  136  n,;  replies  to  Kuang 
Hsu's  letters,  142-144;  agreement  as 
to  Shanghai,  158,  159  and  n.;  exten- 
sion of  settlements  at  Tientsin,  164- 
168;  ideas  as  to  indemnity,  202,  203 

■**  Fists  of  Righteous  Harmony  "  Society. 
See  Boxer  Rebellion 

Fleming,  murder  of,  82  and  n. 

Foochow,  21  n.,  82  and  n. 

Fowler,  Consul  (U.  S.)j  78,  79  n. 

France,  first  treaty  with  China,  21;  ex- 
pedition of  i860  to  Peking,  23; 
Tongking  war,  24;  demands  and 
leases  Kwangchouwan,  etc.,  34,  35; 


extension  of  settlement  at  Shanghai, 
35,  36;  agrees  to  Hay  Note  of  Sept., 
1899,  38;  aid  to  Catholic  clergy,  72 
and  n.;  second  Legation  guards,  99; 
Chinese  edict  denouncing  France, 
104,  105;  policy  in  China,  127  n., 
128  n.;  reply  to  letter  of  Kuang  Hsu, 
142  and  n.;  on  removal  of  Legation 
to  Tientsin,  148;  Tientsin  extension, 
165-167;  reply  to  German  proposals 
for  punishment,  179  and  n.,  181  and 
n.;  French  proposals,  1 83- 189;  re- 
viewed by  Diplomatic  Body,  189-193; 
additions  to,  193-196;  acceptance  of, 
203,  204 

Fukien,  34,  36 

Fung-Shui,  71 

Fu  Shang  )tinq  army  corps,  30  n. 

Gaselee,  Gen.,  156  n.,  161  and  n.,  163 

Germany,  seizure  and  lease  of  Kiaochau, 
28,  29,  29  n.;  agreement  with  Great 
Britain,  32  n.;  accepts  Hay  Note  of 
Sept.,  1899,  38;  punitive  expedition 
into  Shantung  province,  80 ;  first  Le- 
gation guards,  99;  pohcy  in  China, 
128  n.;  reply  to  Kuang  Hsu's  letter, 
142,  143;  Tientsin  extension,  165, 
167  n.;  proposal  for  punishment  of 
Boxer  officials,  1 75-183;  mission  of 
regret  and  monument  to  Ketteler  by 
China,  194,  208,  214;  opposition  to 
Hague  referendum,  197  and  n 

Giers,  M.  de,  opposed  to  attack  on  Taku 
Forts,  113;  Russian  Legation  at 
Tientsin,  148,  149;  objection  to  re- 
newal of  punitive  expeditions,  155; 
objection  to  M.  Raggi's  proposal,  195, 
196 

Gordon,  General,  23  n. 

Great  Britain,  Opium  war  with  China, 
19-22;  "  Arrow  "  war  and  expedition 
to  Peking  in  i860,  23;  leases  Wei- 
haiwei,  31,  32;  agreement  with  Ger- 
many regarding  Shantung.  32  n.; 
Hong  Kong  (Kowloon)  Extension, 
33;  Yangtse  Valley  pledge,  34;  op- 
position to  extension  of  French  settle- 
ment at  Shanghai,  35,  36;  accepts 
Hay  Note  of  Sept.,  1899,  38;  offers 
of  help  to  China  against  pirates  and 
Yellow  river  floods,  71  n.;  first  Lega- 
tion guards,  94,  95 ;  second  Legation 
guards,  99;  accepts  von  Waldersee, 
136  n.;  on  Li's  appointment  as  com- 
missioner, 146;   on  removal  of  Lega- 


238 


INDEX 


[650 


tion  to  Tientsin,  148,  149;  against 
renewal  of  punitive  expeditions,  156 
and  n.;  Chuchow  demands,  157  and 
11.,  158;  reply  to  German  proposal 
for  punishment,  179,  181 ;  on  French 
proposals,  187;  Satow's  proposal  for 
revision  of  commercial  treaties,  195 
and  n. 
Gresham,  Sec.  of  State,  as  to  Legation 
guards  in  1895,  92>  93  and  n. 

Hague  Court,  proposal  to  refer  indem- 
nity to,  185,  192,  197  and  n. 

Hainan,  34,  35 

Hamilton,  Lord,  161  n. 

Hankow,  49,  72  n.,  160,  197 

Hanlin  College,  45 

Hanneken,  von,  54  n. 

Hanotaux,  M.,  announces  acceptance  of 
French  demands  by  China,  35 

Hardinge,  Sir  Charles,  183 

Hart,  Sir  Robert,  provision  against 
opium  by,  33;  safe  conduct  to  Li,  151 

Hatzfeldt,  Count,  163 

Hay,  John,  Note  of  September,  1899, 
37~39;  to  Wu  Ting-fang  concerning 
American  forces  to  China,  123;  Cir- 
cular of  July  3,  126,  127;  on  question 
of  war  existing,  130  n;  on  Li's  pro- 
posed armistice,  146,  147;  policy  of, 
165;  failure  to  obtain  Tientsin  con- 
cession, 172,  173;  reply  to  French 
proposals,  186  and  n.,  187 

Henry  of  Prussia,  Prince,  interview  with 
Tzu  Hsi,  66 

Heyking,  Baron  von,  leases  Kiaochau, 
29 

Hill,  David  J.,  Act.-Sec,  reply  to  Ger- 
man proposal  for  punishment,  176, 
177 

Hochialou,  78 

Honan,  121 

Hong  Kong,  ceded  to  Great  Britain,  21 
n,;  Extension,  33  and  n. 

Hottinguer  and  Co.,  27  n. 

Hou  Chen  Yingy  camp  of  Prince  Tuan, 
98 

Hsi-an.     See  Sianfu 

Hsiku  Arsenal,  133  and  n. 

Hsu  Cheng-yu,  20  r,  215 

Hsu  Chingcheng,  99,  201,  215 

Hsu  Tung,  201,  215 

Hsu  Yung-yi,  99,  201,  215 

Huangtsun,  220 

Hunan,  119 

Hung  Sui-tsuen,  23 


Hupeh,  119 


Ichoufu,  disturbances  at,  77-78,   79  n. 

Imperial    (Forbidden)    City   (Peking), 

parade  of  Alhed  army  through,  173, 

Imperial  Maritime  Customs  (now  Chi- 
nese Maritime  Customs),  72  n.;  203, 
218 

Imperial  Palace,  173,  207 

India,  16,  161  n. 

Italy,  accepts  Hay  Note  of  Sept.,  1899, 
37,  38;  second  Legation  guards,  99; 
failure  to  obtain  lease,  104,  105;  ac- 
cepts von  Waldersee,  136  n.;  on 
removal  of  Legation  to  Tientsin,  149; 
extension  at  Tientsin,  167  n.;  accepts 
German  proposal  for  punishment, 
278,  r8i  and  n.;  accepts  French  pro- 
posals, 188;  Min.  Raggi's  proposals, 
193.  194 

Japan,  war  with  China,  25,  26;  agrees 
I  to  Hay  Note  of  Sept.,  1899,  38:  sec- 
]  ond  Legation  guards,  99;  policy  in 
China  during  Rebellion,  128  n.;  reply 
j  of  Aoki  to  Kuang  Hsu's  letter,  143; 
opposition  to  Li's  credentials,  150- 
152;  Tientsin  extension,  165,  167  n.; 
;  on  German  proposal  for  punishment, 
177,  181,  182;  "general  agreement'* 
with  French  proposals,  188  n.;  mis- 
sion of  regret  demanded  for  murder 
of  Sugiyama,  794;  against  Hague  re- 
ferendum, 197;  opposition  to  punish- 
ment ultimatum,  200 

Jardine,  Matheson  and  Co.,  82 

Jihchao,  German  expedition  to,  80 

Joint  Note,  196  and  n.,  197-199,  207- 
210,  222 

Joostens,  M.,  213 

Journal  de  Saint- Petersbourg,  149  n. 

Jung  Lu,  interview  with  Yuan  Shih- 
kai,  54,  55;  his  army,  98;  appointed 
Min.  Plen.,  153  n.;  Warren  concern- 
ing, 180  n. 

Kang  Hi,  40 

Kangsu  troops,  83,  84 ;  discussions  over, 
89-92 


Kansu,  201  and  n.;  215 

Yi,   121,  152,  180,  I 
201,  215 


Kang 


84  n.,  199, 


Kang  Yu-wei,  interview  with  Yamen 
and  Emperor,  43-47;  reform  decrees 
of,  44-55;  hostility  to  Tzu  Hsi,  54, 


651] 


INDEX 


239 


100;  failure  of  plot  against  Tzu  Hsi, 
criticism  of  Kang  and  reform,  56-51; 
estimate  of  by  Cockburn,  59,  60;  de- 
nounced by  Tzu  Hsi,  61,  62 

Kempff,  Admiral,  opposed  to  attack  on 
Taku  Forts,  113,  114,  129,  130, 186  n. 

Ketteler,  Baron  von,  murder  of,  125, 
126  n.,  136  n.,  187  n.,  194,  198,  203, 
207,  208,  214 

Khartoum,  85 

Kiangsi,  119 

Kiangsu,  79  n.,  119 

Kiaochau  (Tsingtao  ,  leased  to  Russia 
in  Cassini  Convention,  27;  seized  by 
Germany,  28;  and  leased,  29  and  n., 
36,76 

Kienning  riots,  82  and  n. 

Killie,  Faris  and  Chalfant,  report  of,  76- 
79,  79  n. 

Knobel,  F.  M.,  210,  213 

Kolnische  Zeitung,  on  lease  of  Weihai- 
wei  to  Great  Britain,  32  n. 

Komura,  Jutaro,  213 

Kowloon  (Hong  Kong)  Extension,  33 

Kuang  Hsu,  estimate  of,  40,  41;  decree 
protecting  Christianity,  51 ;  dismisses 
Weng  Tung-ho,  42;  appoints  Kang 
Yu-wei  adviser,  43;  reform  decrees 
of,  44-55;  abolishes  six  Government 
Boards,  52  and  n.;  action  on  memor- 
ial of  Wang  Chao,  53  and  n.;  plan 
to  seize  Tzu  Hsi,  54;  failure  of  plot, 
55;  decree  of  Sept.  21,  1898,  56; 
illness  of,  67-69;  arrangement  for 
succession,  114-116;  letter  to  McKin- 
ley,  139,  140;  letters  to  Europe,  142- 
144;  second  letter  to  McKinley  and 
reply,  144  n. 

Kulturkampf,  75 

Kwangcbouwan,  leased  to  France,  34, 
35;  seizure  denounced,  104 

Kwangsi,  34,  35,  82  and  n.,  119 

Kwantung,  34,  35>  "9 

Lamsdorff,  Count,  on  state  of  war  in 
China,  131,  132  and  n.;  against  re- 
newal of  punitive  expeditions,  156; 
on  German  proposal  for  punishment, 
178;  opinion  on  China's  power  to 
punish,  182,  183 

Lanchou,  220 

Lanfang,  133,  220 

Lansdowne,  Marquis  of,  against  renewal 
of  punitive  expeditions,  150,  160, 
163,  164;  to  Satow,  197 

Lascelles,  Sir  F.,  181 


Legation  guards,  Sec.  Gresham  concern- 
ing, 92,  93;  first  guards,  93-96;  sec- 
ond guards,  97-100;  permanent 
guards  proposed  by  France,  184; 
discussion  of  by  Diplomatic  Body, 
J92;   permanent  guards,  219,  222 

Liao  Shou-heng,  99 

Lien  Yuan,  99,  201,  215 

Li  Hung-chang,  criticism  of  by  Mac- 
Donald,  53  n.;  opposition  to  Kuang 
Hsu,  59;  enmity  to  Chang  In-huan, 
62,  63;  to  aid  against  Yellow  river 
floods,  71  n.;  appointed  peace  com- 
missioner, 145  and  n.,  146,175;  his 
proposed  armistice,  146;  reply  of  Hay 
to,  147;  message  to  Sir  Chihchen 
Lofenglu,  147,  148;  failure  of  armis- 
tice, 148;  on  removal  of  Legations 
to  Tientsin,  148,  149;  dispute  over 
his  powers  to  negotiate,  150-154; 
journey  to  Peking,  150,  151;  objects 
to  renewal  of  punitive  expeditions, 
155;  opposition  to  United  States  con- 
cession at  Tientsin,  172,  173;  objec- 
tion to  part  of  Joint  Note,  197,  198; 
objection  to  extreme  punishments, 
200;  reply  to  Joint  Note,  211,  212 

Likin,  71,  72,  45 

Lin  (Commissioner  Lin),  21  n. 

Li  Ping-heng,  184  n..  201,  215 

Li  Shan,  201,  215 

Literati,  discredited  by  reform,  48,  57; 
affiliation  with  Boxers,  108 

Liu  Kun-yi,  118,  120-122 

Liu  Shu-tang,  157 

Li  Ying,  77 

Lofa  Station,  133 

Lofenglu,  Sir  Chihchen,  opinion  as  to 
Legation  guards,  93;  memorandum 
to  British  Foreign  Office,  121;  re- 
ceives Li's  proposed  armistice,  147; 
message  from  Yangtse  Viceroys,  160 

Lo  Jung-kwang,  129  n. 

London,  2)%  121,  123,  126,  147,  160, 
180  n. 

London  Times  on  German  seizure  of 
Kiaochau,  29  n. 

Louis  XVI,  40 

Lukouchiao,  89 

Lutai,  220 

McCalla,  Capt.,  132  n.,  133  n. 

McKinley,  President,  policy  during  Re- 
bellion, 127;  letter  of  Emperor  to, 
139,  140;  reply,  140,  14I;  second 
letter  and  reply,  144  n. 


240 


INDEX 


[652 


MacDonald,  Sir  Claude,  estimate  of 
Weng  Tung-ho,  42 :  criticism  of  reform 
decree  of  June  ii,  189S,  44;  on  de- 
cree reforming  Government  examina- 
tions, 48  n.;  criticism  of  Li  Hung 
chang,  53  n,;  criticism  of  reform 
movement,  58  n.:  efforts  in  behalf  of 
Chang  In-huan,  62,  63;  advice  con- 
cerning Emperor's  illness,  68,  69: 
on  first  disturbances  in  Peking,  83, 
84;  protests  against  presence  of 
Kangsu  troops,  89,  90;  interview 
with  Ching,  94;  opinion  as  to  Lega- 
tion guards,  95;  interview  with 
Yamen,  98,  99;  term  for  Boxers,  113 
n.;  his  instructions,  114;  observa- 
tions on  von  Ketteler's  murder,  130 
n.;  on  Li's  appointment,  146,  152, 
153;  opposed  to  removal  of  Legation 
to  Tientsin,  148;  on  occupation  of 
Summer  Palace,  174,  175;  regarding 
Prince  luan  et  al.,  179;  on  edict  of 
Sept.  25,  180  n.;  calls  meeting  for 
French  proposals,  189;  on  Boxer 
leaders,  190  n.j  succeeded  by  Satow, 
190  n.,  193  n.;  regarding  indemnity 
claims,  191  and  n.,  192 

MacDonald,  Lady,  address  at  reception 
of  Tzu  Hsi,  66 

Manchu  "  Banners,"  46,  48 

Manchuria,  Russian  policy  in,  128  n.; 
Prince  Tuan  in,  201  n. 

Manchus,  policy  of,  17,  18;  after  Tai- 
ping  Rebellion,  24,  25;  their  war  with 
Japan,  25,  26;  permission  to  settle  in 
provinces,  49 

Mansfield,  Consul  (Br.),  on  piracy,  70 
n.,  71  n. 

Marco  Polo,  16 

Ming  dynasty,  17,  45 

Missionaries,  discussion  of,  72-75;  de- 
crees for  protection  of,  41,  101-103 

Monson,  Sir  E.,  187  n. 

Moukden,  199  j 

Mumm   von    Schwarzenstein,  A.,    194,  j 
210,  213  j 

Mu  Tsung  Yi.     See  Tung  Chih 

Nanking,  21  n.,  120,  121,  122,  153  n.,  ; 

159,  160,  197;  treaty  of  and  compari-  I 

son  with  treaty  of  Wang-hia,  21  n.      , 

Napier  embassy,  20  n.  j 

Na  Tung,  116,  216  I 

Netherlands,  first  arrival  of  Dutch  in 

China,  18;    mission   of  1656,  19;   at 

Deshima  "  factory,"  19  n.  j 


Nestorian  Tablet,  16 

Ngantungwei,  77 

Nicholas  II,  136  11. 

Ningpo,  21  n. 

Nissi,  T.,  210 

Norddeutsche  Zeitung,  on  lease  of  Wei- 

haiwei  to  Great  Britain,  32 
Norman,  murder  of,  83  and  n. 
North  China  Herald,  28 
Novoe  Vremya,  regarding  lease  of  Port 

Arthur,  31  and  n. 

Official  Gazette  {V^MS&vx), reply  to  Kuang 
Hsu's  letter  in,  143 

Opium,  provision  against,  33;  contra- 
band trade  in,  72 

Opium  war,  19-22 

Ost  Asiatisches  Lloyd,  84,  85 

"  Palace  revolution,"  term  for  Coup  d^ 
Etat,  60 

Paotingfu,  outbreaks  at,  82  and  n.; 
Boxers  at,  97,  112;  punitive  expedi- 
tion to,  155,  156,  190 

Paris,  38,  123,  126,  127  n.,  155  n. 

Pauncefote,  Lord,  130  n. 

Peace  Protocol  of  September  7,  1901, 
173,  195  n.,  200  n.,  201,204,  213-222 

Pechihli.     See  Chihli 

Peiho,  167,  219,  220 

Peitang  (Catholic  Cathedral),  136  n. 

Peking,  16,  23,  25,  29  and  n.,  32,  44, 
54,  55»  59,  62,  64,  65,  68,  77,  81,  2>z, 
85,  89,  90,  92,  93,  94,  96,  97,  98,  99, 
100,  104,  107,  no,  III,  112,  113, 
114,  117,  118,  120,  124  n.,  125,  126, 
127,  129,  130, 131, 132,  133,  135, 136, 
141,  143,  »44  and  n.,  145  n.,  146, 147, 
148,  149,  150,  151, 152,  153,  155, 162, 
164,  165,  173,  174,  176,  177, 179, 181, 
182,  184,  185,  186,  187,  188  n.,  189, 
192,  193,  197,  198,  200,  203,  204,  207, 
208,  209,  210,  21 1,  212,  214,  216,  218, 
219,  222 

Peking  Gazette,  59 

Peking-Hankow  Railway,  49 

Peking  University,  establishment  of,  45 ; 
aids  to,  48;  allowed  by  Tzu  Hsi  to 
continue,  65 

Peter  the  Great,  40 

Petrograd.     See  St.  Petersburg 

Persia,  16 

Peytang,  136,  192 

Pichon,  M.,in  favor  of  renewal  of  puni- 
tive expeditions,  162,  163 


653] 


INDEX 


241 


Piracy,  prevalence  of  before  Rebellion, 
70  and  n.,  71  n. 

Port  Arthur,  Russian  assurances  con- 
cerning, 29;  demands,  30;  and  leases, 
31,  36 

Porter,  Horace,  127  n. 

Portugal,  18,  119 

Prohibition  of  import  of  arms,  proposed 
by  France,  184  and  n.;  Aoki  on,  188 
and  n.,  191 ;  in  Joint  Note,  198,  199 
and  n.,  209;  in  Peace  Protocol,  216 

Prohibition  of  membership  in  Boxer 
Societies,  193,  220 

Protestants  in  China,  73,  74.  See  Mis- 
sionaries 

Pu  Chun,  Heir  Apparent,  115  and  n. 

Pu  Hsing,  116 

Punishment  of  Boxer  officials,  German 
proposal  for,  175  et  seq.,  decree  of 
Sept.  25,  180  and  n.,  i8i;  reception 
of  German  proposals  by  Powers,  182, 
183;  in  French  proposals,  \Z\etseq,\ 
ideas  of  Diplomatic  Body  concerning, 
189-191;  final  discussion  of,  11,7, 
198;  decree  of  Nov.  13,  199,  200 ; 
final  compromise,  200  and  n.,  201  and 
n.,  202  and  n.,  214,  215,  220 

Punitive  expenditions,  to  Paotingfu  and 
Chengtingfu,  155,  156;  opposition  to 
renewal  of,  156;  Shansi,  160;  Con- 
ger's attitude,  161,  162;  other  diplo- 
mats, 162-164 

Raggi,  M.  Salvago,  proposals  of,  193, 
194 

Ragsdale,  Consul  (U.  S.),  135  n.,  165, 
168,  169  and  n.,  170  n.,  171  n. 

Reception  to  wives  of  diplomats,  66, 
67;  second  reception,  67  n. 

Reed  treaty  of  1858,  126 

Reform  Gazette,  61 

Reform  movement,  1898,  reform  de- 
crees, 44,  46-51;  criticism  of,  56-60, 
overthrow  of,  63-66;  popular  inter- 
pretation in  China  of  overthrow,  69, 
70 

Rites,  Board  of,  interview  of  dismissed 
officials  with  Tzu  Hsi,  52,  54 

Rites,  question  of,  72  and  n. 

Robinson,  murder  of,  82,  83  n 

Rockhill,  W.  W.,  202  and  n.,  213 

Rome,  38,  126,  155  n. 

Russia,  missions  of  i68q  and  after,  19; 
character  of  Russo-Japanese  war  25, 
26;  loan  to  China,  27;  Russo-Chinese 
Bank,   27;   Cassini  Convention,    27, 


28;  demands  and  leases  Port  Arthur 
and  Dalny,  29-31;  opposition  to 
British  demand  for  Weihaiwei,  32; 
reply  to  Hay  Note  of  Sept.,  1899,  38; 
first  Legation  guards,  94,  95 ;  second 
Legation  guards,  9);  policy  in  Man- 
churia, 128  n.;  reply  to  Kuang  Hsu's 
letter,  143,  144;  on  removal  of  Lega- 
tion to  Tientsin,  148,  149;  on  renewal 
of  punitive  expeditions,  163;  exten- 
sion at  Tientsin,  165,  166;  policy  of, 
167,  187  n.;  on  German  proposal  for 
punishment,  178,  183;  version  of 
French  proposals,  184  n.;  views  of 
French  proposals,  185,  187,  188;  pro- 
poses indemnity  to  Hague,  192; 
opposition  to  punishment  ultimatum, 
200. 

Russo-Chinese  Bank,  27  and  n. 

Russo-Japanese  war,  25,  26,  205. 

St.  Petersburg  (Petrograd),  29,  38,  123, 
126,  132,  155  n.,  178,  187  n. 

Salisbury,  Marquis  of,  opinion  of  Rus- 
sian demand  for  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny,  30;  regarding  Yangtse  Vice- 
roys, 122;  on  question  of  state  of 
war,  131 ;  reply  to  Kuang  Hsu's  letter, 
142;  on  Li's  proposed  armistice,  147; 
on  proposal  to  remove  Legation  to 
Tientsin,  148;  regarding  Li's  creden- 
tials, 153;  on  punishment  of  Chinese 
officials,  179,  181;  on  edict  of  Sept. 
25,  1900, 180  n.;  on  French  proposals, 
187 

Sanmen  Bay,  refused  to  Italy,  104 

Satow,  Sir  Ernest,  on  Chuchow  disturb- 
ances, 157;  to  Conger,  162;  Tien- 
tsin arrangement  with  Conger,  171, 
172;  succeeds  MacDonald,  190  n,, 
193  ^'y  proposals  for  garrison  at 
Tientsin,  193,  194;  opposition  to  re- 
ligious clause,  193,  194;  proposes 
revision  of  commercial  treaties,  195 
and  n. 

Scott,  Sir  C,  132  and  n. 

Seljuk  Turks,  17 

Seymour,  Admiral,  opinion  on  means 
for  eradicating  piracy,  71  n.;  arrives 
with  fleet  at  Taku,  113,  114;  expedi- 
tion of,  129,  132-135;  supports 
Yangtse  Viceroys,  158,  159  n. 

Shanhaikwan,  192,  193,  200,  220 

Shanghai,  60  n.,  61,  145  n.,  146,  147, 
149,  150,  156,  158,  159,  180  n.,  217: 
one  of  first  open  ports,  21  n.;  French 


242 


INDEX 


[654 


settlement  at  35,  36  and  n.;  situation 
during  Rebellion,  118,  119 
Shansi,  121,  160,  163,  190  n.,  200,  201, 

215 

Shantung,  German  lease  and  concessions 
in,  29;  first  disturbances  in,  76-79, 
79  n.,  80  n.;  German  punitive  expe- 
dition in,  80;  Yuan  Shih-kai  Gov- 
ernor, 81,  81;  decrees  concerning 
disturbances  in,  101-103;  position  of 
Yuan  Shih-kai  in,  120 

Shashih,  riot  at,  82  and  n. 

Sheng  Tzu  Ying  zxvfxy  corps,  130  n. 

Shansi,  164 

Shimonoseki,  145 

Shirinsky,  Lieut.-Col.,  134 

Sianfu  (Hsi-an),  150,  157,  164,  180 

Smithfield,  75 

Spain,  first  arrivals  of  Spaniards  in 
China,  18,  19 

"  Spheres  of  influence  ",  36 

Sugiyama,  Mr.,  Japanese  Chancellor, 
murder  of,  125,  194,  203,  207,  208, 
215,  216 

Summer  Palace,  burned  in  i860,  23; 
occupied  by  Allies,  174,  175 

Sung  dynasty,  45 

Suspension  of  official  examinations,  189, 

208,  215 
Sweden,  192 
Switzerland,  192 

Szechwan,  anti-Christian  riot  in,  82 
and  n. 

Taiping  Rebellion,  23  and  n.;  overcome 
by  monarchy,  24,  70 

Tai  Shou-li,  Brig.-Gen.,  78 

Taiyuanfu,  190  n. 

Taku,  113,  114,  120,  123,  124,  128, 
129  n.,  130,  131,  135  n.,  184  and  n., 
186  n.,  192 

Taku  Forts,  bombardment  and  capture 
of,  1 28-1 3 1,  140;  dismantlement  of 
proposed  by  France,  184  and  n.,  186 
and  n.;  discussion  of  by  Diplomatic 
Body,   192;    to  be   razed,  203,  204, 

209,  219 

Talienwan,  (Dalny  or  Dairen).  See 
Dairen. 

Tan,  Viceroy,  70  n. 

Tangku,  220 

Tangshan,  220 

Tientsin,  54,  94,  95,  97,  100,  112,  118, 
123  n.,  124,  132,  133  n.,  134,  135, 
146,  148,  150,  151,  159,  164-173, 
182  n.,  184  and  n.,  186, 189, 192,  193, 
195,  220 


Ting  Cheng,  77 

Tokyo,  38.  123,  152,  188  n. 

Tongking,  24,  34,  35,  36 

Triple  Alliance,  104,  178,  200 

Tsai  Hsun,  Prince  Chuang,  199,  201, 
214,  215 

Tsai  Lan,  Duke  Fu-kuo,  201,  214 

Tsai  Lien,  199 

Tsai  Yin,  Secondary  Prince,  199 

Tsinan,  145 

Tsingtao.     See  Kiaochau 

Tsung-li  Yamen,  leases  Kiaochau  to 
Germany,  29;  Port  Arthur  and  Dairen 
to  Russia,  31;  Weihaiwei  to  Great 
Britain,  31,  32;  grants  French  de- 
mands, 34,  35;  interview  with  Kang 
Yu-wei,  43;  with  Wang  Chao,  52, 
53;  concerning  reports  of  Kuang 
Hsu's  illness,  68;  negotiations  over 
Ichoufu  disturbances,  79  and  n., 
80  n.;  question  of  Kangsu  troops, 
89-92;  notes  concerning  first  Lega- 
tion guards,  93-95;  letter  from  Dip- 
lomatic Body  for  second  Legation 
guards,  97,  98;  interview  for  guards, 
98-100;  interview  with  Conger,  117; 
proposed  abolition  of,  193;  trans- 
formed into  Waiwupu  (now  Wai- 
cbiaopu),  204,  210,  221 

Tuan,  Tsai-I,  Prince,  army  of,  98;  in 
power  at  Court,  loi,  iii;  son 
appointed  Heir  Apparent,  115  and 
n.;  estimate  of  by  Conger,  116; 
opposition  to  Liu  Kun-yi,  121;  edict, 
123  n.;  opposition  of  Aoki  to,  152; 
denounced  in  edict  of  Sept.  25,  179, 
180  n.,  and  in  edict  of  Nov.  13,  199, 
200;  punishment  of,  201  and  n,,  2x4 

Tung,  General,  152 

Tung  Chih,  40,  115 

Tungchow,  148 

Tung  Fu-hsiang,  180  n.,  182,  184  n., 
190  and  n.,  199,  200,  201  and  n.,  215 

Turkestan,  63,  201  and  n.,  214 

"Two  Kwangs "  (Kwangtung  and 
Kwangsi  provinces),  119 

Tyler,  President,  report  on  Far  East,  21 
n.;  letter  to  Emperor,  2i  n.,  22  n 

Tzu  Hsi,  Empress  Dowager,  hostility  to 
Kang  Yu-wei,  51,  52,  loo;  interview 
with  officials  of  Board  of  Rites.  53, 
54;  overthrows  Emperor,  55;  decree 
denouncing  Kang  Yu-wei,  61,  62; 
measures  against  reform,  63-66;  re- 
ception to  wives  of  diplomats,  66,  67; 
resentment  over  warniug  from  Mac- 
Donald  as  to  Kuang  Hsu,  69;  esti- 


655J 


INDEX 


mate  of  policy  at  outbreak  of  Rebel- 
lion,  ICO,  loi;  appoints  Heir 
Apparent,  114-116;  opposed  to 
extreme  punishments,  200 

United  States,  treaty  of  Wang-hia,  21 
and  n.,  22;  interested  in  Amoy,  34 
n.;  opposition  to  French  extension 
at  Shanghai,  35,  36;  opposition  to 
European  aggressions,  37;  Hay  Note 
of  Sept.,  1899,  37  39;  fifst  Legation 
guards,  95;  second  guards,  99;  atti- 
tude concerning  bombardment  of 
Taku  Forts,  113,  114;  policy  during 
Rebellion,  125,  126;  Hay  Circular  of 
July  3,  126,  1 27;  McKinley  to  Kuang 
Hsu,  140,  141,  144  n.;  on  Li's  ap- 
pointment, 146;  on  removal  of  Lega- 
tion to  Tientsin,  148,  149;  opposed 
to  renewal  of  punitive  expeditions, 
156;  regarding  Tientsin  extensions, 
164-170;  on  German  proposal  for 
punishment,  176,  177,  182,  183; 
reply  to  French  proposals,  185-187; 
proposes  indemnity  claims  to  Hague, 
192;  withdraws  proposal  for  Hague 
referendum,  197  and  n.;  opposition 
to  punishment  ultimatum,  200 ;  ideas 
as  to  indemnity,  202  and  n. 

Valdez,  J.  M.  T.,  119 
Vienna,  126,  155  n. 

Waldersee,  Count  von,  appointment  of, 
136  and  n.;  expedition  to  Paotingfu 
and  Chengtingfu,  155,  156;  army  or- 
der of,  161  n.;  on  renewal  of  punitive 
expeditions,  161,  162,  163,  164 

Wang  Chao,  activities  of,  52,  53  and  n. 

Wang  Chih-chun,  120 

Wang-hia,  treaty  of  and  comparison 
with  treaty  of  Nanking,  21  n. 

Ward,  General.  23  n. 

Warren,  Act.  Consul-Gen.  (Br.),  on 
Chuchow  disturbances,  157,  159  n.; 
on  edict  of  Sept.  25,  180  n. 

Washington,  96,  123,  126,  145  n.,  155 
n.,  175,  184  n.,  186,  202 

Webster,  Daniel,  report  on  Far  East, 
21  n.;  instructions  to  Gushing,  21  n., 
125 

Weihaiwei,  leased  to  Great  Britain,  31, 
32;  British  declaration  to  Germany 
concerning,  32  n.:  attitude  of  Russia 
concerning,  32,  33 


Weng  Tung-ho,  estimate   of,  42,  43; 

dismissed,  43,  47 
Whangpu,  219,  220,  221 
Whitehead,     Mr.,     conversation     with 

Aoki,  188  n. 
Winter  Palace,  174 
Witte,  M.,  27  n. 
Wollant,  M.  de,  184 
Wolseley,  Lord,  85 
Woosung,  122 

Wuchang,  153  n.,  159,  180  n. 
Wu  Cheng,  no 
Wu  Ting-fang,  Hay  to  Wu  concerning 

American  forces  to  China,    123;   in 

connection  with  Kuang  Hsu's  letter, 

140,  144 
Wu  Wei  Kutty  army  of  Jung  Lu,  98 

Yangtse  Valley,  British  pledge  over,  34, 
36 

Yangtse  Viceroys,  orders  to,  1 12;  pledge 
of,  123  and  n.;  results  of  attitude, 
124,  125;  appointed  peace  negoti- 
ators, 153  n.;  defense  of  Yuan  Shih- 
kai,  159;  on  Shansi  punitive  expedi- 
tion, 160;  opposed  to  extreme  pun- 
ishments, 197 

Yangtsung,  126,  220 

Yellow  river  (Hoangho)  71  and  n. 

Yi,  Prince,  199 

Ying  Nien,  199,  201,  213,  214 

Yuan  Chang,  99,  201,  215 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  opinion  of  reform  move- 
ment of  1898,  54,  55;  interview  with 
Jung  Lu,  55  and  n.;  Governor  of 
Shantung,  81,  82,  96;  hampered  by 
Court,  103,  104;  conduct  during  Re- 
bellion, 120;  ability  of,  145,  146; 
defended  by  Yangtse  Viceroys,  159, 
160 

Yu  Hsien,  removed  as  Governor  of 
Shantung,  81 ;  Governor  of  Shansi, 
81,  160;  omitted  in  edict  of  Sep- 
tember 25,  180  n.;  denounced  by 
Diplomatic  Body,  182,  and  Russia, 
184  n.,  190  and  n.;  in  decree  of  No- 
vember 13,  199,  200  n.;  final  punish- 
ment of,  201,  215 

Yu  Lien-san,  120 

Yu  Lien-yuen,  123,  145 

Yu  Lu,  no 

Yunnan,  non-alienation  of  demanded 
by  France,  34,  35 

Yunnanfu,  34,  35;  trouble  in,  82  and  n. 


VITA 


The  author  was  born  at  Davenport,  Iowa,  1884.  For 
his  undergraduate  studies  he  attended  Leland  Stanford 
University,  the  University  of  Cahfornia,  and  Indiana  Uni- 
versity; A.B.,  Indiana,  191 1.  Graduate  work:  Indiana 
University,  A.M.,  1912;  Harrison  Fellow  in  Political  Sci- 
ence, University  of  Pennsylvania,  1912-1913;  University 
Fellow  in  International  Law,  Columbia  University,  191 3- 
19 14.  At  Columbia  University,  in  the  Faculty  of  Political 
Science,  he  studied  under  Professors  John  Bassett  Moore, 
Ellery  C.  Stowell,  Munroe  Smith,  and  James  Harvey  Robin- 
son. He  attended  the  International  Law  Seminars  of  Pro- 
fessors Moore  and  Stowell.  His  investigations  in  Far 
Eastern  history,  politics  and  economics  were  directed  by 
Professor  Friedrich  Hirth  of  the  Department  of  Chinese. 
Contributor  of  articles  on  the  Far  East  to  The  New  In- 
ternational EncydopcFdia,  24  vols.,  2d  ed.  (New  York, 
1914 — ).  Lecturer  on  "The  Politics  and  Diplomacy  of 
China  and  the  Powers  since  1840  "  at  Columbia  University^ 
Department  of  Extension,  1915-1916. 

245 


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